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The thesis addresses the question: how have international human rights norms for 
protecting women and girls from harmful practices influenced and shaped the 
emergence and conceptualisation of community bylaws for addressing child marriage 
and other harmful practices affecting women in rural Malawi? 
 ‗Community bylaws‘ is a label for Chief-led community ‗rules‘ aimed at 
combating harmful practices, which mostly affect women and girls. This 
thesis contributes to the theoretical discourse on norm diffusion by critically 
assessing and appraising the way in which scholars have conceptualised how 
international human rights norms are internalised, and, particularly, how 
vernacularisation operates, through a case study of the community bylaws. 
Drawing from qualitative empirical data following a study conducted in four 
districts covering the three regions of Malawi, the study focused on the 
territories of four Senior Chiefs. Data was gathered through semi-structured 
interviews with Senior Chiefs and government officials, NGOs, and donors; 
and through focus group discussions with Group Village Heads, Village 
Heads, groups that formulated or monitor the implementation of community 
bylaws, and women living under these bylaws.  
The thesis shows that while scholars have sought to explain how international 
human rights norms are appropriated in local communities using the concept 
of vernacularisation, existing conceptualisations do not adequately represent 
what is happening with the community bylaws phenomenon. 
Vernacularisation is a unicameral concept that sees human rights ideas and 
programmes as being purposefully introduced in local communities by 
epistemic outsiders. Based on empirical data, this thesis argues that the 
concept of ‗horizontal vernacularisation‘ better describes the processes 
occurring in respect of community bylaws in Malawi. This concept has regard 




vernacularisation, whether knowingly or not. Thus, horizontal 
vernacularisation acknowledges that human rights appropriation and 
translation through community bylaws unfolds within a predominantly local-
local dialogue, and is not usually structured, since the bylaws sprout in a 
continuum of intuitive, interlocking, convoluted, and iterative processes.  
As such, this thesis contributes to a deeper understanding of community 
bylaws in rural and cultural settings, and their role in reconceptualising the 
internalisation of international human rights norms for protecting women 
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GLOSSARY OF CHICHEWA TERMS 
Amai a chinsinsi Secret mothers 
Anankungwi Initiation counselors 
Bulangete l mfumu ‗Chief‘s blanket‘ — a way of making a male visiting Chief feel 
welcome and respected by giving him a young woman to 
sleep while away from home. 
Chiharo or chokolo Wife inheritance/levirate marriage. 
Chimwanamayo/ 
chimwanamaye 
Wife swapping, also known as ‗swinging‘— two couples that 
are very good family friends agree that the men can have sex 
with each other‘s wife whenever the men feel like it. 
Chinamwali Initiation ceremonies. 
Chindapusa ‗ A fine‘ is generally seen as the best English approximation of 
this term. However, this word connotes more than the Enlgish 
transaltion suggests. The word‘s literal translation connotes 
someone who is being humbled to make the payment as an 
acceptance that he/she acted ‗stupidly.‘ Chindapusa is usually 
payable in the form of goats and chickens, and sometimes 
their monetary equivalents.  
Chiramu  Having sex with a sister-in-law. 
Chitayo Chitayo (losing‘) demands that if a pregnant woman 
miscarries, a hired man should sexually cleanse her by having 
unprotected sex with her. 
Fisi  Fisi means hyena, connoting a mystery man who comes under 
the cover of darkness. On the one hand, the fisi entails hiring a 
man to impregnate a wife whose husband is impotent to 
enable the family to have children. On the other hand, a fisi is 
hired when a widow has prospects of remarrying. The fisi is 
identified by her clan elders to have sex with her to cleanse 
her womb, since it is assumed that she may not have had sex 
for a long time. 






Gwamula A practice whereby young men storm into a girls‘ hut at 
night, and (forcibly) grab a girl each, have sexual intercourse 
and run away.  
Hlazi or mbiligha Bonus wife. 
Kuchotsa fumbi or 
 kusasa fumbi 
Coerced experimental sex for initiated girls. 
Kulowa bzyade or  
kuika mwana ku malo  
 
A mother of a three to six months-old baby is required to have 
ritual unprotected sexual intercourse in order to ‗strengthen‘ 
the child to grow healthily. If the mother is married, the ritual 
is performed with her husband. If unmarried, a hired man is 
used. 
Kujura nthowa ‗To open the way‘—having sex with a virgin. 
Kulowa or kupita kufa This practice symbolises ‘removing death‘, and demands that 
the spouse of a deceased person (in most societies the widow, 
but in some societies the widower too) should have 
unprotected sex with a hired ‗cleanser‘ to chase away evil 
spirits that caused the death. 
Kulowa ngalawa The owner of a new boat (ngalawa) is required to have sex 
with a woman—whether his wife or not— to protect the boat 
from evil spirits that could make it capsize. 
Kupimbira  
or kupawila 
Whereby a girl is given as a wife to a creditor as payment for 
a debt. 
Kupita moto  
 
Kupita moto (‘removing fire‘) is practiced when people are 
firing bricks, or when a house catches fire. During the firing of 
bricks, the one who lit the kiln fire is sexually cleansed so that 
the bricks should burn well, and that he should not swell up 
and die. When a house catches fire, a woman in the family is 
sexually cleansed to avoid similar accidents in future.  
Kupita ngozi Sexual cleansing that is done to chase evil spirits in any other 
accident. 
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UNMASKING COMMUNITY BYLAWS 
 
1.1 THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND RATIONALE 
This thesis explores the question: how have international human rights norms 
for protecting women and girls from harmful practices influenced and shaped 
the emergence and conceptualisation of community bylaws for addressing 
child marriage and other harmful practices affecting women in rural Malawi? 
For clarity, the thesis is neither examining the effectiveness of community 
bylaws, nor the challenges of codifying customary law.  
This thesis is important on two related grounds. First, it contributes to a 
deeper understanding of community bylaws in rural and cultural settings, 
and their role in reconceptualising the internalisation of international human 
rights norms for protecting women and girls from harmful practices. 
Secondly, the potential of rural and other resource-constrained communities 
to protect women and girls from harmful practices, including child marriage, 
through the use of bylaws can best be appreciated through a nuanced 
understanding of what the phenomenon of community bylaws practically 
means in those communities.  
The thesis‘ preoccupation with community bylaws is inspired by the 
challenge of harmful practices, including child marriage, that Malawi faces. 
Generally, harmful (traditional) practices obstruct women‘s development 
potential and are ‗probably the most severe menace to women‘s rights‘ in 
Africa. 1  Since appearing on the international agenda in 1958, 2  harmful 
                                               
1 Kenneth Omeje, ‗Sexual Exploitation of Cult Women: The Challenges of Problematising 
Harmful Traditional Practices from a Doctrinalist Approach,‘ Social & Legal Studies (10)1 




traditional practices (as a category of coercive practices that constitute human 
rights abuses, are discriminatory and traditionally anchored3) have become a 
growing global policy concern.4 They are considered discriminatory and a 
form of violence against women (VAW).5  
In Malawi, harmful practices contribute to poor development indicators for 
women and girls. 6  Child marriage is, particularly, a key development 
challenge because domestic statistics show that 47 percent of girls get married 
before their 18th birthday.7 The 2019 State of the World‘s Children Report 
projects that between 2012 and 2018, 42 percent of girls in Malawi were 
married before their 18th birthday, which is the 11th and 10th highest rate of 
child marriage globally and in Africa, respectively.8 Meanwhile, Malawi is 
gaining a global reputation as a model country that is utilising traditional 
leadership and community bylaws to address child marriage and other 
                                                                                                                                      
2 Back then, the focus was on harmful practices affecting the health of girls and women—Jane  
Cottingham and Eszter Kismodi, ‗Protecting Girls and Women from Harmful Practices 
Affecting Their Health: Are We Making Progress?,‘ International Journal of Gynecology & 
Obstetrics (106)2 (2009), 128-131 128. 
3 See section 4.3.1.2 of the thesis. 
4 Judith-Ann Walker, ‗Early Marriage in Africa–Trends, Harmful Effects and Interventions,‘ 
African Journal of Reproductive Health (16)2 (2012), 231-240 237; Bronwyyn Winter, Denise 
Thompson, and Sheila  Jeffreys, ‗The UN Approach to Harmful Practices: Some Conceptual 
Problems,‘ International Feminist Journal of Politics (4)1 (2002), 72 . 
5 Newman Wadesango, Symphorosa Rembe, and Owence Chabaya, ‗Violation of Women‘s 
Rights by Harmful Traditional Practices,‘ The Anthropologist (13)2 (2012), 121-129 121; Kenneth 
Omeje, ‗Sexual Exploitation of Cult Women: The Challenges of Problematising Harmful 
Traditional Practices from a Doctrinalist Approach,‘ (2001), 46. 
6 The opportunity and financial costs of child marriage on good governance, population and 
demography, health and nutrition, education, labour force participation, earnings, public and 
private social spending, household growth potential are huge. At 137 births per 1,000 girls, 
Malawi‘s adolescent birth rate is the 3rd highest in the SADC region. Survival rates for Std 8 
for both girls and boys are poor, though girls are faring the worst at 28 percent compared to 
35 percent for boys. The HIV prevalence for adult women is 10.8 percent, and 6.4 percent for 
adult men—Government of Malawi, Malawi Growth and Development Strategy II Review and 
Country Situation Analysis Report (2016), xvii & 39;  National Statistical Office (NSO) Malawi 
and ICF, Malawi Demographic and Health Survey 2015-16 (Zomba, Malawi and Rockville, 
Maryland, USA: NSO and ICF, 2017), 229. 
7 National Statistical Office (NSO) Malawi and ICF, Malawi Demographic and Health Survey 
2015-16, ibid, 57. 
8 UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children 2019: Children, Food and Nutrition (2019), 223-235. 





harmful practices. 9 Addressing these practices is an imperative under the 
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).10 Particularly, SDG 5 
(to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls) firmly targets 
the elimination of ‗all harmful practices such as child, early and forced 
marriage and female genital mutilation by 2030‘.11 
1.2 OBJECTIVES AND RELEVANCE OF THE THESIS 
In view of the above, the thesis has the following four objectives: 
1. To explain the factors influencing the emergence and use of community 
bylaws to ensure the protection of the right of women to be free from 
harmful practices.  
2. To examine the relationship between the community bylaws and African 
customary law within the broader context of legal pluralism. 
3. To understand how the community bylaws and harmful practices (within 
the bylaws) are being conceptualised, and the extent to which such 
conceptualisation is consistent with and/or influenced by domestic and 
international human rights law.  
4. To contribute to the theoretical discourse on norm internalisation by 
assessing and testing if the phenomenon of community bylaws is 
revealing other vernacularisation concepts that are at play when 
culture/custom is the action ground.  
                                               
9  For example, Senior Chief Kachindamoto of Dedza district has received international 
attention for her stiff stance against child marriage in her area. On 21 March 2016, at a jam-
packed side event of the 60th session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of 
Women, she explained how she had decided to use her influential position as custodian of 
culture to promote peace, social economic development and reduce poverty—Janet Karim, 
‗Praise to Cultural Leaders for Ending Child Marriages,‘ The Nation, 25 March 2016. 
10 Adopted by the United Nations in 2015 to replace the Millennium Development Goals. 




The first strand of the thesis proceeds from the premise that one has to 
appreciate that the use of these community bylaws is a relatively new 
phenomenon that needs careful study. As Chapter 2 illustrates, so far, 
community bylaws for addressing harmful practices are an absent topic in 
scholarship. There is also a dearth of scholarship on the role of traditional 
leaders as women‘s rights activists. As a result, the relationship between the 
community bylaws and African (living) customary law or indeed other laws 
remains to be understood.  
Thus, the second arm of the thesis focuses on the legal nature of community 
bylaws on child marriage and other harmful practices in Malawi: are the 
bylaws seen as customary law, living customary law, or formal law? In 
addressing this question, the thesis seeks to shed some light on the debates 
about African customary law and legal pluralism in order to establish 
whether or not the community bylaws can be located within this discourse; 
and if so, to understand the role of customary or legal pluralism regimes in 
internalising international human rights. This discussion makes room for a 
critical examination of the conceptual discourse on norm internalisation in 
human rights jurisprudence. 
While addressing harmful practices affecting women and girls remains a key 
international women‘s rights agenda, we lack an understanding of how 
community bylaws relate to international human rights and legislative norms 
on the one hand, and customary law and practices on the other hand. At first 
impression, one could be tempted to conclude that the community bylaws are 
an example of the diffusion of international human rights norms into 
Malawian local culture and practices.12 After all, international human rights 
                                               
12 Indeed, my Malawian gender activist experience attests that our gender circle has tended to 
casually read the recent spread of the community bylaws in Malawi as a sign that human 




binoculars habitually zoom in on customs and tradition.13 However, currently 
there is no evidence to support or reject the claim that the community bylaws 
are emerging because Malawian rural communities have finally seen the 
‗human rights light‘, resulting in the internalisation of human rights/gender 
equality norms in traditional spaces.  
The third part of the thesis seeks to use empirical evidence to understand the 
complementarity or mismatch between international and domestic legal 
measures and local practice/approaches to addressing harmful practices. In 
clarifying how human rights and legislative measures on gender equality 
influence and shape the emergence and conceptualisation of the community 
bylaws, the thesis uses community bylaws as a case study for critiquing the 
conventional approach to norm internalisation of international law and 
practice, especially from the angle of vernacularisation.  
The norm internalisation/vernacularisation paradox is this: to claim that a 
human rights norm has been internalised, efforts from the onset must be 
                                               
13  For example, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has, 
through its General Comment No. 14, emphasised that states have a legal obligation to adopt 
effective and appropriate measures to abolish harmful traditional practices affecting the 
health of children, particularly girls, including early marriage, female genital mutilation, 
preferential feeding and care of male children—Paragraph 22, CESCR General Comment No. 
14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12),  U.N Doc. E/C.12/2000/4. 
Under CEDAW, legislation is needed to modify or abolish customs and practices that 
discriminate against women (Article 2(f)). Through General Recommendation No. 19, the 
CEDAW Committee urges States Parties to take effective legal measures, including penal 
sanctions, civil remedies and compensatory provisions to protect women against all kinds of 
violence—Paragraph 24(r)(i), UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), General Recommendation No. 19: Violence against women, 1992, U.N Doc. 
A/47/38. General Recommendation No. 24 calls on states parties to enact and effectively 
enforce laws that prohibit female genital mutilation and marriage of girl children—Paragraph 
15(d), UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
General Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health), 1999, U.N 
Doc.A/54/38/Rev.1. The CRC mandates States Parties to take all effective and appropriate 
measures to abolish traditional practices affecting the health of children (Article 24(3)). 
General Comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child recommends that State 
Parties should implement legislation aimed at changing attitudes and addressing gender 
roles and stereotypes that contribute to harmful traditional practices—Paragraph 20 UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General Comment No. 4 (2003): Adolescent Health 





purposefully geared towards having a specific norm appropriated and 
translated locally (mostly through externally driven efforts). However, what if 
a valid claim cannot be made that the community bylaws are an exclusive 
byproduct of current understandings of vernacularisation, although their 
contents may perhaps prima facie reflect human rights internalisation? How 
does such a misfit fit into vernacularisation discourse anyway (or does it)?  
1.3  COMMUNITY BYLAWS: PROBLEMATISATION 
Some rural communities in Malawi have taken concrete steps to combat 
harmful practices, which mostly adversely affect women and girls, through 
what has come to be popularly known as ‗community bylaws‘. Generally, the 
phenomenon of community bylaws is not a preserve for the gender sector. 
For example, in the health sector, ever since the Government of Malawi 
banned traditional birth attendants in 2008, women who do not deliver at 
health facilities can be fined through bylaws set by some traditional leaders.14  
The Child Health Programme15 also targets the implementation/enforcement 
of local bylaws as a strategy to reduce the number of illnesses and deaths 
amongst children under age five.16 In the water and sanitation sectors, some 
bylaws were set by Water Point Committees and local leaders under the 
Community Water, Sanitation and Health (COMWASH) project ‗to govern 
the care and management of boreholes, taps and wells‘.17 In 2013, WaterAid 
                                               
14 The Health Foundation, ‗Improving Maternal and Newborn Health in Malawi: Lessons 
from a Landmark Programme Addressing Maternal and Newborn Health in Malawi.‘ 
Available at 
http://www.health.org.uk/sites/default/files/ImprovingMaternalNewbornHealthMalawi.
pdf, accessed on 18 June 2016. 
15  A joint program for Inter Aide, the Ministry of Health and Traditional Authorities, 
launched in 2014. 
16 Inter Aide. Available at http://interaide.org/health/malawi/about-us/, accessed 21 June 
2016. 
17  Community Water Sanitation and Health Project (COMWASH) Malawi, ‗Operational 
Research Report on Water Ownership and Access Rights in Malawi: Customs, Practice and 
Statutory Laws‘ (2003). Available at https://sarpn.org/documents/d0001327/P1588-




announced that bylaws that had been adopted by local Chiefs had resulted in 
access to improved latrines for over 20,000 people in Rumphi and Karonga.18 
In the gender sector, community bylaws to counter harmful practices and 
assorted forms of gender inequalities have been adopted in several rural 
localities. Analysed in detail in Chapters 7, 8 and 9, these community bylaws 
impose sanctions on issues such as: forcing a girl or boy to marry before 
completing secondary education;19 preventing access to quality education for 
girls and boys; 20  and combating child marriages and harmful initiation 
rituals.21 Including the community bylaws in the four study sites, this thesis 
has referenced about 30 community bylaws across Malawi, which indicates 
the spread use of such laws.  
Senior Chief Teresa Kachindamoto of Dedza 22  has particularly received 
international acclaim for her firm stance against child marriage in her area 
                                               
18 WaterAid, ‗Malawi: Latest News A Round-up of WaterAid's Recent Activities and 
Achievements in Malawi.‘ Available at http://www.wateraid.org/news/news/malawi-
latest-news. http://www.wateraid.org/news/news/malawi-latest-news, accessed on 18 June 
2016. 
19 For example, Plan Malawi has reported that in Karonga, bylaws that were adopted in 
Traditional Authority (TA) Mwakaboko‘s area in 2013 impose a fine of K60,000 (equivalent to 
USD 81) for forced marriage. 
20 For example, community bylaws developed in World Vision‘s impact area of TA 
Mankhambira in Nkhata Bay district in 2015 tackle twenty factors, namely: absenteeism from 
school; early marriages; drug and substance abuse; absconding from classes; child abuse; 
school dropouts; failure by Chiefs and their subjects to participate in school development; 
laziness by teachers; keeping the girl child indoors when she reaches puberty; causing 
violence in the community; teachers impregnating school girls; teachers and learners found 
drunk during school hours; corporal punishment; film shows and conducting traditional 
dances during school hours; learners‘ poor mode of dressing; domestic animals destroying 
crops; mismanaging project materials; immoral behaviour by some community members; 
insulting teachers in schools; learners not attending classes due to lack of school uniform— 
Government of Malawi, UNFPA, and EU, 'Mapping of Community Bylaws under the Gender 
Equality and Women Empowerment (GEWE) Programme' (2016), 19. 
21 For example, the Girls Empowerment Network (GENET) has supported local leaders and 
community members in Chiradzulu district to formulate and strengthen community bylaws 
in this area. Similar bylaws have also been formulated between 2012 and 2016 in 26 TA areas 
covered by the GEWE Programme in in Chitipa, Karonga, Mzimba and Nkhata Bay 
(Northern Region;) Dedza, Dowa, Mchinji and Salima (Central Region); and Chikhwawa, 
Chiradzulu, Machinga, Mangochi and Nsanje (Southern Region)—ibid, 67-92. 
22  Who is also World Vision Malawi‘s End Child Marriages Brand Ambassador since 
December 2017—Chikondi Chimala, ‗Kachindamoto Unveiled as World Vision "End Child 




through the use of community bylaws.  She is on record as ‗having resolved 
to use her influential position as custodian of culture to promote peace, social 
economic development and reduce poverty‘.23 To demonstrate her resolve, 
Chief Kachindamoto once suspended four village headmen who had 
contravened the community bylaws by consenting to child marriages.24  The 
suspension happened before the new marriage law in Malawi was enacted.25 
In April 2016, Chief Kalipula of Karonga 26  heralded Kachindamoto as ‗a 
superwoman, a no nonsense leader who has reclaimed hundreds of boys and 
girls, sending them back to school and who is building a new chapter of child 
protection by working together with her subjects‘.27  
Efforts of another female Chief, Traditional Authority (TA) Mwanza of Salima 
district, have also received wide international publicity. On 21 June 2014, TA 
Mwanza attracted a high-level delegation of Chiefs and government officials 
led by Her Royal Highness Queen Best Olimi of Toro Kingdom of Uganda. 
Their mission was to learn how cultural leaders were advancing positive 
social change in Malawi, particularly through girl education.28  In questioning 
whether the community bylaws are in fact working well in practice, the 
foregoing examples suggest that the bylaws are being regarded as a strategic 
weapon for dealing with negative traditions that reinforce and reproduce 
gender inequality and disempower women and girls.  
                                               
23 Janet Karim, ‗Praise to Cultural Leaders for Ending Child Marriages,‘ (2016). 
24  UN Women, ‗Malawi Chief Annuls 330 Child Marriages.‘ Available at 
http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2015/9/malawi-chief-annuls-330-child-
marriages, accessed on 21 April 2016. She only reinstated these village headmen after the 
chiefs ended the marriages— ‗Malawi Fearsome Chief Terminator of Child Marriages.‘ 
Available at 
http://africanchildinfo.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=7299:malawis-
fearsome-chief-terminator-of-child-marriages&Itemid=67&lang=en, accessed on 22 April 
2016. 
25 Parliament passed the new Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act in April 2015. 
26  Who had led a busload of village heads, clergy and government officials to Chief 
Kachindamoto‘s base on a learning tour—James Chavula, ‗Kachindamoto Inspires Karonga 
Chief, ‘ The Nation, 20 April 2016. Available at http://mwnation.com/kachindamoto-






One of the mysteries around community bylaws lies in the use of the term 
‗bylaws‘. This is ordinarily a term of art, with legal insinuations. The Malawi 
Local Government Act No. 42 of 1998,29 for example, provides that only a 
District, Town or City Assembly can make bylaws for the good governance of 
a local government area: the Council or Assembly cannot delegate its powers 
to make bylaws.30  Section 102 of the Act accepts District Council bylaws to be 
made at area/Traditional Authority level to respond to contextual matters, so 
long as legal procedures are followed.  
Yet, the community bylaws under study have emerged as an unstable body of 
law adopted outside the established law-making processes understood by 
lawyers in Malawi. These bylaws are neither made under the auspices of 
District Councils, nor do they comply with other legal prescriptions for 
making bylaws. Nevertheless, they are branded ‗community bylaws‘ because 
in some instances, Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have made 
communities to understand that this is what their community rules are.31 
Therefore, through the circulation of ideas relating to the phenomenon, 
‗community bylaws‘ has become customarily accepted as the name for the 
efforts of rural people to proactively self-regulate and impose socio-cultural 
behavioural boundaries for members within. This is why the thesis maintains 
the terminology.  
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In the light of the discussion above, community bylaws raise several pertinent 
problems. First, the community bylaws are emerging against a backdrop of 
poorly implemented gender equality statutes, including legal provisions that 
criminalise harmful practices in Malawi. The Constitution of the Republic of 
Malawi, adopted in 1994, guarantees the right to gender equality and calls for 
                                               
29 As amended by Local Government (Amendment) Act No. 10 of 2017. 
30 Section 5(1) as read with sections 6(1)(f) and 15(1)(b) of the Local Government Act No. 42 of 
1998, as amended by Local Government (Amendment) Act No. 10 of 2017. 




the enactment of gender equality legislation.32 Yet, one of the biggest concerns 
for gender activists in Malawi has been the weak implementation of the spate 
of gender equality laws that Parliament has passed since 2006. There are six 
gender-related laws in total:  
1. the 2006 Prevention of Domestic Violence Act;33 
2. the Child Care, Protection and Justice Act No 22 of 2010;  
3. the Deceased Estates (Wills, Inheritance and Protection) Act No 14 of 
2011;  
4. the Gender Equality Act No 3 of 2013;  
5. the Trafficking in Persons Act No 3 of 2015; and  
6. the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act.34  
There is generally a poor record of implementing these gender equality laws. 
One of the reasons for the poor implementation is inadequate funding. For 
example, a gender analysis of the national budget by the United 
Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN 
Women) in 2015 found that over five financial cycles, budgets for the Ministry 
of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare (MoGCDSW) did not 
reflect government allocation for the specific implementation of gender-
related laws.35 There was a similar finding in respect of 17 other votes in the 
2015/16 national budget. 36  
Given these implementation problems, it has been argued that community 
bylaws have the potential to make a difference. Kouyate37 has submitted, for 
                                               
32 Sections 20(2) and 24(2)(b) of the Constitution. 
33 Chapter 7:05 of the Laws of Malawi. 
34 Chapter 25:02 of the Laws of Malawi. 
35  Ministry of Gender Children Disability and Social Welfare and UN Women Malawi, 
‗Gender Analysis of Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare's Budget  
2010–2015,‘ (2015). On file with author. 
36 UN Women Malawi, ‗Gender Analysis of 17 Votes in the 2015/16 Budget ‘ (2015). On file 
with author. 
37  Morisanda Kouyate, ‗Harmful Traditional Practices against Women and Legislation,‘ 




example, that ‗socio-communal legislation is usually more appropriate, easily 
accepted and more respected than legislation that is handed down by national 
parliaments‘.38 However, despite their emergence and growing prominence, 
the concept of chief-led community bylaws is not grounded in Malawi‘s 
formal law.  Gender equality legislation, more especially the Gender Equality 
Act and the child protection law, do not mention community bylaws as part 
of their implementation scheme.  
This raises the issue of the legal validity and authority of these bylaws. First, 
there is the question of how ‗community laws‘ sit with the formal law on the 
one hand, and African (living) customary law on the other hand. As regards 
statutory law, apart from the broad question of their legal mandate, one of the 
contentious issues is that the sanctions imposed by the community bylaws 
stand in stark contrast to the statutory ones.39 Feminists, who usually indict 
norms and customs as being the main barriers to women‘s substantive 
equality,40 could argue that community bylaws have the potential to reverse 
legislative gains that have been made by dramatically diluting sanctions for 
                                                                                                                                      
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Expert Group Meeting on Good Practices in 
Legislation on Harmful Practices Against Women, 25-28 May, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2009). 
38 Ibid. 
39 Under Section 5 of the Gender Equality Act, any person who commits a harmful practice 
offence is liable to a fine of one million Kwacha (K1,000,000.00) [ equivalent to USD 1,347] and 
to imprisonment for five (5) years. Under Section 83 of the Child Care, Protection and Justice 
Act, the penalty for harmful practices perpetrated against children is imprisonment for ten 
(10) years. To the contrary, community bylaws impose traditional fines such as chickens and 
goats (or equivalent monetary value). 
40 For example, Tove Stang Dahl, Women's Law: An Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence (Oslo: 
Norwegian University Press 1987); and Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Oxford, England: 
Polity Press 1988) cited in Anne Hellum, ‗Human Rights and Gender Relations in Postcolonial 
Africa: Options and Limits for the Subjects of Legal Pluralism,‘ Law & Social Inquiry (25)2 




harms that principally affect women.41 Besides, the enforcement mechanism 
of the community bylaws (often different tiers of chieftaincy) is isolated from 
the formal justice system. 
A third related difficulty lies in the very fact that community bylaws could be 
disconnected from formal systems of law, raising questions of their 
democratic legitimacy and constitutionality. It can be deduced from the 
general tone of international women‘s rights frameworks that the preferred 
measure for combating harmful practices against women is statutory law 
reform, and not necessarily traditional legal schemes. 42  In Malawi, this 
obligation has already been achieved in large measure by the enactment of 
the Gender Equality Act and the child protection law. Nevertheless, rural 
communities have still found it necessary to adopt community bylaws. This 
provokes the broader question of whether community bylaws are even 
internalising the spirit of these laws.  
Another pertinent issue concerns the position of Chiefs as custodians of 
culture/customary law, and yet they are pioneering the community bylaws. 
One would argue that their immersion in the phenomenon of community 
bylaws potentially puts them in a position of conflict considering that the 
bylaws are directly opposing harmful traditions and practices. The whole 
                                               
41 This argument would be analogous to MacKinnon‘s feminist concern, that states have left 
areas traditionally considered private to be governed by customary legal systems, thereby 
increasing women‘s vulnerability to discrimination—Catharine A MacKinnon, ‗Sex Equality 
Under the Constitution of India: Problems, Prospects, and ―Personal Laws‖,‘ International 
Journal of Constitutional Law (4)2 (2006) cited in Johanna Bond, ‗Gender, Discourse and 
Customary Law in Africa,‘ Southern California Law Review (83) (2010), 509-574 510. Though 
the argument could arguably also fit within the concept of Sanders‘s norm spoiling, one 
should be mindful that unlike the intended outcome of norm spoiling (whereby ‗actors 
directly challenge existing norms with the aim of weakening their influence‘) section 9.4.1 of 
the thesis illustrates that community bylaws are seen as buttressing gender equality 
legislation—Rebecca Sanders, ‗Norm Spoiling: Undermining the International Women‘s 
Rights Agenda‘ International Affairs (94)(2) (2018), 271-291 272. 




movement of international human rights has been to push against customs 
and traditions that are harmful to women and children.43  
Lastly, the notion of community bylaws raises the problem of ownership of 
these ‗laws‘. Some community bylaws are arising in areas where donors or 
local/international NGOs have operations. This prompts the questions: to 
what extent are these laws authentic community laws? Are these external 
agencies supporting already existing community initiatives or introducing 
new norms under the guise of community bylaws? From a gender 
perspective, the character of ‗drivers or actors‘ could have implications on the 
agenda of the community bylaws, as well as the level of receptivity or 
opposition of local stakeholders to the bylaws. 
1.5  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE THESIS 
The exploration of the thesis‘ four objectives will be anchored in the concept 
of norm internalisation and African customary law theoretical frameworks, 
                                               
43 For example, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has, through its 
General Comment No. 14, emphasised that states have a legal obligation to adopt effective 
and appropriate measures to abolish harmful traditional practices affecting the health of 
children, particularly girls, including early marriage, female genital mutilation, preferential 
feeding and care of male children (paragraph 22, UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard 
of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant), 11 August 2000, E/C.12/2000/4). Under CEDAW, 
legislation is needed to modify or abolish customs and practices that discriminate against 
women (article 2(f), UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, 18 December 1979, A/RES/34/180). CEDAW Committee‘s 
General Recommendation No. 24 calls on states parties to enact and effectively enforce laws 
that prohibit female genital mutilation and marriage of girl children (paragraph 15(d), 
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health), 1999, 
A/54/38/Rev.1, ch). The CRC mandates states parties to take all effective and appropriate 
measures to abolish traditional practices affecting the health of children (article 24(3), UN 
General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3). General Comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child recommends that state parties should implement legislation aimed at changing 
attitudes and addressing gender roles and stereotypes that contribute to harmful traditional 
practices (paragraph 20,  UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General Comment 
No. 4 (2003): Adolescent Health and Development in the Context of the Convention on the Rights of 





which are analysed in Chapter 3. The theory of ‗norm internalisation‘ serves 
to achieve three of the objectives of the thesis, namely: 
 Explaining the factors influencing the emergence and use of 
community bylaws to ensure the protection of the right of women to be 
free from harmful practices.  
 Understanding how the community bylaws (and harmful practices) are 
being conceptualised and whether such understanding is consistent 
with domestic and international human rights law norms.  
 Contributing to the theoretical discourse on norm internalisation by 
assessing and testing if the phenomenon of community bylaws is 
revealing other concepts that are at play when culture/custom is the 
action ground.  
Norm internalisation falls under the broader discourse of norm diffusion – an 
international relations theory that has mostly been used to understand how 
international (human rights) norms filter into domestic settings.44 However, 
since the concept of norm internalisation mostly relates to the 
institutionalisation of human rights norms in formal systems and structures 
of the state, this thesis uses an analytical concept that explains how human 
rights norms penetrate local levels, namely, vernacularisation (developed in 
anthropology).45  
                                               
44  Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‗International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change,‘ International Organisation (52)4 (1998); Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 
‗Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and 
Comparative Politics,‘ Annual Review of Political Science (4) (2001); Susanne Zwingel, ‗How Do 
International Women‘s Rights Norms Become Effective In Domestic Contexts? An Analysis of 
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘ (Doctoral 
Thesis, Universität Bochum, 2005); Susanne Zwingel, ‗How Do Norms Travel? Theorising 
International Women‘s Rights in Transnational Perspective,‘ International Studies Quarterly 
(56) (2012). 
45 By Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into 




Merry‘s vernacularisation involves appropriation and translation. Activists 
replicate human rights programmes, interventions and ideas developed 
elsewhere (i.e. a local transnational setting) in another locality 
(appropriation). Merry argues that in the process, they ‗adjust the rhetoric 
and structure of these programmes, interventions and ideas to local 
circumstances‘ (translation).46 This thesis categorises vernacularisation as a 
norm internalisation mechanism in order to take a closer look at how the 
community bylaws are unfolding and whether what is transpiring could be 
seen as an example of vernacularisation as we know it or not.  
The thesis scrutinises vernacularisation through empirical evidence in order 
to test whether the way the phenomenon of community bylaws to eliminate 
harmful practices is playing out in Malawi begs for a reconceptualisation of 
the convention conception of vernacularisation. Therefore, the thesis will 
demonstrate that there are contexts in which vernacularisation amorphously 
unfolds horizontally as well. This will contribute to a deeper understanding 
of community bylaws in rural and cultural settings, and their role in 
reconceptualising the internalisation of international human rights norms 
protecting women from harmful practices.  
Legal pluralism, particularly in relation to African (living) customary law, is 
relevant to this thesis.47 The concept of ‗strong, deep or new legal pluralism‘48 
as advanced by Banakar and Travers49 posit that informal plural normative 
orderings permeate most societies.50 While some scholars are more cynical 
about African customary law, given its distortions by colonialists,51 this thesis 
                                               
46 Ibid., 135. 
47 One of the thesis' objectives is to examine the relationship between the community bylaws 
and African customary law.  
48 Reza Banakar and Max Travers, An Introduction to Law and Social Theory (Hart Publishing 
2002), 302. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 302. 
51 For example Martin Chanock, as cited in Rachel Sieder and John-Andrew McNeish, Gender 




is more interested in uncodified customary law. Ndulo52 describes African 
customary law as ‗the indigenous law of various ethnic groups that 
constitutes pluralist legal systems in Africa‘.53 Himonga54 observes that while 
scholars have carved the two categories of official customary law and living 
customary law, there is no linear distinction between the two, and that the 
two concepts simply represent ‗accepted dominant forms of customary law‘.55  
In this thesis, the concept of living customary law is particularly useful in 
scrutinising the extent to which communities are using the bylaws as 
homegrown ‗law‘ or rules to adapt to socio-economic changes around them. 
While different definitions of customary living law abound, Diala56 presents a 
more streamlined definition, that ‗living customary law is law that emerges 
from people‘s adaptation of customs to socio-economic changes‘.57 African 
customary living law scholars have noted that the dynamic changes in the 
practices and customs in people‘s daily lives may be influenced by multiple 
factors (including state law and international human rights).58  
Himonga and Bosch59 recognise that the common denominator in Ehrlich‘s60 
pioneering living law theory and Moore‘s61 semi-autonomous social fields 
                                               
52 Muna Ndulo, ‗African Customary Law, Customs, and Women's Rights,‘ Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies (18) (2011), 87-120. 
53 Ibid., 88-89. 
54  Chuma N. Himonga, ‗Family and Succession Laws in Zambia: Developments Since 
Independence,‘ Lit Verlag (7) (1995). 
55 Ibid., cited in Chuma Himonga and Craig Bosch, ‗The Application of African Customary 
Law Under the Constitution of South Africa: Problems Solved or Just Beginning,‘ South 
African Law Journal (117) (2000), 306-341 318. 
56 Anthony C. Diala, ‗The Concept of Living Customary Law: A Critique‘ The Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law (49)2 (2017), 143-165. 
57 Ibid., 155. 
58 For example Chuma Himonga and Craig Bosch, ‗The Application of African Customary 
Law Under the Constitution of South Africa: Problems Solved or Just Beginning,‘ (2000), 318; 
Anthony C. Diala, ‗The Concept of Living Customary Law: A Critique‘ (2017), 155. 
59 Chuma Himonga and Craig Bosch, ‗The Application of African Customary Law Under the 
Constitution of South Africa: Problems Solved or Just Beginning,‘ (2000). 
60 Kurt A. Ziegert, Introduction to Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of Sociology of Law 19 
(Transaction Publishers 2001, 1936). 
61  Sally Falk Moore, ‗Law and Social Change: The Semi Autonomous Social Field as an 




theory is that both do not consider the state as the singular source of law, but 
acknowledge that law can also emerge from people‘s lived reality.62 Thus ‗the 
force of living law may even not be grounded in external authority, but rather 
from the relationship amongst the people concerned themselves‘.63  
A discussion on legal pluralism, especially living customary law, is important 
for the thesis on two main grounds. First, African (living) customary law 
literature will help to establish the variants and parallels between customary 
law and community bylaws because there is no clarity about how the 
community bylaws theoretically compare with the characteristics of 
customary law. Second, for the thesis to be relevant, it will have to make a 
case about the validity of these so-called bylaws in a context where the legal 
architecture of bylaws in Malawi would not treat them as legally defensible 
laws.  
Therefore, from a legal pluralism standpoint, the fact that the community 
bylaws can be questioned for their democratic legitimacy, constitutionality 
and coherence with the rule of law (and even for their correlation with 
customary law for that matter) does not mean they should be downrightly 
cast off. While legal pluralism at times has been criticised for its open-ended 
approach, others have commended it precisely because the open-ended 
approach embraces those normative orders that impinge on women‘s lives.64 
Indeed in the case of the community bylaws for purging harmful practices, 
such normative orders could be a positive turning point against the cultural 
suppression of women and girls.  
1.6 CONCLUSION AND THESIS OUTLINE  
This chapter has shown that the thesis will examine how international human 
                                               
62 Chuma Himonga and Craig Bosch, ‗The Application of African Customary Law Under the 
Constitution of South Africa: Problems Solved or Just Beginning,‘ (2000), 318. 
63 Ibid., 320. 




rights norms for protecting women and girls from harmful practices have 
influenced and shaped the emergence and conceptualisation of community 
bylaws on child marriage and other harmful practices affecting women in 
rural Malawi.  
By demonstrating that the vernacularisation of international human rights 
norms in the community bylaws phenomenon has taken the new dimension 
of ‗horizontal vernacularisation‘, the thesis contributes to an in-depth 
understanding of community bylaws on child marriage and other harmful 
practices, and provides an alternative understanding of vernacularisation as a 
norm internalisation channel.  
The rest of the thesis is set out as follows: 
Chapter 2 describes existing scholarship and makes a case for the relevance of 
the thesis by exposing literature gaps.  
Chapter 3 analyses theories of norm diffusion/internalisation. This discussion 
is relevant in exposing gaps in norm internalisation theory, particularly the 
concept of vernacularisation, which fail to adequately explain the emergence 
of and conceptualisation of community bylaws – calling for reliance on the 
concept of horizontal vernacularisation instead. The chapter also discusses 
theoretical perspectives to African customary law, living customary law and 
legal pluralism. This discussion lays the foundation for bridging 
vernacularisation with human rights theory, and probing the relationship 
between community bylaws and African (living) customary law.  
Chapter 4 examines international human rights law and jurisprudence on 
harmful practices. Particular attention is given to the jurisprudence of the 
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW Committee), the Committee on the Convention on the 




Human and Peoples‘ Rights (ACHPR) and the African Committee of Experts 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC), with two aims. The first 
aim is to understand the practices that are regarded as harmful in the 
jurisprudence in order to compare them with the practices on which 
community bylaws are focusing. The second aim is to expose the treaty-
monitoring bodies‘ understanding of norm internalisation. Particularly, the 
discussion seeks to reveal whether the treaty-monitoring bodies see 
community and informal mechanisms, including horizontal vernacularisation 
as a norm internalisation mechanism. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the Malawian domestic context, especially the ‗formal‘ 
or ‘state‘ level. First, it explains how harmful practices have historically been 
addressed. Second, it examines how the formal is internalising international 
human rights norms by focusing on the Constitution and government policy: 
how the Constitution envisages the place of international law in the domestic 
sphere and what this means for norm internalisation; the place of informal 
systems in the constitutional order; and how the Constitution has been 
translated into gender equality policy and legislation. Third, the Chapter 
analyses the extent to which the law and policy (including the 
implementation scheme for laws addressing harmful practices) makes itself 
relevant to rural settings, acknowledges the role of horizontal 
vernacularisation in localising human rights, or whether there are gaps that 
explain the emergence of community bylaws.  
Chapter 6 discusses the methodology that was applied for the empirical part 
of the thesis, including information on the study sites. 
Chapter 7 provides a history of these community bylaws. It then unpacks the 
notion of ‗community bylaw‘ as the communities that use the bylaws 
understand it, and explains the processes by which they are adopted. Using 
empirical data, the chapter also explores the factors that have influenced the 




harmful practices. In addressing these issues, the chapter lays bare how the 
community bylaws are exposing features of horizontal vernacularisation.  
Chapter 8 examines the legal character of the community bylaws. It does this 
by first scrutinising where the community bylaws fit in the constitutional or 
formal legal architecture, and in living (customary) law discourse. Then it 
analyses how the community bylaws and their conceptualisation reflect 
human rights and statutory norms protecting women from harmful practices.  
Chapter 9 demonstrates how the community bylaws phenomenon exhibit 
horizontal vernacularisation through its conceptualisation of penalties, the 
strategies utilised for translating human rights norms in local contexts, and 
the types of vernacularisers that are involved.  
Chapter 10 concludes the thesis and makes some recommendations for policy 




CHAPTER 2   
LITERATURE REVIEW: COMMUNITY BYLAWS ‘NOT TRENDING’ 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
As indicated in Chapter 1, this thesis interrogates how international human 
rights norms for protecting women and girls from harmful practices have 
influenced and shaped the emergence and conceptualisation of community 
bylaws for addressing child marriage and other harmful practices affecting 
women in rural Malawi. This chapter shows that academic scholarship has 
neither paid attention to how human rights are vernacularised in cultural 
phenomena, such as community bylaws; nor to community bylaws in general, 
and those addressing harmful practices in particular. There is some 
scholarship on the phenomenon of ‗village bylaws‘ or ‗village laws‘, but these 
carry distinct characteristics from the community bylaws under study: they 
are formulated outside the framework of chieftaincy mechanisms65 and are 
usually part of formal state systems.66  
                                               
65 For example, some Village Bylaws in Northern Ethiopia have been formulated to manage 
communal grazing lands and enclosures. They are set up at a public meeting and enforced by 
village committees— Yami Mastewal, Wolde Mekuria, and Michael Hauser, ‗The 
Effectiveness of Village Bylaws in Sustainable Management of Community-managed 
Exclosures in Northern Ethiopia,‘ Sustainability Science (8)1 (2013), 73-86. 
66  For example, natural resources management village bylaws in Uganda have been 
formulated at lower levels of decentralisation under formal processes of enacting village 
bylaws—Pascal C. Sanginga, Rick N. Kamugisha, and Adrienne M. Martin, ‗Strengthening 
Social Capital for Adaptive Governance of Natural Resources: A Participatory Learning and 
Action Research for Bylaws Reforms in Uganda,‘ Society and Natural Resources (23)8 (2010), 
695-710. Village bylaws to regulate the Marine industry in Western Samoa begun as village 
initiatives in the mid 1980‘s, but by 1999 they were integrated into the formal system and are 
formulated in accordance with the national fisheries legislation—U Fa‘asili and I Kelekolio, 
‗The Use of Village By-laws in Marine Conservation and Fisheries Management‘ (Information 
Paper 17 presented at the First SPC Heads of Fisheries Meeting Pacific Community, 9-13 
August, Noumea, New Caledonia, 1999). In Indonesia, Village Laws are also enacted under 
Law 6/2014 on Villages in order to address decentralisation related weaknesses—See Hans 
Antlöv, Anna Wetterberg, and Leni Dharmawan, ‗Village Governance, Community Life, and 




Through reliance on empirical data, this thesis fills these literature gaps by 
making three theoretical contributions:  
a) empirically positioning community bylaws and the activist role of Chiefs 
regarding harmful practices, as well as the legal pluralism discourse; 
b) applying norm internalisation theories to grassroots and Chief-led 
community bylaws; and 
c) proposing a new approach/concept of vernacularisation that explains 
events in community bylaws that cannot be clarified by existing 
understandings of ‗vernacularisation.‘  
Due to the absence of specific scholarly literature on the topic, the thesis 
draws from the following literature in order to make its case: unpublished 
Malawian studies on community bylaws; Malawian and other literature 
related to Chiefs and women‘s rights; and harmful practices in the African 
context. Apart from women‘s rights literature, academic literature is 
particularly drawn from fields of democracy/political science, 
multiculturalism and anthropology. 
While appearing relevant, some literature has deliberately not been reviewed. 
For example, literature on ‗social norms,‘ has been excluded because the 
phenomenon of community bylaws is different from these social norms, 
which are fluid. As Elster 67  puts it, ‗social norms are emotional and 
behavioural propensities of individuals‘.68  
The body of ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom-up‘ literature would not take us to 
where the gap is. This literature is preoccupied with a broad range of issues 
                                                                                                                                      
183. 
67 Jon Elster, ‗Social Norms and Economic Theory,‘ Journal of Economic Perspectives (3)4 (1989), 
99-117. 




surrounding global norms, regulations and institutions (top-down) and 
bottom-up mechanisms that usually depart from the premise of formal/elitist 
institutions at state level (e.g. lawyers, NGOs, law reform, government 
policies, state regulations, etc.) trying to pursue people-centred and 
participatory approaches in their programmes.69  
The thesis recognises that scholars have paid considerable attention to female 
genital mutilation (FGM) as a harmful practice affecting women‘s and girls‘ 
health. However, because FGM is not generally practised in Malawi, the 
analysis deliberately minimally engages with FGM literature just to 
demonstrate that community bylaws have not been given attention in that 
context either. 
2.2  EXISTING LOCAL NARRATIVES ON COMMUNITY BYLAWS AND CHIEFS 
This section seeks to expose research gaps in studies on community bylaws 
conducted as projects in Malawi, as well as other local studies that have 
engaged the issue of community bylaws more broadly.   
2.2.1 Malawian Studies on Community Bylaws Focus on Project 
Assessments 
In the Malawi context, other than some media articles, 70  two studies on 
                                               
69  For example, see Gita Gopal, ‗Gender Related Legal Reform and Access to Economic 
Resources in Eastern Africa,‘ (1999); Steven D. Jamar, ‗A Lawyering Approach to Law and 
Development,‘ North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation (27 )31 
(2001); Meena Jagannath, Nicole Phillips, and Jeena Shah, ‗A Right-Based Approach to 
Lawyering: Legal Empowerment as an Alternative to Legal Aid in Post-Disaster Haiti,‘ 
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights (10)7 (2011); Patricio Navia, ‗Top-Down and 
Bottom-Up Democracy in Latin America: The Case of Bachelet in Chile,‘ Stockholm Review of 
Latin American Studies 3 (2008); Oliver Edward Walton, Thomas Davies, Erla Thrandardottir, 
and Vincent Charles Keating, ‗Understanding Contemporary Challenges to INGO 
Legitimacy: Integrating Top-Down and Bottom-Up Perspectives,‘ ISTR Voluntas (27) (2016); 
Stacy Laira Lozner, ‗Diffusion of Local Regulatory Innovations: The San Francisco CEDAW 
Ordinance and the New York City Human Rights Initiative,‘ Columbia Law Review (104) 
(2004). 
70  For example, see The Times Reporter ‗TA Mwanza Leads Fight for Girls, Women 




community bylaws have been conducted as different projects. The first study 
was conducted in 2015 as a joint UN project to promote girls education 
implemented by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United 
Nations Children‘s Fund (UNICEF) and World Food Organisation (WFP) in 
Mangochi, Salima and Dedza. 71  The study assessed the validity and 
effectiveness of community bylaws that emerged from the project, and 
explored some legal challenges posed by the community bylaws. It concluded 
that the community bylaws fail the constitutional ‗legality test,‘ since Chiefs 
have no statutory authority to make any law. 72  In this thesis, the latter 
analysis is useful in engaging the legal character of the community bylaws, as 
well as in exploring their legal pluralism dynamic.  
This thesis takes up this issue further by interrogating the legal character of 
the community bylaws against the backdrop of legal pluralism. Does the fact 
that community bylaws lack democratic and constitutional legitimacy mean 
that they should be rejected offhand? This question is important, considering 
that CEDAW‘s recent jurisprudence (General Recommendation No. 33, 2015) 
has imported ‗community laws‘ into the legal pluralism discourse. Indeed, as 
seen in section 1.2, one thread of this thesis is to establish whether community 
bylaws can be credibly positioned within the legal pluralism discourse.  
                                                                                                                                      
leads-fight-for-girls-women-emancipation/, accessed on 21 April 2016; Rabecca Chimjeka 
‗Snatched from the Jaws: Malawi Abolishes 600,000 Child Marriages,‘ The Nation 2 January 
201. Available at https://mwnation.com/snatched-from-the-jaws-malawi-abolishes-600-000-
child-marriages/, accessed on 12 January 2017; Janet Karim ‗Praise to Cultural Leaders for 
Ending Child Marriages,‘ The Nation 25 March 2016; James Chavula ‗Kachindamoto Inspires 
Karonga Chief,‘ The Nation 20 April 2016. Available at http://mwnation.com/kachindamoto-
inspires-karonga-chief/, accessed on 21 April 2016; Norway Official Site in Malawi ‗Chief 
Kachindamoto Has Stopped 850 Child Marriages and Sent the Girls Back to School,‘ 14 April 
2016. Available at http://www.norway_malawi/News-from-Malawi/News/Chief-
Kachindamoto-has-stopped-850-child-marriages-and-sent-the-girls-back-to-
school/#.Vxj9OyN94T, accessed on 21 April 2016. Incidentally this media visibility was 
prominent during the implementation of the GEWE programme.; Penelope Paliani-Kamanga 
‗Malawi: A Chief's Fight against Child Marriages,‘ Gender Links News 15 April 2019. Available 
at http://genderlinks.org.za/news/malawi-one-womans-fight-against-child-marriages/, 
accessed on 4 May 2019. 
71 United Nations Malawi, ‗Mapping of the Existing Bylaws in Three Project Districts,‘ (Draft, 
2015). On file with author.  




A more comprehensive study was conducted in 2016 to ‗map‘ community 
bylaws that address harmful practices and gender equalities developed under 
the GEWE Programme (2012-2016), funded by European Union (EU).73 The 
study findings describe the contents and processes of formulating community 
bylaws in 20 traditional authority areas.  
While the study analysed how some bylaws were linked to the provisions of 
several gender equality statutes and international human rights law, it did not 
establish whether this consistency was a result of deliberate effort on the part 
of communities to internalise gender equality norms or coincidental. Neither 
have more recent efforts by MoGCDSW and UN Women to produce a unified 
community bylaws framework.74 A 2017 ‗learners‘ pregnancy management‘ 
report quoted the mapping study, and acknowledged that sensitised 
traditional leaders are pivotal to preventing harmful cultural practices that 
result in unintended pregnancies in Malawi through community bylaws that 
do not infringe on child rights.75 
This thesis brings much more to the academic comprehension of community 
bylaws for addressing harmful practices. Empirical data will offer a better 
understanding of what exactly is a ‗community bylaw‘ in the first place. This 
perspective is necessary in order to give meaning to ways in which 
community bylaws fall within or outside the ambit of norm internalisation 
theories. The understanding of processes of making community bylaws, as 
                                               
73 Government of Malawi, UNFPA, and EU, 'Mapping of Community Bylaws under the 
Gender Equality and Women Empowerment (GEWE) Programme' (2016). The GEWE 
Programme was worth 12 million Euros. It was funded by EU, and coordinated by Ministry 
of Gender with technical support from UNFPA Malawi. It was implemented in 13 districts— 
see note 21.  
74 UN Women commissioned work to develop this framework as it views the framework a 
beings necessary for traditional leaders and their subjects on the content of the bylaws as well 
as minimum penalties—Yakuwawa William Msika, 'Preliminary Report on the Consultancy 
to Facilitate the Finalisation of the Community Bylaw Framework, Submitted to The Ministry 
of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare ' 2019, 6.  On file with author.  
75  Malawi Human Rights Commission and Southern Africa Litigation Centre, Towards a 
Human Rights-Based Approach to Learner Pregnancy Management in Malawi (MHRC and SALC, 




well as the various issues that communities are grappling with in their bylaws 
will enhance scholarly knowledge about the strengths and challenges in the 
way international human rights jurisprudence theorises norm internalisation. 
2.2.2 Literature on Chiefs in Malawi does not Closely Focus on 
Community Bylaws 
A review of academic literature, research reports and papers that allude to 
Chiefs and/or community bylaws in Malawi revealed that none of them has 
engaged community bylaws robustly, let alone in a norm internalisation 
setting. Englund76 has claimed that villagers in one Malawian community 
exceeded vernacularisation by transforming the very meaning of human 
rights as they opposed the state‘s reluctance to recognise their preferred 
Village Head.77 However, neither community bylaws nor the concept of norm 
internalisation are engaged.  
A 2018 AU sponsored report of child marriage in Africa78 focusing on ten 
countries, including Malawi, mentions chieftaincy institutions. 79 The report 
investigated the root causes and prevalence of child marriage and the 
practices, customs and beliefs that perpetuate child marriage, and assessed 
the level of state compliance with international and regional obligations to 
prevent child marriage. 80  In acknowledging that bylaws are helping to 
eliminate child marriage in Malawi and Uganda,81 the report attributes the 
                                               
76  Harri Englund, ‗Human Rights and Village Headmen in Malawi: Translation Beyond 
Vernacularisation‘ cited in Law Against the State: Ethnographic Forays Into Law's 
Transformations, ed. Julia Eckert, Brian Donahoe, Christian Strümpell, and Özlem Biner 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
77 Ibid., 70-71. 
78 Produced by the joint collaboration of the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria 
and the African Union (in particular the African Commission on Human and People‘s Rights 
and the mechanism of the Special Rapporteur of the Rights of Women in Africa)—Centre for 
Human Rights, A Report on Child Marriage in Africa, (2018). 
79 The rest are Cameroon, the DRC, the Gambia, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
South Africa and Uganda—ibid. 
80  Ibid., 12. It further analyses legislative and policy frameworks and selected efforts to 
address child marriage. 




formulation of the bylaws in some parts of Malawi to the ‗training‘ of local 
Chiefs (presumably by human rights activists or state actors) on the need to 
create stringent bylaws. 82 This claim is not substantiated in the report, and is 
a key focus of this thesis. Furthermore, the report fails to position community 
bylaws in its strategic recommendations for addressing child marriage, which 
are predominantly ‗formal‘ and human rights focused.  
A number of other papers and studies take the role of Chiefs and the use of 
community bylaws for granted as important means of combating child 
marriage in Malawi. For example, a 2017 working paper by the Programme 
on Governance and Local Government (University of Gothenburg) highlights 
the experiences of Senior Chief Kachindamoto in ending child marriage in 
Dedza. The paper investigates how ‗traditional and state authority messages 
(or those from male or female sources)—affect public support for human 
rights issues.‘83 Chiweza‘s 2014 workshop paper on chieftaincy and gender 
equality advocates for Chiefs and community members to develop and 
implement local bylaws against child marriage and other harmful sexual- 
related cultural practices. 84  
However, some reports do not recognise the role of Chiefs in community 
bylaws. The Malawi Government‘s and UNICEF report on the assessment of 
the national child protection system (2012) does not go beyond labelling 
Chiefs as ‗local child protection gate-keepers‘ and cursorily recognising their 
                                               
82 Ibid. 
83 Ragnhild Muriaas, Vibeke Wang, Lindsay J. Benstead, Boniface Dulani, and Lise Rakner, ‗It 
Takes a Female Chief: Gender and Effective Policy Advocacy in Malawi‘ Programme on 
Governance and Local Development at University of Gothenburg (Working Paper No. 17) (2017). 
84 Asiyati Lorraine Chiweza, ‗CSOs, Chiefs and Governance: Experiences from Malawi and 
Southern Africa on Chieftaincy and Gender Equality,‘ (paper presented at a Workshop on 
Gender and Human Rights Based Approach to Development: The Role of Traditional Chiefs, 
(undated), Lilongwe, Malawi, 2014) cited in United Nations Malawi, ‗Mapping of the Existing 




role in presiding over village courts.85  Although the 2009 study on ‗Town 
Chiefs‘ in Malawi lists some gender-related disputes86 as falling within the 
purview of the Chiefs‘ responsibility to preserve justice and order, 87 it does 
not pay attention to gender or community bylaws.  
This thesis differs from the approaches taken in the literature discussed above 
in that it firmly locates Malawian chiefs in the harmful practices discourse, 
particularly regarding the extent to which Chiefs grapple with the tension 
between tradition and human rights pertaining to harmful practices.  
2.3  NARRATIVES OF CHIEFS AS WOMEN’S RIGHTS SPOILERS 
While there is considerable scholarship on culture and the women‘s rights 
discourse (discussed in Chapter 3), not much has been written on the role that 
traditional leaders themselves are playing in advancing gender equality and 
women‘s rights. Indeed, Becker 88  notes that traditional authorities are a 
neglected topic in political gender analyses because of their reputation as 
‗immutable patriarchal institutions and traditions‘.89 Moreover, the literature 
usually situates Chiefs and women‘s rights on binary opposing sides, often 
viewing traditional leaders as the ‗problematic other‘ when it comes to 
women‘s rights. 
                                               
85 Government of Malawi and UNICEF ‗Protecting Children in Malawi: A Report of the Major 





sessment%20of%20the%20NCPS.pdf, accessed on 23 May 2019.  
86 For example inheritance, domestic violence and family problems. 
87 Diana Cammack, Edge Kanyongolo, and Tam O‘niel, ‗'Town Chiefs' in Malawi ‘ Africa 
Power and Politics Programme by the Overseas Development Institute (Working Paper No. 3) 
(2009), 28. 
88 Heike Becker, ‗'New Things after Independence‘: Gender and Traditional Authorities in 
Postcolonial Namibia,‘ Journal of Southern African Studies (32)1 (2006), 29-48. 




Of course, some scholars have acknowledged the relevance of traditional 
leaders to the implementation of women‘s rights. For example, Becker 90 
contends that traditional authorities are not at all stuck in old tradition, but 
are a changing and modern institution that, together with rural people, 
produces local modernities as the institution interacts with global social 
forces.91 Bennet92 also acknowledges instances when Chiefs‘ courts in Zambia 
modified customary law in order to improve women‘s status, only to have 
such decisions overturned by subordinate courts on the ground that the 
Chiefs were negating customary law. 93  Sieder and McNeish 94  identify 
traditional and community structures for dispute resolution as potential 
means of making quick gains in justice projects.95  
With these few exceptions, literature, including some feminist scholarship, 
presents traditional leaders as being antagonistic to women‘s rights. This 
suspicion of traditional leaders is not exactly unfounded. 96  For example, 
Bond97 observes that ‗traditional leaders may be hostile to equality based 
cultural change‘.98 Williams99 argues that customary law systems (of which 
traditional leaders are custodians), ‗legitimise and enforce‘ gender 
discrimination and threaten women‘s status, including in areas of marriage, 
                                               
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., 31. 
92 Tom W. Bennett, A Sourcebook of African Customary Law for Southern Africa (Juta, 1991). 
93 Ibid., cited in Wayne Van Der Meide, ‗Gender Equality v. Right to Culture—Debunking the 
Perceived Conflicts Preventing the Reform of the Marital Property Regime of the Official 
Version of Customary Law,‘ South African Law Journal (116) (1999), 100-112 108. 
94 Rachel Sieder and John-Andrew McNeish, Gender Justice and Legal Pluralities: Latin America 
and African Perspectives, (2013). 
95 Ibid., 12. 
96  For example, Bond captures how, during the drafting of the new South African 
Constitution, traditional leaders in South Africa lobbied to exclude personal and customary 
law from the purview of the non-discrimination clause in the Constitution. A strong and 
organised women‘s lobby defeated the effort—Johanna  Bond, ‗Gender, Discourse and 
Customary Law in Africa,‘ (2010), 559. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid., 567. 
99 Susan H. Williams, ‗Democracy, Gender Equality, and Customary Law: Constitutionalising 




divorce and property. 100  Doho101  asserts that in the Zimbabwean context, 
traditional leadership systems were, and indeed continue to be partly 
responsible for ‗women‘s pathetic conditions‘,102 arguing among other things 
that the traditions that traditional leaders have condoned have been without 
women‘s consent.103 Ewelukwa104 observes that, often, Nigerian local rulers 
resist efforts to reform customary practices that disadvantage women, and 
they suppress women‘s voices by undermining democratic processes at 
village levels.105  
Much of this literature is tainted by the tendency to overgeneralise, which in 
turn, invisibilises ‗positive‘ Chief-led initiatives such as the community 
bylaws under study. Furthermore, while some of the literature accepts the 
potential of traditional leaders as agents of positive change, it assumes 
without more ado that such change only happens under the influence of the 
state, and sometimes NGOs. 106  This thesis tests this assumption using 
empirical data from Malawi. 
Additionally, while the field of multiculturalism is more concerned with the 
moral and political claims/rights of individuals within a minority group 
and/or a wide range of marginalised groups, 107  its feminist debates 
surrounding women and culture (e.g. in relation to female circumcision, 
polygamy, marriage and sex equality in general) support the traditional 
                                               
100 Ibid., 65. 
101 Obediah Dodo, ‗Traditional Leadership Systems and Gender Recognition: Zimbabwe,‘ 
International Journal of Gender and Women’s Studies (1)1 (2013), 29-44. 
102 Ibid., 38-39. 
103 Such as forced marriages, levirate marriages, polygamy, FGM and inheritance inequalities 
—ibid. 
104 Uche U. Ewelukwa, ‗Post-Colonialism, Gender, Customary Injustice: Widows in African 
Societies,‘ Human Rights Quarterly (24) (2002), 424-486. 
105 Ibid., 472-473. 
106  For example ibid.; Senorina Wendoh and Tina Wallace, ‗Re-thinking Gender 
Mainstreaming in African NGOs and Communities,‘ Gender and Development (13)2 (2005), 70-
79 78 . 
107 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton 
University Press, 2002); Sarah Song, ‗Multiculturalism,‘ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2017) cited in Susan H. Williams, ‗Democracy, Gender 




authorities versus women‘s rights chasm. By default, traditional authorities 
are positioned as defenders of negative culture. This has resulted in 
perceptions that the cultural stand of traditional authorities is sometimes 
legally accommodated at the expense of positions held by marginalised 
groups, including women.108  
The literature on feminist multiculturalism advances the view that women are 
critical to ‗cultural policy production/reformulation,‘109 and should therefore 
be supported to challenge cultural systems and embedded problematic 
cultural practices.110 According to this scholarship, women should not only be 
supported to pursue various dialogue models with ‗divergent‘ traditional 
leaders, and challenge the traditions that their leaders are promoting without 
the fear of a backlash.  
Various democratic dialogue models that incorporate women‘s voices (and 
preferably brokered by NGOs and the state) should also be deployed to 
resolve problematic cultural practices. 111  In other words, women are or 
should be the ones ‗pushing back‘ against their traditional leaders‘ 
retrogressive cultural positions. Bond 112  vouches for the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and People‘s Rights in Africa as a tool for 
strengthening women‘s agency in engaging with traditional leaders in 
localised dialogue in order to shift the latter‘s position regarding the value of 
                                               
108 Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism Without Culture, vol. 8 (Princeton University Press, 2007), 
163 cited in Susan H. Williams, ‗Democracy, Gender Equality, and Customary Law: 
Constitutionalising Internal Cultural Disruption,‘ (2011), 70. 
109 Johanna Bond, ‗Gender, Discourse and Customary Law in Africa,‘ (2010), 511. 
110 Sarah Song, Justice, Gender and the Politics of Multiculturalism (Cambridge University Press, 
2007); Judith Squires, Culture, Equality and Diversity (Polity Press, 2002); Monique Deveaux, 
Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice (Cornell University Press, 2000); Seyla Benhabib, The 
Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era, (2002) cited in Susan H. Williams, 
‗Democracy, Gender Equality, and Customary Law: Constitutionalising Internal Cultural 
Disruption,‘ (2011). 
111 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era, (2002); Judith 
Squires, Culture, Equality and Diversity, (2002); Monique Deveaux, Cultural Pluralism and 
Dilemmas of Justice, (2000); Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the 
Global Era, (2002); Sarah Song, Justice, Gender and the Politics of Multiculturalism, (2007). 




advancing women‘s rights (and finding a win-win solution for human rights 
and tradition in the process).113 The ‗dialogue model,‘ is certainly different 
from the phenomenon of community bylaws, although one could argue that 
dialogue can create the space for community bylaws dialogue – and this has 
not been exploited so far in literature.   
It has been argued that the idea that the mindsets of traditional leaders are 
typically inclined towards reinforcing culturally-driven women‘s rights 
abuses has led to programmatic top-down responses that ‗target‘ traditional 
leaders.114  For example, Wendon and Wallace 115  have reported that some 
African NGOs have opened paths for gender equality by forging alliances 
with traditional leaders, who in turn have created opportunities for 
mainstreaming gender equality in village systems.116 The harmful practices 
literature analysed below makes a similar claim. In seeking to study in detail 
the activism of Chiefs in the area of harmful practices, this thesis provides a 
better understanding of the role of traditional leaders as ‗change targets‘ in 
their own right. 
2.4 THE LITERATURE ON LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER MEASURES ON HARMFUL 
PRACTICES  
This section engages the literature on harmful practices to unveil the type of 
issues that have occupied this literature so far, and to demonstrate its 
deficiencies. Two main gaps are noted: the absence of community bylaws in 
the literature on harmful practices; and bias towards top-down interventions 
in dealing with harmful practices in academic literature.  
                                               
113 Ibid., 550. 
114 Chapter 4 demonstrates that this approach is heavily bolstered by international human 
rights jurisprudence.  
115 Senorina Wendoh and Tina Wallace, ‗Re-thinking Gender Mainstreaming in African NGOs 
and Communities,‘ (2005). 




Research reports on harmful practices in Malawi have mostly investigated 
various forms of harmful practices from a health perspective. Several 
researches have focused on the HIV and AIDS, 117  while a 2015 study 
examined the impact of traditional practices on young people‘s sexual and 
reproductive health rights.118 As for academic literature, Kaime119 provides 
anecdotal evidence on how the harmful practice of initiation fisi120 has been 
eliminated in some Malawian communities by village elders who have 
advised women who manage the initiation ceremonies that the practice was 
no longer necessary. 121  In relying on anecdotes, Kaime does not provide 
contextual information of where these changes have occurred, but it does not 
seem that the changes by ‗village elders‘ (who may or may not be Chiefs) 
were prompted by anything more than dialogue between them and 
outsiders.122  
                                               
117 Malawi Human Rights Commission, Harmful Practices in Malawi (2006); Olivia M‘chaju 
Liwewe and Priscilla Upasani Matinga, ‗Socio-Cultural Gender-Based Factors that Contribute 
to Women and Girls Vulnerability to HIV/AIDS Infection in Mulanje and Thyolo Districts ‘ 
(2005); WLSA Malawi, ‗Women, HIV and AIDS in Six Districts in Malawi: Balancing the 
Equation Between Women‘s Grounded Realities and the Appropriateness of the Response,‘ 
(2009). 
118 Government of Malawi and UNFPA, Cultural Practices Study Report: Safeguarding Young 
People (UNFPA, 2015). 
119 Thoko Kaime, ‗The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Cultural Legitimacy of 
Children's Rights in Africa: Some Reflections,‘ African Human Rights Law Journal (5)2 (2005), 
221-238. 
120 Fisi means hyena, connoting a man who comes under the cover of darkness. The word has 
two meanings. The first one relates to girls‘ initiation, whereby a fisi, whose identity is hidden 
from the initiated girls will have sexual intercourse with the initiates as an initiation ritual. 
The second meaning relates to a practice whereby a fisi is hired by a family to impregnate a 
wife whose husband is impotent. 
121 Thoko Kaime, ‗The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Cultural Legitimacy of 
Children's Rights in Africa: Some Reflections,‘ (2005), 235-236. 
122  Kaime asserts that the village elders were approached (it is not clear by who, but 
presumably by HIV and AIDS advocates/NGOs) and advised to do away with the practice 
because it was putting many people at risk of HIV. At first, the elders resisted and justified 
the practice, but later relented when the issue was reframed from being about the CRC, to an 
issue of ensuring that girls were not dying early due to HIV (thus depriving the community 
of potential wives) or growing up as sickly and unhealthy women as they went into marriage 




Page‘s123 doctoral study analysed the relationship between the practice of 
fisi 124  in the HIV context in Malawi, but without paying attention to 
community ‗legal‘ orderings to address the practice.125  Lee-Rife et al.‘s 126 
review of 23 child marriage prevention programmes in Malawi and other 
low-income countries only evaluates a cash transfer intervention that was 
implemented in Zomba district as an incentive for girls education.127 None of 
the other interventions reviewed identify community bylaws as a 
programmatic approach that has been used to respond to the harmful practice 
of child marriage whether in Malawi or elsewhere.128  
As for the broader academic literature, Longman and Bradley‘s 129  recent 
edited volume titled Interrogating Harmful Cultural Practices: Gender, Culture 
and Coercion seeks to address the gap of the scarce application of the term 
‗harmful cultural practices‘ in research reports and academic literature 
despite its common usage by activists and policy makers. Drawing on an 
impressive line-up of multi-disciplinary scholars, the volume critically 
engages with the concept of and approaches towards harmful cultural 
practices from diverse perspectives. 130  However, none of its chapters 
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and HIV/AIDS in Africa (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). 
124 See note 120 and the Glossary of Chichewa Terms. 
125  Samantha Page, ‗Narratives of Blame HIV/AIDS and Harmful Cultural Practices in 
Malawi: Implications for Policies and Programmes ‘ (2014). 
126  Susan Lee-Rife, Anju Malhotra, Ann Warner, and Allison McGonagle Glinski, ‗What 
Works to Prevent Child Marriage: A Review of the Evidence,‘ Studies in Family Planning (43)4 
(2012) . 
127 Ibid., 287-303. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Chia Longman and Tamsin Bradley, ‗Interrogating the Concept of ―Harmful Cultural 
Practices‖,‘ in Interrogating Harmful Cultural Practices: Gender, Culture and Coercion, ed. Chia 
Longman and Tamsin Bradley (Routledge, 2016). 
130  Including: strategies for documenting and monitoring persistent harmful cultural 
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harmful cultural practices interventions; tensions between the regulation of, and discourses 
on certain practices affecting minority women; the practical meanings of concepts such as 
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addresses community bylaws. Even Page‘s chapter, which draws on her 
doctoral study on the harmful cultural practice of fisi,131 referred to earlier, 
does not discuss community bylaws.132  
Ewelukwa133 has alluded to something that is faintly similar to community 
bylaws. Noting in the context of Nigerian widowhood practices that ‗customs 
have changed only when a traditional ruler was insistent on change‘, 134 
Ewelukwa‘s article shows how the willingness of traditional rulers and 
village elders to accept change in some communities has enabled local women  
(inspired by NGOs and influences from neighbouring communities) to 
successfully influence changes in some practices. 135  The article provides 
information on the concrete efforts communities had taken to eradicate 
harmful widowhood practices such as establishing committees to investigate 
the plight of widows, setting new shorter timelines for conducting 
widowhood rites136 and mourning rites,137 and creating offences for exceeding 
these timelines.138  Some communities had even discarded the practice of 
shaving a widow's hair, labeling it ‗unnecessary and humiliating.‘ 139 
According to Ewelukwa, these changes usually resulted from periods of 
                                                                                                                                      
circumcision dialogue, particularly where the ‗harmed‘ contest the existence of harm; the 
relevance of in-depth contextual and intersectional analysis in preventing harmful vaginal 
practices; the conflict between developmental progress and indicators of the reduction of 
violence against women in dowry harassment terms; and the challenges of arguing for the 
eradication of the practice of lip-plates on the basis of the discomfort of outsider ‗others,‘ 
despite the comfort of the women ‗inside‘—Chia Longman and Tamsin Bradley, eds., 
Interrogating Harmful Cultural Practices: Gender, Culture and Coercion (Routledge, 2016). 
131 See note 120 and the Glossary of Chichewa Terms. 
132  Samantha Page, ‗"Narratives of Blame" Surrounding HIV and AIDS Eradication Policies 
and Sexual Cultural Practices in Malawi,‘ in Interrogating Harmful Cultural Practices: Gender, 
Culture and Coercion, ed. Chia Longman and Tamsin Bradley (Routledge, 2016), 67-80. 
133 Uche U. Ewelukwa, ‗Post-Colonialism, Gender, Customary Injustice: Widows in African 
Societies,‘ (2002). 
134 Ibid., 473. 
135 Ibid., 472. 
136 In Illah, from three months to one month (with hopes to further reduce it to seven days). 
137 In Enugwu-Ukwu, the mourning period of twenty-eight days had been reduced to twelve 
days, with further talks by the traditional ruler to have it reduced to seven days. The 
mourning period was reduced to four days in Abua. 
138 Uche U. Ewelukwa, ‗Post-Colonialism, Gender, Customary Injustice: Widows in African 
Societies,‘ (2002), 472-473. 




deliberations, negotiations, and consensus building. Sometimes, the 
traditional ruler and his advisers would make the final decision after listening 
to community members.140  
Ewelukwa‘s insights are important as they provide a fleeting taste of how, 
outside legislative weaponry, the political will of traditional leaders is pivotal 
to the renegotiation and reformulation of local rules on cultural practices. 
However, Ewelukwa still is pessimistic about the traditional rulers, arguing 
that left to their own devices (without state guidelines), traditional leaders‘ 
support for patriarchal ideologies present an obstacle to reform.141  He makes 
this argument even though he has not studied the ‗local rules‘ in detail to 
fully comprehend their dynamics, how they relate to international human 
rights norms, and their potential in addressing harmful practices.  
While some scholars have contended that harmful practices would be 
prevented by legal and policy measures, 142  others have criticised this 
approach. Omeje143 has criticised the emphasis that intellectuals and social 
activists have laid on the legislative prohibition and elimination of harmful 
tradition practices.144 Other scholars have questioned assumptions behind the 
reliance on legislative measures in addressing harmful practices generally145 
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(2012), 231-240 231; John Tobin, ‗The International Obligation to Abolish Traditional Practices 
Harmful to Children's Health: What Does it Mean and Require of States?,‘ Human Rights Law 
Review (9)3 (2009), 373-396 389. 
143 Kenneth Omeje, ‗Sexual Exploitation of Cult Women: The Challenges of Problematising 
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144 Ibid., 45. 
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Reproductive Rights of Women in South Africa,‘ Journal of International Women's Studies (16)3 
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and FGM. 146  Legislation alone cannot accomplish the task of uprooting 
practices that run generations deep.147 In some cases, legislation has failed to 
respond to specific contexts (including to guarantee equality), 148  and has 
enjoyed little practical implementation on the ground,149 especially in remote 
villages.150  
As a result, scholars have recommended extra measures, mostly top-down 
too, such as public education and sensitisation. Ssenyonjo151 contends that it is 
possible to transform deep-rooted practices through public education at 
global, regional, national and local levels.152 Similarly, in their analysis of 
harmful traditional practices that limit women‘s rights, Durojaye et al.153 press 
for education and awareness campaigns and the adoption of affirmative 
action in political and socio-economic spheres over and above legal 
reforms.154 For his part, Mubangizi155 recommends a ‗holistic approach that 
includes advocacy, human rights education, change of patriarchal mindsets 
                                               
146 For example Jo Boyden, Alula Pankhurst, and Yisak Tafere, ‗Child Protection and Harmful 
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Child and the Cultural Legitimacy of Children's Rights in Africa: Some Reflections,‘ (2005). 
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153 Ebenezer Durojaye, Bridget Okoye, and Adetoun Adebanjo, ‗Harmful Cultural Practices 
and Gender Equality in Nigeria,‘ Gender and Behaviour (12)1 (2014), 6169-6181. 
154 Ibid., 6178-6180. 
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and political will‘.156 Key players in this regard are women, men, civil society 
organisations (CSOs), the judiciary and the state. 157  In another article, 
Mubangizi158 highlights the crucial role that women‘s rights NGOs play in 
devising solutions to the problems of harmful cultural practices.159 Walker160 
argues for a sub-regional strategy to address child marriage, and observes 
that programmes that have complemented legal measures for preventing 
child marriage have included those providing educational and economic 
support (through donor funds).161 All these scholarly contributions have not 
examined the potential role of community bylaws in eliminating harmful 
practices. 
In the context of FGM, Cottingham and Kismodi 162  recommend that 
legislative measures should be bolstered by outreach efforts conducted by 
CSOs, government and other players.163 While recognising that community-
led action is essential to addressing the social stigma around those who shun 
FGM, and that community leaders can help to achieve accelerated progress on 
the elimination of FGM, community bylaws have not yet been considered as 
an option.164 Tobin165 also promotes education as a complementary measure, 
noting that awareness raising and sensitisation campaigns have to be 
anchored in dialogue and community participation.166 While Tobin is wary of 
the emphasis on ‗expert driven solutions‘ that do not sufficiently engage 
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Traditions,‘ (2012). 
159 Ibid., 46. 
160 Judith-Ann Walker, ‗Early Marriage in Africa–Trends, Harmful Effects and Interventions,‘ 
(2012). 
161 Ibid., 231. 
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concerned communities,167 his proposed ‗community campaigns‘ still imply 
the involvement of outside knowers who come and educate grassroots 
communities. Unlike this approach, Mackie and LeJeune 168  call for 
transformative human rights education strategies that pursue the promotion 
of international human rights norms without necessarily trivialising local 
values and practices.169 
Other scholars have suggested dealing with harmful traditional practices 
through legal reforms to African customary law systems. This approach 
represents another top-down standpoint. For example, Mubangizi 170  is 
convinced that courts and the legislature are most competent to reform and 
develop customary law systems that can protect women from harmful 
cultural practices. 171  In their review of harmful traditional practices that 
violate women‘s rights in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) region, Wadesango et al.172 recommend that SADC states should use 
legal and policy measures to ‗address the experience of the dual legal system 
and unyielding patriarchal cultural attitudes‘,173 without further elaboration.  
It is clear that customary law and formal state systems alone cannot fully 
eliminate harmful cultural practices. Neither can the reform of such systems. 
In fact, the emergence of community bylaws in Malawi suggests that recent 
legal reforms and measures on harmful practices have not succeeded in 
eliminating these practices.  
                                               
167 Ibid. 
168 Gerry Mackie and John LeJeune, ‗Social Dynamics of Abandonment of Harmful Practices: 
A New Look at the Theory ‘, Special Series on Social Norms and Harmful Practices (UNICEF 
Innocenti Research Centre, 2009). 
169 Ibid. 
170 John Cantius Mubangizi, ‗A South African Perspective on the Clash between Culture and 
Human Rights, with Particular Reference to Gender-Related Cultural Practices and 
Traditions,‘ (2012). 
171 Ibid., 46. In relation to the role of courts and the legislature respectively, Mubangizi argues 
that courts can strike down customary law aspects offensive to the Bill of Rights; and the 
legislature can pass laws that reform customary law. 
172 Newman Wadesango, Symphorosa Rembe, and Owence Chabaya, ‗Violation of Women‘s 
Rights by Harmful Traditional Practices,‘ (2012). 




This thesis cautions against drawing the hasty conclusion that the community 
bylaws are deliberately vernacularising state law and human rights norms. 
However, the thesis is not the first to adopt such a cautious approach. 
Kaime174 for example, has rejected simplistic and elitist legislative solutions 
that seek to replace harmful traditional norms with human rights norms, 
urging governments and CSOs to design interventions that are ‗culturally 
legitimate, grounded and localised‘.175 Such interventions, he argues, have a 
higher potential of promoting child rights successfully in Africa.176  
Though this thesis argues that such a starting point is still top-down, Kaime‘s 
application of An-Naim‘s177 concept of ‗internal criteria of legitimacy‘178 is of 
interest to this study. The underlying philosophy is that the procedures used 
to challenge negative culture must be acceptable to members of the culture 
(procedural legitimacy); and that the proposed alternatives must speak to the 
needs and expectations of the members (substantive legitimacy). 179 According 
to An-Na‘im, cultural change can best be sustainably gained and managed if 
internally driven by insiders and their own debates about their situation.180   
While both Kaime and An-Na‘im engage the concept of ‗internal criteria of 
legitimacy‘ from perspectives of children‘s rights and related interventions, 
the empirical chapters of this thesis explore whether processes similar to the 
concept are manifesting in the way community bylaws are emerging and 
being conceptualised in rural Malawi. This will help to uncover new forms 
and strategies of vernacularising human rights ideas that are missing from the 
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existing vernacularisation discourse. 
2.5 NORM INTERNALISTION AND VERNACULARISATION SCHOLARSHIP  
Chapter 3 discusses norm internalisation and vernacularisation literature 
from a conceptual point. Illustrative examples from this literature show that 
scholars have not engaged the concepts of norm internalisation and 
vernacularisation from the context of community bylaws and harmful 
practices. Therefore, unique ways in which vernacularisation plays out in the 
phenomenon of community bylaws on harmful practices are not understood. 
Merry‘s181 work builds understanding about how transnational human rights 
approaches to VAW are adopted in local contexts. However, her ‗local‘ is not 
local ‗legal‘ orders such as community bylaws. Sarfaty182 only engages norm 
internalisation and vernacularisation in the context of indigenous people 
seeking self-determination. Using South Korea as case study, Cheng 183 traces 
how international human rights norms on trafficking in persons and women‘s 
rights become appropriated and translated into anti-prostitution polices.184  
Several scholars recognise relevance of local mechanisms in norm 
internalisation, but not in the context of phenomenon such as community 
bylaws. Zwingel185 appreciates that ‗the label of norm internalisation‘ fails to 
expose diverse processes that unfold domestically after the state‘s treaty 
ratification.186 However, she does not allude to harmful practices or local 
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processes such as community bylaws. Rajam and Zararia187 acknowledge that 
textbook rights must translate into lived rights in local communities;188 and 
that villagers may consciously or unconsciously translate global human rights 
discourses to local contexts. 189  However, the authors were not studying 
community bylaws or harmful practices; nor did they conceptualise the 
micro-processes of vernacularisation as performed by this thesis.  Zwart190 
argues that local institutions are essential to the full implementation of 
international human rights191 without an examination of the mechanisms of 
local ‗laws‘ or even the institution of Chiefs. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that a human rights culture has to be developed in 
local communities by epistemic outsiders. It is presumed that NGO human 
rights projects in local communities work towards change by reframing 
communities‘ psychology.192  Other authors have argued that communities 
should be supported to change towards increased respect for the human 
dignity of women and other societal members.193  In other words, human 
rights would hardly permeate local communities without the intervention of 
epistemic intermediaries.194 The prospect that NGOs‘/external interventions 
may only be complementary to already existing locally/traditionally driven 
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190 Tom Zwart, ‗Using Local Culture to Further the Implementation of International Human 
Rights: The Receptor Approach,‘ Human Rights Quarterly (34) (2012), 546-567. 
191 Ibid., 547. 
192 Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local 
Justice (2006a), 136; Sally Engle Merry, ‗Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: 
Mapping the Middle,‘ (2006b) 38-51 41 & 49. 
193 Rachel Sieder and John-Andrew McNeish, Gender Justice and Legal Pluralities: Latin America 
and African Perspectives, (2013), 14-15. 
194 Peggy Levitt and Sally Merry, ‗Vernacularisation on the Ground: Local Uses of Global 
Women's Rights in Peru, China, India and the United States,‘ Global networks (9)4 (2009); 
Benjamin Gregg, ‗Translating Human Rights into Muslim Vernaculars,‘ Comparative Sociology 
(7)4 (2008); Lynette J. Chua, ‗The Vernacular Mobilisation of Human Rights in Myanmar's 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Movement,‘ Law & Society Review (49)2 (2015); David 
M. Engel, ‗Vertical and Horizontal Perspectives on Rights Consciousness,‘ Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies (19)2 (2012); Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: 




efforts that are challenging negative (cultural) practices from within is not 
considered.  
All this scholarship demonstrates that vernacularisation is centred on 
unicameral programming in which the knowledgeable ‗outsider‘ 
conceptualises, transfers and adapts human rights ideas to the local. It is not 
seen as a bicameral exercise, whereby the conceptualisation, transfer and 
adaptation of human rights ideas may, consciously or unconsciously, also be 
sparked locally.   
2.6 CONCLUSION 
There is clearly a dearth of academic scholarship on community bylaws and 
their role in eliminating harmful cultural practices and promoting women's 
rights. The little that alludes to these bylaws lacks a full understanding of 
these initiatives, and do not address harmful practices in general or analyse 
the extent to which these initiatives represent instances of human rights norm 
internalisation/vernacularisation. While some literature acknowledges that 
rural interventions may not necessarily be motivated by human rights norms 
and related legislative developments,195 this has not been made after studying 
community bylaws on harmful practices and promoting gender equality. 
Even multi-disciplinary literature has not yet given attention to these bylaws 
or offered an explanation of how (and why) African communities such as 
those under study are mobilising themselves to protect women and girls from 
harmful practices.  
A few reports of a non-academic nature have focused on community bylaws 
in the Malawian context, but these have been largely descriptive and centred 
on specific projects, and have not asked the question whether these bylaws 
represent a form of norm internalisation and how they can be explained 
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within the context of legal pluralism. Other reports on harmful practices in 
Malawi have neglected community bylaws altogether or the role of Chiefs in 
promoting and protecting women‘s rights.  
The empirical chapters of this thesis (Chapters 7 to 9) will contribute to this 
literature by firmly locating community bylaws and the activist role of Chiefs 
in relation to harmful practices, as well as the legal pluralism discourse; 
applying norm internalisation theories to grassroots and Chief-led 
community bylaws; and reconceptualising vernacularisation in order to show 
that human rights ideas do not only get appropriated and translated through 
externally driven programming, but also horizontally through locally-driven 
activism. The next chapter discusses how, from a women‘s rights perspective, 







INTERNALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
Demonstrating that international human rights norms for protecting women 
and girls from harmful practices have shaped and influenced the emergence 
and conceptualisation of community bylaws on child marriage and other 
harmful practices in rural Malawi in unanticipated ways draws attention to 
two conceptual issues. The first issue is how scholars have conceptualised 
norm internalisation generally, and vernacularisation particularly. This 
analysis is critical to the thesis objective of contributing to the theoretical 
discourse on norm internalisation by assessing and testing if the phenomenon 
of community bylaws reveals other concepts that are at play when 
culture/custom is the action ground.  
The second issue is to understand debates about culture, customary law and 
human rights, given that vernacularisation connects culture and human 
rights, which are at times seen as incompatible. This discussion contributes to 
another objective of the thesis: to examine the relationship between the 
community bylaws and African (living) customary law within the broader 
context of legal pluralism.  
 The analysis departs from the premise that norm internalisation, anchored in 




of international human rights norms on domestic scenes.196 While the thesis is 
multi-disciplinary, it is located in constructivist norm diffusion scholarship 
since the thesis considers vernacularisation 197 (to be an essential conceptual 
and process tool for the internalisation of international human rights norms 
protecting women from harmful practices at local level) .198  
Vernacularisation identifies with the ‗second wave‘ of norm diffusion 
scholarship focusing on domestic political structures and the agency of norm 
recipients (as opposed to the ‗first wave‘, interested in international systems 
and moral cosmopolitanism). 199  Some scholars have called this ‗a second 
wave of normative change scholarship‘200 or ‗cross-cultural dynamics of norm 
diffusion‘,201 which focuses on how non-Western norm recipients contest and 
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reinterpret (Western) norms. 202  An emerging ‗third wave‘ scholarship is 
portraying non-Westerners as norm makers too.203 
Vernacularisation 204  is the preferred conceptual model of analysis to 
localisation.205 Localisation depicts 'how universal human rights norms are 
translated and adapted to local contexts'.206 Although some of the ideas in 
localisation and vernacularisation connect (e.g. framing, cultural fit), world 
politics scholarship has mostly positioned the ‗local‘ sphere under the concept 
of localisation at macro level (regional, sub-regional or state).207 Therefore, the 
limitation of localisation is that it ‗focuses on macro level processes with no 
explanation of how they affect micro level undertakings and vice versa‘.208 On 
its part, vernacularisation engages how international human rights ideas and 
practices seep deeper into and are made resonant with lived realities of 
small(er) communities.209 Thus the vernacularisation discourse has ‗produced 
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more nuanced terminology‘210 that, one might add, accommodates an equally 
nuanced explanation of the emergence of community bylaws for addressing 
harmful practices in Malawi, and the factors/actors that have influenced their 
emergence and content. 
The next section starts with a definition of norms. This is followed by an 
analysis of the models of norm internalisation, and vernacularisation. Then, 
an examination of culture and human rights, as well as customary law and 
living customary law is conducted in order to offer a conceptual basis for 
analysing the relationship between the community bylaws and African 
(living) customary law.  
The chapter ends with a conclusion that demonstrates that vernacularisation 
is an important analytical framework for this study. Therefore, 
vernacularisation will be empirically tested in Chapters 7 to 9 in order to 
establish whether the community bylaws in rural Malawi are displaying all 
predicted facets of vernacularisation, or whether they are introducing new 
lenses of understanding vernacularisation. The conclusion also isolates key 
issues in debates surrounding African (living) customary law, which too are 
empirically analysed in Chapter 8, order to establish the legal character of 
community bylaws within legal pluralism discourse.  
3.2  WHAT ARE NORMS?  
Different definitions of norms abound. Finnemore and Sikkink,211 pioneers of 
the ‗norm life cycle model‘ discussed in section 3.3, define a norm as ‗a 
standard of appropriate behaviour of actors with a given identity‘. 212 
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Kardam213 and Cortell et al. 214 adopt Krasner‘s215 description that norms are 
‗standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations‘.216 This 
definition resonates with the human rights inclination of this thesis as it 
directly invokes the expectation that norms should yield the obligation (if not 
action) to conform to certain standards of protecting, promoting and fulfilling 
specific rights. According to Kardam, gender equality norms provide 
benchmarks for addressing discrimination.217 An international norm develops 
when appropriated by many states. 218  Liebowitz and Zwingel219  flag that 
norms are never cast in stone, but are being ‗constantly re-negotiated‘.220 
The various descriptions of norms are important to the thesis because, on the 
one hand, the community bylaws for addressing harmful practices are hinged 
on normative shifts within cultural norms and identities. On the other hand, 
these shifts are occurring amidst the state‘s aspirations to adhere to 
international human rights norms. Notably, the descriptions portray that 
norms exist at both international (the source) and domestic levels (the 
destination). However, Zwingel221 argues that gender-related norms cannot 
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be sorted in the ‗global versus local order‘, as global, regional, national, and 
local contexts are unified.222 This view resonates with the thesis, which is 
visibilising ‗the local‘ as a key player, not only in receiving norms protecting 
women and girls from child marriage and other harmful practices, but also in 
positively reconstructing its cultural norms, sometimes without the ‗help‘ and 
tools of orthodox ‗translating actors‘.223  
That the protection of women from harmful practices is irrefutably an 
international human rights norm, will be established in Chapter 4. Since the 
thesis is interested in how such norms are internalised in the emergence and 
conceptualisation of community bylaws in Malawi, it is worthwhile to 
understand what norm internalisation implies.  
3.3 SOCIALISATION: THE PATH TOWARDS NORM INTERNALISATION  
Socialisation allows the domestic establishment of international norms to 
occur. 224  According to early norm diffusion scholarship, the diffusion of 
international norms into local practices is explained by the ‗socialisation 
process‘– ‘an induction of new members into ways of behaviour that are 
preferred in society‘.225 Socialisation of a norm implies that global norms have 
been accepted and applied in a national context to facilitate change.226  
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Risse227 advances five stages of a spiral model through which the socialisation 
of international human rights norms into domestic practices happens. The 
first is repression, whereby an international community, which has enough 
information about a norm-violating state, decides to hold it accountable, 
especially if there is no domestic opposition to the violations.228  The second 
stage is denial, when the norm-violating state asserts its autonomy and rejects 
the norms being advanced by the international community.229 The third stage 
is tactical concession, when escalating international pressure prompts the 
norm-violating state to make appeasement cosmetic changes.230 The fourth 
stage is prescriptive status, and occurs when the norm-violating state ratifies 
and domesticates relevant treaties. The last stage is rule consistent behaviour, 
whereby international norms are fully institutionalised domestically, are 
enforced by law, and are consistently observed.231  
Thus, norm internalisation is the term given to the domestic aspect of the 
socialisation theory, under the seminal ‗norm life cycle‘ model of Finnemore 
and Sikkink. 232   The ‗norm life cycle‘ explains how international norms 
develop and impact on the domestic arena. The first step is norm emergence, 
whereby so-called ‗norm entrepreneurs‘ intensely advocate for states to 
spearhead the adoption of new norms. This folds into the second step of the 
norm cascade, where states socialise each other to turn from ‗norm breakers 
into norm followers‘.233 In the third and last stage, called norm internalisation, 
the norms become routinely accepted in official domestic systems.234 
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Since the first and second stages of Finnemore and Sikkink‘s norm life cycle 
model 235  are transnational episodes, this thesis is interested in the norm 
internalisation stage. 236  The concept of norm internalisation also directly 
applies to the stages of prescriptive status and rule consistent behaviour in 
the spiral model of Risse, and provides a good starting point for unpacking 
what norm diffusion means in the domestic arena. However, one should be 
mindful that across states, there may be enabling and impeding factors to the 
internalisation of some norms compared to others.237  
As the empirical chapters will show, one has to be conscious of the fact that 
the phenomenon of community bylaws on child marriage and other harmful 
practices does not tidily fit into the ‗international to domestic‘ flow of events 
predicted by the models discussed above. However, the existing scholarship 
still inspires some questions for the empirical chapters. For example, in what 
ways does the community bylaws narrative influence how we should look at 
socialisation beyond the transnational market, i.e. when the socialiser and the 
socialised may share local quarters?  
The stage of norm internalisation in Finnemore and Sikkink‘s norm life cycle 
raises three main issues. It is believed that socialisation results in a) the 
alteration of domestic beliefs and attitudes in conformity with the imported 
norms; b) the consistent following of the norms, and c) the routine acceptance 
of the norms in daily life.238 These are all profound tangible normative shifts 
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attributed to socialisation. However, such changes cannot just be assumed or 
generalised by sketchily looking at institutional changes.  
This thesis concurs with the view that it is one thing to suggest that (seeds of) 
legal ideas, institutions and practices produced in the global North have been 
planted in recipient societies elsewhere; it is quite another thing to conclude 
that once planted, the legal ideas and institutions tend to predominate over 
the legal order that they encounter. 239  A cautious appraisal of norm 
internalisation is necessary to expose the intricacies of the theory, and 
demonstrate where vernacularisation plays a role in engineering substantive 
norm diffusion at local levels.  
3.4  NORM INTERNALISATION AT DOMESTIC LEVEL 
Understanding norm internalisation (as a broader concept) is helpful because 
the practicalities behind the phenomenon of community bylaws on child 
marriage and other harmful practices in Malawi are challenging norm 
internalisation in general, and vernacularisation in particular, as currently 
theorised. As it has been observed, ‗translation of international norms to 
national and local levels remains elusive, and there are many gaps between 
global norms and local responses when it comes to implementation‘.240 
3.4.1 The Broad Conceptualisation of Norm Internalisation 
The internalisation of international norms has been defined as ‗a process by 
which states incorporate international law concepts into domestic practice‘.241 
Indicators of norm internalisation include the integration of the norms into 
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domestic formal legal systems and into domestic administrative 
arrangements.242 In agreement, Cortell and Davis243 provide two indicators of 
an international norm that has been domesticated – action towards shifting a 
domestic policy agenda; and changes in national institutions to suit the 
norm.244    
To the extent that norm internalisation entails that gender equality measures 
created in domestic settings have a direct correlation with international 
norms,245 there is no dispute in Malawi about the ‗internalisation status‘ of the 
international human rights norms protecting women from harmful 
practices.246  Therefore, Malawi has surpassed the first three stages of the 
spiral model (repression, denial and tactical concession), and is now perched 
somewhere within the band of internalisation, as defined by Finnemore and 
Sikkink‘s norm life cycle model.  
Henkin‘s 247  asserts that the acceptance of an international norm will be 
evident in formal state mechanisms and people‘s lives.248  While Henkin‘s 
view, as well as Finnemore and Sikkink‘s norm life cycle model discussed 
above only consider the ‗international to local‘ movement of norms, it is 
pragmatic to view this top-down approach as being unavoidable since states 
have given prominence to international human rights law in the last few 
decades. Besides, the whole notion of norm internalisation departs from the 
premise that there is a ‗higher standard‘ (international norm) that should be 
obeyed.  
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Of course this is not to accept the moral cosmopolitan view that ‗universal 
norms are good, and norms that are situated in local beliefs and practices 
should be maligned‘.249 Rather, the challenge lies in that there is a blurred 
conceptualisation of how norm internalisation percolates beyond formal 
domestication of international norms and formal institutional changes to 
reach rural settings dominated by customary law, tradition and practices in 
the African context (such as the community bylaws under study).   
On the other hand, the top-down presumption ignores the existence of active 
engagement between global and local spheres, which can result in the local‘s 
acceptance or refusal to appropriate transnational norms.250 As Goodman and 
Jinks251 noted, the fact that a state has publicly subscribed to global norms 
does not automatically translate into their private acceptance. 252  Thus the 
analysis of vernacularisation below illustrates that it is problematic to regard 
norm internalisation as a strict one-lane process (international to local).253 
Indeed, the empirical chapters challenge assumptions that efforts by rural 
societies in Malawi to address harmful practices through community bylaws 
are exclusively about the desire to internalise human rights.  
Of course, in arguing for the two-way interactive process, one should not 
underestimate the significance that the norm internationalisation model 
propounded by Finnmore and Sikkink gives to institutional changes, 
especially because of the security that such institutional changes promise – 
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namely, that the internalisation is meaningful, concrete and durable. In short, 
norm internalisation is not linear, but multifaceted. 254 It is a complex notion 
that is realised in widely differing domestic processes. 255  It is therefore 
important, as Berman256 contends, to understand ‗how norm internalisation 
actually takes place outside of official organs of government‘.257 Particularly, 
there is a need to understand how norms become real for ordinary people,258 
and how informal norms affect the acceptance of international norms in local 
communities.259  
Norms only have influence when they are actively interpreted and 
appropriated nationally and locally.260 This is why vernacularisation is key to 
appreciating how norm internalisation pervades local spaces.  
3.4.2 Norm Internalisation through Vernacularisation 
3.4.2.1   Definition 
In the human rights discourse, vernacularisation is closely associated with 
anthropologist Sally Engle Merry, whose seminal work initially defined the 
vernacularisation process as ‗one of appropriation and translation‘.261 Merry 
defines appropriation as ‗taking the programmes, interventions and ideas 
developed by activists in one local transnational setting and implementing 
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them in another‘.262 She further defines translation as ‗the process of adjusting 
the rhetoric and structure of these interventions to local environments‘.263   
Notably, the concept of translation has been perceived slightly differently in 
other definitions of vernacularisation by Merry (and collaborators). For 
example, Levitt et al. 264  delinked translation from the meaning of 
vernacularisation, contending that the two terms are somewhat distinct. 265 
Their argument was that in translation, translators simply communicate 
something to make it comprehensible and build awareness. But in 
vernacularisation, apart from awareness, vernacularisers adapt and 
reinterpret an idea with intent to assimilate it into local norms.266 Therefore, 
they defined vernacularisation as ‗the process of appropriation and 
customisation‘.267 
In another collaborative work, Levitt and Merry268 defined vernacularisation 
as ‗the process of appropriation and local adoption of globally generated 
ideas and strategies‘. 269  Their subsequent work more elaborately defined 
vernacularisation as the multi-faceted process of meaning making that 
happens at the local sites where human rights discourse and other local social 
justice discourses meet.270 Then Merry and Levitt‘s271 recent work embraces 
translation again in the definition of vernacularisation, saying ‗the 
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vernacularisation process involves the extraction of ideas and practices from 
the universal sphere of international organisations and their translation into 
ideas and practices that resonate with the values and ways of doing things in 
local contexts‘. 272 Thus women‘s rights vernacularisation involves contextual 
translation, with NGOs strategically adapting the rights to local meanings. 273 
Indeed, translation features as a vernacularisation modality in other 
scholarship. For instance, Rajam and Zararia274 illustrate that if translation is 
broken down into specific meaning processes, it is inseparable from 
vernacularisation itself. Such meaning-making processes of translation 
include recuperation (done through presentations that adapt historical 
concepts and traditionally respected symbols/figures to promote a new 
human rights idea); hybridisation (integrating formal language/processes 
into local meanings and processes); simplification (e.g. using communication 
means relatable to both literate and illiterate consumers); and 
compartmentalisation (process of sieving and purposively selecting ideas). 275  
New kinds of translation are also being introduced, e.g. Golan and Orr‘s276 
‗triangular translation‘, 277 and Bettiza and Dionigi‘s 278  ‗institutional 
translation‘.279 The empirical chapters demonstrate that other new forms of 
translation are evident within the community bylaws discourse. Therefore, 
the thesis prefers to use definitions that regard translation as key to 
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vernacularisation. Attaching translation to the definition of vernacularisation 
eliminates ambiguities about the task of making sense of, and changing global 
human rights ideas into local form.  
According to Merry,280 translation happens in three moves. First, translation is 
achieved through the use of frames (images, symbols and stories) that 
communicate the programme using locally contexualised ‗narratives and 
conceptions‘. 281  Second, translation occurs by adapting the appropriated 
programme to the new locality and its systems.282 Thirdly, translation occurs 
by selecting an appropriate target group for the translated programme.283  
Translation happens in three ways: 
a) Transnational human rights ideas and practices circulate to small 
communities through deliberate and active ‗transplant‘ processes, with 
the goal of having them assimilated and accepted locally. 284 
b) These human rights ideas and practices are not casually transferred to 
micro settings, but are purposively adapted, reinterpreted, reframed 
and presented in ways that resonate with the local cultural norms, 
values and practices. 285  The purpose is to make human rights 
meaningful in local contexts.286 
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c) Vernacularisation has some trade-offs: while women‘s human rights 
ideas do not utterly lose their original sense when interpreted locally, 
they also inevitably tangle with local ideologies.287 Chua288 calls this 
‗the imbuement of human rights with local sensitivities‘.289 Debates 
about this dilemma are discussed in section 3.4.2.4. 
The emphasis on vernacularisation as an active local process is captured 
finely by Elliot‘s290 description, that ‗vernacularisation is an action-oriented 
approach that moves human rights from an abstract idea, to a resource for 
human interaction and progress‘. 291  Thus strengthened by community-
development approaches, vernacularisation enables ‗human rights to work at 
a human scale‘.292  In the words of Merry and Levitt,293  ‗vernacularisation 
converts universal human rights into local understandings of social justice‘.294 
According to Safarty, 295  vernacularisation happens when norms affect 
people‘s informal communications and ordinary routines. Therefore, for 
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Safarty, vernacularisation is the outcome after ‗all is said and done‘, i.e., the 
socio-cultural norm shifts that can actually be witnessed as a result of 
‗embracing‘ human rights culture at local level. 296  Despite being skewed 
towards process, as evident in the ensuing analysis, Merry in a way still 
accepts that results have room in vernacularisation discourse. She recognises 
that human rights gain impact when they are ‗lived‘ by ordinary people; and 
that law becomes meaningful to people not just through sanctions, but when 
it guides their lived realities.297 Similarly, Rajam and Zararia298 contend that 
women‘s human rights become lived reality when they shift from ‗state law‘ 
to ‗local norms‘.299 
Chapter 9 demonstrates how vernacularisation is empirically evident in the 
community bylaws phenomenon in rural Malawi in order to answer the 
research question about how international human rights norms are 
influencing and shaping the community bylaws. Thus, the notion of 
‗appropriation‘ begs scrutiny of whether outside (transnational) programmes, 
interventions and ideas have anything to do with the bylaws. If there is 
appropriation, the concept of ‗translation‘ is key to giving meaning to the 
form(s) of vernacularisation that the community bylaws are manifesting. 
3.4.2.2   Framing: a key component of translation 
 ‗Framing‘ originates from Goffman‘s 300  conceptualisation of ‗frame‘ as 
‗schemata of interpretation‘301. Ferree302 defines a frame as ‗an interpretive 
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package surrounding a core idea‘. 303  This ‗interpretive package‘ is better 
comprehended through the description of frames as the use of images, 
symbols and stories anchored in local cultural narratives and conceptions in 
order to simplify the understanding of a human rights intervention in a new 
locality.304 Therefore, frames are the means for presenting foreign ideas in 
ways that capture local resonance and motivate local interest in such ideas – 
culminating in the identification of strategic actions.305 Frames are, in short, a 
medium of social change306 that streamline the task of establishing resonance 
between global norms and local norms.307 Framing gives a global norm a local 
façade.308 
Framing is a requisite translation tool, and determines the success or failure of 
vernacularisation. 309  Merry 310  considers framing to be one of the three 
dimensions of translation.311 Thus, through framing, activists adjust human 
rights interventions, developed elsewhere, to the circumstances of another 
local community.312 Through meaning making, human rights ideas from a 
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(transnational) local community are operationalised at another small 
locality.313 Frames have several functions for women‘s human rights: 
a) They affect how women‘s problems are defined and understood.314  
b) They affect how causes of women‘s problems and their solutions are 
conceptualised and which perspectives are embraced or rejected.315 
c) They stifle perceptions that the rights being promoted are alien, as the 
(re)interpretation of global norms in localised terms connects the norm 
with grounded reality.316  
In view of the above, ‗framing‘ is important to this study thesis because it 
helps to explain whether (and how) human rights ideas have influenced the 
emergence of community bylaws in Malawi; the ways in which the bylaws 
are adopted, conceptualise harmful practices, and connect local practices with 
international and national laws promoting women‘s rights, if at all. And since 
translation processes become meaningful when the target group ‗adopts 
ideas, meanings, processes and mechanisms that translators utilise‘,317  the 
next section examines translators/vernacularisers. 
3.4.2.3   The vernaculariser 
As Chapter 9 demonstrates, knowing the ‗actors‘ involved in community 
bylaws efforts, as well as their strategies (and their motives) is important in 
accounting for the emergence of the community bylaws in Malawi. 
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Furthermore, it clarifies the type of vernacularisation, as well as translation 
modes unfolding in the phenomenon of community bylaws.  
Vernacularisation scholarship has several names for the actors who facilitate 
the local transmission of human rights ideas: ‗translators;‘ 318 
‗vernacularisers;‘319 ‗converters, adaptors, transformers, generators;‘320 ‘norm 
adaptors;‘321 ‗human rights intermediaries‘322 or just ‗intermediaries‘.323 This 
thesis uses the term ‗vernacularisers‘ in order to answer the following 
questions: Who are these vernacularisers? What do they do? What 
vernacularisation paths do they use? 
Levitt and Merry324  define vernacularisers as ‗people-in-between‘.325  These 
vernacularisers seem to exist in two hierarchical groups – the elite and the 
local. The elite (first level) category includes skilled social movement activists 
and (women‘s rights) NGO staff who simultaneously navigate the local-
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international interface.326 Using Asia-Pacific case studies, Merry327 observed 
that vernacularisers were ‗transnational activists, national elites and middle 
tier educated leaders‘. 328  Rajam and Zararia 329  noted that leaders of one 
organisation in their study in India belonged to the upper caste and middle 
class,330 and their ground staff was lower- to middle-class young women 
living near the project office.331 Referring to the same study, Levitt et al.332 
said another organisation had leaders who were ‗ideological outsiders‘, with 
educated and well-travelled trustees. 333  Levitt and Merry 334  noted that ‗a 
powerful board of directors, some high ranking‘, led a Chinese NGO engaged 
in vernacularisation efforts.335   
In Chua‘s336 scenario, human rights/movement activists were facilitating the 
‗vernacular mobilisation of human rights‘. 337  Orr 338  recognised NGOs as 
central actors in translating global norms locally. 339   Cheng 340  mentioned 
lawyers and middle-level to elite activists, academics and funders.341 From 
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these descriptions, the elite vernacularisers programme their interventions in 
advance and vernacularise them in targeted communities.  
Some scholars have identified ‗second level‘ 342  vernacularisers – locals. 
According to Levitt and Merry,343 this is a ‗relatively untravelled‘ and ‗locally 
based‘ group of vernacularisers. They promote the vernacularised norms and 
ideas that are imparted to them by fellow staff members344 and movement 
activists. 345  These vernacularisers could be ‗women that have attended 
training programmes, staff in legal clinics, and domestic violence survivors 
turned advocates‘.346 Levitt et al.347 observed the case of female leaders of 
traditional women‘s courts in India who, having learnt about global human 
rights from their middle-class sponsors, would in turn vernacularise these 
ideas to village women.348     
Chua349 noted that in a vernacularisation project seeking to create a social 
movement, vernacularisers used framing processes to recruit and coach new 
activists/locals. These locals expanded the movement by returning home and 
mobilising a local movement through disseminating and further adapting the 
human rights norms they had learnt – thereby becoming vernacularisers 
too. 350  Notably, even in this local mode, vernacularisers do not grow 
themselves, but are discipled by and equipped by elites to implement 
‗second-level‘ translation. Indeed, Boesenecker and Vinjamuri 351  observed 
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that sometimes, anti-FGM Western activists would only succeed when they 
enlisted Islamic authorities to vernacularise FGM in Koranic terms. 352 
In terms of roles, vernacularisers appropriate and modify international 
human rights norms by framing them to make cultural sense. 353  Thus 
vernacularisers have to balance the act of fitting transnational ideas into local 
culture on the one hand, and that of challenging existing injustices on the 
other hand. 354  The concepts of ‗double consciousness‘ 355  or ‗dual 
consciousness‘356 have been used to describe how vernacularisers hold both 
transnational human rights and native perspectives. 357  Horizontally, 
vernacularisers challenge local injustices through culturally digestible 
communication. 358  Vertically, vernacularisers reframe local injustices in 
human rights violations terms to suit national and international 
audiences/agendas.359   
Vernacularisers use different avenues. However, as Chua 360  asserted, 
activities can only amount to vernacularisation if they are intended to 
vernacularise. 361  She noted that local activists in Myanmar used several 
vernacularisation activities to mobilise a social movement: workshops, rallies 
and movement strategy meetings. 362 Rajam and Zararia363 documented how 
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Baroda NGOs used advisory services to clients; local courts run by women for 
women; and flyers/kites to frame global human rights ideology in cultural 
terms. 364  Merry 365  discovered that some vernacularisers transplanted 
mechanisms/programmes, such as ‗gender training programmes, domestic 
violence laws, counseling centres for battered women or human rights 
commissions‘ into different settings.366  
For the empirical chapters, the issue of vernacularisers inspires a multilayered 
analysis. The hierarchical conceptualisation of vernacularisers above informs 
the analysis of actors that are engineering norm change in rural areas through 
community bylaws, and whether they mirror existing descriptions of 
vernacularisers. Where there are departures, instead of implying that 
vernacularisation is not occurring, the community bylaws challenge us to 
broaden the current view of vernacularisers when it comes to horizontal 
vernacularisation. Furthermore, the role of vernacularisers demands an 
exploration of how various vernacularisers are translating human rights 
ideas, and the implications for how horizontal vernacularisation should be 
understood.   
3.4.2.4   Concerns about vernacularisation  
This thesis is mindful of three concerns about vernacularisation. The first 
concern is the dilemma of framing using soft versus deep vernacularisation. 
Generally, the concept of ‗resonance‘ 367  of international norms with 
domestic/cultural norms is punctuated by its own frictions. In terms of soft 
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vernacularisation, Chanock368 has cautioned that change will hardly result 
where activists ‗over‘ sugarcoat human rights in local thinking terms.  This is 
because human rights can best confront systemic challenges by being 
radical.369 Scholars concede that human rights ideas that are vernacularised 
softly may be locally resisted370  Yet, deeply vernacularised human rights 
ideas may be welcomed, but lose their potential to effect change as the 
superior big brother to local norms.371 Thus it is abnormal for human rights to 
blend smoothly with patriarchy/injustice.372  
Scholars argue that while human rights ideas have to be translated in ways 
that resonate with local cultural frameworks, it is important that human 
rights universal principles should not be diluted in the process.373 Merry374 is 
quick to observe that vernacularisation is not indigenisation—the complete 
transformation of human rights principles in translated programmes. 375 
Gregg‘s376 distinctive perspective is that ‗to indigenise is not to transform a 
human rights culture‘.377  Rather it is to transform the local culture, since 
                                               
368  Martin Leon Chanock, ‗'Culture' and Human Rights orientalising, occidentalising and 
authenticity,‘ in Beyond Rights Talk and Culture Talk : Comparative Essays on the Politics of Rights 
and Culture (Cape Town David Philip, 2000) cited in Sally Engle Merry, ‗Transnational 
Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle,‘ (2006b). 
369  Martin Leon Chanock, ‗'Culture' and Human Rights orientalising, occidentalising and 
authenticity,‘ (2000) cited in Sally Engle Merry, ‗Transnational Human Rights and Local 
Activism: Mapping the Middle,‘ (2006b), 41. 
370 Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local 
Justice (2006a), 221; Benjamin Gregg, ‗Translating Human Rights into Muslim Vernaculars,‘ 
(2008), 466. 
371 Benjamin Gregg, ‗Translating Human Rights into Muslim Vernaculars,‘ (2008), 471; David 
M. Engel, ‗Vertical and Horizontal Perspectives on Rights Consciousness,‘ (2012), 445. 
372 Benjamin Gregg, ‗Translating Human Rights into Muslim Vernaculars,‘ (2008), 471. 
373 Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local 
Justice (2006a), 220; Benjamin Gregg, ‗Translating Human Rights into Muslim Vernaculars,‘ 
(2008), 465; Peggy Levitt and Sally Merry, ‗Vernacularisation on the Ground: Local Uses of 
Global Women's Rights in Peru, China, India and the United States,‘ (2009), 457. 
374 Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local 
Justice (2006a). 
375 Ibid., 137 & 221. 
376 Benjamin Gregg, ‗Translating Human Rights into Muslim Vernaculars,‘ (2008). 




indigenised human rights change aspects of local culture and challenge 
patriarchy.378  
Realistically though, both human rights and the cultural framework have to 
sacrifice something for indigenisation (and thus vernacularisation) to 
materialise – with culture likely foregoing more.379 Of course Orr380 argues 
that the compromises vernacularisers make as they adapt human rights 
norms is not necessarily a constraint. This is because the dynamic 
vernacularisation process encounters the diverse interests and values of 
different actors.381  
Human rights sacrifices, which may at times have to be made, relate to the 
language deployed during vernacularisation, which is the second framing 
challenge. Levitt and Merry382 submit that framing human rights ideas may 
entail forsaking the rights language at local level.383 This in itself is a double 
bind. On the one hand, it means vernacularisers have to be highly adaptable 
and creative so as to still convey human rights ideas without familiar 
vocabulary. On the other hand, there is a risk that such creativity could stray 
from the original intent of the human rights framework being articulated, 
thereby diluting its impact. 384  Run-away interpretations are also a reality 
given that ‗manifold interpretations (at times contradictory) and contestations 
of the meaning of women‘s rights co-exist, both internationally and 
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While these language-related framing concerns are valid, the empirical 
chapters attest that it is shrewd to accept that overt human rights language 
may not always work to achieve human rights-related goals at grassroots 
level. If vernacularisation stands for the idea that human rights have to be 
reinterpreted and repackaged to make sense to local people and provoke 
change, then vernacularisation indeed has to envisage circumstances where 
substitute language has to be strategically used to make human rights gains. 
One has to be savvy, especially in local communities that have ‗innate‘ 
suspicion of the notion of human rights, to use alternative language that 
inflames interest in dialogue about problematic social norms (that are in a real 
sense human rights violations) if there is likelihood that such dialogue could 
be resisted at the first mention of ‗human rights.‘386  
Indeed, Levitt and Merry387  portray a form of vernacularisation whereby 
NGO staff did not directly apply human rights language, but instead relied 
on the ‗imaginative space created by women‘s human rights‘ in repackaging 
local women‘s issues.388 Furthermore, Gregg389 recognises that an oppressed 
group can relate to their plight in human rights terms without talking human 
rights.390  This thesis broadens the scope of Gregg‘s thinking, because the 
community bylaws being studied are not resulting from the cry of ‗oppressed 
groups,‘ (in the sense of there being a human oppressor and victim on 
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opposing sides). But rather, the community bylaws depict communities as ‗an 
oppressed whole‘ because negative cultural beliefs and customs (while 
affecting individuals such as women) have, by implication, trapped entire 
communities developmentally.  
The third vernacularisation concern relates to the possibility that one may be 
presumptuous about the results of vernacularisation. I use Munger‘s391 case 
study of legal/rights consciousness in Thailand, including Engel‘s392 analysis 
of the same, to illustrate this point. Munger describes a Thai social movement 
of poor villagers, in collaboration with NGO activists, attempting to protect 
themselves from negative environmental and socio-economic impacts of a 
dam construction project.393 The peak of this campaign coincided with the 
final drafting stage of the new Thai Constitution; and the 1997 Constitution 
guarantees ‗special protections for environmental rights and public 
participation in decision making‘.394 
Engel illustrates how scholars can have varied interpretations of such results. 
For example, in ‗Merrian‘ terms, the fact that rights-based grassroots (and 
NGO) driven action gave prominence to environmental rights in a 
constitution could illustrate that rights concepts were successfully translated 
to have local meaning. Consequently, villagers used this consciousness to 
affect changes to formal law.395 However, Munger‘s observation about the 
community action she studied was that ‗social justice among the rural poor 
was grounded in the unique importance of the environment, rather than a 
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general belief in rights and democracy‘. 396  This validates Michelutti‘s 
inference that ‗ideology is not the only explanation of what moves people to 
action‘.397 Of course one may argue that vernacularisation provides a win-win 
situation for both interpretive repertoires – the vernaculariser achieves the 
result of the successful translation of a human rights idea; while the 
community opportunistically rides on this process to promote and strengthen 
its own pre-existing beliefs that align with the vernaculariser‘s agenda.  
Nevertheless, Engel‘s and Michelutti‘s perspectives above are significant to 
this thesis. To get to the bottom of what is influencing the emergence of the 
community bylaws for addressing harmful practices, the thesis asked several 
broad questions398 whose answers provide important insights in establishing 
whether the bylaws are being adopted because of belief in the importance of 
women‘s human rights or because of some other reason the community 
deems more important. This inquiry helped to make the case for horizontal 
vernacularisation, which consciously and unconsciously, results in the 
interface between communities‘ own motives and human rights ideals – 
discussed in the empirical chapters.  
The subsequent discussion recognises that vernacularisation bridges the 
perceived divide between culture and human rights (or universalism and 
relativism).399 Indeed, the broader inquiry into how community bylaws are 
operating as a site of norm internalisation in Malawi stands in a vacuum 
without ascertaining how the bylaws are situated within African customary 
law and legal pluralism discourse.  
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3.5 NORM INTERNALISATION AND CUSTOMARY LAW/LEGAL PLURALISM 
PERSPECTIVES 
One aim for this thesis is to make a connection between the community 
bylaws on child marriage and other harmful practices in rural Malawi and 
African customary law. Currently, differences and similarities between 
characteristics of the community bylaws and those of African 
customary/living customary law are unknown. Therefore, this part 
illuminates the debates about culture and human rights, as well as African 
customary/living customary law in the broader context of legal pluralism. 
This discussion is important because should one argue that the community 
bylaws are not a recognisable norm internalisation method under formal law, 
the empirical chapters have to establish whether the bylaws could still be 
considered law within the scope of living customary law and legal pluralism 
(and therefore capable of internalising human rights norms).  
However, the scope of the thesis does not allow an exhaustive analysis of the 
expansive body of literature related to African customary law. As such, this 
section only illustratively covers debates that would guide the analysis of 
community bylaws (within the context of African customary law) in the 
empirical chapters. As the thesis is concerned with (harmful) ‗cultural‘ 
practices, it is vital to first examine the link between culture as a concept and 
human rights. 
3.5.1 Culture and Human Rights 
Culture is a ‗macro concept‘ 400  and an ‗extremely indeterminate word‘.401 
Bennet402 asserts that culture comprises ‗the languages, beliefs and laws that 
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give social groups their unique identity‘. 403  According to Phiri, 404  people 
express their culture through religious belief systems and practices, symbols, 
language, customs, art, music, etc. Thus culture dynamically evolves as 
various cultures hybridise each other, and as people‘s living realities 
change.405 Merry406 concurs that culture is not static, ‗but it is a shared system 
of beliefs and values that is ever evolving‘.407 Positively, culture benefits its 
members; and negatively, some cultural practices can be harmful.408 
Human rights debates have sometimes depicted cultural practices/orderings 
and human rights as reciprocally disruptive towards each other. 409  This 
fraught history of the relationship between culture and human rights is not 
foreign to Malawi‘s own experience. When the government of Malawi was 
ratifying CEDAW, it entered the reservation that ‗owing to the deep-rooted 
nature of some traditional customs and practices of Malawians, the 
Government of the Republic of Malawi shall not, for the time being, consider 
itself bound by such of the provisions of the Convention as require immediate 
eradication of such traditional customs and practices‘. 410  In this instance, 
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Malawi recognised the divergence between the norms contained in CEDAW, 
and those propagated by the cultural practices prevalent in Malawi. 
Anthropology scholars have observed that treating rights and culture as a 
binary opposition between universalism (within the European concept of 
rights, which is globally accepted) and cultural relativism (deference to local 
cultural disparities) is both unwarranted and unreasonable.411 First, because 
human rights themselves are a cultural phenomenon that is continuously 
developing and changing as social, economic, political and cultural 
developments demand from time to time.412  Second, because culture itself 
does not necessarily have fixed meanings that are discordant with human 
rights as it is ‗a field of creative exchange and contestation, often around 
mutual symbols, propositions, practices and continual transformation‘. 413 
Third, because even law (which usually embodies human rights norms) and 
culture are intertwined – law is an expression of cultural principles, while 
culture is constructed by legal procedures and practices.414  
Therefore, it is no longer necessary for one to side with either culture or 
human rights, as one can stand for both.415 This is because universalism and 
cultural relativism both symbolise ‗the on-going negotiation of evolving and 
inter-connected global and local norms‘.416 Thus, instead of viewing culture as 
the change resistor where local practices are concerned, it should be seen as ‗a 
medium of innovation, appropriation and creation‘. 417  The subsequent 
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sections illustrate that the thinking relating to the evolving transformative 
nature of culture similarly applies to debates concerning customary law and 
living customary law.  
3.5.2  Debates about African Customary Law  
Like culture, Moore and Himonga418 submit that customary law is located in 
the present and not the past, since rules of customary law respond to socio-
economic developments.419  According to Chanock,420 arguments that custom 
can only be valid if it has existed for a longtime without changing are 
‗outdated and blind to the general context within which legal change takes 
place‘.421  
Of course a distinction has to be made between ‗custom‘ and ‗(living) 
customary law,‘ because unlike customary law, some customs are mere non-
obligatory social habits and practices that do not attract pressure for 
conformity and/or criticism/consequences if breached. 422  For Kolajo, 423 
customary law means those ‗rules of conduct that persons living in a 
particular locality have come to recognise as governing them in their 
relationships between one another and between themselves and things‘.424  
Bennet425 argues that the validity of all forms of customary law is anchored in 
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accepted social practice that a community sees as obligatory.426 The scope of 
customary law in South Africa (‗all matters regulating personal and family 
life, marriage, the consequences of marriage, succession, land tenure and 
traditional leaders‘) presented by Moore and Himonga427 can also apply to 
many African societies. Indeed, Ndulo 428  and Kolajo 429  describe African 
customary law as part of the pluralist legal systems of various 
ethnic/indigenous groups in many African countries.430  
Customary law has historically been undermined and mistrusted, and two 
examples illustrate this. First, Rozoemana and Hansungule431 observe that 
common law generally dismissed customary law because ‗it envisaged 
customary law as incapable of delivering gender equity and justice‘. 432 
However, the authors argue that, to the contrary, gender justice has long 
existed in customary law through African customs and practices allowing 
women to lead communities and justice forums. Further, they assert that the 
evolving character of customary practices means that gender justice within 
customary law will be unavoidable as the customary system interfaces with 
global gender justice ideals. 433 The latter perspective is connected with the 
notion of living customary law, discussed in the next section. Onyango434 and 
Rautenbach435 submit that attitudes that marginalise African customary law 
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and customs promote sentiments of colonialists that African customs and 
usages were uncivilised.436 
A second example that customary law is mistrusted is the fact that some 
scholars are cynical about African customary law, which they view to be 
deceptive in its current form.437 For instance, Himonga and Manjoo438 contend 
that the version of African customary law applied by South African courts 
before 1994 was distorted, based on precedents and texts, and remote from 
people‘s living law. 439  Claassens‘ 440  analysis of the South African 
Constitutional Court case, Bhe & others v Magistrate Khayelitsha & others,441 
makes a similar observation. For Odinkalu, 442  ‗expressions such as 
customary/traditional law are convenient labels for a very complex set of 
rules that, in certain localities, have with time, acquired force of habit, backed 
by mechanisms of coercion and state power‘.443  
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Snyder444 notes that scholars such as Chanock and Hobsbawn have branded 
African customary law ‗invented tradition that is derived from specific 
economic, institutional and socio-cultural conditions of colonial rule, and that 
does not necessarily embody wisdom from ancestors‘. 445 Thus Sieder and 
McNeish446 argue that colonial powers secured domination by exploiting legal 
pluralism and reformulating customary law.447 Through the example of South 
Africa‘s Communal Land Rights Act, Claassens448 illustrates that distortions 
of customs and traditions regarding women‘s land rights that were rife 
during colonialism and apartheid have simply been entrenched.449  
The above concerns show that the mistrust of customary law (mostly 
unwritten 450 ) deepens when customary law is codified. For example, 
Ozoeman 451  argues that codification has reinforced the rigidity of South 
Africa‘s customary law. 452  Several scholars present the codification of 
customary law as a panic project by colonial and apartheid governments, who 
lacked knowledge of the customary laws they were supposed to apply.453 In 
this process, customary law was fabricated from the ‗preconceptions and 
biases of its translators‘, and not from ‗genuine pre-colonial traditions‘ or 
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evolving social norms of African societies.454  
According to Sieder and McNeish, 455  codification faces multiple snags, 
including: the risk that the process may be driven by international agencies; 
limiting the flexible, dynamic and negotiable appeal of custom; making legal 
pluralism redundant; and ‗reducing rich community based forms of law to 
simple lists of norms and procedures‘.456 In Bennet‘s457 opinion, ‗an authentic 
customary law will lack the precision and conceptual order achieved by 
writing‘.458 Therefore, Kent459 claims that the plasticity of customary law is 
advantageous to human rights internalisation processes at rural level.460 
While customary law in Malawi is uncodified, the emergence of written 
community bylaws for addressing harmful practices (while not concluding 
here that the bylaws are customary law) still draws attention to the concerns 
about confining to paper ‗law‘ any semblances of law at customary level. 
Notably, one difference between the bylaws in rural Malawi and the 
codification of customary law in countries such as South Africa is that the 
latter have been state law projects; whereas the community bylaws are loose 
community endeavours. Indeed, the emergence of these community bylaws 
invites scrutiny into the whole concept of living customary law. Ozoemena461 
contends that social change determines the character of customary rules and 
practices, also called ‗living customary law‘462 – analysed next.  
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3.5.3 Living Customary Law as the Preferred Concept to ‘Tainted’ 
Customary Law 
The concept of living customary law arises from the broad concept of living 
law. Himonga and Bosch 463  recognise that the common denominator in 
Ehrlich‘s464  pioneering living law theory and Moore‘s465  semi-autonomous 
social fields theory is that both do not consider the state as the singular source 
of law, but acknowledge that law can also emerge from people‘s lived reality 
(living law).466 Thus ‗the force of living law may even not be grounded in 
external authority, but rather from the relationship amongst the people 
concerned themselves‘.467 
Some scholars do not automatically associate living law with customary law. 
Claassens468 has discussed the theory of living law in the context of land-
related reforms in South Africa. She questions whether living law is a 
separate strand of customary law alongside other law, or a buffet of multiple 
sources of law applicable to people‘s lives.469 By examining case law and 
different scholarship, she establishes that the phrase ‗living law‘ is taken for 
granted and applied loosely by South African courts. For example, the 
Constitutional Court refers to ‗living indigenous law‘ in various judgments. 
While not dismissing the concept of living indigenous/customary law, 
Claassens observes that the scope of living law extends beyond the 
‗customary framework‘470 since living law manifests itself more as a ‗mixing 
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and matching of vernacular law, constitutional law or statutory law‘.471  
This observation squares with Anne Hellum‘s472 definition of living law as 
‗the outcome of the interplay between international law, state law, and local 
norms that takes place through human interaction in different historical, 
social and legal contexts‘.473 Oomen474 rejects attaching the term ‗customary‘ 
in descriptions of living law. She argues that ‗customary‘ means a return to 
the past and therefore is not consonant with the living and changing character 
of living law.475 For this thesis, the broader concept of ‗living law‘ is relevant 
because community bylaws could be challenged as not being ‗customary‘ 
(law) but they cannot be easily challenged if considered as ‗living‘ law. 
Various scholars agree that since what is branded ‗customary law‘ is of 
suspect origin, the term ‗living customary law‘ is preferable. Himonga476 
notes that ‗official customary law‘ and ‗living customary law,‘ cannot be 
neatly categorised, but that ‗the two are the accepted dominant forms of 
customary law‘.477 Bennet478 asserts that people are usually governed not by 
‗official customary law,‘ but by a living form of customary law, usually oral, 
that flows from social practice and that is subtly and continually changing.479 
Sanders480 calls living customary law ‗automatic customary law‘, which is 
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self-generated, self-regulating, fluid, unconfined to a fixed written form, and 
adaptable to ever-changing external influences, while retaining its traditional 
communal spirit.481 Concurring, Himonga and Moore482 contend that living 
customary law ‗is grounded in social practice and which is actually observed 
by (black South African) communities‘.483 Living customary law evolves by 
adapting to on-going changes in its operational environment.484  
Indeed Diala 485  has recently offered a streamlined definition: ‗living 
customary law is law that emerges from people‘s adaptation of customs to 
socio-economic changes‘. 486  State law and international human rights can 
even influence these changes.487 As the other scholars, Diala‘s definition of 
living customary law accentuates the role of community agency. Diala 
recognises that as people adapt living customary law to prevailing socio-
economic changes around them, this may happen in a ‗single social field‘ 
where state law and customary law are interacting. Thus, state law and 
customary law do not always exist as ‗semi-autonomous social fields‘.488  
Some scholars have made similar claims that challenge Sally Falk Moore‘s489 
concept of the semi-autonomous social field. 490  For example, Sieder and 
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McNeish491 recognise that ‗20th century old legal pluralism‘ (that saw state law 
and customary law as existing in relation to one another in multiple systems 
or semi-autonomous spheres) has been replaced by a ‗new wave of legal 
pluralism‘, which treats ‗different legal orders as hybrid, fluid and mutually 
constituted‘.492 De Sousa Santo‘s493 concept of ‗inter-legality‘, which stresses 
‗the role of human agency on the constitution of constantly evolving 
hybrids‘,494 is recognised as influencing the new thinking.  
This thesis is aware of the opposition by scholars such as Brian Tamanaha495 
to give the label of law to ‗negotiated orders‘. For Tamanaha, the term ‗living 
law‘ betrays analytical clarity and drags ‗non-law‘ materials into the law field. 
This process, he argues, eclipses the true nature of such negotiated orders.496 
Nevertheless, there is merit in Claassen‘s argument that:  
The rejection of living law as law, on whatever basis, carries with it 
the implication that people-made law cannot be law as such. Such 
rejection implies that, to qualify as law, a practice must be made by 
authorised ‗experts‘, such as lawyers, judges, governments and 
traditional leaders.497  
Yet, legal pluralism accepts different laws and mechanisms that draw 
legitimacy from international, state, local or non-official systems.498 In fact, 
legal pluralities develop from multiple laws operating in the same social 
                                               
491 Rachel Sieder and John-Andrew McNeish, Gender Justice and Legal Pluralities: Latin America 
and African Perspectives, (2013). 
492 Ibid., 8. 
493  Baoventura de Sousa Santos, ‗Law: A Map of Misreading. Towards a Postmodern 
Conception of Law ‘ Journal of Law and Society (14)3 (1987), 279-302. 
494 Ibid.; cited  in Rachel Sieder and John-Andrew McNeish, Gender Justice and Legal Pluralities: 
Latin America and African Perspectives, (2013), 8. 
495 Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‗A Vision of Social-Legal Change: Rescuing Ehrlich from ―Living 
Law‖,‘ Law and Social Inquiry (36)1 (2011), 297-318. 
496 Ibid., cited in Aninka Claassens, ‗Entrenching Distortion and Closing Down Spaces for 
Change: Contestations Over Land and Custom in South Africa,‘ (2012), 33. 
497  Aninka Claassens, ‗Entrenching Distortion and Closing Down Spaces for Change: 
Contestations Over Land and Custom in South Africa,‘ (2012), 34. 





field, 499  since ‗law and rights are not just about enforceable rules‘. 500  As 
section 4.4.4 shows, legal pluralism is even embraced by international human 
rights jurisprudence.501 However, discomfort with legal pluralism arises when 
the ‗modern‘ (statutes/human rights norms) is seen in opposition to the 
‗traditional‘– the two being seen as anchors of gender equality and gender 
inequalities, respectively. 502  Indeed, the foregoing has shown that gender 
justice and customary law have been viewed as contradictory.503  
A discussion on legal pluralism, especially living law and living customary 
law, is important for the thesis on two grounds. First, African (living) 
customary law literature aids in clarifying the comparative characteristics of 
(living) customary law and the community bylaws, which are currently hazy. 
Second, despite the critique that legal pluralism is too open ended,504 it assists 
the thesis to make a case about the validity of the community bylaws where 
the bylaws are seen as exceeding the scope of official law. As living law or 
living customary law, flexible ‗legal‘ orders such as community bylaws could 
be an entry point for making ‗plural systems more permeable to international 
human rights discourses and more equitable practices‘.505 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter started with providing methodological insights into how 
international norms are appropriated and absorbed by formal state systems 
and local communities. With regards to norm internalisation and 
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vernacularisation, the chapter has unveiled five areas that will be used as a 
framework of analysis in the empirical chapters. First, socialisation is a 
conduit for norm internalisation, whereby a state is socialised to adopt 
international norms. In this thesis, socialisation raises the issue of whether 
this is only an international-to-domestic‘ occurrence, or whether the 
community bylaws are exposing the presence of intra-domestic socialisation. 
Establishing such layer of socialisation in Chapter 9 contributes to the 
strengthening of norm internalisation theory.  
Second, while Chapter 5 shows that Malawi has internalised the international 
human rights norm protecting women from harmful practices, there is 
blurred understanding of how norm internalisation filters to rural contexts 
dominated by customary law, tradition and practices. This is where 
‗vernacularisation‘ helps to explain the aspects of norm internalisation that 
transpire in smaller communities. Thus, in Chapter 9, the range of 
vernacularisation processes of ‗translation‘ offered by scholars provides a 
pedestal for validating that the vernacularisation of human rights norms, 
protecting women and girls from harmful practices, through the community 
bylaws is occurring differently; and that unique forms of translation are 
manifesting in the community bylaws context.  
Third, the centrality of the vernaculariser to the whole vernacularisation 
journey is pivotal to accounting for the emergence and conceptualisation of 
the community bylaws in rural Malawi. The conceptualisation of the 
vernaculariser in this chapter instructs the empirical chapters to draw 
parallels and distinctions with what is occurring under the community 
bylaws; and to reconceptualise vernacularisation, as well as the 
vernaculariser, in the context of ‗horizontal vernacularisation‘. 
Fourth, the chapter has raised three concerns about vernacularisation: the 




compromises that sometimes have to be made exchanging explicit human 
rights language with using local meanings; and interpretation – the possibility 
that the vernaculariser and norm recipients engaged in the vernacularisation 
may actually be driven by different motives. The empirical chapters 
illuminate whether any of these three concerns is visible in the community 
bylaws phenomenon, and the implications for how horizontal 
vernacularisation should be understood in the community bylaws context.  
Lastly, the chapter has shown that vernacularisation is currently 
conceptualised as a unicameral concept, whose singular and deliberate 
mission is for a viable transnational human rights idea, invented in one place 
to be funded, localised, and absorbed in another locality. However, the 
empirical chapters should demonstrate whether the community bylaws are 
displaying a different reality that calls for reconceptualising 
vernacularisation. 
In respect of the customary law content of the thesis, the objective is to 
understand the relationship between the community bylaws and African 
customary law. The internalisation of international norms protecting women 
from harmful practices through community bylaws cannot have much effect 
unless the bylaws have some validity. Where such legitimacy cannot be 
derived from state law, the field of legal pluralism becomes the oyster. 
Therefore, scholarship related to customary law awakens two main issues 
that are explored in the empirical chapters. The first issue is to understand 
where the community bylaws are positioned in the human rights 
universalism and relativism debates. The second related issue is that as a 
category of legal pluralism, the concepts of living law and living customary 
law allow for the recognition of people‘s lived law beyond state law. Thus, 
the empirical chapters ought to elucidate whether the community bylaws on 
child marriage and other harmful practices in rural Malawi are law in the 




The next chapter further engages the concept of norm internalisation by 
examining what international human rights law and jurisprudence on 
harmful practices expects states to do, including in relation to their informal 





CHAPTER 4  
NORM INTERNALISATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
AND JURISPRUDENCE ON HARMFUL PRACTICES 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 has demonstrated that in norm diffusion scholarship, socialisation 
is completed with norm internalisation, when international norms infiltrate 
domestic practice. 506  Therefore, it is important to have an in-depth 
understanding of international human rights norms for protecting women 
and girls from harmful practices in order to meaningfully analyse how the 
vernacularisation of such norms has influenced and shaped the emergence 
and conceptualisation of community bylaws on child marriage and other 
harmful practices in Malawi. 
One objective of this thesis is to understand how harmful practices are being 
conceptualised in the community bylaws on child marriage and other 
harmful practices in rural Malawi; and the extent to which such 
conceptualisation conforms to or is influenced by international human rights 
law. Thus, this chapter engages the international human rights discourse that 
protects women‘s right to be free from harmful practices in two ways. First, it 
explains the universal norms on harmful practices. This exposes the type of 
practices that international law and jurisprudence regards as harmful. 
Chapter 8 compares these practices and their conceptual basis with those 
harmful practices covered by the community bylaws.  
Second, the chapter interrogates whether treaty-monitoring bodies perceive 
                                               
506 Thomas Risse, ‗International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative 
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community or informal mechanisms as vehicles of norm internalisation. This 
involves scrutinising the route that jurisprudence requires states to pursue for 
international human rights norms to reach rural sites where state law 
application is weak. Furthermore, it entails examining changes that have 
occurred in the jurisprudence regarding the role of community and informal 
justice mechanisms in addressing harmful practices.  
The chapter concludes by highlighting conceptual issues that are further 
analysed in Chapter 8, extrapolated from the empirical evidence. The 
conclusion reveals that despite some shifts, the jurisprudence lacks a more 
nuanced approach to norm internalisation, since its principal top-down 
agenda is for states to adjust formal laws and mechanisms and comply with 
international law. In turn, this approach is reflected in current 
vernacularisation approaches that focus on programming which ‗outsiders‘ 
drive in order to facilitate the appropriation of human rights norms in local 
communities, with little recognition of vernacularisation that happens 
horizontally when it is driven by local communities themselves – whether 
independently, or in collaboration with the ‗outsiders‘.  
4.2 THE TREATY BASIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 
PROTECTING WOMEN FROM HARMFUL PRACTICES  
Ever since harmful practices first received the UN‘s attention in 1954,507 there 
has been increased recognition of their gravity and impact on women‘s health 
                                               
507 United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women and United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa, ‗Background Paper for the Meeting on Good Practices in Legislation 
to Address Harmful Practices Against Women‘ (paper presented at the Expert Group 
Meeting on Good Practices in Legislation on Harmful Practices against Women, 25-28 May, 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2009) . The paper reports that harmful practices were recognised in 
the UN through the adoption of the first resolution of the UN General Assembly on harmful 
practices 843 (IX) that highlighted customs, ancient laws and practices relating to marriage 
and the family inconsistent with UDHR principles—cited in EGM/GPLVAW/2009/BP. 
Available at 
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and status. 508  While other non-binding frameworks have contributed to 
establishing norms protecting women and girls from harmful practices, 509 
this section examines sources of international human rights law that codify 
the norms within UN and AU human rights systems– CEDAW and CRC (UN 
treaties); and the Maputo Protocol, African Children‘s Charter and the 
African Youth Charter (AU treaties). Although sub-regional protocols have 
not been analysed, the thesis is mindful that the SADC Protocol on Gender 
and Development (revised in 2016), which adheres to the regional and 
international protocols, is a key binding instrument for addressing child 
marriage and other harmful practices in Malawi and the SADC region.  
4.2.1 Codification of Norms Protecting Women from Harmful Practices in 
UN Human Rights Law 
CRC510  and CEDAW511 , the UN conventions that advance children‘s and 
women‘s rights respectively, legally establish the norm that women and girls 
                                               
508  Jane Cottingham and Eszter Kismodi, ‗Protecting Girls and Women from Harmful 
Practices Affecting Their Health: Are We Making Progress?,‘ (2009), 128. 
509  For example, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women calls for the 
elimination of customary practices and all other practices that perpetuate the inferiority, 
superiority and stereotyping of either men or women (Paragraph 4(j). The Beijing Declaration 
and the Platform for Action presses governments to refrain from invoking any custom, tradition 
or religious consideration to avoid their obligations to eliminate VAW (paragraph 124(a)). 
The 1998 United Nations General Assembly resolution 52/99 on the issue of traditional or 
customary practices affecting the health of women and girls urges states to adopt legislation 
and/or measures prohibiting harmful traditional or customary practices. In 1999 and 2000 
respectively, United Nations General Assembly resolutions 53/117 called upon member states to 
develop and implement legislation and policies prohibiting traditional or customary practices 
affecting the health of women and girls through appropriate measures against those 
responsible, and to establish a concrete national mechanism for the implementation and 
monitoring. It is recognised that the African Union has in recent years also adopted positions 
that cement the norm protecting women and girls from harmful practices, particularly child 
marriage. For example, in May 2014, the AU launched a campaign to end child marriage in 
Africa. The AU Goodwill Ambassador on ending child marriage and the AU Special 
Rapportuer on child marriage were also appointed the same year. In 2015, AU Heads 
formally adopted the African Common Position on the AU Campaign to end child 
marriage—Paragraph 1, Joint General Comment of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR) and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACERWC) on ending Child Marriage, 2017. 
510 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United 




should be free and protected from harmful practices. Four principles 
underpin the CRC: non-discrimination; the best interests of the child; the right 
to life, survival and development; and respect for a child‘s views.512 These 
principles ‗frame children‘s protection from violence and harmful 
practices‘.513 CRC‘s Article 19 proscribes all forms of violence against children 
(VAC), while Article 24 (3) requires States Parties to abolish traditional 
practices prejudicial to children‘s health. The child marriage prohibition is 
implicit in several CRC provisions, 514  including Article 1, which defines 
‗child‘ as a person less than 18 years.515 CEDAW, which explicitly denounces 
child marriage, 516  uses the broad term ‗harmful practices‘ not ‗harmful 
traditional practices.‘ CEDAW‘s approach to harmful practices is inspired by 
the convention‘s key principles: non- discrimination against women and 
gender equality. Zwingel517 further observes that ‗state responsibility‘ is the 
third key principle of CEDAW.518  
CEDAW‘s mission is to achieve women‘s formal and substantive equality 
                                                                                                                                      
511 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, 18 December 1979, A/RES/34/180. 
 
512  UNICEF, 20 Years: The Convention on the Rights of the Child, vol. 2019. Available at 
https://www.unicef.org/rightsite/237_202.htm, accessed on 1 June 2019. These principles 
draw much from Articles 2, 3, 6 and 12 of the CRC. 
513 Plan International, In-depth Review of Legal and Regulatory Frameworks on Child Marriages in 
Malawi, (Plan International, 2016), 7. 
514 Article 2: non-discrimination; Article 3: primacy of the child‘s best interests; Article 6: 
child‘s right to life, survival and development; Article 12: right to participation; Article 17: 
right to access information and materials; Article 19: prohibition of violence against children; 
Article 28: right of the child to education; Article 31: child‘s right to rest, leisure and 
recreation; Article 34: protection against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse; Article 35: 
protection from abduction, sale of or trafficking; Article 39: support for child victims of all 
forms of neglect, exploitation or abuse. UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3. 
515 Article 1: ‗a child is every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the 
law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier‘. UN General Assembly, Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3. 
516 Article 16(2) says the betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect. UN 
General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
18 December 1979, A/RES/34/180. 
517 Susanne Zwingel, ‗Women‘s Rights Norms as Content-in-motion and Incomplete Practice,‘ 
(2017). 




with men in the enjoyment of their human rights.519 Achieving substantive 
equality between women and men means addressing social inequalities that 
marginalise and malign ‗the identity, culture, values and behaviours‘ of 
women and girls (resulting in increased vulnerability to violence), while 
privileging those of men and boys.520 It also entails confronting economic 
inequalities that adversely impact on women‘s ‗access to, and distribution of, 
basic needs, opportunities and material resources‘. 521  Further, substantive 
equality aspires to achieve equality of outcome, improved power relations, 
and the distribution of resources between men and women.522 Transformative 
substantive equality engages and dismantles the very systems and structures 
that propel women‘s disadvantage, replacing them with norms and values 
that uplift women‘s status.523  
CEDAW robustly facilitates the promotion of women‘s empowerment and 
gender equality at multiple tiers – legally, in activism, and public policy 
development and analysis.524 Still, Bond525 notes some of CEDAW‘s flaws, i.e. 
its limited focus on ‗multiple sites of oppression in women's lives‘, and its 
failure to project African women‘s diversity as both community members and 
                                               
519  Simone Cusack and Lisa Pusey, ‗CEDAW and the Rights to Non-Discrimination and 
Equality,‘ Melbourne Journal of International Law (14) (2013), 54-92 57. The authors cite 
Paragraph 4, General Recommendation No. 25, on Article 4, Paragraph 1, of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, on Temporary Special Measures, 2004, 
A/59/38 Annex I [4] 2. 
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Available at  
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing15/interactive_panel_III/Byrnes%20paper.p
df, accessed on 20 October 2017. 




gender equality advocates within those communities.526  
Undeniably though, CEDAW has given traction to the concept of harmful 
practices.527 In striving to eliminate harmful practices, CEDAW‘s Article 2(f) 
obliges states ‗to pursue a policy of eliminating discrimination against women 
by undertaking all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or 
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that constitute 
discrimination against women‘. Article 5 (a) commits States Parties ‗to take all 
appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of 
men and women so as to eliminate prejudices and customary and all other 
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of 
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women‘. Cusack and 
Pusey528 rightly note that these two provisions are buttressed by the principle 
of transformative equality, desiring States Parties to intervene and eliminate 
obstinate gender stereotypes.529 
Bond 530  contends that CEDAW‘s Articles 2(f) and 5(a) portray culture 
negatively531  and thus ‗CEDAW promotes the perceived conflict between 
gender equality and cultural norms‘.532 Merry533 similarly notes that CEDAW 
associates culture with harmful traditional practices and primitive violations 
of women‘s rights.534 She surmises that the transnational elites and human 
rights lawyers who produce documents such as CEDAW are suspicious of 
culture because in their ‗legal rationality‘ minds, cultural differences can 
                                               
526 Ibid., 519 & 525. 
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obstruct the universal application of human rights if unchecked.535 However, 
Byrnes536 argues that since CEDAW targets violations of women‘s human 
rights, it would naturally focus on negative facets of culture and tradition.537 
But is CEDAW really unconstructive about culture and tradition? CEDAW‘s 
language538 certainly does not hint that the convention is undiscerningly wary 
of all customs and traditions. As Newman et al.539 have asserted, culture has 
both benefits and drawbacks – the latter because some practices it engrains 
are harmful to other societal members.540 For example, the community bylaws 
being studied only frown upon social and customary practices that threaten 
gender equality, gender equality being ‗a key norm underlying CEDAW‘.541  
Any cultural elements that do not fit the CEDAW bill are unacceptable where 
the interest is to advance gender equality. According to Brennan, 542  the 
agenda to dismantle oppressive practices makes all culture practices 
subservient to human rights norms.543 Therefore, where cultural values and 
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gender equality norms clash, CEDAW says the latter should prevail.544 This is 
not to suggest that the approaches for addressing harmful practices that the 
CEDAW Committee (and other treaty monitoring bodies) promote are 
flawless, but that is a different topic discussed under section 4.4. 
4.2.2 Codification of norms protecting women from harmful practices in 
African human rights law 
Since the community bylaws on child marriage and other harmful practices in 
Malawi are situated in Africa,545 we will examine how the AU human rights 
system has established the elimination of harmful practices as a legal 
normative standard. 546  For starters, the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples‘ Rights 547  (Banjul Charter), 548  does not openly proscribe harmful 
practices. The Charter only obliges states to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination against women, and protect women‘s and children‘s rights 
according to international standards.549  
The Banjul Charter proclaims the duty of every individual to ‗preserve and 
strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations with other 
members of the society‘.550 Ibhawoh551 argues that by acknowledging the right 
of peoples to their cultural development, the Charter reconciles cultural 
traditions and states human rights aspirations. 552  However, Gawaya and 
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Mukasa553 submit that the Banjul Charter overlooks the reality that some 
practices within African traditions harm and discriminate against women.554 
Bond555 argues that the Charter fails to as jealously safeguard gender equality 
as it does cultural rights.556  
Several protocols to the Banjul Charter557 address harmful practices and child 
marriage more rigorously. The Maputo Protocol 558  is lauded for taking a 
‗more nuanced approach to culture and tradition‘ when compared with 
CEDAW and the Banjul Charter559 and for balancing appreciation of positive 
cultural values and women‘s rights to equality.560 The Protocol outlaws both 
VAW 561  (under which harmful practices usually fall 562 ), and harmful 
practices. According to Banda,563 the Protocol unequivocally rejects harmful 
practices through its expansive definition of ‗harmful practices‘564—defined as 
‗all behaviour, attitudes and/or practices which negatively affect the 
fundamental rights of women and girls, such as their right to life, health, 
                                               
553 Rose Gawaya and Rosemary Mukasa, ‗The African Women's Protocol: A New Dimension 
for Women's Rights in Africa,‘ Gender & Development (3) (2005), 42-50. 
554 Ibid., 44. 
555 Johanna Bond, ‗Gender, Discourse and Customary Law in Africa,‘ (2010). 
556 Ibid., 537. 
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movements across the board concurred that a range of harmful traditional practices should 
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International Feminist Journal of Politics (7)4 (2005), 471-495 475. 
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dignity, education and physical integrity‘.565 Thus the Protocol owns women‘s 
rights violations through harmful practices as African problems, thereby 
discrediting views that such issues are driven by Western agendas.566 
Besides Article 5, which decrees legislative and other measures that states 
should take to eliminate harmful practices, 567  several provisions of the 
Maputo Protocol mandate states to address harmful practices. Article 2(2) of 
the Protocol has developed Articles 2(f) and 5(a) of CEDAW568 by committing 
states to eliminate harmful tradition practices through public outreach 
strategies. 569  Article 4(d) obliges states to use educational measures in 
eradicating traditional and cultural beliefs, practices and stereotypes that 
stimulate VAW. However, Article 6(c) of the Protocol is soft on polygamy, 
since it only ‗encourages monogamy as the preferred form of marriage‘. 
Commenting on Article 17, Bond570 contends that the Maputo Protocol has 
higher potential571 to facilitate the local internalisation of human rights norms 
since it guarantees women the right to enjoy positive culture and to be key 
actors in the formulation of cultural policies. 572  Furthermore, this right 
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guarantees that women can dialogue with traditional leaders to ensure that 
women‘s rights and positive cultural practices are localised.573 
The African Children‘s Charter574 similarly disapproves harmful practices. 
Article 1(3) discourages customs, traditions, cultural or religious practices that 
are inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter. Notably, ‗discourage‘ is 
rather cautious language.575 However, Article 21(1) plainly requires states to 
pursue ‗all appropriate measures to eliminate discriminatory social and 
cultural practices that harm the welfare, dignity, growth and health of the 
child‘. For its part, the African Youth Charter576 directs that young people‘s 
education should preserve and strengthen positive traditional values and 
cultures; and that life skills education curricula should address cultural 
practices harmful to young girls‘ health. 577  The Maputo Protocol 578  and 
African Children‘s Charter579 also expressly proscribe child marriage. 
4.2.3 Conclusion on Harmful Practices in UN and AU codes 
Unquestionably, UN and AU human rights laws display consternation about 
harmful practices, resulting in the norm protecting women from such 
practices. While CEDAW does not explicitly cover ‗harmful practices,‘ these 
practices are implied in CEDAW‘s provisions that prohibit child marriage and 
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betrothal and those requiring states to modify or abolish existing customs and 
practices that constitute discrimination against women and perpetuate gender 
inequality.  
The Maputo Protocol‘s definition of harmful practices as ‗all behaviour, 
attitudes and/or practices . . .‘580 does not prima facie declare primary interest 
in cultural or traditional practices. But still, the elimination of child marriage 
and harmful cultural and traditional practices and the promotion of positive 
cultural values are its clear agenda.  
Though argued that the concept of harmful traditional practices is affixed on 
harms towards women (e.g. gender discrimination and VAW), and that only 
recently have attempts been made to address harms against children,581 the 
UN‘s attention to FGM since the 1950s and CRC provisions (demanding the 
abolition of traditional practices harmful to children‘s health) speak 
otherwise. However, the scope of harm inflicted by negative cultural practices 
obviously transcends health concerns. The African Children‘s Charter more 
holistically targets the elimination of social and cultural practices harmful to 
the welfare, dignity, growth and health of children.  
Chapter 8 demonstrates whether the key principles of CEDAW and the 
Maputo Protocol on the one hand, and CRC and the African Children‘s 
Charter on the other hand, are discernible in the community bylaws. The next 
discussion provides a picture of how harmful practices are conceptualised by 
international human rights jurisprudence.  
                                               
580 For full definition, see Article 1(g) in note 565. 
581 Chia Longman and Tamsin Bradley, ‗Interrogating the Concept of ―Harmful Cultural 




4.3 CONCEPTUALISATION OF HARMFUL PRACTICES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE  
To appreciate how treaty-monitoring bodies understand harmful practices, 
jurisprudence under the UN and AU human rights systems is analysed in 
turn. 
4.3.1 UN treaty bodies’ conceptualisation of harmful practices 
Within the UN human rights system, the CEDAW and CRC committees 
monitor how states are implementing the CEDAW and CRC respectively. 
Thus CEDAW and CRC jurisprudence derives from the respective 
committees‘ interpretive statements of the rights enshrined in CEDAW and 
CRC respectively as captured in general recommendations (for CEDAW) or 
general comments (for CRC), 582  concluding observations 583  and individual 
communications and reports on inquiries under the Optional Protocols to the 
two Conventions.584 
However, since neither the CEDAW nor CRC committee has determined 
individual communications related to harmful practices, attention is on 
                                               
582 General comments and general recommendations are very helpful in elaborating states 
parties‘ obligations when these are not mentioned or are mentioned broadly or are explained 
insufficiently in a treaty—Sally Engle Merry, ‗Constructing a Global Law: Violence against 
Women and the Human Rights System,‘ Law & Social Inquiry (28)4 (2003), 941-977 952; 
Rebecca J. Cook, ‗Women's International Human Rights Law: The Way Forward,‘ Human 
Rights Quarterly (15)2 (1993), 230-261 232. 
583 Andrew Byrnes, ‗Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: 
Reflections on their Role in the Development of International Human Rights Law and as a 
Catalyst for National Legislative and Policy Reform (2016),‘ 6. Byrnes explains that 
concluding comments/observations of the CEDAW Committee are particularly important in 
their application to specific countries, they can also be relevant to understanding the 
committee‘s general stance on a range of issues, especially where there is no general 
recommendation or case law on the subject. On the other hand, Kelly adds that the 
committee‘s conclusions have a kind of moral force, providing a basis for subsequent 
activism and lobbying at national level—Liz Kelly, ‗Inside Outsiders: Mainstreaming 
Violence Against Women into Human Rights Discourse and Practice,‘ (2005), 482. 
584 For example with respect to the CEDAW Option Protocol, UN Women notes by ratifying 
the Optional Protocol, a state recognises the competence of the CEDAW Committee to receive 
and consider complaints from individuals or groups within its jurisdiction. Available at 




general recommendations and general comments. Though CEDAW 
committee and CRC committee jurisprudence is the primary topic,585 where 
applicable, the jurisprudence of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR),586 is included. Where further illumination on the 
CEDAW Committee‘s stance is necessary, illustrative examples are provided 
from recommendations related to harmful practices from 20 CEDAW 
Concluding Observations on African State Party reports issued between 2012 
and 2016.587 The subsequent analysis first examines how CEDAW, CRC and 
CESCR jurisprudence autonomously defines harmful practices, before 
scrutinising the definition under the joint CEDAW General 
Recommendation/CRC General Comment on harmful practices.  
4.3.1.1 Conceptualisation of harmful practices in ‘independent’ UN  
jurisprudence 
Originally, the concept of harmful practices popularly referred to FGM, but 
has since expanded to cultural practices harmful to women. 588  CEDAW 
General Recommendation No. 12 was the first to address VAW as a broad 
concern (1989). 589  CEDAW General Recommendation No. 14  (female 
circumcision and other harmful practices, 1989) concentrated on FGM despite 
purporting to cover other harmful practices. This General Recommendation 
has been updated by the joint CEDAW General Recommendation No. 31 
                                               
585 The work of the CEDAW Committee is the major subject because (a) CEDAW is a legal 
framework dedicated to promoting women‘s rights; (b) the CEDAW Committee has a more 
thriving body of general recommendations (and related concluding observations on State 
Party reports) overtly touching on harmful practices. 
586 Monitoring body of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). 
587 The number of reports as well as the reports themselves were randomly selected (no 
particular scientific method was applied), and the interest was to examine the CEDAW 
Committee's concluding observations made from 2014—given that the CEDAW/CRC Joint 
Recommendation/Comment was adopted in 2014. 
588  Sally Engle Merry, ‗Human Rights Law and the Demonisation of Culture (And 
Anthropology Along the Way),‘ (2003), 63; Jane Cottingham and Eszter Kismodi, ‗Protecting 
Girls and Women from Harmful Practices Affecting Their Health: Are We Making Progress?,‘ 
(2009) 128. 
589  Paragraph 1, UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 




/CRC General Comment No. 18 (2014).  
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 (1992) dived deep into VAW, 
particularly family violence and other forms of gender-based violence (GBV). 
It has since been updated by CEDAW General Recommendation No. 35 
(2017), 590  under which ‗gender-based VAW‘ 591  occurring through harmful 
practices is termed ‗inhuman or degrading treatment‘.592 Thus over time, the 
CEDAW Committee has endeavoured to capture the multifaceted nature of 
discrimination against women by addressing VAW and GBV, originally 
omitted in CEDAW.593  
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24 on women and health (1999) also 
covers FGM and child marriage.594 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 36 
on the right of girls and women to education (2017) labels child and/or forced 
marriage a discriminatory and harmful practice that demonstrates states‘ 
failure to provide girls and boys equal access to education.595 
                                               
590  Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), General 
Recommendation No. 35 on Gender-Based Violence Against Women, Updating General 
Recommendation No. 19, 26 July 2017, CEDAW/C/GC/35. 
591 The CEDAW Committee chooses to use this term instead of just ‗violence against 
women‘ because: ‗the concept of ―violence against women‖, as defined in General 
Recommendation No. 19 and other international instruments and documents, has 
placed an emphasis on the fact that such violence is gender-based. Accordingly, in the 
present recommendation, the term "gender-based violence against women" is used as a 
more precise term that makes explicit the gendered causes and impacts of the violence. 
The term further strengthens the understanding of the violence as a social rather than 
an individual problem, requiring comprehensive responses, beyond those to specific 
events, individual perpetrators and victims/survivors‘—Paragraph 9, 
CEDAW/C/GC/35. 
592 Paragraph 16, CEDAW/C/GC/35. 
593 United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women and United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa, ‗Background Paper for the Expert Group Meeting on Good Practices 
in Legislation to Address Harmful Practices Against Women,‘ (2009). 
594 Paragraph 15(d), CEDAW Committee, CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of 
the Convention (Women and Health), 1999, A/54/38/Rev.1, chap. I. 
595 Paragraph 52, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 36 (2017) on the Right of Girls and Women to Education, 16 November 2017 
(advance unedited version) CEDAW/C/GC/36. The committee adds that negative impacts 




As for the CRC Committee, its General Comment No. 4 on adolescent‘s health 
and development (2003) 596  urges states to implement legislation towards 
changing attitudes and addressing gender roles and stereotypes that 
contribute to harmful traditional practices.597 CRC General Comment No. 13 
related to VAC (2011)598 recommends measures for protecting children from 
all forms of violence. The General Comment contains a litany of harmful 
practices against the child,599 and gender-based ones include: FGM; violent 
and degrading initiation rites; force-feeding of girls; fattening; virginity 
testing; forced marriage and early marriage; ‗honour‘ crimes; and dowry-
related death and violence.600 
The CESCR weighs in on harmful practices through two general comments. 
General Comment No. 14 on the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health (2000)601 emphasises the legal obligation of states to adopt effective and 
appropriate measures to abolish harmful traditional practices affecting the 
health of children, particularly girls, including early marriage, FGM, 
preferential feeding and care of male children.602  General Comment No. 22 
                                                                                                                                      
norms confining girls to the home, or stigma; increased risk of domestic violence, 
reproductive health risks and limitations to the right to freedom of movement. 
596 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General Comment No. 4 (2003): Adolescent 
Health and Development in the Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1 July 
2003, CRC/GC/2003/4. 
597 Paragraph 20, CRC/GC/2003/4. 
598 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 13: The Right of the Child to 
Freedom from All Forms of Violence, 18 April 2011, CRC/C/GC/13. 
599 Paragraph 29: harmful practices include, but are not limited to: corporal punishment and 
other cruel or degrading forms of punishment; FGM; amputations, binding, scarring, burning 
and branding; violent and degrading initiation rites; force-feeding of girls; fattening; virginity 
testing (inspecting girls‘ genitalia); forced marriage and early marriage; 'honour' crimes; 
'retribution' acts of violence (where disputes between different groups are taken out on 
children of the parties involved); dowry-related death and violence; accusations of 
'witchcraft' and related harmful practices such as 'exorcism'; vulectomy and teeth 
extraction—                  CRC/C/GC/13. 
600 Paragraph 29, CRC/C/GC/13. 
601 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 14: 
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant), 11 August 2000, 
E/C.12/2000/4. 




on the right to sexual and reproductive health (2016)603 requests states to 
undertake preventive, promotional and remedial action to shield all 
individuals from harmful practices and GBV norms that violate their sexual 
and reproductive health, including: FGM, child and forced marriage, 
domestic and sexual violence.604 
The above descriptions of harmful practices show that before the 2014 joint 
CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC General Comment (discussed 
below), UN jurisprudence evolved around several harmful practices related 
to health and VAW,605  without a nuanced engagement of the concept of 
harmful practices itself.606 This conceptual gap could have prompted views 
that the UN is biased towards ‗non-Western‘ harmful practices.607 The UN has 
since captured ‗Western‘ harmful practices in the 2014 CEDAW General 
Recommendation/CRC General Comment on harmful practices 608  without 
necessarily watering down the impact of ‗non-Western‘ harms. However, this 
all-harms approach can potentially obscure harmful practices that have severe 
developmental impacts, as those addressed by the community bylaws.609 
                                               
603 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 22 (2016) on 
the Right to sexual and reproductive health (article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 2 May 2016, E/C.12/GC/22. 
604 Paragraphs 29 and 49(d), E/C.12/GC/22. 
605 Chia Longman and Tamsin Bradley, ‗Interrogating the Concept of ―Harmful Cultural 
Practices‖,‘ (2016),‘ 12. 
606 But notably outside the jurisprudence, the 1995 UN Fact Sheet No. 23, inspired by Article 
5(a) of CEDAW, engaged more deeply on the following harmful practices affecting women‘s 
and girls‘ health: FGM, son preference and its implications for the status of girls, female 
infanticide, early marriage and dowry, early pregnancy, nutritional taboos and practices 
related to child delivery and VAW—United Nations, ‗UN Fact Sheet No 23 Harmful 
Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children‘ (1995). 
607 Bronwyyn Winter, Denise Thompson, and Sheila Jeffreys, ‗The UN Approach to Harmful 
Practices: Some Conceptual Problems,‘ (2002), 72-94 72. 
608  Paragraph 9: In addition, many women and children increasingly undergo medical 
treatment and/or plastic surgery to comply with social norms of the body, rather than for 
medical or health reasons, and many are also pressured to be fashionably thin, which has 
resulted in an epidemic of eating and health disorders—CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, 
see note 610 below. 
609 Furthermore, Longman and Bradley observe that 'recent tendencies to broaden the concept 
of harmful cultural practices to include harm against children and LGBTQI individuals and 




4.3.1.2   Conceptualisation of harmful practices under joint CEDAW/CRC 
jurisprudence 
The 2014 joint General Recommendation No. 31 of the CEDAW Committee 
and General Comment No. 18 of the CRC Committee (joint General 
Recommendation/General Comment) on harmful practices 610  is a historic 
effort to conceptually consolidate and interpret international human rights 
norms protecting women and girls from harmful practices. Recognising that 
both CEDAW and CRC embrace legally binding obligations for states to 
eliminate harmful practices, the joint General Recommendation/General 
Comment provides extensive authoritative guidance on this obligation.611  
The joint General Recommendation/General Comment underscores the due-
diligence obligation of states to prevent acts that infringe on rights of women 
and children, and ensures that ‗private actors do not perpetuate 
discrimination against women and girls, GBV, and any form of VAC‘.612 
Indeed, Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras 613  demonstrates that this due-
diligence obligation of states applies to harmful practices against children614 
(and women).  
                                                                                                                                      
and Tamsin Bradley, ‗Interrogating the Concept of ―Harmful Cultural Practices‖,‘ (2016),‘ 11. 
However, the position of this thesis on harmful practices affecting children is that these have 
been recognised since the UN became concerned about FGM in the 1950's. 
610  Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Joint general 
recommendation No. 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women/general comment No. 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on harmful practices 
(59th session, 2014), CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
611 Paragraph 1, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
612 Paragraph 11, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
613 This case was reviewed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) in 1988, 
concerning state responsibility for enforced disappearances. The due diligence concept 
establishes that an illegal act, which violates human rights and is initially not directly 
attributable to a state can lead to the international responsibility of the state if there was lack 
of due diligence by the state to prevent the violation or to respond to the violation as required 
by the relevant human rights treaty – cited in United Nations Special Representative of the 
Secretary General on Violence against Children, Protecting Children from Harmful Practices in 





The joint General Recommendation/General Comment first lists broad 
examples of harmful practices, 615 some of which were also identified in the 
UN‘s effort to conceptualise selected harmful practices affecting women‘s and 
girls‘ health in 1995.616  Thereafter, it illustratively interprets four harmful 
practices: FGM,617 child marriage/forced marriages (including dowry/bride 
price payments), 618  polygamy, 619  and ‗honour‘ crimes. 620  Child marriage, 
servile marriages and levirate marriages are considered forms of forced 
marriage, amongst others.621 However, while recognising that child marriage 
involves any party aged below 18 years, the joint General 
Recommendation/General Comment has dropped the bar to 16 years in 
exceptional circumstances. 622  Nevertheless, states are tasked to address 
harmful effects of child marriage.623 
                                               
615 Paragraph 9 provides the following examples of harmful practices besides the 'Western 
ones' cited in note 608: neglect of girls (linked to the preferential care and treatment of boys), 
extreme dietary restrictions, including during pregnancy (force-feeding, food taboos), 
virginity testing and related practices, binding, scarring, branding/infliction of tribal marks, 
corporal punishment, stoning, violent initiation rites, widowhood practices, accusations of 
witchcraft, infanticide and incest. They also include body modifications performed for the 
purpose of beauty or marriageability of girls and women (e.g. fattening, isolation, the use of 
lip discs and neck elongation with neck rings) or in order to protect girls from early 
pregnancy or from being subjected to sexual harassment and violence (e.g. breast ironing)—
CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18.  
616 See note 606. 
617 Paragraph 19, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
618 Paragraphs 20-23, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18.  
619 Paragraphs 25-28, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
620 Paragraphs 29-30, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
621  Paragraph 23: Other types of forced marriage are trade-off marriages (i.e. baad and 
baadal); allowing a rapist to escape criminal sanctions by marrying the victim; forcefully 
marrying off an immigrant girl within the family‘s community of origin or to provide 
extended family members or others with documents to migrate to and/or live in a particular 
destination country; the forcing of girls into marriage by armed groups during conflict; 
forcing a girl into marrriage in order to escape post-conflict poverty; not allowing one of the 
parties to end or leave a marriage— CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18.  
622 Paragraph 20 provides that in exceptional circumstances, one can get married at 16 years 
so long as a judge approves ‗based on legitimate exceptional grounds defined by law and on 
the evidence of maturity without deference to cultures and traditions‘—CEDAW/C/GC/31-
CRC/C/GC/18. 
623  i.e. early and frequent pregnancies and childbirth, resulting in higher than average 
maternal morbidity and mortality rates; pregnancy-related deaths as the leading cause of 
mortality for 15-19 year old girls (married and unmarried) worldwide; high infant mortality 
among the children of very young mothers; limited decision-making power by girls in 




The joint General Recommendation/General Comment defines harmful 
practices as: 
Practices and behaviour that are grounded in discrimination on the 
basis of, among others, sex, gender and age in addition to multiple 
and/or intersecting forms of discrimination that often involve 
violence and cause physical and/or psychological harm or suffering. 
The harm that these practices cause to victims surpasses the 
immediate physical and mental consequences and often has the 
purpose or effect of impairing the recognition, enjoyment and 
exercise of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of women 
and children. There is also a negative impact on their dignity, 
physical, psychosocial and moral integrity and development, 
participation, health, education and economic and social status.624 
Thus, the joint General Recommendation/General Comment pronounces that 
practices should meet four criteria to pass the ‗harmful test‘:  
a) Indignity and human rights abuse: the practices should constitute a denial of 
the dignity and/or integrity of the individual and a violation of the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the CEDAW and 
CRC.625 
b) Discrimination, with adverse impacts: the practices should be discriminatory 
against women/children and result in negative physical, psychological, 
economic and social effects on individuals/groups and limitations on 
one‘s capacity to participate fully in society or develop to their full 
potential.626 
                                                                                                                                      
where girls have limited education; higher rates of school dropout, particularly among girls, 
forced exclusion from school; increased risk of domestic violence; limited enjoyment of the 
right to freedom of movement; girls‘ lack of personal and economic autonomy; girls‘ attempts 
to flee or commit self-immolation or suicide to avoid or escape the marriage—Paragraph 22, 
CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
624 Paragraph 15, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
625 Paragraph 16(a). CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 




c) A traditional root: the practices should be traditional, re-emerging or 
emerging practices that are set and/or nurtured by social norms that 
perpetuate male dominance and the inequality of women and children, on 
the basis of sex, gender, age and other intersecting factors.627  
d) Imposition: the practices should be imposed on women and children by 
family members, community members or society at large, regardless of 
whether the victim provides, or is able to provide full, free and informed 
consent.628 
As demonstrated by the empirical chapters, the advent of these criteria, as 
well as the joint General Recommendation/General Comment‘s description of 
harmful practices is instructive in identifying resemblances and variances 
between what community bylaws are stamping as harmful practices, and the 
parameters of the joint General Recommendation/General Comment on this 
matter. Such pollination clarifies how the community bylaws in rural Malawi 
are internalising international human rights norms when assessed from the 
perspective of the joint General Recommendation/General Comment‘s 
conceptual framework. The empirical chapters also consider how AU 
jurisprudence conceptualises harmful practices, discussed next. 
4.3.2 Conceptualisation of Harmful Practices in AU jurisprudence 
The maiden joint general comment of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples‘ Rights (ACHPR) and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child is on ending child marriage (ACERWC).629 Adopted 
in 2017, this joint General Comment interprets the obligation of States Parties 
to the Maputo Protocol and the African Children‘s Charter to take legislative, 
                                               
627 Paragraph 16(c), CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
628 Paragraph 16(d), CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
629  The ACHPR oversees states parties‘ execution of the Banjul Charter and associated 
protocols, e.g. the Maputo Protocol (in accordance with Article 62 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights). The ACERWC enforces the African Children‘s Charter (Article 




institutional and other measures to prevent marriage of persons below 18 
years.630 The joint General Comment recognises child marriage as a harmful 
practice the pervasiveness and negative impacts of which are ignited by other 
harmful practices.631 
Mirroring the Maputo Protocol,632 the joint General Comment defines harmful 
practices as ‗all behaviour, attitudes and/or practices that negatively affect 
the fundamental rights of women and girls, such as their right to life, health, 
dignity, education and physical integrity.‘633 While it includes attitudes,634 this 
definition does not explicitly emphasise the discriminatory element of 
harmful practices as does the joint CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC 
General Comment. While discrimination could be implied in the definition,635 
Chapter 8 demonstrates that omitting the terminology from the definition 
works well for some conceptualisations of harmful practices in the 
community bylaws. The joint General Comment has understandably not 
laboured to determine criteria for establishing harmful practices636 since it is 
confined to child marriage.  
The joint General Comment covers children who are married, children who 
are at risk of child marriage, and women who were married before their 18th 
                                               
630 Paragraphs 1 & 2, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. Furthermore, Paragraph 16 
of the joint General Comment asserts that obligations of the state to eliminate the harmful 
practice of child marriage are informed by Article 21 and Article 1(3) of the African 
Children‘s Charter (CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990)), as well as Article 6 of the Maputo Protocol 
(CAB/LEG/66.6 (Sept. 13, 2000), which  proscribe harmful social and cultural practices, child 
marriage and betrothal— joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
631 Paragraph 49. For example, such other harmful practices, which should be prohibited, are: 
abduction, kidnapping for marriage purposes, FGM, virginity testing, breast ironing, forced 
feeding, forced marriage, tourist marriage, and payment of dowry—joint ACHPR/ACERWC 
General Comment. 
632 Particularly Article 1(g), CAB/LEG/66.6 (Sept. 13, 2000). 
633 Paragraph 6, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
634 ‗Attitudes‘ are not specifically mentioned in the joint CEDAW General 
Recommendation/CRC General Comment.  
635 To the extent that harmful practices negatively affect all fundamental rights of women and 
girls. 
636  Like the joint CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC General Comment 




birthday.637 It also purportedly includes boys vulnerable to or affected by 
child marriage,638 although the definition of harmful practices is limited to 
women and girls. Unlike the joint CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC 
General Comment, the joint General Comment totally prohibits anyone aged 
below 18 years to get married.639 
The joint General Comment‘s interpretive guidance on child marriage and 
embedded harms is founded on the general principles underpinning the 
protection of children‘s rights under the African Children‘s Charter (best 
interest of the child; children‘s right to freedom from discrimination; 
children‘s right to survival, development and protection; and children‘s right 
to participate in matters affecting them640) and the Maputo Protocol (equality 
and non-discrimination641). These are similar principles underpinning the 
CRC642 and CEDAW, respectively.643  
The joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment interprets these key 
principles from a child marriage perspective. First, it stipulates that since 
child marriage has negative physical, psychological, economic and social 
consequences, the best interests of the child principle644 restrains states from 
condoning child marriage on any ground645  (or invoking the principle to 
                                               
637 Paragraph 5, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment.  
638 Paragraphs 5 & 18, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
639 Paragraphs 6, 9 & 10, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
640 Paragraph 7, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
641 Paragraph 7, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
642 Except that joint General Comment opts for a child's right to 'survival, development and 
protection' instead of the child‘s right 'to life, survival and development' under the CRC. But 
Chirwa observes that ‗in respect of the best interests of the child principle, the African 
Children‘s Charter goes a step ahead of the CRC by stating that the best interests of the child 
must be 'the primary consideration' in all actions concerning the child. This offers better 
protection for children since the best interests principle under the Charter is the overriding 
consideration—Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, ‗The Merits and Demerits of the African Charter 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,‘ (2002), 160. 
643 See section 4.2.1 of the thesis. 
644 Under Article 4(1) of the African Children‘s Charter, CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). 
645 Paragraph 8, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. Thus parents, traditional leaders 
and community representatives must act in the best interests of the child by not perpetrating, 




justify child marriage 646 ). It also calls on stakeholders, such as parents, 
traditional leaders and community representatives to, in the best interests of 
the child, not perpetrate, perpetuate or support child marriage.647  
Second, in relation to the right of individuals to be free from discrimination,648 
the joint General Comment clarifies that child marriage is a manifestation of 
gender inequalities and sex discrimination because it mostly affects girls and 
women and entrenches harmful constructions of gender and patriarchy.649 
Third, the joint General Comment notes that the adverse impacts of child 
marriage threaten children‘s right to survival, development and protection.650 
In respect of prohibiting child marriage, ACHPR/ACERWC jurisprudence 
specifically expounds that child marriage violates girls‘ right to survival and 
development because of its high contribution to maternal mortality and 
morbidity; and because children entering such marriages usually drop out of 
school, and cannot (effectively) participate in economic, political, social and 
other life spheres. 651  Chirwa 652  has also demonstrated how the African 
Children‘s Charter promotes children‘s right to survival and development 
through the rights to education and health.653 Also, the right of children to 
protection comes with the responsibility to protect children from economic 
exploitation,654 and from sexual exploitation and abuse.655  Lastly, the joint 
                                               
646 Paragraph 10, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
647 Paragraph 8, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
648 Under Article 2 of the African Children‘s Charter and Article 3 of the Maputo Protocol. 
649 Paragraph 11, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
650 Paragraph 12 observes that this right is anchored by Article 5(2) of the African Children's 
Charter, as well as the condemnation of practices that obstruct the physical development of 
women and girls in the Maputo Protocol‘s preamble—joint ACHPR/ACERWC General 
Comment.  
651  Furthermore, Paragraph 12 outlines that child marriage heightens girls‘ exposure to 
domestic violence—joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
652 Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, ‗The Merits and Demerits of the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child,‘ (2002). 
653 Protected under Articles 11 and 14 of the African Children's Charter respectively—ibid., 
162-164. 
654 Article 32 of the CRC (UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 
November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3); and Article 15 of the African 




General Comment considers child marriage656 to be a hindrance to a child‘s 
right to participation/giving free and informed.657 
The joint General Comment is important to this thesis since community 
bylaws in rural Malawi are heavily invested in eliminating child marriages. 
Therefore, the joint General Comment ‘s expanded scope of victims requiring 
protection from child marriage is useful in engaging the community 
bylaws.658 Additionally, the joint General Comment‘s application of the four 
general principles governing the African Children‘s Charter and the two 
principles underlying the Maputo Protocol expands the analytical framework 
of the joint CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC General Comment in 
assessing how community bylaws are conceptualising harmful practices and 
internalising norms protecting women from such practices.  
Having established what human rights jurisprudence says about the norm 
protecting women and girls from harmful practices, the next section examines 
how the jurisprudence expects states to domesticate the norm, including the 
envisaged role of community and informal mechanisms in this endeavour.   
                                                                                                                                      
655 Article 34 of the CRC (UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 
November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3); and Article 27 of the African 
Children's Charter (CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990)). 
656 Especially betrothal, parental consent for child marriages, marriage of rape victims by 
rapists, and forcing children to stay married. 
657 Paragraph 14,  joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
658 Unlike UN jurisprudence, the joint General Comment specifically embraces women who 
were married before the age of 18 years under its wings. The joint General Comment also 
isolates children who are particularly vulnerable to child marriage, including those with 
disabilities, in child headed households, and in conflict/post-conflict scenarios—joint 




4.4 REQUIREMENTS ON HOW STATES SHOULD INTERNALISE NORMS PROTECTING 
WOMEN FROM HARMFUL PRACTICES  
Beyond treaty ratification, domestic processes of norm appropriation spur 
social change.659 Various scholars assert that international norms become fully 
institutionalised nationally as states integrate the norms into formal sources 
of national law, policy and practice; as the norms become accepted and 
enforced by law; and as the norms become local practice. 660  This norm 
internalisation model centres on formal institutional changes, 661  and not 
informal community-level changes, as the community bylaws. The ensuing 
narrative confirms that international human rights jurisprudence on harmful 
practices prioritises this ‗institutionalisation‘ approach to norm 
internalisation, pestering states to chiefly address harmful practices through 
legal and administrative exploits.  
4.4.1 Norm Internalisation Through Legal Measures  
The use of the formal domestic legal system and instruments in 
domesticating global human rights norms is preferred as ‗more proficient 
and programmatic‘.662 Out of the jurisprudence analysed in this thesis, 
only CEDAW General Recommendation No. 14 on female circumcision 
and other harmful practices (before being updated) did not explicitly 
demand legal measures for addressing FGM and other harmful 
                                               
659 Susanne Zwingel, ‗How Do Norms Travel? Theorising International Women‘s Rights in 
Transnational Perspective,‘ (2012), 120. 
660  Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‗International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change,‘ (1998); Thomas Risse, ‗International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and 
Communicative Behaviour in the Human Rights Area,‘ (1999); Sarah H Cleveland, ‗Norm 
Internalisation and U.S Economic Sanctions ‘ (2001); Sandra Sofia Englund, ‗Transnational 
Norm Diffusion and Norm Localisation: A Case Study of Gender Equality in the Republic of 
Chile and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,‘ (2013); Trine Flockhart, ed. Socialising 
Democratic Norms: The Role of International Organisations for the Construction of Europe (Springer, 
2005). 
661  Susanne Alldén, ‗How Do International Norms Travel? Women‘s Political Rights in 
Cambodia and Timor-Leste ‘ (Doctoral Thesis, Umeå University, 2009). 
662 Angela M. Banks, ‗CEDAW, Compliance, and Custom: Human Rights Enforcement in Sub-
Saharan Africa,‘ (2009), 783; Zvika Orr, ‗The Adaptation of Human Rights Norms in Local 




practices. 663 Jurisprudence related to legal measures calls for a) the 
enactment and review of legislation; b) criminalisation and enforcement 
of criminal sanctions.  
4.4.1.1   Enactment and review of legislation   
Despite recent position shifts, both UN and AU jurisprudence mostly 
presses states to purge harmful practices through formal laws. CEDAW 
General Recommendation No. 12 on VAW starts with inviting states to 
report on legislation they have enacted to protect women from al l kinds 
of violence.664 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24 on women and 
health agitates for laws prohibiting FGM and child marriage. 665 
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 35, 666  which updates General 
Recommendation No. 19, regrets that states breach their due dil igence 
obligation to address gender-based VAW through inadequate or deficient 
implementation of legislation. 667 It recommends the prioritisation of 
functioning laws, institutions, and systems to address VAW. 668  The 
CEDAW Committee‘s macro delineation of arrangements that states 
should make in implementing General Recommendation No. 35 at 
legislative, executive and judicial levels exposes overt attentiveness to 
formal legal measures.669  
                                               
663 As observed prior, this general recommendation has since been updated by the joint 
CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC General Comment. 
664  Paragraph 1, UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), General Recommendation No. 12: Violence against Women, 1989. 
665 Paragraph 15(d), UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), General Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health), 
1999, A/54/38/Rev.1, chap. I. 
666 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), General 
Recommendation No. 35 on Gender-Based Violence Against Women, Updating General 
Recommendation No. 19, 26 July 2017, UN. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/35. 
667 Paragraph 7, CEDAW/C/GC/35. 
668 Paragraph 25, CEDAW/C/GC/35. 
669 Under General Recommendation No. 35, the CEDAW Committee has interest to see that: 




CEDAW General Recommendation No. 33 on women‘s access to justice 
also trumpets state-level mechanisms as the arsenal for resolving justice-
related challenges affecting women. It recommends measures that states 
should implement in six areas that are considered pertinent to 
guaranteeing women access to justice. 670  These measures are mostly 
judicial/quasi-judicial, and within the formal justice machinery. 671 
Although the Committee positively recognises alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) processes672 and plural justice systems,673 its pitch that 
‗VAW cases should never undergo ADR processes‘674 divulges discomfort 
with these systems.675  
The joint CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC General Comment 
declares that states should prioritise developing, enacting, implementing and 
monitoring relevant legislation as ‗a key element of any holistic strategy to 
address harmful practices‘. 676  Legislation aimed at eliminating harmful 
practices must include befitting measures for budgeting, implementing, 
                                                                                                                                      
that all national laws are harmonised with CEDAW. This includes repealing, including in 
customary, religious and indigenous laws, all legal provisions that are discriminatory against 
women and thereby enshrine, encourage, facilitate, justify or tolerate any form of gender-
based violence. Also in particular, repealing provisions that allow, tolerate or condone forms 
of gender-based violence against women, including child or forced marriage and other 
harmful practices (Paragraphs 26 (a) and 29 (c)); b) public authorities are investigated and 
sanctioned for their inefficiency, complicity and negligence in dealing with complaints 
(Paragraph 26 (b)); and c) all legal procedures involving allegations of gender-based violence 
against women should meet international law standards (Paragraphs 26 (c))—
CEDAW/C/GC/35.  
670  The six areas are justiciability, availability, accessibility, good quality, provision of 
remedies for victims and accountability of justice systems—CEDAW Committee, General 
Recommendation No. 33 on Women’s Access to Justice, 23 July 2015, UN. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/GC/33. 
671 Paragraphs 15-19, CEDAW/C/GC/33. 
672 Paragraphs 57 & 58, CEDAW/C/GC/33. 
673 Paragraphs 61-64, CEDAW/C/GC/33. 
674 Paragraph 58(c), CEDAW/C/GC/33. Incidentally, such recommendation is also echoed in 
the 2016 CEDAW concluding observations on Mali‘s State Party report – Committee on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations on the 
combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Reports of Mali, 25 July 2016, CEDAW/C/MLI/CO/6-7 
(Paragraph 20(a)). 
675 These informal systems are discussed under section 4.4.4 of the thesis. 




monitoring and effective enforcement; 677  and provide victims of harmful 
practices redress.678 Moreover, the joint General Recommendation/General 
Comment provides guidance on legislative considerations that states should 
make in order to effectively address harmful practices.679 CEDAW General 
Recommendation No. 36 supports measures that are prescribed by the joint 
General Recommendation/General Comment, including that legislation 
should outlaw child marriage.680  
CRC General Comment No. 13 similarly urges states to pursue 
comprehensive legislative measures (including budgetary, implementation 
and enforcement) against all forms of VAC.681 Furthermore, CRC General 
Comment No. 4682 invites states to take all appropriate legislative measures 
and protect adolescents from all harmful practices.683 CEDAW Committee‘s 
concluding observations on African State Party reports also demonstrate a 
relentless push for the illegalisation of cultural practices harmful to women. 
For instance, the Committee recommends legal measures in all but three684 of 
the 20 concluding observations reviewed in this thesis. Sometimes, the 
Committee mentions specific areas requiring legislation. For instance, the 
                                               
677 Paragraph 12, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. Here, the joint General 
Recommendation/General Comment is making direct reference to what the CEDAW 
Committee has prescribed under Paragraph 38(a) of CEDAW General Recommendation No. 
28 (2010), CEDAW/C/GC/28; and what the CRC Committee has recommended under 
Paragraph 40 of CRC General Comment No. 13 (2011), CRC/C/GC/13. 
678 Paragraph 52, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
679 Paragraph 55, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
680 Paragraph 55, which particularly recomends that legislation should impose 18 years as the 
minimum marriage age—CEDAW/C/GC/36. 
681 Paragraph 40: Legislative measures comprise national, provincial and municipal laws and 
all relevant regulations defining the systems, mechanisms and the roles and responsibilities 
of concerned agencies and competent officers—CRC/C/GC/13. 
682 CRC General Comment No. 4 on Adolescent Health and Development in the Context of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1 July 2003, CRC/GC/2003/4. 
683 Paragraph 39(g), CRC/GC/2003/4. 
684 Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
Observations on the combined Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of Zimbabwe, 23 
March 2012, CEDAW/C/ZWE/CO/2-5; Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of 
Equatorial Guinea, 9 November 2012, CEDAW/C/GNQ/CO/6; and Paragraph 19(c), 
Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 




concluding observations on Swaziland‘s State Party report advocated for 
‗effective legal measures‘ to address child/forced marriage and polygamy.685  
In the AU jurisprudence, the first call made by the joint ACHPR/ACERWC 
General Comment is for states to ‗enact, amend, repeal or supplement 
legislation,‘ to prohibit child marriage, and set the minimum marriage age at 
18 years. States are asked to make such legislation superior to customary, 
religious, traditional or sub-national laws. 686  Standards that should be 
observed in constitutional reforms related to child marriage are also 
articulated.687  The emphasis on legislative reforms and the supremacy of 
legislation over other laws entails that formal legal structures are presumed to 
be the centres of human rights engineering, appropriation and internalisation, 
with the community/local structures being the recipients. Notably, some 
jurisprudence calls for criminal measures too.  
4.4.1.2   Criminalisation and enforcement of sanctions 
Some jurisprudence recommends the criminalisation and/or imposition 
of penalties for harmful practices and/or VAW. For example, CEDAW 
Recommendation No. 19 advises states to protect women from all kinds 
of violence through penal sanctions. 688  Even the updated CEDAW 
General Recommendation on Gender-Based VAW (No. 35) exhibits a 
punitive inclination, urging states to prosecute and punish gender-based 
VAW through courts and tribunals. 689  Additionally, it urges that all 
judicial bodies are to strictly apply all penal provisions punishing gender-
based VAW.690 States will become complicit in promoting gender-based 
                                               
685 Paragraph 19(c), Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Concluding Observations on the combined Initial and Second Periodic Reports of Swaziland, 
24 July 2014, CEDAW/C/SWZ/CO/1-2. 
686 Paragraphs 18 & 19, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
687 Paragraphs 24, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
 
688 Paragraph 24(t)(i), U.N Doc. A/47/38 (now updated by General Recommendation No. 35). 
689 Paragraph 32 (b), CEDAW/C/GC/35. 




VAW when they fail to investigate, prosecute, and punish perpetrators 
and to compensate victims.691 
The CEDAW Committee‘s concluding observations on African State Party 
reports suggest that criminal measures prove a state‘s tenacity to 
eliminate harmful practices. In its 2015 concluding observations on 
Malawi‘s State Party report, the Committee prompted the state to 
effectively implement the Gender Equality Act by punishing all 
perpetrators of harmful practices. 692  The Committee made similar 
recommendations in concluding observations for Guinea 693 and 
Madagascar, 694  and recommended criminal measures to eliminate 
harmful practices and/or all forms of VAW in 11 other concluding 
observations.695 
                                               
691 Paragraph 25, CEDAW/C/GC/35.  
692  Paragraph 21, Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Malawi, 24 November 2015, 
CEDAW/C/MWI/CO/7. 
693 Paragraph 29(a), Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and Eight Periodic Report of Guinea, 14 
November 2014, CEDAW/C/GI/CO/7-8. 
694 Paragraph 19(b), Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Reports of 
Madagascar, 9 March  2016, CEDAW/C/MDG/CO/6-7. 
695  Paragraph 49, Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports of the 
United Republic of Tanzania, 9 March 2016, CEDAW/C/TZA/CO/7-8; Paragraph 21(a), 
Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Gabon, 11 March 2015, CEDAW/C/GAB/CO/6; 
Paragraph 26(a), Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Initial and Second to Fifth Periodic Reports of 
the Central African Republic, 24 July 2014, CEDAW/C/CAF/CO/1-5; Paragraph 17(c), 
Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
Observations on the Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of Cameroon, 28 February 2014, 
CEDAW/C/CMR/CO/4-5; Paragraph 20(c), Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations on the Sixth and Seventh Periodic 
Reports of Democratic Republic of Congo, 30 July 2013, CEDAW/C/COD/CO/6-7; Paragraph 
25(a), Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
Concluding Observations on the combined Second and Third Periodic Reports of Mauritania, 24 July 
2014, CEDAW/C/MRT/CO/2-3; Paragraph 18(a) & (b), Committee on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report 
of Angola, 27 March 2013, CEDAW/C/AGO/CO/6; Paragraph 21(c), Committee on the 




UN and AU jurisprudence has similar and different positions on 
punishment targets. The joint CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC 
General Comment expects states to consistently enforce criminal 
sanctions, while being mindful of ‗potential threats to and negative 
impact on victims, including acts of retaliation‘ .696 Thus no perpetrator is 
exempted from punishment. The joint ACHPR/ACERWC General 
Comment asserts that states should not penalise/sanction children 
involved in child marriages. But where they do, ‗states must carefully 
avoid any risk of retaliation against a child‘. 697 Chapter 8 analyses the 
implications of how jurisprudence conceptualises child marriage victim 
versus the approach in the community bylaws.  
Unlike the joint General Recommendation/General Comment, which nets 
all perpetrators, the joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment is 
hesitant about the sanctioning of parents ‗to avoid  clandestine child 
marriages‘. 698  Instead, it targets punishment towards those registering 
child marriages without conducting checks; those officiating child 
marriages; and ‗any person who actively encourages and facilitates a 
child marriage‘. 699  However, it is inconceivable how parents could be 
divorced from the latter category, or how children could be consistently 
protected if reprobate parents face no consequences.  
                                                                                                                                      
Combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Report of Togo, 8 November 2012, 
CEDAW/C/TGO/CO/6-7; Paragraph 24(a), Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations on the Initial to Fourth Periodic Reports 
of Comoros, 8 November 2012, CEDAW/C/COM/CO/1-4; Paragraph 20(b), Committee on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the Sixth and Seventh Periodic 
Reports of Democratic Republic of Congo, 30 July 2013, CEDAW/C/COG/CO/6. 
696 Paragraph 51. Furthermore, in respect of perpetrators, Paragraph 50 of the joint CEDAW 
General Recommendation/CRC General Comment also says medical professionals, 
government employees, or civil servants and professionals involved or complicit in 
conducting harmful practices should face stiff criminal sanctions—CEDAW/C/GC/31-
CRC/C/GC/18. It seems that these provisions had FGM highly in mind. 
697 Paragraph 19, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
698 Ibid. 




Generally, the issue of applying punitive measures to harm affecting women, 
as well as the deterrent effect of such measures, is controversial. For example, 
there is concern that ‗an abolitionist approach, backed by punitive measures 
like imprisonment and fines‘ hardly works well for complicated challenges 
such child marriage and FGM, as penalties mostly lead to camouflaging the 
practices and driving them underground‘. 700  Even rape discourse 
demonstrates that some early feminists were hesitant to support harsh 
penalties for rapists, arguing that such penalties would result in fewer 
convictions (and therefore less deterrence), unlike light punishments.701  
These conversations attest that in dealing with harmful practices, a ‗one-
size-fits-all‘ punitive approach that is encouraged by international 
jurisprudence (and that has been massaged into legislative approaches as 
seen in Chapter 5) may not always work. While the jurisprudence has  
focused on the formal justice system, this thesis is mindful that penalties 
are also employed in the community bylaws being studied. As such, 
Chapter 8 provides insight into how such penalties are conforming to 
human rights jurisprudence; and, indeed, how horizontal 
vernacularisation is being partly shaped by community punishment 
schemes that are culturally practical, and yet ‗pushing back‘ on legislative 
penalties. The next section illustrates that the jurisprudence also heralds 
formal administrative measures as important in tackling harmful 
practices. 
4.4.2 Norm Internalisation through administrative measures  
Human rights jurisprudence recommends administrative measures that 
states ought to implement to address harmful practices in several 
                                               
700 Jo Boyden, Alula Pankhurst, and Yisak Tafere, ‗Child Protection and Harmful Traditional 
Practices: Female Early Marriage and Genital Modification in Ethiopia,‘ (2012), 517. 
701  Discussed in Michael Davis, ‗Setting Penalties: What Does Rape Deserve,‘ Law and 




categories: policy and other institutional frameworks, services for 
victims, budgetary resources, and capacity building/awareness raising.  
4.4.2.1   Policies and other institutional frameworks 
The jurisprudence bids states to undertake policy and other institutional 
measures at national and sector levels. CEDAW General Recommendation 
No. 14 on female circumcision charge states to review their national health 
policies;702 while CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24703 requires states 
to protect women‘s health by formulating policies, health care protocols and 
hospital procedures to address VAW.704 CEDAW General Recommendation 
No. 28705  prompts states to design women-tailored public policies and to 
ensure that women are developing on the same level with men. 706  CRC 
General Comment No. 13 further expects administrative measures to involve 
policy establishment.707  CRC General Comment No. 4 stresses that states 
should regularly review and revise policies and strategies, and take all 
appropriate administrative and other measures to protect adolescents from all 
harmful practices.708 
The duty of states‘ to exigently develop and operationalise 
‗comprehensive national strategies‘ to eliminate gender stereotypes 
and/or harmful practices is topical in CEDAW concluding observations 
of African State Party reports. Between 2012 and 2016, the CEDAW 
Committee recommended the development and implementation of such 
strategies (at times termed ‗comprehensive strategy with result-oriented 
                                               
702  Updated by the joint CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC General Comment 
(CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18). 
703 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health), 
1999, U.N Doc.A/54/38/Rev.1. 
704 Paragraph 15(a), ibid. 
705 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 
2 of the CEDAW (2010), CEDAW/C/GC/28. 
706 Paragraph 9, ibid. 
707 Paragraph 42, CRC/C/GC/13. 




approach‘709 or ‗national plans‘710) to eliminate gender stereotypes and/or 
harmful practices in 17711 out of the 20 reviewed concluding observations 
of African State Party reports.  
                                               
709 For example in the 2012 concluding observations for Togo and Congo State Party reports— 
Paragraph 21(a), Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Concluding Observations on the combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Report of Togo, 8 
November 2012, CEDAW/C/TGO/CO/6-7; Paragraph 22(a), Committee on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the Sixth Periodic Report of the Republic of the 
Congo, 1 March 2012, CEDAW/C/COG/CO/6. 
710  For example, 2014 CEDAW Committee's concluding observations for Central African 
Republic‘s State Party report recommend the effective implementation of a ‗national plan 
addressing traditional practices harmful to women‘s health and GBV'—Paragraph 26(b), 
Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
Observations on the Combined Initial and Second to Fifth Periodic Reports of the Central African 
Republic, 24 July 2014, CEDAW/C/CAF/CO/1-5. 
711 Paragraph 19(a), Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports of the 
United Republic of Tanzania, 9 March 2016, CEDAW/C/TZA/CO/7-8; Paragraph 21(c), 
Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Gabon, 11 March 2015, CEDAW/C/GAB/CO/6; 
Paragraph 21, Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Malawi, 24 November 2015, 
CEDAW/C/MWI/CO/7; Paragraph 23(a), Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations on the combined Sixth and Seventh 
Periodic Report of Ghana, 14 November 2014, CEDAW/C/GHA/CO/6-7; Paragraph 19(a), 
Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
Observations on Sixth Periodic Report of Sierra Leone, 10 March 2014, CEDAW/C/SLE/CO/6; 
Paragraph 17(a), Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of Cameroon, 
28 February 2014, CEDAW/C/CMR/CO/4-5; Paragraph 20(a), Committee on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations on the 
Sixth and Seventh Periodic Reports of Democratic Republic of Congo, 30 July 2013, 
CEDAW/C/COD/CO/6-7; Paragraph 18(a), Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Angola, 
27 March 2013, CEDAW/C/AGO/CO/6; Paragraph 17(a), Committee on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic 
Report of Benin, 28 October 2013, CEDAW/C/BEN/CO/4; Paragraph 21(a), Committee on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations on the 
Combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Report of Togo, 8 November 2012, 
CEDAW/C/TGO/CO/6-7; Paragraph 22(a), Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations on the Initial to Fourth Periodic Reports 
of Comoros, 8 November 2012, CEDAW/C/COM/CO/1-4; Paragraph 24(a), Committee on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations on the 
Sixth Periodic Report of Equatorial Guinea, 9 November 2012, CEDAW/C/GNQ/CO/6; 
Paragraph 22(a), Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Concluding Observations on the combined Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports 
of Zimbabwe, 23 March 2012, CEDAW/C/ZWE/CO/2-5; Paragraph 22(a), Committee on the 




While each country has to determine the nature of ‗appropriate measures‘ for 
its comprehensive strategies or action plans for dealing with harmful 
practices, the joint CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC General 
Comment elucidates that such measures should target ‗specific obstacles, 
barriers and resistance to the elimination of discrimination that fuel harmful 
practices and VAW‘. 712  Similarly, Ibhawol 713  has observed that cultural 
barriers to human rights should be identified, not for purposes of rejecting 
cultural traditions wholesale, but in order to understand their social bases so 
that apt human rights-based transformative solutions can be found.714  
The intervention models that the jurisprudence recommend for states to 
adopt in their national strategies or action plans on harmful practices reveals 
preference for programmes targeting the state machinery or that are state led, 
as opposed to community (led) programmes. For example, the CRC General 
Comment No. 13 advises states to introduce elaborate programmes, and 
monitoring and oversight systems to address all forms of VAC within 
national and sub-national governments, 715  and within governmental, 
professional and civil society institutions.716  The joint ACHPR/ACERWC 
                                                                                                                                      
Sixth Periodic Report of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, 1 March 2012, 
CEDAW/C/COG/CO/6. 
712 Paragraph 30, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
713 Bonny Ibhawoh, ‗Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy 
of Human Rights in the African State,‘ (2000). 
714 Ibid., 856. 
715  By establishing a government focal point to coordinate child protection strategies and 
services; defining the roles, responsibilities and relationships between stakeholders on inter-
agency steering committees with a view to their effectively managing, monitoring and 
holding accountable the implementing bodies at national and subnational levels; ensuring 
that the process of decentralising services safeguards their quality, accountability and 
equitable distribution; implementing systematic and transparent budgeting processes in 
order to make the best use of allocated resources for child protection, including prevention; 
providing independent national human rights institutions with support and promoting the 
establishment of specific child rights mandates such as child rights ombudsmen where these 
do not yet exist —Paragraph 42(a), CRC/C/GC/13. 
716 This includes adopting intra- and inter-agency child protection policies; professional ethics 
codes, protocols, memoranda of understanding and standards of care for all childcare 
services and settings (including daycare centres, schools, hospitals, sport clubs and 
residential institutions etc.); and involving academic teaching and training institutions with 





General Comment promotes the establishment and improvement of official 
births and marriages registration systems.717  
The joint General Recommendation/General Comment recommends that a 
special ‗high-level entity should facilitate the vertical coordination of local, 
regional, and national level actors with traditional and religious leaders‘.718 
This suggests intent that a national-level structure should be in control. Even 
the joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment expects ‗competent judicial, 
administrative and legislative authority, or any competent authority provided 
by law‘ to provide institutional remedies related to access to justice.719 
The jurisprudence also primarily situates the establishment of administrative 
monitoring mechanisms for harmful practices/all forms of VAW and VAC at 
state level. CEDAW General Recommendation No. 33 recommends states to 
take measures that strengthen the accountability of formal justice systems.720 
Similarly, the recommended ‗independent monitoring mechanism‘ to track 
how women and girls are being protected from harmful practices under the 
joint General Recommendation/General Comment‘s holistic strategy 721  is 
likely to function at national/state level too. CRC General Comment No. 13 
promotes the national statistical system as an important tool in eliminating all 
forms of VAC, 722  and ‗strongly recommends‘ formal mechanisms for 
reporting VAC that are entwined with the state‘s justice machinery. 723  
                                               
717 Paragraphs 26-28, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
718 Paragraph 33, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18.  
719 Paragraph 41, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
720  This includes (a) monitoring to guarantee that justice systems function in harmony with 
the principles of justiciability, availability, accessibility, good quality and the provision of 
remedies; (b) monitoring the actions of justice system professionals—Paragraph 14(f), 
CEDAW/C/GC/33. 
721 Paragraph 34, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
722 It urges the establishment of a comprehensive and reliable national data collection system 
in order for states to have systematic monitoring and evaluation of systems (impact analyses), 
services, programmes and outcomes based on indicators aligned with universal standards, 
and adjusted for and guided by locally established goals and objectives—Paragraph 42(a)(v), 
CRC/C/GC/13. 
723  These recommended reporting mechanisms include the use of 24-hour toll-free hotlines 




Furthermore, CEDAW Committee‘s concluding observations on Africa State 
Party reports urge states to have functional monitoring measures to address 
harmful practices. 724  The monitoring measures mostly involve service 
provision to victims, which is another administrative measure that the 
jurisprudence pursues. 
4.4.2.2   Services for victims  
The CEDAW, CRC and ACHPR/ACERWC jurisprudence stress that the 
state should ensure that victims of harmful practices access effective 
remedies and adequate protection. The joint General 
Recommendation/General Comment enjoins states to provide prevention, 
protection, recovery, reintegration, and redress measures to victims. 725 
Particularly, victims should access legal remedies, victim support and 
rehabilitation services and socio-economic opportunities.726 
According to CEDAW concluding observations on Malawi‘s State Party 
Report (2015), making justice accessible to women is part of the state‘s duty 
to investigate, prosecute and adequately punish perpetrators of all harmful 
                                                                                                                                      
mechanisms will be established by: (a) providing appropriate information to facilitate the 
making of complaints; (b) participation in investigations and court proceedings; (c) 
developing protocols which are appropriate for different circumstances and made widely 
known to children and the general public; (d) establishing related support services for 
children and families; and (e) training and providing ongoing support for personnel to 
receive and advance the information received through reporting systems—Paragraph 49, 
CRC/C/GC/13. 
724 For example, in concluding observations of State Party reports from Equatorial Guinea, 
Togo, Comoros, Zimbabwe and Congo—Paragraph 24(b), Concluding Observations on the Sixth 
Periodic Report of Equatorial Guinea, 9 November 2012, CEDAW/C/GNQ/CO/6; Paragraph 
21(c), Concluding Observations on the combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Report of Togo, 8 
November 2012, CEDAW/C/TGO/CO/6-7; Paragraph 22(b), Concluding Observations on the 
Initial to Fourth Periodic Reports of Comoros, 8 November 2012, CEDAW/C/COM/CO/1-4; 
Paragraph 22(d), Concluding Observations on the combined Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Periodic 
Reports of Zimbabwe, 23 March 2012, CEDAW/C/ZWE/CO/2-5; Paragraph 22, Concluding 
Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of the the Republic of the Congo, 30 July 2013, 
CEDAW/C/COG/CO/6. 
725 Paragraph 13, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 




practices.727 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 33 stipulates that justice 
accessibility necessitates establishing justice access centres (such as one-stop 
centres) 728  and the ‗creation, maintenance and development of courts, 
tribunals and other entities‘. 729  Legal remedies should include 
rehabilitation.730 The joint CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC General 
Comment considers medical, psychological and legal services as urgent 
support services for harmful practices victims.731 Even for women in rural 
and remote areas, the CEDAW Committee still promotes formal 
systems/mobile courts.732 Markedly, the Committee‘s imagination regarding 
making justice systems accessible to women concentrates on judicial and 
quasi-judicial systems and technologies.733   
The joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment proposes legal, health and 
education services for victims as well as those at risk of child marriage. 
Legally, it recommends that states should establish women‘s and children‘s 
police units.734  Health services should include providing age-appropriate 
comprehensive sexual and reproductive health (SRH) school curricula;735 and 
comprehensive SRH services to girls, including married ones.736 Educational 
services should include provision of sanitary facilities for girls and bursary 
programmes targeting girls at risk.737 Chapter 8 exposes the extent to which 
                                               
727Paragraph 21, Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Malawi, 24 November 
2015, CEDAW/C/MWI/CO/7.  
728 These should be devoted to the provision of legal advice and aid, commencing legal 
proceedings and coordinating necessary support services for women, including poor and 
rural women—Paragraph 17 (f), CEDAW/C/GC/33. 
729 Paragraph 16(a), CEDAW/C/GC/33.  
730 Particularly medical and psychological care and other social services—Paragraph 17(f),  
CEDAW/C/GC/33.  
731  Paragraph 82, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
732 Paragraph 16(a), CEDAW/C/GC/33.  
733 E.g. the removal of economic barriers to justice (filing fees and other court costs) and 
linguistic barriers in judicial & quasi-judicial processes (Paragraph 17(a)); videoconferencing 
of court hearings (Paragraph 17(d)); and ensuring a conducive physical environment for 
judicial and quasi-judicial processes (Paragraph 17(e))—CEDAW/C/GC/33. 
734 Paragraph 40, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
735 Paragraph 36, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
736 Paragraphs 34 & 37, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 




the community bylaws support these services.  
The joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment recommends that states 
should provide support for boys and girls who are already in marriage. Such 
support includes comprehensive social protection and health services, 
education assistance, legal assistance, and parenting support.738 This way, the 
joint General Comment seeks to reduce the harsh impacts of child marriage on 
and further victimisation of those who married as children.739 The ‗already 
married‘ category is not clearly covered in the support meant for ‗children and 
women who are, or are at high risk of becoming victims of harmful 
practices‘740 under the joint CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC General 
Comment. 
The various services require money, and the jurisprudence regards budgets as 
essential in internalising norms protecting women from harmful practices. 
4.4.2.3   Budget and resource allocation 
Under the jurisprudence, successfully addressing harmful practices cannot be 
achieved without central and local government budgets. The joint CEDAW 
General Recommendation/CRC General Comment and CRC General 
Comment No. 13 uphold the budget as one key strategy for implementing 
legislation to address harmful practices and VAC respectively.741 CEDAW 
General Recommendation No. 35 expects the executive to coordinate with 
relevant state agencies and commit adequate budgetary resources for the 
implementation of specific institutional measures. 742 The joint 
                                               
738 Paragraph 42, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
739 Paragraph 25, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
740 Paragraph 87(a) , CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
741 Paragraph 12, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18; Paragraphs 40 & 41, CRC/C/GC/13. 
The latter urges laxing states parties to provide adequate budget allocations for the 
implementation of legislation and all other measures adopted to end VAC (Paragraph 41(e)). 
742 i.e. design of focused public policies, development and implementation of monitoring 
mechanisms and the establishment and/or funding of competent national tribunals – 




ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment anticipates that states would meet 
their obligations under the General Comment by ‗allocating sufficient 
budgetary and other resources‘ towards ending child marriage.743 
Thus, the availability of budgets and resource allocation towards the 
implementation of institutional laws, policies and programmes targeting the 
elimination of harmful practices is an important indicator of whether states 
have internalised the norm protecting women from harmful practices. 
Relatedly, budgets are also vital for capacity-building interventions related to 
harmful practices.  
4.4.3 Norm Internalisation through Capacity Building and Awareness 
Raising  
The CEDAW, CRC and ACHPR/ACERWC jurisprudence on harmful 
practices is unrelenting about the need to immerse wide categories of 
people in the human rights discourse if socio-cultural transformation 
leading to the abandonment of harmful practices is to happen. This 
should be achieved through (top-down) ‗capacity building,‘ ‗trainings,‘ 
‗awareness raising‘– and often the difference between these 
terminologies is vague. The subsequent analysis examines the targeted 
audience for these programmes; and the anticipated designers and 
facilitators of the programmes. This discussion also unveils where the 
jurisprudence has located traditional leaders, who are championing the 
community bylaws under study.  
4.4.3.1   The targets of capacity-building and awareness-raising interventions 
‗A comprehensive, holistic and effective approach to capacity building‘ 
                                               
743 Paragraph 45. Generally, Paragraph 17 explains that the normative framework of the joint 
ACERWC/ACHPR General Comment is also guided by Article 26 of the Maputo Protocol 
(CAB/LEG/66.6 (Sept. 13, 2000)), which urges states parties to adopt measures and provide 
budgetary and other resources towards the full and effective implementation of the 




should focus on attitudinal and behavioural transformations towards harmful 
practices amongst targeted groups and the wider community. 744  The 
jurisprudence recommends capacity-building measures for purposes of 
empowering various cadres of duty bearers to know human rights norms and 
apply them to their services domains. UN jurisprudence shows that for the 
activities branded as ‗capacity building/training,‘ the CEDAW Committee 
has at times been engrossed with professional groups. For example, CEDAW 
General Recommendation No. 24 on women and health requires states to 
train health workers to spot and manage the health impacts of GBV.745 In the 
justice sector, CEDAW General Recommendation No. 33 instructs states to 
arrange ‗capacity-building programmes for judges, prosecutors, lawyers and 
law enforcement officials‘.746 
On the other hand, the joint CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC 
General Comment accommodates both formal and informal structures in the 
‗comprehensive, holistic and effective approach to capacity building‘ that 
states should implement at all levels in order to eliminate harmful practices.747 
It observes that a key preventative measure is to develop the capacity of all 
relevant professionals who are in regular contact with victims, potential 
victims and perpetrators of harmful practices.748 Police, public prosecutors, 
judges and other law enforcement officials should be trained to implement 
legislation criminalising harmful practices and equip them with knowledge 
                                               
744 Paragraph 70, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18.   
745 Paragraph 15(b), U.N Doc.A/54/38/Rev.1. 
746 Paragraph 29(f) provides that the training should be about the application of: international 
legal instruments relating to human rights, including the convention and the jurisprudence of 
the Committee; and of legislation prohibiting discrimination against women—
CEDAW/C/GC/33. 
747  Paragraphs 69-72: These include influential leaders (such as traditional and religious 
leaders), as many relevant professional groups as possible (including health, education and 
social workers, child care professionals, asylum and immigration authorities, the police, 
public prosecutors, other law enforcement officials, judges and politicians at all levels). They 
need to be provided with accurate information about the practice and applicable human 
rights norms and standards with a view to promoting a change in attitudes and behaviours of 
their group and the wider community—CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 




and skills about women‘s and children‘s rights, as well as victim handling.749 
Additionally, the joint General Recommendation/General Comment prompts 
states to include those serving in ADR and traditional justice systems in 
human rights training programmes.750  
CRC General Comment No. 13 also supports building the capacity of 
personnel in both formal and informal structures. It requires states to provide 
initial and in-service general and role-specific training to all professionals and 
non-professionals working with, and for children, including traditional and 
religious leaders – so that they can protect children from all forms of physical 
or mental violence.751 The CRC Committee prefers that educational measures 
towards addressing attitudes, traditions, customs and behavioural practices 
that condone and promote VAC should be implemented under the state‘s 
responsibility.752 
The joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment recommends that training 
programmes should be implemented for prosecutors, court personnel, 
national human rights institutions, civil society organisations (CSOs) 
supporting child marriage victims, and statutory bodies. 753  Additionally, 
states should ‗conduct trainings and capacity building workshops for 
marriage and birth registration officials, teachers, health providers, judicial 
officers, and religious, community and traditional leaders‘ – to enlighten them 
                                               
749 Paragraphs 70-72(c), CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
750  The training should be on human rights and the appropriate application of key human 
rights principles. Traditional and religious leaders and professional groups should receive 
with accurate information about harmful practices and applicable human rights norms and 
standards—Paragraph 69, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
751 Paragraph 44(d), CRC/C/GC/13. 
752  Such measures should encompass well-programmed training/education undertakings 
targeted at a wide range of government and civil society professionals and institutions—  
Paragraph 44, CRC/C/GC/13. 




of laws proscribing child marriage and rights of children to be protected from 
child marriage.754 
When it comes to interventions coined ‗awareness raising,‘ CEDAW General 
Recommendation No. 35 proposes that these programmes should target 
women and men at all societal levels; education, health, social services and 
law enforcement personnel and other professionals and agencies involved in 
prevention and protection responses; traditional and religious leaders; and 
perpetrators of any form of GBV. 755  The joint CEDAW General 
Recommendation/CRC General Comment stipulates that traditional and 
religious leaders, should be given accurate information about applicable 
human rights norms in order to renew their thinking.756 
Furthermore, the joint CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC General 
Comment advises states to raise awareness of the causes and consequences of 
harmful practices through dialogue with relevant stakeholders.757 Awareness-
raising programmes targeting state structures should engage decision-
makers, relevant programmatic staff and key professionals working within 
local and national government agencies.758 Personnel within national human 
rights institutions should also be awakened to the human rights implications 
of harmful practices so that they can focus on eliminating these practices.759  
CEDAW concluding observations of all the 20 reviewed African State Party 
reports are crammed with suggestions regarding using widespread and 
targeted awareness-raising (especially for traditional leaders, who are 
custodians of culture) to substantively tackle harmful practices. Even the 2015 
CEDAW concluding observations on Malawi‘s State Party Report 
                                               
754 Paragraph 43, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
755 Paragraph 30(b)(ii), CEDAW/C/GC/35. 
756 Paragraph 69, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
757 Paragraph 56, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
758 Paragraphs 80(b), CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 




recommended ‗comprehensive education and awareness raising programmes 
targeting women and men at all levels of society, with a particular focus on 
traditional leaders‘.760  
The above demonstrates that international human rights jurisprudence on 
harmful practices considers human rights education and awareness raising, 
including of traditional leaders, as a key step in creating an enabling 
environment for transforming traditional practices harmful to women and 
children.761 This begs the question: who is the jurisprudence expecting to be 
responsible for designing and facilitating education and awareness-raising 
interventions? 
4.4.3.2   Conceptualisers of education and awareness-raising interventions: 
Positions of the state, CSOs and traditional leaders  
The CEDAW, CRC and ACHPR/ACERWC jurisprudence on harmful 
practices recommends that states should design and implement 
awareness-raising and education/capacity-building programmes. The 
jurisprudence is partially noncommittal about the need for the state to 
partner with CSOs and other local allies (norm 
translators/vernacularisers) in developing relevant programmes. For 
example, CRC General Comment No. 4 places on ‗State Parties‘ the onus 
of developing and implementing awareness-raising campaigns and 
education programmes to overcome harmful traditional practices. 762 The 
joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment asserts that enforcement and 
awareness will only occur if states train all relevant stakeholders, 
                                               
760  Paragraph 21(a), Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Malawi, 24 
November 2015, CEDAW/C/MWI/CO/7. 
761  Paragraph 24(t)(ii), U.N Doc. A/47/38 (CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19); 
Paragraph 20, CRC/GC/2003/4; Paragraph 44, CRC/C/GC/13; Angela M. Banks, ‗CEDAW, 
Compliance, and Custom: Human Rights Enforcement in Sub-Saharan Africa,‘ (2009), 834. 




especially government officials, police and the judiciary to protect girls 
and boys from child marriage and its effects.763 
Even CEDAW concluding observations on African State Party reports 
demonstrate that states are rarely encouraged to engage (other) 
vernacularisers764 in the developmental stages of national strategies or 
plans for the elimination of harmful practices. Out of the 20 concluding 
observations reviewed, only Madagascar was specifically tasked to 
design public education programmes in collaboration with civil 
society.765 For countries such as Angola, Comoros, Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Togo and Zimbabwe, 766 
vernacularisers were not acknowledged at the level of formulating 
awareness-raising programmes, but only during programme 
implementation. This approach locates the development of awareness 
raising and education interventions primarily on the state dais. Though, 
in reality the state cannot be a ‗unitary actor‘, 767 vernacularisers can 
proficiently advocate for and influence the vernacularisation of human 
rights norms if they participate in the conceptualisation of national 
programmes.  
                                               
763 Paragraph 63, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
764 Chapter 3 has featured ‗vernacularisers/translators‘ as the domestic actors who facilitate 
the transmission of human rights ideas to local stages. These can be national elites, local 
activists, mid-level social activists, human rights lawyers, feminist NGO leaders, academics, 
funders etc —see section 3.4.2.3 of the thesis. 
765 Paragraph 19(c), Concluding Observations on the Combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Reports 
of Madagascar, 9 March  2016, CEDAW/C/MDG/CO/6-7. 
766 Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Angola, 27 March 2013, 
CEDAW/C/AGO/CO/6; Concluding Observations on the Initial to Fourth Periodic Reports of 
Comoros, 8 November 2012, CEDAW/C/COM/CO/1-4; Concluding Observations on the Sixth 
and Seventh Periodic Reports of Democratic Republic of Congo, 30 July 2013, 
CEDAW/C/COD/CO/6-7; Concluding Observations on the combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic 
Report of Ghana, 14 November 2014, CEDAW/C/GHA/CO/6-7; Concluding Observations on 
the Sixth Periodic Report of Equatorial Guinea, 9 November 2012, CEDAW/C/GNQ/CO/6; 
Concluding Observations on the combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Report of Togo, 8 November 
2012, CEDAW/C/TGO/CO/6-7; Concluding Observations on the combined Second, Third, Fourth 
and Fifth Periodic Reports of Zimbabwe, 23 March 2012, CEDAW/C/ZWE/CO/2-5. 
767 Andrew P Cortell and James W Davis Jr, ‗Understanding the Impact of International 
Norms: A Research Agenda,‘ (2000), 454; Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‗Norms, Institutions, and 




Part of the jurisprudence draws in archetypal vernacularisers by 
explicitly mandating states to design awareness-raising campaigns and 
education programmes together with CSOs. For example, CEDAW 
General Recommendation No. 35 requires states to develop and 
implement effective awareness and education measures 768  with the 
active participation of women‘s organisations and marginalised groups 
of women and girls.769 Similarly, the ‗ethnicity and minority sensitive‘ 
targeted outreach activities under CEDAW General Recommendation 
No. 33 are to be designed in close cooperation with women‘s and other 
relevant organisations.770 Additionally, states are to cooperate with non-
state actors in capacity-building and training programmes for justice 
system personnel.771  
Also, CRC General Comment No. 13 stipulates that both state and CSOs 
should facilitate educational measures, though the state is given overall 
responsibility. 772  As seen in Chapter 3, the involvement of CSOs at 
programme development stage is crucial because as vernacularisers, 
they have ‗double consciousness‘– which enables them to engage in 
issues from both human rights and local perspectives and contexts. 773  
Besides trusting state actors and CSOs, jurisprudence developed in 2014, 
2016 and 2017 respectively has pushed the frontiers and embraced 
local/traditional leaders in the pipeline that designs programmes, and 
transports human rights norms to the ground. The joint CEDAW 
General Recommendation/CRC General Comment promotes the 
                                               
768 To address and eradicate the stereotypes, prejudices, customs and practices that condone 
or promote gender-based VAW and underpin the structural inequality of women with men.  
769 Paragraph 30 (b), CEDAW/C/GC/35.  
770 Paragraph 17 (c), CEDAW/C/GC/33.  
771 To ensure that religious, customary, indigenous and community justice systems harmonise 
their norms, procedures and practices with the human rights standards—Paragraph 64 (a), 
CEDAW/C/GC/33.  
772 Paragraph 44, CRC/C/GC/13.  




engagement of all relevant stakeholders (including ‗local leaders,‘ 
practitioners, grassroots organisations and religious communities) in 
preparing and implementing public discussion activities for eliminating 
harmful practices.774 Similarly, CEDAW General Recommendation No. 
34 invites states to adopt outreach and support programmes, awareness-
raising and media campaigns to eliminate harmful practices and 
stereotypes in collaboration with ‗traditional leaders‘ and CSOs.775  
The language of ‗collaboration‘ is also found in the joint ACHPR/ACERWC 
General Comment, which urges states ‗to facilitate dialogue, and promote 
collaboration between all stakeholders and particularly traditional, 
community and religious leaders, in preventing child marriage‘.776 However, 
unlike CEDAW General Recommendation No. 34 that specifies collaboration 
with traditional leaders when the state is ‗adopting‘ awareness programmes, 
the nature of collaboration in the joint General Comment could be variedly 
interpreted. It could either mean that traditional, community and religious 
leaders should be involved in ‗implementing‘ child marriage preventative 
strategies or that they should in fact also participate in ‗developing‘ such 
strategies. 
But whatever the case, the fact that the above jurisprudence is not co-opting 
traditional leaders as ‗mere targets‘ (of awareness and education) is certainly 
a paradigm shift. It addresses Bank‘s777 concern that CEDAW jurisprudence 
fails to guide states to collaborate with providers of customary justice as 
meaning-making institutions and actors.778 By conscripting traditional leaders 
in both the formulation and facilitation of human rights-based awareness 
                                               
774 Paragraph 81(f), CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
775  Paragraph 23, UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), General Recommendation No. 34 on the Rights of Rural Women (2016), 
CEDAW/C/GC/34. 
776 Paragraph 62, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. 
777 Angela M. Banks, ‗CEDAW, Compliance, and Custom: Human Rights Enforcement in Sub-
Saharan Africa,‘ (2009). 




programmes against harmful practices, traditional leaders are effectively 
being endorsed as the contemporary vernaculariser too.  
One would argue that it is unsurprising that traditional leaders have 
weight in CEDAW General Recommendation No. 34, the joint CEDAW 
General Recommendation/CRC General Comment and the joint 
ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment (which primarily about ‗rural 
dealings‘ 779 ) since this is the best opportunity to capitalise on the 
territorial influence of traditional leaders. Nevertheless, the 
development is a fresh twist given the circumspect attitude that the 
same jurisprudence holds towards plural justice mechanisms, as the 
next section demonstrates.  
Therefore, Chapter 9 analyses how this new curve in the jurisprudence, 
together with the reality of how traditional leaders are translating human 
rights norms through community bylaws in Malawi, is challenging two well-
accepted imageries of the vernaculariser. First, that the vernaculariser is the 
‗outsider‘ who comes into a community to frame/vernacularise human rights 
norms for the benefit of local community members. 780  Second, that the 
vernaculariser is both transnationally and locally cultured and able to readily 
convert human rights issues from transnational and local perspectives (and 
vice versa) depending on the podium.781 
Still, one should be mindful that the positive shifts notwithstanding, section 
4.4.3.1 has illustrated that the extent to which traditional leaders are entrusted 
with the responsibility to facilitate norm internalisation pales compared to the 
high demand in the jurisprudence that they should be ‗targets‘ of awareness- 
                                               
779 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 34 is about the rights of rural women; the joint 
CEDAW General Recommendation/ CRC General Comments is exclusively about harmful 
practices; and the joint ACHPR/ACERW General Comment is exclusively on ending child 
marriage. 





raising and capacity-building programmes. In fact, out of the reviewed 20 
CEDAW Committee concluding observations on African State Party reports, 
the Committee recognised traditional leaders as collaborators in awareness- 
raising efforts only in seven concluding observations (for Gabon,782 Guinea,783 
Cameron,784 DRC,785 Angola,786 Togo,787 and Zimbabwe788). Clearly, the very 
responsibility of traditional leaders to culturally sanitise ‗the other‘ comes 
with the duty to first subject ‗the self‘ to the internalisation dosage.   
4.4.4 The Position of Plural and Community Law in the Jurisprudence  
Jurisprudence regarding alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and plural legal 
systems is relevant because the community bylaws under study could fall 
under either. CEDAW General Recommendation No. 33 describes ADR 
processes as mandatory or optional systems that many jurisdictions have 
adopted for mediation, conciliation, arbitration and collaborative resolutions 
of disputes. ADR is mainly applied in issues of family law, domestic violence, 
amongst others.789 Informal ADR processes include ‗non-formal indigenous 
courts and chieftaincy-based ADR, where Chiefs and other community 
leaders resolve interpersonal disputes‘.790 Community bylaws could operate 
as a ‗chieftaincy-based ADR‘ mechanism. 
                                               
782 Paragraph 21(c), Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Gabon, 11 March 
2015, CEDAW/C/GAB/CO/6. 
783 Paragraph 31(a), Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and Eight Periodic Report of 
Guinea, 14 November 2014, CEDAW/C/GI/CO/7-8. 
784 Paragraph 17(a), Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of 
Cameroon, 28 February 2014, CEDAW/C/CMR/CO/4-5. 
785  Paragraph 20(a), Concluding Observations on the Sixth and Seventh Periodic Reports of 
Democratic Republic of Congo, 30 July 2013, CEDAW/C/COD/CO/6-7. 
786 Paragraph 18(a), Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Angola, 27 March 
2013, CEDAW/C/AGO/CO/6. 
787 Paragraph 21(a), Concluding Observations on the combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Report of 
Togo, 8 November 2012, CEDAW/C/TGO/CO/6-7. 
788  Paragraph 22(a), Concluding Observations on the combined Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth 
Periodic Reports of Zimbabwe, 23 March 2012, CEDAW/C/ZWE/CO/2-5. 
789 Paragraph 57, CEDAW/C/GC/33. 




Relatedly, CEDAW General Recommendation No. 33 defines plural 
legal systems as ‗religious, customary, and indigenous or community 
laws and practices that sometimes legally coexist with state laws, 
regulations, procedures and decisions‘. 791 By individually mentioning 
customary law and community law, the CEDAW Committee contradicts 
Onyango‘s 792  assertion that customary law is community law. 793 
Therefore, the community bylaws would fit under the jurisprudence‘s 
‗community law‘ label, especially as the jurisprudence considers it 
immaterial ‗whether or not such laws have categorical legal basis‘.794 
Examined chronologically, the jurisprudence on harmful practices has been 
unstable in its endorsement of ADR and legal pluralism systems as potential 
mechanisms for addressing harmful practices. The joint CEDAW General 
Recommendation/CRC General Comment concedes that ADR or traditional 
justice systems could sometimes be deployed to respond to harmful 
practices.795 However, the joint General Recommendation/General Comment 
affirms that states‘ obligations under CEDAW and the CRC796 prohibiting 
harmful practices supersede customary, traditional, or religious laws.797 Thus 
the joint General Recommendation/General Comment recommends the 
instant repeal of all legislation, traditional, customary or religious laws that 
condone, allow, or stimulate harmful practices.798 
Then, while acknowledging the relevance of ADR and pluralist processes, 
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 33 (2015) cautions that these flexible 
and cheaper processes may habour patriarchal values that embolden 
                                               
791 Paragraph 61, CEDAW/C/GC/33. 
792 Peter Onyango, African Customary Law: An Introduction, (2013). 
793 Ibid., 134. 
794 Paragraph 61, CEDAW/C/GC/33. 
795 Paragraph 71, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
796 And other international human rights standards. 
797 Paragraph 54(b), CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 




perpetrators, violate women‘s rights, and hinder women‘s access to justice.799 
Therefore, it utterly disapproves subjecting any case of VAW to ADR 
processes.800 And, like the joint General Recommendation/General Comment, 
General Recommendation No. 33, expects multiple sources of law 
(notwithstanding their legal viability801) within states to respect and protect 
women‘s rights according to CEDAW and other human rights principles.802 
Thereafter, CEDAW General Recommendation No. 35 (2017) reverts to the 
position accommodating ADR, only disputing the ‗mandatory‘ reference of 
violence cases to ADR procedures; and calling for ADR procedures to be 
strictly regulated.803 It further urges plural legal systems to protect victims of 
gender-based VAW and guarantee them access to justice and effective 
remedies.804 
The fact that the jurisprudence between 2014 and 2017 exhibits fluctuating 
positions on whether VAW (which includes harmful practices) should be 
subjected to ADR, including within traditional mechanisms, reveals that the 
jurisprudence on harmful practices itself is a living negotiation site. 805 
Indeed, Krook and True806 have observed that norms evolve as their content is 
subjected to continuous scrutiny or affected by emerging developments.807 
Zwingel 808  has also called norms ‗never finished products/content-in-
                                               
799 Paragraphs 57&62, CEDAW/C/GC/33. 
800 Paragraph 58(c), CEDAW/C/GC/33. See also note 674, which mentions the similarity 
between this recommendation and that made in CEDAW concluding observations on Mali‘s 
State Party report. 
801 From a formal law point of view. 
802 Paragraph 61, CEDAW/C/GC/33. 
803 Paragraph 32(b), CEDAW/C/GC/35. 
804 Paragraph 29(b), CEDAW/C/GC/35. 
805 As seen above, the jurisprudence went from a guarded acknowledgement of ADR as a 
possible avenue for such cases in 2014; to ‗absolutely not‘ in 2015; and back to a cautious ‗yes‘ 
in 2017.  
806 Mona Lena Krook and Jacqui True, ‗Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms 
"The United Nations and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality" ‘ European Relations (18) 
(2012) 
807 Ibid., 117. 






In recognising both the risk and the potential of plural justice systems to 
women‘s access to justice and women‘s rights generally, the jurisprudence 
draws attention to debates about living customary law, cultural relativism and 
universalism. CEDAW General Recommendation No. 33 expects states to 
reconcile existing plural justice systems with CEDAW by, among others, 
formally recognising and codifying religious, customary, indigenous, 
community and other systems.810 As discussed in Chapter 3, the codification 
of customary law or equivalent is contested by living customary law scholars. 
Furthermore, the pre-eminence of education and awareness-raising measures 
to promote norms protecting women from harmful practices in the 
jurisprudence811 betrays the commitment of the jurisprudence to universalism 
(the notion that all societies must protect certain minimum standards of 
human dignity812) and not cultural relativism.  
This bias towards universalism is underlined by the jurisprudence‘s rejection 
of any form of harmful practices and VAW and VAC, both in law and in 
practice. Rejection of cultural relativism is evident in the various instances 
when the jurisprudence denotes that culture and tradition directly incite 
harmful practices against women and girls.813 This universalistic approach 
has been justified by concerns that ‗the respect of cultural differences‘ may 
eventually translate into women‘s rights invasions.814 
The implication of the jurisprudence‘s positivist approach to human rights is 
that the CEDAW and CRC are not seen as ‗legal codes amongst the several 
                                               
809 Ibid., 676. 
810 Paragraph 62, CEDAW/C/GC/33. 
811 See section 4.4.3 of the thesis. 
812 Sally Engle Merry, ‗Constructing a Global Law: Violence against Women and the Human 
Rights System,‘ (2003), 944. 
813 See Paragraph 14, CEDAW/C/GC/35; Paragraphs 5, 6 & 8, CEDAW/C/GC/31-
CRC/C/GC/18; Paragraph 12, CRC/C/GC/13. 
814 Susan Moller Okin, ‗Feminism, Women‘s Human Rights and Cultural Differences,‘ Hypatia 




alternatives that exist in a plural legal field‘.815  Yet, it has been proven that in 
plural legal systems, the enthusiasm by a treaty-monitoring body to 
universalise could lead to the misunderstanding of local ‗legal‘ arrangements 
that communities find functional.816 This is a risk that orderings, such as the 
community bylaws on child marriage and harmful practices in rural Malawi 
face, especially when they come across as potentially diluting statutory law 
and human rights standards. Indeed, the jurisprudence suggests that the 
internalisation of the norms protecting women from harmful practices either 
within ADR or other traditional processes would be incomplete if 
international human rights standards are shortchanged.  
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analysed international human rights law and jurisprudence 
on harmful practices relevant to the objective of this thesis ‗to understand 
how community bylaws and harmful practices are being conceptualised and 
whether such understanding is consistent with domestic and international 
human rights law norms‘. UN and AU human rights law has established 
international human rights norms protecting women from harmful practices. 
Jurisprudence has moved from the absence of, to a concrete definition and 
conceptualisation of harmful practices under the Maputo Protocol and the 
joint CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC General Comment (and under 
the joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment in respect of child marriage). 
The chapter has shown that an inquiry into how community bylaws on child 
marriage and other harmful practices are internalising international human 
                                               
815 Sally Engle Merry, ‗Human Rights and Transnational Culture: Regulating Gender Violence 
Through Global Law ‘ (2006c), 53-76 74. 
816 Ibid., 59 & 72. Merry provides an example regarding how the CEDAW Committee, in 
deliberations of a Fiji State Party report and ensuing concluding observations, instinctively 
rushed to demand the scraping of a useful and entrenched reconciliatory local mechanism 
called bulubulu. The committee was reacting to a concern expressed by the State Party 
delegation that bulubulu was sometimes being misused to handle rape cases. And instead of 
condemning this element of abuse, the committee insisted that bulubulu be abolished, which 




rights norms cannot overlook assessing how the bylaws reflect key principles 
of CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol (gender equality and non-
discrimination); and the core principles of the CRC and the African Children‘s 
Charter (especially the best interest of the child; non-discrimination; and 
children‘s right to survival; development and protection/life).  
A key aspect of the international human rights law and jurisprudence on 
harmful practices are measures that states are expected to pursue to eliminate 
harmful practices. This chapter has demonstrated that international law and 
jurisprudence suggests that internalisation of norms protecting women from 
harmful practices should address three programmatic areas, predominantly 
at the formal/macro level. First, there is a resounding call for states to 
prioritise legislative measures to eliminate harmful practices. The 
jurisprudence recommends criminalising harmful practices, and enforcing 
criminal sanctions. Chapter 8 exposes that penalties are central to the 
community bylaws in rural Malawi. Therefore, examining how international 
human rights norms are influencing the community bylaws entails 
understanding the bylaws‘ punishment schemes and how they also shape the 
course of horizontal vernacularisation at local level.  
Notably, community bylaws (community laws) are not a legislative measure 
under the jurisprudence. Rather, CEDAW jurisprudence suggests that 
community laws fall under ADR and plural justice systems and recommends 
that plural justice systems should be harmonised with CEDAW through 
codification. Over the years, the jurisprudence seems unstable about whether 
to subject VAW to ADR. This inconclusiveness confirms that international 
human rights norm negotiation is on-going business. 
Second, apart from legal measures, the jurisprudence promotes state- 
level/led administrative measures in addressing harmful practices. It 




(including comprehensive national strategies/action plans), institute 
services for victims and provide budgetary resources. Services for victims 
are a closer intervention to the community bylaws. Chapter 8 assesses 
whether any of the recommended services are part of the community 
bylaws regime.  
Third, jurisprudence on harmful practices stresses the need for human 
rights capacity building, training, awareness raising as a strategy for 
ensuring that different duty bearers are internalising international  
standards on harmful practices and applying them to their core 
business. Apart from professional groups, traditional leaders are a 
notable target of such interventions under both general 
comments/general recommendations, and CEDAW concluding 
observations of African State Party reports. 
Some of the jurisprudence tasks the state to design and implement 
awareness-raising and education/capacity-building programmes 
singularly, while some jurisprudence requires this to be done in 
collaboration with CSOs and traditional leaders. The recognition of 
traditional leaders is novel considering that the jurisprudence is 
generally nervous about plural justice mechanisms. The new curve begs 
Chapter 9 to ponder how traditional leaders are involved in translating 
human rights norms through community bylaws in Malawi, and the 
implications of this activism on how norm internalisation scholarship 





CHAPTER 5  
THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 
PROTECTING WOMEN FROM HARMFUL PRACTICES ON THE LEGAL 
AND INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE IN MALAWI 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In striving to understand whether and how international human rights norms 
are shaping and influencing the emergence and conceptualisation community 
bylaws on child marriage and other harmful practices in rural Malawi, 
Chapter 4 has established that legislation and other formal measures are 
highly valued norm internalisation entry points within states. Thus this 
chapter explores how formal law and policy in Malawi is internalising and 
interacting with international human rights norms.  
The chapter first examines the history of policy and legislation on gender 
equality and harmful practices in Malawi, covering the colonial, 
independence and post-independence periods. Particularly critical for 
purposes of this thesis is the post-independence period, which saw the 
adoption of the current Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. Thereafter, 
the chapter analyses how the Constitution entrenches women‘s rights in the 
context of harmful practices and how it positions informal systems, 
customary law and Chiefs. It then examines the Constitutional vision of how 
international law should be domesticated and assesses how the vision has 
translated into policy and legislative reforms on harmful practices.  
The chapter demonstrates that, to a large extent, Malawi has achieved first-
level norm internalisation by adopting laws and policies that assimilate and 




not had much impact on the ground, as existing legislation and other formal 
measures for addressing harmful practices remain largely detached from 
rural people. Available strategies for second-level norm internalisation fall 
short of embracing the reality that human rights appropriation does not 
always formally flow from the top to rural communities, but that human 
rights appropriation and translation could be a horizontal exercise too in 
which Chiefs, in collaboration with their communities, are central players.  
5.2 A HISTORY OF GENDER EQUALITY AND HARMFUL PRACTICES IN MALAWI 
Efforts by the state and Christian missionaries provide a good historical 
impression of legal and extra-legal strategies that were engaged to address 
harmful practices affecting women and girls in the colonial and independence 
epochs. The ensuing narrative first interrogates developments after Malawi 
(then Nyasaland) was declared as a British Protectorate on 14 May 1891.817 
Thereafter, it discusses legal and policy strategies towards addressing 
harmful practices during Kamuzu Banda‘s autocratic rule after Malawi 
attained independence on 5 July 1964. 
5.2.1 The Colonial Age 
Discussing harmful practices in the context of the colonial period is important 
to this study because it completes the understanding of where Malawi has 
come from in addressing harmful practices to reach this current age where 
community bylaws (besides international jurisprudence and  legislation) have 
entered the scene as means of addressing harmful practices.   
During Malawi‘s 70 years under colonial rule, gender inequality was 
institutionalised through the introduction of the cash economy, which 
devalued women‘s labour, excluded women from land ownership, and 
                                               




increased male labour migration.818 African women did not participate in 
policy or law related initiatives of the Executive and Legislative Councils.819 
The first policy shift that acknowledged women as active participants in  
politics was implemented in 1958820 at a party level when Kamuzu Banda, 
then a new leader of the Nyasaland African Congress, created women‘s and 
youth wings of the party.821  
Colonial legislative history demonstrates some effort to address harmful 
practices affecting women and girls. For example, Article 15(2) of the British 
Central Africa Order in Council (1902) contained a reception clause for 
English law in Malawi while Article 20 recognised the applicability of 
customary law to Africans provided that it passed the repugnancy test.822  
However, polygamy and discriminatory inheritance practices were not 
declared repugnant.823  
5.2.1.1   Child marriage in colonial times 
The colonial period witnessed both ecclesiastical and state action against child 
marriage. Ecclesiastically, while literature mostly covers missionary efforts to 
address child marriage, there was also indigenous activism by a local 
reverend, John Chilembwe, who founded the Providence Industrial Mission 
in Chiradzulu.824 In 1900, Chilembwe agonised over the cultural acceptance 
                                               
818 Francis B. Nyamnjoh, Rights and the Politics of Recognition in Africa (Zed Books, 2004), 72-73. 
819 UN Women Malawi, ‗The Gender Journey: A Historical Perspective 1891–2015 (Draft),‘ 
(2016), 7. The report further explains that and because all government structures at the 
central, provincial and district level were male dominated, even careers for white women 
were limited to secretaries or nurses. 
820 Six years before independence. 
821 UN Women Malawi, ‗The Gender Journey: A Historical Perspective 1891–2015 (Draft)‘, 75. 
822 Franz von Benda-Beckman, Legal Pluralism in Malawi: Historical Development 1858-1970 and 
Emerging Issues (2007), 37. However, African customary law was applicable on the conditions 
that: (a) it was not repugnant to justice, equity, or good morality and (b) it was neither in its 
terms nor by necessary implication in conflict with any written law – Antony Allott, New 
Essays in African Law (1970) cited in Muna Ndulo, ‗African Customary Law, Customs, and 
Women's Rights,‘ (2011), 96. 
823 Muna Ndulo, ‗African Customary Law, Customs, and Women's Rights,‘ (2011), 96. 




and prevalence of child marriage and early pregnancy in Chiradzulu. 825 
Referring to his wife‘s role in empowering women,826 Chilembwe wrote, ‗Mrs 
Chilembwe . . . is seeking to prevent early marriage amongst girls‘.827  
Between 1898 to 1931, the Nkhoma Synod of the Church of Central African 
Presbyterians in Malawi (then under the Dutch Reformed Church Mission, 
DRCM),828 grappled with setting the minimum age of marriage for African 
converts, over time shifting between puberty and the ages of 15, 18 and 17 for 
women; and 21 and 19 for men.829 While the unsteady age could be seen as a 
tussle between Christianity against tradition, or Western 830  and African 
culture, underlying the church‘s motives was the desire to protect women.831 
As for state measures, efforts to regulate child marriage came through the 
enactment of the Marriage Act 1903, modeled after the English common law, 
which prohibited marriage involving persons aged below 21 years unless 
written consent was obtained from designed persons.832 In 1945, collaboration 
between churches and the state resulted in the adoption of anti-child marriage 
language in the African marriages ordinance law prohibiting the celebration 
                                               
825 UN Women Malawi, ‗The Gender Journey: A Historical Perspective 1891–2015 (Draft)‘, 13. 
826 Through sewing and other enterprises. 
827 UN Women Malawi, ‗The Gender Journey: A Historical Perspective 1891–2015 (Draft)‘, 13. 
828 Isabel Apawo Phiri, Women, Presbyterianism and Patriarchy: Religious Experience of Chewa 
Women in Central Malawi, (2001). 
829 Ibid., 72-73. Phiri documents that in 1898, the DRMC issued an executive ruling that the 
minimum age of marriage should be either puberty or 15 years. In 1903, the Mission Council 
pronounced that a man who married a girl who had not reached puberty could not join 
baptismal classes. An extension of this ruling in 1907 prohibited Christians from giving their 
pre-puberty children and sisters in marriage. In 1908, the church forbad the betrothal of 
children before puberty. In 1930, it revised the minimum age of marriage to 18 years for 
women and 21 years for men, only to adjust to 17 years for women and 19 years for men 
respectively in 1931. Any Christian who allowed his or her child to marry before the 
recommended age would be suspended from taking Holy Communion for 18 months.  
830 That is, the desire for missionaries to align the minimum age of marriage in Malawi with 
that in their home countries. 
831 Isabel Apawo Phiri, Women, Presbyterianism and Patriarchy: Religious Experience of Chewa 
Women in Central Malawi, (2001), 72. 




of marriage where the female party was below puberty age.833 Even back 
then, as is today, victims of child marriage were predominantly girls.834  
These efforts show that anti-child marriage advocacy has a historical basis in 
Malawi that predates the prevailing international human rights norms. 
‗Vernacularisation‘ was at play even in colonial times, as proven by the fact 
that ‗natives‘ were not appropriating missionaries‘ anti-marriage 
proclamations blindly, but were involved in negotiation and deliberation with 
the missionaries resulting, for instance, in the DCRM‘s shifting positions on 
the minimum marriage age.835  
5.2.1.2   Polygamy in the colonial era 
During colonial rule, Christian missionaries in Malawi attempted to impose 
monogamous marriages upon their converts, 836  although the statutory 
position on polygamy in Christian marriages was unclear. As evident through 
doctrines of the DCRM in Central Malawi and the Livingstonia Mission in 
Northern Malawi, the anti-polygamy stance of the missionaries preceded 
legislative steps. In 1899, Elmslie, 837  a missionary in Northern Malawi, 
described polygamy ‗as an evil institution that allowed old men to bid for 
young girls without the latter‘s consent.‘ 838  In 1903, the DCRM banned 
polygamy amongst African Christians, requiring polygamists to leave their 
                                               
833 Isabel Apawo Phiri, Women, Presbyterianism and Patriarchy: Religious Experience of Chewa 
Women in Central Malawi, (2001), 73. 
834 For example, according to the Malawi Demographic Health Survey child marriage is at 47 
per cent for girls compared to 8 percent for boys –  National Statistical Office (NSO) Malawi 
and ICF, Malawi Demographic and Health Survey 2015-16, ibid, 57. 
835 Isabel Apawo Phiri, Women, Presbyterianism and Patriarchy: Religious Experience of Chewa 
Women in Central Malawi, (2001), 64. 
836 Simon Roberts, ‗A Revolution in the Law of Succession of Malawi,‘ Journal of African Law  
(1966), 21-32 21. 
837 Walter Angus Elmslie is the first missionary in Northern Malawi to write a major work 
about the people in the Livingstonia Mission area in his book ‗Among the Wild Ngoni‘s 
1899)—cited in Peter G Forster, ‗Missionaries and Anthropology: The Case of the Scots in 
Northern Malawi,‘ Journal of Religion in Africa (16) (1986), 101-120 104. 




wives except the first one.839 In the Livingstonia Mission, while the ban of 
polygamy was uncontested amongst missionaries, conservative theologians 
insisted that all but the first wife should be divorced, while liberal theologians 
were flexible on which wife a polygamist could keep.840  
State legislation prohibiting polygamy was introduced in 1912, but only 
polygamy among Christian Africans was forbidden. 841 However, the 1923 
African Marriage (Christian Rites) Registration Act842 did not ban polygamy if 
a person getting married under the Act had existing marriages at customary 
law.843 In 1948, Holmes of Zambezi Mission urged the government to legislate 
against polygamy for all Africans. 844  The government rejected this call, 
reiterating that it could not impose a ‗Christian law‘ in a secular state.845  
To this day, the state is yet to absolutely ban polygamy despite that the 
international human rights framework has increasingly framed polygamy as 
a human rights issue.  
                                               
839 Isabel Apawo Phiri, Women, Presbyterianism and Patriarchy: Religious Experience of Chewa 
Women in Central Malawi, (2001), 74. Phiri reports that in 1903, DMRC issued a ruling that a 
polygamous man should not be allowed into the baptismal class. He would only be accepted 
if he divorced the rest of his wives, except the first one. The ruling was extended in 1905 to 
prevent Christians from giving their sisters and daughters in marriage to a polygamous man.  
840  Peter G Forster, ‗Missionaries and Anthropology: The Case of the Scots in Northern 
Malawi,‘ (1986), 107. Phiri acknowledges that this position utterly disadvantaged the 
divorced women (see ibid), but this issue is outside the scope of this thesis.  
841 Isabel Apawo Phiri, Women, Presbyterianism and Patriarchy: Religious Experience of Chewa 
Women in Central Malawi, (2001), 75. 
842 That was enacted in 1923 to provide for the registration of African marriages celebrated 
according to Christian rites.  
843 This law (Chapter 25:02 of the Laws of Malawi), was only repealed with the enactment of a 
comprehensive marriage law in 2015. Section 3 of the old Act provided that ‗notwithstanding 
anything contained in the Marriage Act it shall be permissible for any minister and at any 
place to celebrate marriage according to the rites of the Church, Denomination or Body to 
which he belongs between any two Africans: Provided that the celebration of marriage under 
this Act shall not as regards the parties thereto alter or affect their status or the consequences 
of any prior marriage entered into by either party according to customary law or involve any 
other legal consequences whatever.‘ 
844 L.M. Holmes, ‗How to Combat Temptation to Gross Sin‘ (paper presented at the first 
Women Missionary Conference, (undated and location unspecified) 1949) cited in Isabel 
Apawo Phiri, Women, Presbyterianism and Patriarchy: Religious Experience of Chewa Women in 
Central Malawi, (2001), 76. 
845 Isabel Apawo Phiri, Women, Presbyterianism and Patriarchy: Religious Experience of Chewa 




5.2.1.3   Colonial attitude towards initiation ceremonies  
During colonial times, initiation rites were only challenged by missionaries 
and not within legislation. Initially, missionaries and mission education846 
indiscriminately condemned traditional practices such as initiation 
ceremonies (chinamwali).847 They overlooked that while customary practices 
that harm women must certainly be eliminated, other aspects of such customs 
may be beneficial to women.848 
The DRMC‘s executive decisions from 1903 exemplify a deliberate, albeit 
futile, effort by the church to eliminate initiation ceremonies.849 Recognising 
the ineffectiveness of this attempt, around 1928, the colonial government 
urged the church to introduce alternative rites.850 The DRMC ruled that all 
children of church members had to attend Christian initiation rites, termed 
chilangizo851 instead. Having found it impossible to eradicate chinamwali, the 
Roman Catholic Church started implementing Christian chinamwali 
ceremonies in Central Malawi around 1939 by modifying and suppressing 
                                               
846  Mission education was supported by the Protectorate Government through grants. 
Mission education institutions included Overton Institute under Livingstonia Mission; St. 
Michael‘s of the Universities Missions of Central Africa; the Henry Henderson Institute of the 
Blantyre Mission and the William Murray Teacher Training College of Nkhoma Mission. 
While boys‘ education provided them with technical skills girls were channelled through 
courses in domestic sciences that preserved their reproductive and community roles. The first 
woman to pass ―O‖ Level Cambridge was Rosemary Kazembe in 1953 – UN Women Malawi, 
‗The Gender Journey: A Historical Perspective 1891–2015 (Draft)‘, 20. 
847 Ibid. 
848 Johanna E. Bond, ‗CEDAW in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons in Implementation,‘ (2014), 261. 
849 Isabel Apawo Phiri, Women, Presbyterianism and Patriarchy: Religious Experience of Chewa 
Women in Central Malawi, (2001), 62. In 1903, the DRMC made it a condition that members 
who were eligible for the baptismal class should not attend the initiation ceremony (called 
chinamwali among the Chewa) in order to liberate women from oppressive practices 
associated with the ceremony. There was belief that the initiation of the pagan girl was 
accompanied by much cruelty and degradation; the chinamwali was associated with nyau (a 
secret cult and ritual dance practiced among the Chewa people); the association of chinamwali 
with low attendance of girls at school; the belief that chinamwali was sinful, including from 
the perspective that it involved sexual initiation by the fisi (hyena—see note 120 and Glossary 
of Chichewa terms). 
850 Ibid., 63. 




immodesty in the ceremonies.852 However, ‗pagan‘ initiation ceremonies were 
not banned by the state.  
5.2.1.4   Conclusion 
The colonial efforts to address harmful practices affecting women and girls 
were a combination of legal and religious frames. While the state 
interventions were mainly de jure, Christian missionaries pursued de facto 
changes although their constituency was limited to African converts. 
Embedded in the missionaries‘ desire to address manifestations of sin within 
the church were interests to safeguard the dignity and welfare of women and 
girls (analogous to today‘s human rights motivations).  
The ways in which missionaries wrestled with different doctrinal models to 
address harmful practices depict a striking semblance to the grounded 
manifestations of vernacularisation of human rights norms today.  African 
Christians were not entirely submissive, but were dynamically engaged in re-
interpreting church doctrine in culturally resonant ways. This is evident in the 
shifting positions the DMRC held on the minimum age of marriage and the 
adoption, through modification, of Christianised initiation rituals by several 
Christian denominations.   
5.2.2 Harmful Practices During Independence 
What follows tracks the existence of gender equality policy and legislative 
action to address harmful practices during Dr Kamuzu Banda‘s autocratic 
rule in Malawi (1964 to 1994). 
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 5.2.2.1  Gender equality policy  
After attaining self-government in 1963 and independence in 1964, Malawi 
became a Republic in 1966 under a new Constitution that did not have Bill of 
Rights.853 As a result, this Constitution did not guarantee gender equality.854 
However, Forster855 observes that, generally, Banda had a personal concern 
for Malawian women and instituted broader policies that improved women‘s 
conditions.856 
As to broader development policy, Malawi‘s first Statement of Development 
Policies (DEVPOL) of 1971 – 1976 made no mention of any specific policy 
regarding women.857 Things started to change in 1984 when the government 
formed the National Commission on Women in Development (NCWID).858 
                                               
853 Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, ‗A Full Loaf is Better than Half: The Constitutional Protection 
of Economic and Social Rights in Malawi,‘ Journal of African Law  (2005), 207-241 208 (Chirwa 
notes that this Constitution moved two steps backwards from its 1964 predecessor by not 
only failing to recognise socio-economic rights, but civil and political rights too.); Msaiwale 
Chigawa, ‗Concept Paper One: The Fundamental Values of the Republic of Malawi 
Constitution of 1994 ‘ (paper presented at the The Law Commission Constitutional Review 
Conference, 28-31 March, Lilongwe, Malawi, 2006); Sarai Chisala-Templelhoff and Seun 
Solomon Bakare, ‗The Impact of the African Charter and the Maputo Protocol in Malawi,‘ in 
The Impact of the African Charter and Maputo Protocol on Selected African States, ed. Victoria 
Oluwasina Ayeni (Pretoria University Press, 2016), 146. 
854 Linda Semu, ‗Kamuzu's Mbumba: Malawi Women's Embeddedness to Culture in the Face 
of International Political Pressure and Internal Legal Change,‘ Africa Today (49)2 (2002), 77-99 
84; UN Women Malawi, ‗The Gender Journey: A Historical Perspective 1891–2015 (Draft),‘ 77. 
855  Peter G Forster, ‗Missionaries and Anthropology: The Case of the Scots in Northern 
Malawi,‘ (1986). 
856  Ibid., 49. However, Semu argues that Banda‘s concern for women was inherently 
patriarchal and politically driven because he created a 'Mbumba' culture in which he 
appropriated the traditional relationship between women who form a sorority ('mbumba' in 
Chichewa) and their male guardian ('nkhoswe'). Kamuzu branded himself 'Nkhoswe No.1.' 
Through the 'Nkhoswe' role he created the image of a community benefactor by providing 
special benefits to some of his active female supporters—Linda Semu, ‗Kamuzu's Mbumba: 
Malawi Women's Embeddedness to Culture in the Face of International Political Pressure and 
Internal Legal Change,‘ (2002), 82. 
857 However, for a long time the broad policy on gender during the single party regime 
focused on improving the position of women in Malawi through the party and the League of 
Malawi Women (a party structure)—UN Women Malawi, ‗The Gender Journey: A Historical 
Perspective 1891–2015 (Draft),‘ 78. 
858 The NCWID‘s mandate was to examine and review the situation of women in all sectors of 
development and propose programmes and strategies to be implemented. The functions of 
the NCWID were complementary to those of Chitukuko Cha Amai m‘Malawi (CCAM), a 
political structure that was founded in August 1985 and it was located in the office of the 




Through the NCWID‘s efforts, Malawi ratified CEDAW on 8 March 1987,859 
although initially with reservations to the provisions on harmful traditional 
practices. 860 This was followed by the ratification of the CRC on 2 January 
1991. Other treaties relevant to gender equality were ratified after Malawi 
embraced multiparty democracy in 1993.861 
5.2.2.2   Legislation on harmful practices  
The ratification of the CEDAW and CRC did not immediately translate into 
legislative changes during Banda‘s rule. In fact, Malawi‘s initial reservations 
to CEDAW reveal that ‗traditional customs and practices‘ were used as a 
defence to violations of women‘s rights.862 Despite this and the retention of 
colonial legal positions on child marriage and polygamy, Malawi‘s legislative 
history during Banda‘s rule reveal attempts to change inheritance law. 
      a)  Harmful inheritance practices 
In 1964, legislative efforts were made to address ‗property grabbing‘ or 
‗property dispossession‘ as a harmful practice. In April 1964, the Wills and 
                                                                                                                                      
development activities in their areas, and its national advisor was the then Malawi‘s Official 
Hostess, Mama C. Tamanda Kadzamira—ibid. According to Semu, the NCWID was 
established as a response to the call during the UN Women‘s Decade (1976–1985) for 
governments to establish and strengthen focal points to coordinate issues relating to women‘s 
needs— Linda Semu, ‗Kamuzu's Mbumba: Malawi Women's Embeddedness to Culture in the 
Face of International Political Pressure and Internal Legal Change,‘ (2002), 88. 
859 UN Women Malawi, ‗The Gender Journey: A Historical Perspective 1891–2015 (Draft),‘ 98. 
860 The reservation stated that ‗Owing to the deep-rooted nature of some traditional customs 
and practices of Malawians, the Government of the Republic of Malawi shall not, for the time 
being, consider itself bound by such of the provisions of the Convention as require immediate 
eradication of such traditional customs and practices.‘ The reservation was withdrawn on 24 
October 1991. Available on http://www.bayefsky.com/html/malawi_t2_cedaw.php, 
accessed on 30 June 2016. 
861 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were ratified on 22 December 1993. The Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and People‘s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa was 
ratified on 20 May 2005.  
862 Tam O‘Neil, Ngeyi Kanyongolo, Joseph Wales, and Moir Walita Mkandawire, Women and 





Inheritance (Kamuzu's Mbumba‘s Protection) Bill was published.863 Kamuzu 
himself presented this Bill in Parliament,864 and declared his discontent with 
the traditional practice in both matrilineal and patrilineal systems that totally 
excluded married women from inheriting their deceased husbands‘ property 
in their own right.865 The Bill sought to revolutionise tradition by providing 
that, regardless of lineage pattern, every wife and child had the right to 
inherit four-fifths of the property of a husband or father who died intestate.866 
The fate of the Bill remains a mystery. Some scholars have claimed that 
although the Bill was well publicised and received by many MPs, it failed to 
pass;867 and that no Parliamentary records exist to explain why.868 Others, 
citing the repeal of the ‗Wills and Inheritance (Kamuzu's Mbumba‘s 
Protection) Ordinance‘ by the 1967 Wills and Inheritance Act869 and relevant 
                                               
863 Phillip Durand, ‗New Provisions for the Making of Wills and Inheritance by Intestate 
Succession in Malawi,‘ Journal of African Law (2) (1964), 109-113 109; Simon Roberts, ‗A 
Revolution in the Law of Succession of Malawi,‘ (1966), 21;Thierry Verhelst, ‗Safeguarding 
African Customary Law: Judicial and Legislative Processes for its Adaptation and 
Integration,‘ (1968), 30. 
864 This time as Prime Minister since he only became president after Malawi was declared a 
Republic in 1966. Kamuzu‘s expressed his concern as follows: ‗I want to make it quie clear 
that whatever anyone else may think about this Bill, whatever anyone else may feel, for me, 
the main purpose of this Bill is to protect married women in this country from their 
avaricious brothers-in-law, avaricious sisters-in-law, avaricious nephews-in-law, and 
avaricious nieces-in-law . . .  the inheritance system leaves a married woman in the cold. This 
to me Mr Speaker is unfair. Most unfair. Grossly unfair to the woman, to the mother‘— 
Nyasaland Protectorate, ‗Legislative Assembly Proceedings 76th Session,‘ (1963–64 ), 35, 35. 
865 Linda Semu, ‗Kamuzu's Mbumba: Malawi Women's Embeddedness to Culture in the Face 
of International Political Pressure and Internal Legal Change,‘ (2002), 82. 
866  Ibid. 
867 Louis Joseph Chimango, ‗Wills and Inheritance: An Examination of Gender and Related 
Concerns in the Malawi Wills and Inheritance Act, 1967 and the Wills and Inheritance 
Ammendment Bill, 1997‘ (paper presented at a Workshop Organised by the Ministry of 
Gender, Youth and Community Services, April (undated), Lilongwe, Malawi, 1998) cited in 
Linda Semu, ‗Kamuzu's Mbumba: Malawi Women's Embeddedness to Culture in the Face of 
International Political Pressure and Internal Legal Change,‘ (2002), 82-83. Also reiterated in 
Sarai Chisala-Templelhoff and Seun Solomon Bakare, ‗The Impact of the African Charter and 
the Maputo Protocol in Malawi,‘ (2016),‘ 2. 
868 Linda Semu, ‗Kamuzu's Mbumba: Malawi Women's Embeddedness to Culture in the Face 
of International Political Pressure and Internal Legal Change,‘ (2002), 82. Semu states that the 
debates of the subsequent 1967 Wills and Inheritance Act do not even refer to the earlier Bill. 




Hansard,870 maintain that the Bill was passed in early April 1964, but was 
never brought into force.871  
If the Bill was passed, the question arises why Banda did not sign it into law 
given his enthusiastic support of it. Semu872 reckons that both patrilineal and 
matrilineal groups may have resisted the standardisation of inheritance rules 
in Malawi.873 According to Forster,874 Banda was not yet powerful enough to 
bulldoze his way in Malawi‘s political and social affairs. After the 1964 
Cabinet crisis, in particular, the success of Banda‘s authoritarianism depended 
on support from Chiefs. This could explain why he may have sacrificed his 
support for this law for political support from the Chiefs.875  
In addition to this setback, the content of the Wills and Inheritance Act 
enacted in 1967 was radically different from that of the Kamuzu‘s Mbumba‘s 
Ordinance. In Parliament, the Bill was touted as ‗aiming at ensuring fair 
distribution of property and remedying past injustices whereby most or all 
property would be grabbed from a wife and children‘.876 However, some MPs 
felt ‗fairness‘ was not good enough. One Mr Blackwood877 identified himself 
as a ‗devout traditionalist who goes for wives and children and leaves the 
nephews to fend for themselves‘.878  
                                               
870 Nyasaland Protectorate, ‗Legislative Assembly Proceedings 76th Session,‘ 54. 
871 Simon Roberts, ‗A Revolution in the Law of Succession of Malawi,‘ (1966), 32.  
872 In reference to the supposedly ‗failed Bill.‘ 
873 Linda Semu, ‗Kamuzu's Mbumba: Malawi Women's Embeddedness to Culture in the Face 
of International Political Pressure and Internal Legal Change,‘ (2002), 82. 
874  Peter G Forster, ‗Missionaries and Anthropology: The Case of the Scots in Northern 
Malawi,‘ (1986), 490. 
875 Ibid. 
876 Speech by Ministry of Transport and Communications, Works and Supplies (Mr Msonthi) 
in ‗Malawi Government, ‗Proceedings of Parliament 5th Session,‘ (1967-68), 44. 
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In reality, the 1967 law largely codified the prevailing customary inheritance 
patterns,879 reducing women‘s inheritance portion (as spouses) and co-opting 
all manner of customary heirs (including remote descendants), thereby 
essentially enabling property dispossession.880 The 1967 Wills and Inheritance 
Act applied even during democracy until its repeal in 2011. 
      b)   Child marriage and polygamy 
During the Banda era, the Marriage Act (Chapter 25:01) continued to uphold 
21 years as the minimum age of marriage for persons married under civil law, 
with the proviso that those aged below that age required appropriate consent 
to be obtained.881 Polygamy was only outlawed for parties married under the 
Act too and not for those married under customary law. 882  Like the 
inheritance law, the Marriage Act continued to apply its repeal in 2015.  
5.2.2.3   Conclusion  
During the independence era, the one pronounced effort to address harmful 
practices is visible through the 1964 Kamuzu‘s Mbumba Protection Bill. While 
not successful, either because the ordinance never became operational, or 
because it was never passed, this law could have facilitated substantive 
gender equality at a time when gender equality was not prominent on the 
global agenda.  
The developments on gender equality that took place in this period resemble 
parts of the Finnemore and Sikkink‘s ‗norm life cycle‘ model and Risse et al.‘s 
five stages of the spiral model through which the socialisation of human 
                                               
879 It stipulated that half (in patrilineal areas) and three fifth (in matrilineal areas) if the state 
shall be distributed to heirs at customary law and the remained to a widow, children and 
dependants. 
880  Seodi White, Dorothy Kamanga, Tinyade Kachika, Asiyati Chiweza, and Flossie 
Chidyaonga, Dispossessing the Widow: Gender Based Violence in Malawi (WLSA 
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rights into domestic practices happen. 883  These developments arguably 
constitute the ‘norm cascade‘ step of the norm life cycle, which section 3.3 
describes as a process that socialises norm breakers to become norm 
followers. 884 The characteristics of a norm breaker were evident in Malawi‘s 
lack of a Bill of Rights in its Constitution and a specific policy on gender 
equality. Malawi launched into the norm cascade mode for the first time 
when it took steps to participate in the 1985 UN Women‘s Conference,885 
setting up the National Commission on Women in Development, and 
ratifying the CEDAW.  
However, as the Constitution did not anchor this change, Malawi could not 
have yet stepped into the third and last stage of the norm life cycle – norm 
internalisation. As shown in Chapter 3, norm internalisation is displayed when 
norms become visible in domestic culture and practice.886 It was only after 
Malawi embraced democracy in 1993 and adopted the new Constitution in 
1994 that a more concrete display of norm internalisation of human rights 
norms protecting women from harmful practices became apparent. 
5.3 POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD AND HARMFUL PRACTICES  
As shown in Chapter 4, the first level of norm internalisation that focuses on 
official state behaviour is a significant (if not the most significant) piece of the 
norm diffusion equation. 887  Therefore, this section analyses how the 
Constitution, Malawi‘s supreme law, has transported the country into a phase 
where norm internalisation of human rights, particularly those affecting 
women and gender equality, has become tangible. The discussion centres on 
how the Constitution addresses the challenge of harmful practices by 
examining women‘s rights guarantees under the Constitution; how the 
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Constitution pitches customary law, culture and the role of Chiefs/informal 
systems; how the Constitution envisages the domestication of international 
law; and how international law has been domesticated through domestic 
policy and law.  
This discussion demonstrates that while the Constitution has created an 
enabling environment for promoting women‘s rights and addressing harmful 
practices, it entrusts that this will be achieved through measures spearheaded 
by the state, including policy and legislative measures. Rural constituents 
would mostly be human rights ‗recipients‘ and beneficiaries (not architects) of 
such measures.  
5.3.1 The Constitution and Harmful Practices  
5.3.1.1   Women’s constitutional rights 
Women‘s rights directly relevant to this thesis are promoted under the 
Constitutional principles of national policy, the non-discrimination clause, the 
women‘s rights clause, and the right to development clause. In its principles 
of national policy, the Constitution requires the state to implement gender 
equality policies to address social issues, such as domestic violence, security 
of the person and rights to property.888 As will be seen in later chapters, 
harmful cultural practices constitute violations of the right to security of the 
person and the right to property, which community bylaws seek to protect.  
The Bill of Rights entrenches ‗rights of women‘ under Section 24. The 
provisions of this section are important because they particularise women‘s 
rights and have potential to facilitate the realisation of substantive gender 
equality. Section 24(1) guarantees women ‗the right to full and equal 
protection by the law, and the right not to be discriminated against on the 
                                               




basis of their gender or marital status‘.889 The state is to realise this right by 
ensuring that women have the same rights as men in civil law, including in 
respect to contractual capacity;890 the acquisition and maintenance of rights in 
property independently or in association with others regardless of their 
marital status;891 the custody, guardianship and care of children (including 
decision making on children‘s upbringing); 892  and the acquisition and 
retention of citizenship and nationality.893 Women‘s right to enjoy the same 
custody and guardianship rights as men is particularly vital for women under 
the lobola marriage system, which, upon divorce, bestows legal custody of 
children on their father divorce.894  
Closer to this study, Section 24(2) declares that any law that discriminates 
against women is unconstitutional, and calls for legislation to eliminate 
customs and practices that discriminate against women, particularly, sexual 
abuse, harassment and violence; 895  discrimination in work, business and 
public affairs; 896  and deprivation of property, including that obtained by 
inheritance.897 This section creates a basis for enacting legislation to uproot 
harmful practices that constitute sex discrimination, sexual abuse and 
violence and property deprivation. Of course, such legislation can only be 
beneficial to rural women if enforcement mechanisms are available and 
accessible to them. In Malawi, access to justice is a major challenge for rural 
                                               
889 Section 24(1). 
890 Section 24(1)(a)(i). 
891 Section 24(1)(a)(ii). 
892 Section 24(1)(a)(iii). 
893 Section 24(1)(a)(iv). 
894  Boyce P. Wanda, ‗Customary Family Law in Malawi: Adherence to Tradition and 
Adaptability to Change,‘ Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law (27) (1988), 117-134 128. 
Mwambene has further noted that 'in the patrilineal system children of the family belong to 
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women. 898  As seen in this chapter, the role of community bylaws in 
improving access to justice and human rights on the ground is invisible.   
Section 24 can be seen as facilitating the internalisation of the international 
norms protecting women from harmful practices. It transcends ‗formal 
gender equality,‘ which merely advocates that laws and policies should apply 
to everyone uniformly899 and embraces substantive equality. In doing so, it 
recognises that equal treatment laws alone cannot address entrenched drivers 
of inequality. 900  According to CEDAW General Recommendation No. 25, 
substantive gender equality pursues strategies that can practically transform 
prevailing gender norms and power imbalances,901 and ensures that women 
are free from violence. 902  Moreover, substantive equality promotes non-
discrimination and equitable opportunities for women within customary laws 
and practices.903  
However, Section 24 is not without some flaws. For example, in respect of 
women‘s rights upon marriage dissolution, it has been argued that the 
concepts of 'fair distribution' and 'jointly held' property under Section 24(1)(b) 
have significant loopholes that can shortchange women during property 
                                               
898   National Statistics Office, UNFPA, and UN Women, Gender Based Violence Survey: A 
Baseline Report of 17 Districts in Malawi (NSO, UNFPA and UN Women, 2012), 26. 
899 Paragraph 6, CEDAW General Recommendation No 25, on Article 4, paragraph 1, of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, on Temporary 
Special Measures; Section 20(1) of the Constitution—all persons are equal under any law…; 
Section 24(1) of the Constitution—women have the right to full and equal protection by the 
law. Also see Sandra Fredman, ‗Beyond the Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Measures: 
Accelerating De Facto Equality of Women under Article 4(1) UN Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women,‘ (2003) 112 cited in Rachel Rebouche, ‗The 
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712. 
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2004, A/59/38 Annex I [4] 2. 
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903  Sandra Fredman, ‗Beyond the Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Measures: 
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distribution upon divorce.904 Furthermore, Chirwa905 observes that Section 24 
does not deeply advance the rights of women;906 it falls short of according 
women special rights, merely expanding the right to non-discrimination 
guaranteed under Section 20 of the Constitution.907 
One could argue that Section 24 is not pursuing ‗special‘ rights, but is 
proclaiming ‗specific‘ rights that aim to facilitate equality between women 
and men in consonance with Section 20 guarantees.908 Under Section 20(2), the 
state has a threefold duty to (a) pass legislation addressing inequalities in 
society; (b) prohibit discriminatory practices and the propagation of such 
practices; and (c) criminalise such practices, where necessary.  
Thus, read with Section 20(2), Section 24(2) has been particularly useful for 
gender advocates calling for legislation advantageous to rural women to 
address issues such as domestic violence,909  property dispossession910  and 
gender inequalities.911 So has the guarantee of special protection to women in 
the promotion of the right to development under Section 30. 912 This right 
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Chidyaonga, Dispossessing the Widow: Gender Based Violence in Malawi, (2002), 34-35 & 103. 
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905 Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, ‗A Full Loaf is Better than Half: The Constitutional Protection 
of Economic and Social Rights in Malawi,‘ (2005). 
906 Ibid., 227. 
907 Ibid., 226-227. Section 20 (1) guarantees the right to equality by prohibiting discrimination 
of persons in any form, including on the ground of sex. 
908 Indeed the title of the section in the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi (as amended 
up to Act No. 11 of 2010) simply reads 'Rights of Women'. 
909 WLSA Malawi, ‗Discussing the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act: Discussion Paper,‘ 
(2003). 
910  Seodi White, Dorothy Kamanga, Tinyade Kachika, Asiyati Chiweza, and Flossie 
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implies that state measures to ‗eradicate social justices and inequalities‘913 
should perforate traditions injurious to women‘s development.914 However, 
being focused on first-level norm internalisation (legislative) efforts, gender 
advocates have not effectively ensured that such legislation adequately 
facilitates second-level norm internalisation, including through community-
level horizontal efforts that are internally initiated/led. 
The Constitution not only visibly supports women‘s rights norms, it also 
recognises the application of customary law as a source of Malawian law.  
5.3.1.2   Constitutional position on customary law and culture 
Since the Constitution expressly provides for the applicability of customary 
law alongside Acts of Parliament and the common law, 915 customary law is 
caught in constitutional provisions that allude to ‗any law,‘916 and ‗all laws.‘917 
Customary law mostly governs the rural masses, and the Constitution 
safeguards human rights in that realm by declaring as invalid aspects of ‗any 
law‘ that are inconsistent with constitutional provisions.918 
 Under the Bill of Rights, the Constitution specifically addresses custom and 
                                                                                                                                      
women, children and the disabled in particular shall be given special consideration in the 
application of this right.' 
913 Section 30(3). 
914  Tinyade Jimusole Kachika, ‗The Matrilineal Tradition and its Harms on Women‘s 
Development in Rural Malawi: A Right to Development Perspective‘ (Masters Degree paper, 
Georgetown University Law Centre, 2008), 39. 
915 Section 10(2) provides that in the application and formulation of any Act of Parliament and 
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far as they are inconsistent with this Constitution, all Acts of Parliament, common law and 
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916 For example, Section 5 (any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution 
shall to the extent of such inconsistency be invalid; Section 20(1) (discrimination of persons in 
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protection. . .); Section 24(2) (any law that discriminates against women on the ground of 
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protecting and enforcing . . . all laws in accordance with the Constitution . . .). 




culture – the former from the angle of anti-discrimination919 and through the 
provisions on marriages by custom;920 and the latter within the context of the 
right to participate in cultural life of one‘s choice.921 Admittedly, the ‗right to 
culture‘ is controversial especially in respect of harmful practices, since such 
practices are considered ‗cultural‘ and open to women‘s participation. 
Whether such participation is free or not is hotly contested.922 In practice then, 
‗choice‘ may be laced with subtle coercion or a sense of obligation.  
Mwambene923 argues that Section 26 does not express internal limitations, 
and that this may seemingly give the right to culture equal weight to other 
rights.924 However, since Section 44(1) places limitations on all rights under 
the Bill of Rights925  such limitations apply to Section 26 as well. And as 
Mwambene926 observes, Sections 20(2) and 24(2) give the right to equality a 
higher hierarchy than the right to culture.927 Indeed, the constitutional test for 
the validity of culture and/or customary law is whether it is consistent with 
constitutional provisions and principles.928  
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921 Section 26. 
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113-122. 
924 Ibid., 114. 
925 Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, ‗Upholding the Sanctity of Rights: A Principles Approach to 
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By allowing human rights to supersede culture,929 the Constitution partly 
aligns with the international jurisprudence on harmful practices.930 However, 
some of ‗the constitutional standards and principles‘ have contradicted 
international standards. For example, until 2017, Section 22 (7)-(8) of the 
Constitution tolerated children aged between 15 and 18 years getting married 
with the consent of parents or guardians and simply ‗discouraged‘ marriages 
of persons below 15 years. This notwithstanding the clear international 
prohibitions of marriages of children aged below 18 years. It took the case of 
Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa vs The Government of 
Malawi 931  before the ACERWC 932  in 2014 for Parliament to change the 
constitutional definition of the child from a person aged under 16 years to one 
aged under 18 years; and to repeal Sections 22(7)-(8) from the Constitution on 
14 February 2017.933 
In general, however, the Constitution has reduced international human rights 
norms protecting women from harmful practices to constitutional status, 
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making them justiciable in Malawian courts.934 Just as any other law that is 
applicable in Malawi, the force of customary law and culture is subjected to 
close human rights scrutiny. Himonga935 submits that ‗international norms for 
the protection of cultural rights anticipate the incorporation of harmless 
practices into domestic laws for the promotion and protection of children‘s 
rights.‘ 936  Consequently, customary practices that violate constitutional 
standards are objectionable. Yet, discriminatory customary laws continue to 
dominate lives of most Malawians‘.937 This is where Chiefs become important 
actors, although their role in norm appropriation is legally marginalised. 
        5.3.1.3   Constitutional and legal position on Chiefs and community bylaws 
The Constitution recognises Chiefs who administer customary law as part of 
local government authorities.938 The Chiefs Act939 specifies the functions of 
Chiefs. Though Malawi has a pluralist legal system, Parliament has exclusive 
legislative powers,940 and an Act of Parliament is supreme over other forms of 
law.941 Constitutionally recognised sources of law do not expressly include 
community bylaws.942  Under the Local Government Act 943  only a District 
                                               
934 Lea Mwambene, ‗Marriage under African Customary Law in the Face of the Bill of Rights 
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Council, and Town or City Assembly can make bylaws for governing a local 
government area. The Council cannot delegate its powers to make bylaws.944  
Meanwhile, Parliament has not deliberated on the status of community 
bylaws. Parliamentary debates preceding the adoption of the statutes 
discussed in section 5.3.3.1 reveals that only one MP referred to community 
bylaws. During debates on the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act, 
Honourable Lilian Patel said: ‗I would like to thank Chiefs in my 
constituency, led by TA Bwananyambi herself. They are trying to tackle child 
marriages by putting bylaws and punishing people who are marrying off 
their children‘.945 
Notable is the fact that this statement did not spark any debate on ‗these 
bylaws‘. Whether Parliament‘s silence on the legal status of community 
bylaws indicates its acceptance of these laws or its uncertainty on how to 
react to the bylaws remains an open question. Parliament‘s opinion on the 
bylaws is important because the phenomenon of community bylaws lends 
itself to legal pitfalls when questions of democratic legitimacy, 
constitutionality and rule of law are raised.  
5.3.1.4   The internalisation of international norms under the Constitution 
The Constitution‘s relevance to rural masses in Malawi depends in part on 
how it weaves together the local and the international. One area where this 
relationship is explicit lies in its provisions on the applicability of 
international law in Malawi.  
The Constitution prescribes two ways of domesticating international norms 
under Section 211. First, international agreements ratified by Malawi after the 
                                                                                                                                      
943Act No. 42 of 1998, as amended by Local Government (Amendment) Act No. 10 of 2017.  
944 Section 5(1) as read with Sections 6(1)(f) and 15(1)(b).  
945 Hon Lilian Patel, UDF  Spokesperson on Gender Issues—Parliament of Malawi, ‗Daily 
Debates (Hansard) Third Meeting–Forty Fifth Session–Seventh Day Thursday, 12 February 




commencement of the Constitution form part of domestic laws only if so 
declared by legislation. 946  Second, international agreements entered into 
before the Constitution 947  became operational are automatically binding 
unless otherwise provided.948 Thus, the Constitution establishes a two-step 
system of incorporating international human rights in Malawi ratified after 
1994: first, the Executive ratifies and thereafter Parliament domesticates. 
Despite the clarity of Section 211(2) discussed above, Malawian courts have 
adopted shifting positions on the question of whether they can directly apply 
human rights treaties that Malawi has ratified.949  
Nevertheless, the Constitution‘s two-step process of norm internalisation (as 
opposed to a strict one-step process whereby international law is 
automatically domesticated upon executive ratification) provides room for 
localising international human rights norms. Thus Parliament can pass 
legislation modifying international treaties as has been witnessed in the case 
of the Child Care, Justice and Protection Act and various other laws 
promoting women‘s rights and gender equality – which modify and 
supplement the CRC, CEDAW, African Children‘s Charter and the Maputo 
Protocol.  
Constitutional interpretation provides another avenue of localising 
international human rights norms in Malawi. Section 11(2)(c) of the 
Constitution stipulates that ‗in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution, 
the court of law shall, where applicable, have regard to current norms of 
public international law and comparable foreign state law‘. In a recent 
                                               
946 Section 211(1). Also cited in Siri Gloppen and Fidelis Edge Kanyongolo, ‗Courts and the 
Poor in Malawi: Economic Marginalisation, Vulnerability and the Law,‘ International Journal of 
Constitutional Law (5) (2007), 258-293 266. 
947 Lea Mwambene, ‗Marriage under African Customary Law in the Face of the Bill of Rights 
and International Human Rights Standards in Malawi,‘ (2010), 80. 
948 Section 211(2). 




Constitutional Court case, Mayeso Gwanda vs The State,950 the court chose to 
lean on the earlier judgment of Nyirenda J, (as he then was) in In the Matter of 
David Banda (a male infant),951 and agreed that  having consciously committed 
itself to uphold treaty obligations, the state is duty bound to comply with 
treaty provisions. In particular, the leading judgment of Mtambo J952 applied 
the ICCPR to expand the constitutional right guaranteeing freedom from 
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment under Section 19(3) of the 
Constitution. The court also relied on communications of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights 953  and the Human Rights 
Committee954 respectively as well as a wide range of comparable decisions of 
foreign courts955 in arriving at its decision to declare rogue and vagabond 
laws unconstitutional.  
Therefore, though not yet tested in the context of harmful practices,956 as seen 
above, international jurisprudence is useful in the courts‘ task of interpreting 
the Constitution and domestic law, thereby internalising international human 
rights norms protecting women from harmful practices. In applying 
international jurisprudence, the court could also tap on the general 
recommendations and general comments on harmful practices issued by the 
                                               
950 Constitutional Cause No. 5 of 2015 (being Criminal Case No. 444 of 2015). Delivered by the 
Constitutional Court on 10 January 2017. The accused was charged with the offence of being 
rogue and vagabond contrary to Section 184(1)(c) of the Penal Code. 
951 (2008) MLR 1. 
952 In Mayeso Gwanda and The State, Constitutional Cause No. 5 of 2015 (being Criminal Case 
No. 444 of 2015).  
953 Mtambo J cited Huri-Laws vs Nigeria (2008) AHRLR 273 (ACHPR 2000) to reinforce the 
constitutional right guaranteeing freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment and 
punishment under Section 19(3) of the Constitution; while the concurring opinion of 
Kalembera J cited Purohit and Another vs The Gambia (2003) AHRLC 96 (ACHPR) to stress that 
the rights to life and integrity of the person were inviolable. 
954 Mtambo J cited the HRC individual complaint of Mukong v Cameroon Communication No 
541 of 1991 to interpret the right to freedom and security of the person under Section 19(6) of 
the Constitution. 
955  Comparable foreign cases were cited in the opinions all the three judges: Mtambo J, 
Kalembera J and Ntaba J. 
956 The one case on harmful practices (involving the practice of sexual cleansing) that has 
come before Malawian courts (The Republic vs Eric Aniva, In the Principal Resident Magistrate 
Court sitting at Nsanje Criminal Case No. 87 of 2016) did not apply international law, 
presumably because the court found the provisions of the Gender Equality Act sufficient for 




CEDAW, CRC and ACHPR/ACERWC (discussed under section 4.3) since 
these elaborate on States Parties‘ obligations under a treaty.957 Furthermore, 
section 4.2 has highlighted several sources of soft law that buttress the 
establishment of the norms protecting women from harmful practices,958 
which, though not necessarily part of Malawian law, could be used by courts 
for interpretation. 
5.3.2 Gender Equality Policy Frameworks 
This section discusses how the Constitution has been translated into policy 
measures for promoting gender equality and addressing harmful practices. It 
first presents the state structure coordinating this mandate, and then 
discusses the various policies adopted to realise constitutional aspirations.  
5.3.2.1    The coordinating entity for gender equality policies 
Established pursuant to the Women‘s World Conference held in Beijing in 
1995, 959  the Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare 
(MoGCDSW) has become a focal point for the internalisation of institutional 
norms for advancing women‘s rights.960 MoGCDSW is the lead agency and 
policyholder in gender mainstreaming in Malawi, 961  and coordinates the 
national gender machinery, which is mandated to spearhead the formulation, 
                                               
957 See note 582. 
958 See note 509. 
959  Salephera Consulting Ltd and Prime Health and Consulting Services, ‗Appraisal of 
Management Systems of the Ministry of Gender,‘ (2013) 12. On file with author. 
960 Paragraph 201 of the Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA) promotes the operationalisation of 
an effective and functioning national machinery for the advancement of women as the central 
policy-coordinating unit inside government. Its main task is to support government-wide 
mainstreaming of a gender equality perspective in all policy areas. Strategic objective H.1. of 
the BPfA particularly calls for the creation or strengthening of national machineries and other 
governmental bodies. 
961  Ministry of Gender Children Disability and Social Welfare and UN Women Malawi, 
‗Gender Analysis of the Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare Budgets, 





implementation, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of national gender 
policy, programmes, projects and activities at all levels.962  
The fact that MoGCDSW has offices in all districts and at community level in 
many areas963 is significant for norm internalisation. On the one hand, the 
Ministry‘s programmes/presence potentially influence the vernacularisation 
of norms protecting women‘s rights in rural communities. On the other hand, 
Chapter 9 demonstrates that community-led, horizontal interventions 
protecting these rights in grassroots settings (as is the case with the 
community bylaws) have also impacted on the Ministry‘s work – although 
this horizontal activity currently remains obscure in vernacularisation 
debates. 
While MoGCDSW‘s stated focus is on (marginalised) ‗men and women; boys 
and girls,‘964  concerns have been expressed over the ‗feminisation of the 
Ministry.‘ 965  A female minister has always headed the Ministry, and its 
projects, which are heavily donor funded, are predominantly about 
women.966 This is somewhat due to lack of resources, as shown in part by the 
analysis of the Ministry‘s budgets between 2010 and 2015, which showed the 
Ministry received less than one percent of the annual national budgets. 967 In 
                                               
962  Salephera Consulting Ltd and Prime Health and Consulting Services, ‗Appraisal of 
Management Systems of the Ministry of Gender‘ (2013) 12; Michael Chasukwa, ‗The Gender 
Machinery: Women in Malawi‘s Central Government Administration,‘ CMI BRIEF (15)11 
(2016), 1. 
963 Michael Chasukwa, ‗The Gender Machinery: Women in Malawi‘s Central Government 
Administration,‘ (2016), 1. 
964 Both the 2000 and 2015 National Gender Policies have specified that this is their scope of 
coverage. 
965 Michael Chasukwa, ‗The Gender Machinery: Women in Malawi‘s Central Government 
Administration,‘ (2016), 2. 
966 Ibid. 
967 For example, it has been established that the Ministry faces the following challenges: very 
low operational expenses; high dependency on donors; little investments in economic 
empowerment and youth development; lack of resources and coherency to effectively 
implement gender-related laws; negligible funding for gender at district level; lack of 
resources for meaningful coordination of sectoral gender mainstreaming; non-compliance 
with budgeting guidelines that mandate gender-responsive budgeting; routine cuts in budget 
allocations; and funding disbursement that misalign with planning—Ministry of Gender, 




2015/16, the Ministry received only 0.35 percent of the total national 
budget.968  
Needless to say that underfunding adversely affects service delivery to the 
masses, including the implementation of the gender equality laws for 
addressing harmful practices that are discussed in section 5.3.3.1. 
Furthermore, the various gaps reflect the inadequate internalisation of the 
norm promoting the establishment of strong national machineries (that have 
authority, capacity and sufficient resources) for the advancement of 
women.969 
5.3.2.2   Gender equality policies 
If the populace is to benefit from international human rights norms beyond 
rhetoric, the internalisation of such norms in domestic policy is necessary. 
Thus Malawi‘s excursions towards the development of gender equality laws 
that address harmful practices would be incomplete without a peek at the 
policy frameworks that have directed law formulation. The purpose of this 
section is not to provide a critical analysis of Malawi‘s gender equality policy, 
but to demonstrate how, in democratic Malawi, first-level norm 
internalisation has happened through policy frameworks.  
Malawi intensified its gender and development efforts in the mid-1990s after 
the 1995 Fourth International Conference on Women in Beijing, China. 
Following Malawi‘s adoption of the Beijing Platform for Action (1995), the 
government, through MoGCDSW, expressed its commitment to gender 
equality by launching its National Platform for Action in 1997. 970  These 
                                                                                                                                      
Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare Budgets, 2009-2015 : A Call for 
Equal and Meaningful Distribution of the National Cake,‘ (2015) 1. 
968 Ibid., 2. 
969 Paragraphs 196 & 203, Beijing Platform for Action. 
970 Government of Malawi, National Gender Programme: Priorities for Gender Mainstreaming for 
Equality and Empowerment December 2004–December 2009, (Ministry of Gender, Child Welfare 




developments culminated in Malawi‘s first National Gender Policy (2000-
2005),971 and one of the policy intentions was to harmonise different UN 
conventions and declarations relevant to gender equality with national 
policies and laws. 972  The National Gender Programme (2004–2009) later 
became the implementation framework of the policy.973 
Malawi‘s overarching development policy framework, the Malawi Growth 
and Development Strategy, has also been attentive to gender equality, though 
at times feebly and theoretically. The first Malawi Growth and Development 
Strategy (MGDS, 2006–2011) had the agenda of accelerating the attainment of 
the Millennium Development Goals. Despite some conceptual gaps,974 the 
MGDS acknowledged under its theme of social development that ‗gender issues 
were an integral part of the national agenda, and that the main challenges to 
gender mainstreaming included social and cultural factors‘.975   
The MGDS II (2011–2016) carried a specific thematic area of ‗gender and 
capacity development‘, which expressed the desire for gender mainstreaming 
to permeate all levels. However, implementation gaps still prevailed.976 It is 
                                               
971 Ibid. 
972 Government of Malawi, National Gender Policy 2000–2005 (Ministry of Gender, Youth and 
Community Services, 2000), 2-3. 
973 Government of Malawi, National Gender Programme: Priorities for Gender Mainstreaming for 
Equality and Empowerment December 2004 – December 2009, (2004) iv. 
974 ‗The MGDS has major conceptual deficiencies in using the terms gender mainstreaming 
and dealing with gender as a cross-cutting issue because this tends to result in gender 
evaporation.  These terms are just thrown in the document as magical words that do not 
require specific attention and effort in all the thematic areas.  A gender section in a national 
policy document such as the MGDS should set standards, guidelines and targets for the 
sectors in a concise manner. The MGDS has failed to achieve this because the section lacks 
conceptual clarity of the vital role gender plays in the thematic areas. Only one woman 
professional in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development fully participated and 
gender experts were not consulted'—Olivia M‘chaju Liwewe, Naomi Ngwira, and Bright 
Sibale, ‗Gender Needs Assessment of the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy,‘ (2006) 
11. On file with author. 
975 Government of Malawi, Malawi Growth and Development Strategy, from Poverty to Prosperity 
2006–2011, (Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, 2006), 51. 
976 The MGDS II gender mainstreaming goals were not matched by planning and designing 
that recognised that the pursuit for gender equality in all sectors is a development goal, just 
as it is smart economics. In a nation where the majority of the population (52 percent women) 




worth noting that except for the HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Management 
Act), all statutes addressing harmful practices977  were enacted during the 
implementation of the Millennium Development Goals and MGDS II. 
However, implementation of these laws has been weak because Parliament 
does not deliberately budget for them once they are enacted.978  This has 
largely left norm internalisation stuck at institutional level without filtering 
down to the masses. 
The current MGDS III (2017 2022) intends to facilitate the implementation of 
the Sustainable Development Goals (2015–2030). Its thematic area of ‗gender, 
youth development, persons with disability and social welfare‘ seeks to 
enforce legislation against harmful practices affecting children; and to 
promote positions of social and political influence for women and address 
power inequalities. 979  Unlike the MGDS and MGDS II (which were 
implemented after the first National Gender Policy expired), the 
implementation of MGDS III and related gender equality commitments align 
with the implementation phase of the revised National Gender Policy.  
The National Gender Policy (NGP) embraces the unfinished business of all 
gender related Millennium Development Goals.980 The implementation of the 
NGP is meant to contribute to the accelerated attainment of the Sustainable 
                                                                                                                                      
development, MGDS II did not view gender mainstreaming as the asset that it is, resulting in 
the marginalisation of gender mainstreaming during implementation. The planning and 
implementation of MGDS II lacked gender policy anchorage, and was more focused on 
activities and not structural coordination issues that make gender mainstreaming efforts so 
fragmented in Malawi—Government of Malawi, Malawi Growth and Development Strategy II 
Review and Country Situation Analysis Report (Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and 
Development, 2016). 
977 The thesis discusses these in section 5.3.3.1. 
978  Ministry of Gender Children Disability and Social Welfare and UN Women Malawi, 
‗Gender Analysis of the Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare Budgets, 
2009-2015: A Call for Equal and Meaningful Distribution of the National Cake,‘ (2015), 5. 
979 Government of Malawi, The Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) III (2017–
2022): Building a Productive, Competitive and Resilient Nation (Ministry of Finance, Economic 
Planning and Development, 2017), 57-58. 
980 Goals 1, 2, 3 and 5—eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary 





Development Goals and other key women‘s rights frameworks.981 The NGP 
squarely targets addressing harmful practices through several strategies:  
 advocating for modification and elimination of traditional and cultural 
practices that have negative effects on girls‘ and boys‘ education;982  
 advocating for the enactment, popularisation and implementation of laws 
on elimination of harmful cultural practices that promote women`s 
susceptibility and vulnerability to HIV and AIDS;983  
 promoting community leaders‘ involvement in modifying harmful 
cultural practices that promote the spread of HIV and AIDS;984  and  
 advocating for the modification and elimination of harmful  cultural and 
traditional practices that perpetuate GBV and discrimination against 
women and girls.985  
Strategies for addressing GBV under the NGP are being comprehensively 
implemented through the National Action Plan to Combat GBV in Malawi 
(NAP GBV, 2016–2022); and the National Strategy on Ending Child Marriage 
(2018-2023). The NAP GBV recognises that harmful practices exacerbate GBV 
and prevent women‘s participation in socio-economic development. 986 
Therefore, the NAP GBV intends to engage in efforts towards modifying 
harmful cultural practices through participatory engagement with target 
                                               
981 The Republic of Malawi, National Gender Policy, (Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability 
and Social Welfare, 2015). 
982 Strategy 8 under Objective 1 aimed at increasing access to, retention and completion of 
quality education for girls and women. 
983 Strategy 5 under Objective 2 aimed at mainstreaming gender issues in all HIV and AIDS 
programming. 
984 Strategy 8 under Objective 2 aimed at mainstreaming gender issues in all HIV and AIDS 
programming. 
985 Strategy 3 under Objective 1 aimed at reducing  GBV and human trafficking incidences. 
986 Government of Malawi, National Action Plan to Combat Gender Based Violence in Malawi, 




groups; 987  supporting traditional leaders in ending harmful traditional 
practices including child marriage;988 and strengthening the accountability of 
traditional leaders to implement gender-related laws and policies.989  
While the recognition of community/traditional leaders makes strategies for 
tackling harmful practices more grounded, recommended interventions in the 
GBV NAP adopt the vernacularisation approach of relying on epistemic 
outsiders, thereby ignoring on-going, horizontal efforts at community level. 
The GBV NAP only recognises elite vernacularisers (government institutions, 
faith-based organisations and CSOs/NGOs) as responsible partners for taking 
interventions to traditional leaders/communities.990 Thus traditional leaders 
as actors that are already internally spearheading vernacularisation efforts in 
their own communities through community bylaws are obscure in the 
strategies – and so are community bylaws as a possible strategy for 
addressing GBV or harmful practices.  
For its part, the National Strategy on Ending Child Marriage continues the 
presumption that traditional leaders and communities have to be ‗educated‘ 
from the top while recognising community bylaws as a strategy for fighting 
child marriage. One of the objectives of the strategy is to facilitate positive 
change in the cultural norms, attitudes, behaviours, beliefs and practices that 
support and promote child marriage. 991  This will be achieved through 
capacity building, empowerment, and engagement of communities. The 
strategy targets raising awareness on child protection amongst cultural 
gatekeepers, religious and opinion leaders, 992  and promoting the 
                                               
987 Paragraph 1.2, NAP GBV, 2016–2022. 
988 Paragraph 14.10, NAP GBV, 2016–2022. 
989 Paragraph 1.4.1, NAP GBV, 2016–2022. 
990 See the NAP GBV's operational matrix: Government of Malawi, National Action Plan to 
Combat Gender Based Violence in Malawi, 2016–2022, (2016), 47-54. 
991 Government of Malawi, National Strategy on Ending Child Marriage, 2018-2023, (2018), 27. 




development and use of community bylaws aimed at ending child marriage 
in 300 TA areas.993  
Since the policy frameworks repeatedly allude to legislation, the next section 
examines how the Constitution has inspired legislative reforms in order to 
realise the mandate to address harmful practices. 
5.3.3 Legislative Reforms: Norm Internalisation in Legislation Addressing 
Harmful Practices  
The Malawi Law Commission 994  has been the state‘s major 995  channel of 
responding to the new constitutional order and facilitating the interaction 
between the local context and international human rights commitments on 
gender equality and women empowerment. 996  Seven gender-related laws 
have been enacted in Malawi between 2006 and 2017.997 Three of these laws 
specifically capture the term ‗harmful practices‘: the Child Care, Protection 
and Justice Act; 998  the Gender Equality Act; 999  and the HIV and AIDS 
(Prevention and Management) Act.1000  Two laws, the Deceased Estates (Wills, 
                                               
993 Ibid., 34. 
994 Created under Section 132 of the Constitution to review and make recommendations 
regarding the repeal and amendment of laws. Bills produced by the Law Commission as part 
of its reports are submitted to the Ministry of Justice, which reviews and later submits the 
same to Parliament.  
995 Major (not exclusive) because in the case of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, the 
law was developed by Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust 
(WLSA Malawi Office) in collaboration with other NGOs and the Ministry responsible for 
Gender, which submitted the law to Parliament as a Government Bill. And as seen in section 
5.3.1.2 of the thesis, the case of Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa vs The 
Government of Malawi (ACERWC Communication No. 004/Com/001/2014) also triggered a 
constitutional amendment outlawing child marriage in 2017. 
996 Malawi Law Commission, Report of the Law Commission on the Development of the Gender 
Equality Act, Report (MLC, 2011), 9. 
997 The 2006 Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (Chapter 7:05 of the Laws of Malawi); the 
Child Care, Protection and Justice Act No. 22 of 2010; the Deceased Estates (Wills, Inheritance 
and Protection) Act No. 14 of 2011; the Gender Equality Act No. 3 of 2013; the Trafficking in 
Persons Act No. 3 of 2015; the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act (Chapter 25: 01 of 
the Laws of Malawi) and the HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Management) Act No. 12 of 
2017. 
998 No. 22 of 2010. 
999 No. 3 of 2013. 




Inheritance and Protection) Act1001 and the Marriage, Divorce and Family 
Relations Act1002 proscribe particular forms of harmful practices.1003  
Three questions are of interest: to that extent have the laws addressing 
harmful practices internalised international law? Is the implementation 
scheme of these laws comprehensible to the rural masses? Are there any legal 
gaps that explain the emergence of community bylaws in rural Malawi? 
Chapter 4 has shown that international human rights jurisprudence 1004 
proposes qualities that legislation should exhibit as part of state‘s obligations 
to effectively deal with harmful practices. Therefore, this section assesses 
Malawi‘s legislation against the prescribed qualities in order to assess the 
depth of norm internalisation that the state is pursuing.  
5.3.3.1   Supremacy of international law standards  
Section 4.4.1 has illustrated that international jurisprudence calls for 
legislation addressing harmful practices to fully comply with obligations 
outlined in the CEDAW, the CRC and other international human rights 
norms prohibiting harmful practices. At the most basic and within Malawian 
practicalities, this means that legislation should outlaw two (child 
marriage/forced marriages, including dowry/bride price payments and 
polygamy) of the four main harmful practices1005 identified/ interpreted by 
the General Recommendation/General Comment. 
As section 5.3.3 shows, Malawian legislation outlaws child marriage and 
                                               
1001 No. 14 of 2011. 
1002 Chapter 25:01 of the Laws of Malawi. 
1003 The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (Chapter 7:05 of the Laws of Malawi) and the 
Trafficking in Persons Act No. 3 of 2015 could be relevant too, but this thesis purposefully 
focuses on the five laws above because they are directly related to widely recognised harmful 
practices in Malawi. 
1004 See section 4.4.1 of the thesis. 
1005 The four practices in respect of which state obligation is expounded in the joint CEDAW 
General Recommendation/CRC General Comment (CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18) are 
FGM, child marriage/forced marriages (including dowry/bride price payments), polygamy, 




forced marriage. However, although the special Law Commission on child 
rights-related law reforms had intended to prohibit ‗subjecting a child to any 
dowry transaction‘ in its proposed law, 1006  the Child Care, Justice and 
Protection Act omitted this provision. Banning dowry or lobola is seen as a 
tough call, since lobola validates a patrilineal customary marriage; and creates 
reciprocal rights and duties between two family and kinship groups.1007 
As for polygamy, the special Law Commission on the review of marriage and 
divorce laws intended that the new marriage law should ban polygamy.1008 
This was a higher standard than that of the Maputo Protocol‘s provision, 
which merely ‗discourages‘ polygamy, 1009  and is compatible with the 
mandate to abolish polygamy under CEDAW jurisprudence.1010 However, 
the provisions in the Bill submitted to Parliament, which sought to ban 
polygamy ‗entirely‘ was replaced with one ‗banning polygamy in civil 
marriages only‘. The following Parliamentary exchange explains the 
distinction: 
Honourable Mpaweni, UDF Balaka Central East: ‗[S]ection 18 
provides that a person who contracts a civil marriage shall be 
married to one spouse only, and yet as Moslems, we are allowed in 
the Koran to marry up to four wives.‘ 
Honourable Kaliati, Minister of Gender: ‗Polygamy is under 
customary marriages and my fathers who are in different faith 
                                               
1006 Malawi Law Commission, Law Commission Report on the Review of the Children and Young 
Persons Act (MLC, 2005), 109. 
1007 Lea Mwambene, ‗Marriage under African Customary Law in the Face of the Bill of Rights 
and International Human Rights Standards in Malawi,‘ (2010), 97. 
1008 Malawi Law Commission, Report of the Law Commission on Review of Laws on Marriage and 
Divorce (MLC, 2006), 29. Section 17 of the Bill that was proposed by the Law Commission as 
part of its report to the Ministry of Justice stipulated that ‗no person shall be married to more 
than one spouse.‘ Similar language was in Section 18 of the draft Bill that was submitted by 
the Ministry of Justice to Cabinet—Ministry of Justice Ref. No. D. 25:01 Draft: Marriage, 
Divorce and Family Relations Bill, 2015 (Cabinet)  (Subject to Change) 30th December, 2014. 
1009 Article 6(c) of the Maputo Protocol invites states to enact legislation to guarantee that 
'monogamy is encouraged as the preferred form of marriage and that the rights of women in 
marriage and family, including in polygamous marital relationships are promoted and 
protected'. 




organisations and follow customary marriages can do it [polygamy] 
the way you want.‘1011  
Therefore, Section 18 of the new marriage law1012 sustains the old position 
that Malawian customary marriages are potentially polygamous. 1013  The 
opportunity to entirely ban polygamy was also missed by the special Law 
Commission on the development of HIV and AIDS legislation, which agreed 
that ‗polygamy should not be prohibited, but should be regulated by 
requiring parties to undergo HIV testing‘.1014  
The way law reform debates have conceptualised specific harmful practices 
also reveals limitations that compromise the full internalisation of 
international human rights norms. For instance, when formulating the 
Gender Equality Act, the special Law Commission considered the practice of 
‗fisi for procreation‘1015 to be harmless, and excluded it from the scope of this 
law.1016 Contrary to international human rights jurisprudence,1017 this stance 
was taken without exception to situations where sociocultural values may 
pressure/coerce one to submit to such practice. This also contradicted with 
the special Law Commission‘s concession that ‗harmful practices involve 
coerced sexual relations‘.1018 In recent developments, because of its interests to 
                                               
1011  Parliament of Malawi, ‗Daily Debates (Hansard) Third Meeting–Forty Fifth Session–
Seventh Day Thursday, 12 February 2015 (unrevised edition)‘ 295. 
1012 Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act. 
1013 Lea Mwambene, ‗Reconciling African Customary Law with Women‘s Rights in Malawi: 
The Proposed Marriage Divorce and Family Relations Bill,‘ (2007), 116; Lea Mwambene, 
‗Marriage under African Customary Law in the Face of the Bill of Rights and International 
Human Rights Standards in Malawi,‘ (2010), 94. 
1014 Malawi Law Commission, Report on the Development of HIV and AIDS Legislation, (MLC, 
2008), 34. 
1015 Fisi (hyena) represents a man who comes under the cover of darkness. In this regard, 
where a husband is suspected to be barren, a clan elders arrange that a (paid) man should 
‗secretly‘ come and have sexual relations with a wife just for purposes of impregnating her.  
1016 Malawi Law Commission, Report of the Law Commission on the Development of the Gender 
Equality Act, (2011), 30. 
1017 See section 4.3.1.2 of the thesis. 
1018 Malawi Law Commission, Report of the Law Commission on the Development of the Gender 
Equality Act, (2011), 26. Furthermore, the special Law Commission on the development of 
HIV and AIDS legislation noted that in most cases, women participate 'in a culture of their 




address HIV and AIDS, the HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Management) 
Act1019 prohibits the practice of fisi without any exceptions,1020 implying that 
in the spirit of preventing HIV transmission, ‗procreation fisi‘ no longer enjoys 
the Gender Equality Act immunity. 
The failure by Malawian legislation to strictly uphold universal norms 
exposes a struggle between localising international human rights norms and 
the sovereignty of such norms when it comes to ‗sensitive‘ local practices.  
5.3.3.2   Repeal of ‘offensive’ laws  
International human rights jurisprudence urges states to immediately repeal 
all laws (including traditional, customary or religious) that condone, allow or 
lead to harmful practices, including the betrothal and marriage of children 
aged below 18 years. 1021  
In relation to inheritance, the Malawian Parliament repealed the Wills and 
Inheritance Act (1967) in 2011, replacing it with the Deceased Estate (Wills, 
Inheritance and Protection) Act1022 (Wills and Inheritance law) which has a 
provision criminalising property grabbing, a harmful practice.1023 In fact, this 
criminal provision was first introduced as an amendment to the Wills and 
Inheritance Act in 19981024 following submissions by the Women‘s Caucus to 
the Malawi Law Commission (in 1996) to punish property grabbing by 
law.1025 The old statute was effectively facilitating the grabbing of property 
                                                                                                                                      
also discriminatory against women—Malawi Law Commission, Report on the Development of HIV 
and AIDS Legislation, (2008) 33. 
1019 No. 12 of 2017. 
1020 Section 4(1) as read with the First Schedule. 
1021 See section 4.2 of the thesis. 
1022 No. 14 of 2011. 
1023 Section 84A. 
1024 Through the Wills and Inheritance (Amendment) Act No. 22 of 1998, which introduced 
Section 84A.  
1025  Malawi Law Commission, Report of the Law Commission on the Review of Wills and 
Inheritance Act, (MLC, 2004), 72. Semu suggests that the Women‘s Caucus could have 
proposed more comprehensive amendments to the inheritance law in the Bill that was 




from widows through its discriminatory formulas for distributing intestate 
property.1026  The Deceased Estates (Wills, Inheritance and Protection) Act 
now prioritises a deceased person‘s immediate family and dependants1027 in 
the distribution of intestate estates.1028  
As for child marriage, previously, the Marriage Act,1029 now repealed, was 
amended in 1997 to place the minimum marriage age for those marrying 
under civil law at 18 years, unless parents consented to a marriage involving 
their minor child.1030 This position left the minimum age in other forms of 
marriage vulnerable to customary or religious dictates. Further, child 
marriage was not expressly prohibited in both civil and customary marriages 
because until 2017, the Constitution only ‗discouraged‘ marriages for children 
aged 15 years and below,1031 and allowed parental consent for those getting 
married under 18 years.1032  
The new marriage law,1033 adopted in 2015, repealed the Marriage Act and 
sets the minimum age of marriage at 18 years for all marriages.1034 According 
to the Law Commission, this legal measure was introduced to make Malawi 
compliant with the CEDAW and CRC. 1035  In 2017, pursuant to the new 
                                                                                                                                      
the substance of the Bill, and dwelt on the fact that the Women‘s Caucus had presented it—
insinuating that women would be killing their husbands if their inheritance portion 
increased. Consequently, the only amendment that was passed was the property grabbing 
provision— Linda Semu, ‗Kamuzu's Mbumba: Malawi Women's Embeddedness to Culture in 
the Face of International Political Pressure and Internal Legal Change,‘ (2002), 90. 
1026  Seodi White, Dorothy Kamanga, Tinyade Kachika, Asiyati Chiweza, and Flossie 
Chidyaonga, Dispossessing the Widow: Gender Based Violence in Malawi, (2002), 35-40. 
1027 Section 3(1): 'Immediate family in relation to any person' means that person‘s spouse and 
children. Dependant means a deceased person's parent; or a minor whose education was 
being provided for by that deceased person, who is not capable, wholly or in part, of 
maintaining himself or herself.  
1028 Section 17. 
1029 Chapter 25:01. 
1030 Section 19, now repealed. 
1031 Section 22(8), now repealed. 
1032 Section 22(7), now repealed. 
1033 The Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act No. 4 of 2015. 
1034 Section 18. 
1035 Malawi Law Commission, Report of the Law Commission on Review of Laws on Marriage and 




marriage law 1036  and the decision in Institute for Human Rights and 
Development in Africa vs The Government of Malawi, 1037  a constitutional 
amendment was made domesticating the international human rights norm 
prohibiting anyone aged 18 years and below to enter marriage. 1038 Related to 
the call for states to repeal laws is the recommendation to enact specific laws.  
5.3.3.3   Enact legislation  
The international mandate is that states should enact legislation prohibiting 
betrothal, forced marriage and setting the minimum marriage age at 18 years 
(and 16 years in exceptional cases1039). Guided by CRC principles,1040 the child 
protection law1041 was the first statute in Malawi to unambiguously proscribe 
harmful practices. The Act bans forced marriage and child betrothal1042 in 
compliance with CEDAW 1043  and the African Children‘s Charter. 1044 
However, child marriage is not mentioned despite that when the special Law 
Commission on child rights-related law reforms was deliberating on child 
marriage, it expressed concern of both forced and early marriages.1045  
                                               
1036  In presenting the Constitution (Amendment) Bill No. 36 of 2016 to Parliament, the 
Ministry of Justice noted that Section 22 (which allowed minors to marry with parental 
consent) had overshadowed the gains made under Section 14 of the Marriage, Divorce and 
Family Relations Act, and that by passing the Bill, the girl child would be protected from 
child marriage—Parliament of Malawi, ‘First Reading Bill No. 36 of 2016: Constitution 
(Amendment),  Daily Debates (Hansard) Fifth Meeting–Forty Sixth Session, 14 February 
2017,‘ (2017), 305. 
1037 ACERWC Communication No. 004/Com/001/2014. Also see note 932. 
1038 Furthermore, the constitutional definition of child was changed from a person below 16 
years to one below 18 years.  
1039  Only provided for in the joint CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC General 
Comment—CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
1040 Malawi Law Commission, Law Commission Report on the Review of the Children and Young 
Persons Act, (2005), 108. 
1041 Act No. 22 of 2010. 
1042 Section 81. 
1043 Article 16(2). 
1044 Article 21(2). 
1045 Malawi Law Commission, Law Commission Report on the Review of the Children and Young 




Yet, the proposed Bill produced by the special Law Commission,1046 and the child 
protection law itself only addressed forced marriage. The joint CEDAW General 
Recommendation/CRC General Comment clarifies that child and forced 
marriage are not distinct, and that child marriage is a form of forced marriage 
since children cannot express their full, free and informed consent. 1047 
Nevertheless, even from this perspective, the child protection law still lacks 
specifics on the minimum marriage age by which forced marriage would be 
measured, including the criteria for establishing a forced marriage.  
ACERWC/ACHPR jurisprudence stipulates that legislation should proscribe 
marriage induced abduction and kidnapping.1048  The child protection law 
outlaws child abduction1049 and child trafficking.1050 Furthermore, it prohibits 
the selling of a child, or using a child as a pledge to obtain credit; using a 
child as surety for a debt or mortgage; or forcing a child into providing labour 
for the income of a parent, guardian or any other person.1051 These practices 
have been known to fuel child marriage in parts of Northern Malawi.1052 
However, one important issue is whether the law is consistent and 
comprehensive. 
5.3.3.4   Adopt consistent and comprehensive legislation  
The thorny issue in Malawi is the comprehensiveness of the legislation as 
required by international human rights jurisprudence. 1053  While the 
legislation is surely preventative and protective, it certainly lacks ‗detailed 
guidance‘, including mechanisms for supporting and assisting victims. 
                                               
1046 Section 173 of the proposed law, cited in ibid., 251. 
1047 Paragraph 23. 
1048 See note 631. 
1049  'A person who, unlawfully takes, retains or conceals a child without the consent of the 
parent or without the consent of any other person who has lawful custody of the child 
commits an offence and shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years.' 
1050 Sections 78(1) and 79(1) respectively. 
1051 Section 82.  
1052 Malawi Human Rights Commission, Harmful Practices in Malawi (MHRC, 2006). 




Definitions of harmful practices, the penalties and the implementation 
procedures set under the respective laws on harmful practices to be realised 
are used illustratively: 
a) Definitions of harmful practices  
The child protection law does not specifically define harmful practices, but 
stipulates that ‗no person shall subject a child to a social or customary practice 
that is harmful to the health or general development of the child‘.1054 This 
provision is broad enough to catch all harmful practices described in 
international jurisprudence. 1055  However, harmful religious practices may 
arguably escape by virtue of the fact that only social and customary practices 
are specified.  
Positively, the Gender Equality Act and the HIV and AIDS (Prevention and 
Management) Act, which specifically mention religious practices, address the 
gap in the Child Care, Justice and Protection Act. The Gender Equality Act 
defines a harmful practice as ‗a social, cultural or religious practice, which, on 
account of sex, gender or marital status, does or is likely to undermine the 
dignity, health or liberty of any person; or result in physical, sexual, 
emotional or psychological harm to any person‘.1056 Despite preceding the 
joint CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC General Comment on harmful 
practices, the definition has elements that meet the views of the CEDAW and 
CRC Committees regarding the criteria for ascertaining ‗harmful practices‘. 
These elements are: the violation of dignity, integrity and human rights; 
discrimination against women or children; traditional practices that occur due 
to gender inequality; practices that are influenced/imposed by others (family 
members, community members or society).1057 The definition under the HIV 
and AIDS (Prevention and Management) Act limits harmful practices to ‗any 
                                               
1054 Section 80. 
1055 See sections 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.2 of the thesis. 
1056 Section 3. 




social, religious or cultural practice that puts a person at risk of HIV infection 
and reinfection; or may catalyse progression of HIV to AIDS‘.1058  
On first impression, the words ‗social, cultural or religious practice‘ in both 
the Gender Equality Act and HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Management) 
Act would comprehensively cover all harmful practices. However, as seen in 
section 5.3.3.1, framers of the Gender Equality Act intended to exclude the 
practice of ‗fisi for procreation‘1059 from the law‘s scope although coerced sex 
may be involved. Yet, international jurisprudence states that ‗harmful 
practices‘ include coercive practices. 1060  For its part, the HIV and AIDS 
(Prevention and Management) Act prohibits 18 practices,1061 implying that 
other practices that potentially perpetuate HIV and AIDS may be 
excluded.1062 Thus this Act may only pass the comprehensiveness test if read 
together with the broader definition of the Gender Equality Act. 
Defining harmful practices comprehensively has been challenging. For 
example, when debating the Child Care, Justice and Protection Act, some 
legislators cautioned against the wholesale internalisation of human rights 
norms protecting children, arguing that culture too needed protection.1063 
They contended that the proposed law would suddenly make illegal certain 
                                               
1058 Section 2. 
1059 See note 1015 and Glossary of Chichewa terms for definition. 
1060 Of course note 1020 has explained that on the other hand, the  HIV and AIDS (Prevention 
and Management) Act prohibits the practice of fisi without any exceptions. 
1061 Chinamwaye, fisi, hlazi, chijura mphinga, kuchotsa fumbi, chiharo, kuika mwana ku malo, kujura 
nthowa, kulowa or kupita kufa, kulowa or kupita ngozi, kupimbira, kupondera guwa, kusamala 
mlendo, kutsuka mwana, mbirigha, gwamula, mwana akule, bulangete la mfumu—see Glossary of 
Chichewa terms for definitions. Notably, the Act does not give English definitions of the 
various terms. Whereas the thesis has drawn from various sources to interpret the terms, the 
author could not find English interpretations for practices such as chijura mphinga and 
kupondera guwa. Therefore, these have been excluded from the Glossary of Chichewa terms.  
1062  For example polygamy. Also, a WLSA Malawi research report mentions additional 
practices such as kulowa ngalawa and chitayo (see Glossary of Chichewa terms for 
definitions)—WLSA Malawi, ‗Women, HIV and AIDS in Six Districts in Malawi: Balancing 
the Equation Between Women‘s Grounded Realities and the Appropriateness of the 
Response‘ (2009). 
1063 Hon Mwechumu UDF Mangochi North East Malawi National Assembly Malawi National 
Assembly, ‗Daily Debates (Hansard) Second Meeting Forty Session Twenty Eight Day 




traditions and norms that Malawian parents routinely practice to raise their 
children well.1064 These arguments support the cultural relativist perspective 
that ‗international human rights norms should not disturb cultural practices 
that are valued by societal groups‘.1065 However, evaluating cultural practices 
by human rights standards remains a legitimate exercise.1066 As some MPs 
observed, omissions to critically examine parts of culture that promote 
undesirable practices can make culture a tool of perpetuating abuses.1067 
The similarities and variations in the definitions of harmful practices between 
international jurisprudence and local law, show that norms do not flow one 
dimensionally from the international shore, to the domestic and to the rural. 
International law definitions are domestically negotiated and reinterpreted to 
make them locally viable. This determines the extent to which international 
norms are appropriated in statutory definitions of harmful practices. And 
since the definitions are in statutes, the norms may hardly filter down 
formally to the rural when law implementation is weak. However, as the 
community bylaws show (Chapter 8), this does not mean that the rural is 
dormant and not internalising/vernacularising international human rights 
norms on harmful practices in its own ways.  
b) Penalties  
The Child Care, Justice and Protection Act, Gender Equality Act and the HIV 
and AIDS (Prevention and Management) Act criminalise harmful practices1068 
as recommended by international human rights jurisprudence. 1069  The 
Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act does not prescribe specific 
                                               
1064 Hon Phoya DPP Blantyre Rural East—ibid. 
1065 Katherine Brennan, ‗The Influence of Cultural Relativism on International Human Rights 
Law: Female Circumcision as a Case Study,‘ Law and Inequality  (1988 – 89), 367-398 369. 
1066 Ibid. 
1067 Hon Kaliati Minister of Gender, Children and Community Development; Hon Kalinde 
DPP Thyolo North—Malawi National Assembly, ‗Daily Debates (Hansard) Second Meeting 
Forty Session Twenty Eight Day Monday 23 June 2010 ‘ 1149 & 1123. 
1068 And the Deceased Estates (Wills, Inheritance and Protection) Act criminalises property 
grabbing.  




punishment for child marriage,1070 which can be seen as a gap.1071 Under the 
Child Care, Justice and Protection Act, except for the offence of child 
trafficking, which is punishable by life imprisonment, 1072  the rest of the 
offences it creates are punishable by ten years‘ imprisonment.1073 There is no 
option of a fine, which may portray the law as unreasonably harsh with 
regards to some harmful practices. For example, one could argue that making 
a child miss school to attend an initiation ceremony, and forcing an initiated 
child to undergo sexual cleansing cannot both strictly attract imprisonment.  
The Gender Equality Act punishes a person who commits, engages in, subjects 
another person to or encourages the commission of any harmful practice with a 
fine of one million Kwacha1074 and five years‘ imprisonment.1075 The HIV and 
AIDS (Prevention and Management) Act punishes committing a harmful 
practice or subjecting, permitting or encouraging another person to indulge in a 
harmful practice with five million Kwacha 1076  and five years‘ 
imprisonment.1077 Since many harmful practices under the Gender Equality 
Act would likely have HIV traces, it is unclear when one may or may not 
invoke the lesser monetary punishment under this law to escape the higher 
penalty under the HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Management) Act. 
Furthermore, harmful practices such as gwamula1078 and initiation fisi1079 can 
be synonymous with rape or defilement, and the punishments under the 
                                               
1070 It just declares it as an invalid marriage. 
1071 Although arguably one can draw on the Gender Equality Act or the Child Care, Justice 
and Protection Act (if one proves that forced marriage includes child marriage) for penalties. 
1072 Section 79(1). 
1073 Sections 78(1) & 83 respectively. 
1074 Equivalent to USD 1,347. 
1075 Section 5. 
1076 Equivalent to USD 6,736. 
1077 Sections 4 & 5. 
1078 A practice whereby young men invade a girls‘ hut at night and force the girls to have sex 
with them. 
1079 See note 1015 and Glossary of Chichewa terms. In this instance, the fisi comes under the 




Gender Equality Act and HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Management) Act 
pale compared to those prescribed under the Penal Code.1080  
In respect of the offence of property grabbing, the Deceased Estates (Wills, 
Inheritance and Protection) Act imposes a punishment of one million 
Kwacha1081 fine, and imprisonment for ten years.1082 Additionally, a guilty 
party is required to restore the property or the equivalent monetary value.1083 
Unlike the other laws, the Deceased Estates (Wills, Inheritance and 
Protection) Act allows the court to pay the full or such part of the fine to the 
person or persons entitled or into the estate of the deceased person.1084 This 
arguably complies with the recommendation of international jurisprudence 
that victims of violations should access appropriate reparations.1085  
The inconsistent punishments laid down by different laws for harmful 
practices are at best confusing. In respect of the ten-year punishment for 
harmful practices against children under the Child Care, Justice and 
Protection Act, one may assume that the Act deliberately imposes a higher 
penalty as a deterrent for crimes against children as other laws have sought to 
do. 1086 The logical explanation for the lesser monetary fine under the Gender 
Equality Act compared to that under the HIV and AIDS (Prevention and 
Management) Act would be currency fluctuations that have occurred in 
between the enactment of the two statutes. In any event, given evidence in 
Chapter 8 that livestock is a common currency in rural areas, 1087  the 
internalisation of international human rights norms on harmful practices 
                                               
1080  Punishable by life imprisonment under Section 133 and 138 of the Penal Code 
respectively. 
1081 See note 1074. 
1082 Section 84(1). 
1083 Section 84(1)(a). 
1084 Section 84(1)(b). 
1085 For example see Paragraph 55(q), CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 
1086 For instance the Trafficking in Persons Act has a higher penalty for child trafficking. 




through punitive legal measures becomes a cosmetic exercise that only 
distances formal laws from people‘s lived realities.  
Besides, one should be mindful that the Law Commission illegalised harmful 
practices in the Gender Equality Act despite traditional leaders‘ resistance 
that legislation was not a strategic tool for tackling harmful practices since 
they happen among people with close ties. 1088  As the empirical chapters 
demonstrate, the community bylaws under study therefore demonstrate that 
the internalisation of international human rights norms in rural settings can 
occur in unconventional ways, apart from being a purely externally driven 
exercise. Such alternative is particularly realistic where the implementation of 
gender-related laws is weak, as is the case with Malawi. 
      c)  Implementation mechanisms and procedures  
The Acts discussed above have very weak implementation schemes, which 
make the laws remote from rural people. Apart from creating offences and 
punishments, the laws do not address issues of access justice in respect of 
harmful practices. Neither do they make provision for support and follow-up 
services and assistance for victims of harmful practices as required by 
international human rights jurisprudence.  
In respect of the criminalisation of property grabbing, the Law Commission 
reported, when it was reviewing the old Wills and Inheritance Act in 2004, 
that the provision had not been enforced five years after its enactment.1089 
                                               
1088  While sympathising with the wide occurrence of harmful practices, participants, 
particularly traditional leaders, in the consultative workshops that the Law Commission held 
in the three regions of Malawi 'were reluctant to subscribe to the statutory regulation of 
harmful practices' because they feared that such a move would only drive the practices 
underground. They recommended that harmful practices would best be dealt with through 
civic education—Malawi Law Commission, Report of the Law Commission on the Development of 
the Gender Equality Act, (2011), 27. 
1089  Malawi Law Commission, Report of the Law Commission on the Review of Wills and 
Inheritance Act, (2004), 72. The Director of Public Prosecution‘s (DPP's) excuse was that those 




This situation remains to date. Police officers opt to use informal mediation 
and ‗counselling‘ to resolve property-grabbing matters.1090  
The use of informal mechanisms despite existence of legislation displays 
complexities of norm internalisation. In addition to challenges related to norm 
internalisation expressed in Chapter 4,1091 Allden1092  has argued that even 
when a norm is seemingly institutionalised through state law, the lack of 
‗capability to function‘ (operationalising the right in practice) can hinder 
internalisation.1093 For the property grabbing law, the lack of capability to 
function goes beyond lack of state resources, but rises from perceptions that 
criminal/state law should not intrude into relational matters that can be 
solved ‗relationally‘.  
The Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act has clearer implementation 
mechanisms regarding marriage registration but not child marriage. In 
compliance with international jurisprudence,1094 the law calls for compulsory 
registration of civil, religious and customary marriages. Traditional 
Authorities (TAs) have been designated ‗registrars‘ with authority to perform 
the functions of the Registrar of Marriages.1095 Not all TAs are physically 
accessible to their subjects though. Additionally, the law does not provide for 
training to develop full competence of TAs, nor does it impose an obligation 
to raise awareness and educate the public about marriage registration.1096 
                                                                                                                                      
property, and were therefore not caught in the statutory definition of ‗property grabber‘ (as 
being someone ‗not entitled to the property).‘ The DPP had also not yet appointed private 
prosecutors to prosecute property grabbing cases as required by the law. On their part, the 
police conceded that there had been no prosecution ‗because property grabbing cases are 
treated as family matters. 
1090 Interview with Patricia Njawili, National Police Victim Support Unit Coordinator, 4 June 
2018. 
1091 See section 4.4 of the thesis. 
1092  Susanne Alldén, ‗How Do International Norms Travel? Women‘s Political Rights in 
Cambodia and Timor-Leste ‘ (2009). 
1093 Ibid., 10 & 11. 
1094 See note 717. 
1095 Section 4, Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act. 
1096 Plan International, In-depth Review of Legal and Regulatory Frameworks on Child Marriages in 




Besides, the state is yet to operationalise the registration mechanisms. 
Unlike the Gender Equality Act and the HIV and AIDS (Prevention and 
Management) Act, the Child Care, Justice and Protection Act has outlined 
some procedure in respect of harmful practices. It provides that when a Social 
Welfare Officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a child has 
experienced a harmful cultural practice,1097 he/she will temporarily remove 
and place the child in a safe place. The child should be brought before a Child 
Justice Court within 48 hours (if practicable). The court may commit the child 
to a foster home or place her/him under a Social Welfare Officer‘s 
supervision until the Social Welfare Officer conducts an appropriate inquiry. 
Should the inquiry reveal that the child needs protection and rehabilitation, 
the court may commit the child to a foster home; and order that the child be 
placed under the supervision of a Social Welfare Officer for a specific 
period.1098  
Although these mechanisms are worthwhile, rehabilitation options are not 
provided for. Nor are any budgetary provisions made for such mechanisms to 
be functional. Besides, foster homes are a foreign concept to most Malawians, 
and the country hardly has basic shelters for victims of GBV.1099 If the fact that 
Social Welfare Officers have so far not processed cases of harmful practices is 
anything to go by,1100 the recommended legal procedures are impractical on 
                                               
1097 Or any practice prohibited under Sections 81 and 82, see notes 1042 and 1051 respectively. 
1098 Section 84, Child Care, Justice and Protection Act. 
1099  National Statistics Office, UNFPA, and UN Women, Gender Based Violence Survey: A 
Baseline Report of 17 Districts in Malawi, (2013), 26. 
1100 For instance, it is the BBC that ignited the case of The Republic vs Eric Aniva  (In the 
Principal Resident Magistrate Court sitting at Nsanje Criminal Case No. 87 of 2016). The 
accused was charged with two offences of: engaging in harmful practices (puberty and 
widow sexual cleansing) and attempting to engage in a harmful practice (kulowa kufa—
widow sexual cleansing) contrary to Section 5 of the Gender Equality Act. It was alleged that 
between 2013 and June 2016, the accused had carnal knowledge of women under the name of 
kulowa kufa (widow sexual cleansing) in villages in Nsanje district in Malawi. His conduct 
came into the public limelight when he admitted to the BBC in July 2016 that he had been 
having sexual intercourse (without disclosing his HIV positive status) as a ‗hyena‘ with more 
than 100 women and girls. President Peter Mutharika ordered his arrest. Although the 




the ground. The lack of operational resources also smothers the effectiveness 
of Social Welfare Officers. This thesis found that instead of focusing on their 
core mandates, district Social Welfare Officers mainly implement donor 
projects due to lack of government funds. Furthermore, the law does not 
anticipate support for those who were previously married as children as 
recommended by ACERWC/ACHPR jurisprudence.1101   
Public awareness raising, as a law implementation measure, is mentioned 
under the Gender Equality Act and Deceased Estates (Wills, Inheritance and 
Protection) Act. Both Acts mandate the Minister of Gender to design and 
implement programmes for the public awareness of the respective laws.1102 
For the Gender Equality Act, this includes developing programmes aimed at 
promoting gender equality in all spheres of life; 1103  and developing 
programmes that create awareness of fundamental human rights, equality 
and mutual understanding and respect. 1104  Both statutes mandate the 
Minister to ‗enlist the services of traditional leadership and NGOs in 
disseminating information and in the conduct of any other activities 
connected with such programmes‘.1105  
Recognising the role of NGOs and Chiefs is important, since they interact 
with the spaces where harmful practices happen. Notably, the two 
stakeholders are not involved during programme design, but during 
                                                                                                                                      
sexually cleansing teenage girls after their first menstruation as per customary requirements 
and it is believed that if the girls refused, disease or some fatal misfortune could befall their 
families or the village as a whole. The accused would also sexually cleanse women who had 
procured an abortion. Although President Mutharika had wanted Aniva tried for defiling 
young girls, but none came forward to testify against him—Ed Butler, ‗The Man Hired to 
Have Sex With Children,‘ BBC News Magazine 21 July 2016. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36843769, accessed on 24 May 2018; BBC News, 
‗Malawi ―Hyena Man‖ Eric Aniva Sentenced to Two Years Hard Labour‘ 22 November 2016. 
Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38063345, accessed on 24 May 2018. 
1101 See note 738. 
1102 Section 85, Deceased Estate (Wills, Inheritance and Protection) Act and Section 21(1), 
Gender Equality Act.  
1103 Section 21(1)(a). 
1104 Section 21(1)(b). 
1105  Section 85 (a), Deceased Estate (Wills, Inheritance and Protection) Act and Section 




implementation only. Chapter 4 has criticised the prospect that the state 
should singularly design programmes since the state may fail to benefit from 
the ‗double consciousness‘1106 of NGOs, and unrealistically expects traditional 
leaders to sponge state prescriptions. Yet, international jurisprudence expects 
the involvement of both NGOs and traditional leaders, both during 
preparation and implementation of programmes on harmful practices.1107  
In respect of traditional leaders, the view that they are only relevant in 
helping the state to implement its public awareness interventions exposes 
both the state‘s bias towards first-level norm internalisation and the state‘s 
limited appreciation of how human rights also horizontally permeate rural 
territories (that are governed by Chiefs) beyond structured and externally 
pushed programmes. As seen in Chapter 3, the latter limitation is also 
reflected in current understandings of vernacularisation.  
5.4  CONCLUSION 
The chapter has shown that harmful practices have evolved from being 
framed as a religious problem in the colonial times, to a developmental and 
legal problem currently. From a difficult past, Malawi has trekked 
remarkably. The Constitution has a Bill of Rights that entrenches women‘s 
rights and that anchors the internalisation of human rights norms protecting 
women from harmful practices. The Constitution has birthed several statutes 
that have been vehicles for institutionalising a culture to eliminate harmful 
practices in Malawi. While international human rights norms have been a big 
influence, occasionally the statutes have re-interpreted the norms to suit the 
local context, even when such re-interpretation may depart from standard 
human rights principles.  
                                               
1106 See note 355. 




While several important legislative measures on harmful practices have been 
taken, there are significant implementation gaps that make them ineffective 
and inaccessible to the masses. Of particular concern is that the legislation is 
not being utilised by victims of harmful practices especially in rural areas. 
This suggests that first-level norm internalisation is inadequate, and that 
outsiders‘ unicameral processes and/or programmes expected to facilitate the 
appropriation of ‗higher law‘ do not always trickle all the way down.  
This is not to say communities are stubborn about harmful practices. It is 
rather to say that legislation has not offered much to trigger second-level 
norm internalisation, which would reach the masses. For this to happen, 
much more would need to be done to raise public awareness and create 
effective structures to enforce state law. Meanwhile, the next chapters 
demonstrate how rural communities in Malawi have taken charge of ‗second-
level norm internalisation‘ through formulating their own community bylaws 
on child marriage and other harmful practices. These efforts provide an 
alternative understanding of how human rights norms on harmful practices 
are also horizontally vernacularised. However, this discussion is preceded by 





CHAPTER 6   
METHODOLOGY FOR FIELD RESEARCH 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
As noted in Chapter 1, the central question examined in this thesis is how 
community bylaws in rural Malawi have been developing, in order to obtain 
a more nuanced understanding of how they are being influenced and shaped 
by international human rights norms addressing child marriage and other 
harmful practices affecting women.  
The thesis has aimed to: explain the factors influencing the emergence and 
use of community bylaws to ensure the protection of the right of women to be 
free from harmful practices; understand how the community bylaws (and 
harmful practices) are being conceptualised and whether such understanding 
is consistent with domestic and international human rights law norms; 
examine the relationship between the way the community bylaws are being 
broadly conceptualised and African customary law within the broader 
context of legal pluralism; and to contribute to the theoretical discourse on 
norm diffusion by assessing and testing if the phenomenon of community 
bylaws is revealing other facets of norm internalisation at play when culture 
is the action ground. These objectives were realised by collecting primary 
data,1108  the rationale and process of which is described in detail in this 
chapter. 
                                               
1108 It should be noted that the objectives of study were also realised through a desk-based 
conceptual research as presented in Chapters 3-5. This desk-research shaped the focus of the 
field research. First, it was important to engage theoretical discourses underpinning the 
study. These were helpful in directing the formulation of questions that would reveal 





In preparation for fieldwork and ethics application, I developed a ‗data wish 
list.‘ This was a matrix with columns for the data that I needed, level of 
importance of the data, where the data would be obtained, level of difficulty 
to obtain the data, what I would lose if I failed to get the data, and strategies I 
would use to address limitations in data availability. This wish list exposed 
the scope of fieldwork the thesis demanded, which interviewees to focus on, 
and how to achieve the thesis‘ objectives. In preparation for my ethics 
clearance application, I formulated ‗interview matrices‘ for each interview 
category. For each question I was intending to ask each interviewee, the 
matrix helped me to deliberately reflect on why I was asking the question, 
and the conceptual interests behind the question.  
6.3 ETHICS  
Ethical clearance was given for this study by the UCT Faculty of Law‘s 
Research Ethics Committee.1109  
Participants were specifically asked whether their names and words could be 
used in this dissertation. Only one participant did not want their name to be 
quoted in the thesis. Most community participants expressed delight at the 
prospect of having their experiences and voices documented, ‘mulembe kuti 
                                                                                                                                      
reconceptualisation of norm internalisation theory (in particular how vernacularisation is 
perceived). Second, Chapter 4 (which assesses how international jurisprudence approaches 
norm internalisation and vernacularisation) as read with Chapter 5 (which examines the 
extent to which domestic approaches to norm internalisation are reflecting tenets of 
vernacularisation, as well as the aspirations of international human rights law and 
jurisprudence on harmful practices) further sharpened the development of questions that 
would provide a clear picture about what is happening in the community bylaws 
phenomenon when the bylaws are matched with human rights and statutory approaches. 
This too would help in clarifying how the community bylaws should be understood in the 
context of vernacularisation. 




tanena kuti eya mutitchule!’1110  Therefore, except for data pertaining to the one 
participant, the thesis uses actual names or, in the case of focus groups, 
categories of interviewees and their study sites. Through the consent form, 
participants were also assured of the confidentiality of the research.1111 The 
research anticipated minimal risk of harm to the participants, 1112  and the 
fieldwork did not reveal any such risks. No minors or vulnerable groups were 
involved in the research.  
6.4 FIELDWORK 
6.4.1 Study Sites 
At first, I intended to collect data from three districts – one district in each of 
Malawi‘s three regions1113 - but later expanded the study to one more district 
in the Central Region for reasons to be explained. The districts represented 
the top five highly populated tribes and Malawi‘s two lineage patterns 
namely, patrilineal1114 and matrilineal.1115 The two subsets of matrilineality—
chikamwini1116 and chitengwa1117 were also represented.  
The four sites were chosen based on the prominence of their community 
bylaws and the activism of their Chiefs. In the Southern Region, the study 
focused on the matrilineal area of Senior Chief Chitera in Chiradzulu 
                                               
1110 Best English approximation would be 'write in your notes that we have said yes, mention 
us/our identities'. 
1111 The consent forms indicated that the research information gathered in the study would 
remain confidential, and only the researcher and UCT would have access to the study data 
and information. The participants‘ names would not be available to anyone. Participants were 
also assured that my computer is password protected and no one has access to the password. 
No, deception was applied in the study. 
1112 In case a participant's testimony would contradict his/her institution‘s agenda for the 
community bylaws, there was a small chance of social risk should the testimony be revealed. 
In order to mitigate this risk, I  put in place strict procedures to ensure that the participant's 
confidentiality was maintained. 
1113 Northern, Central and Southern. 
1114 The lineage follows the male line. 
1115 The lineage follows the female line. 
1116 Where a husband resides in a wife‘s village. 




district, 1118  which has a mixture of Lomwe and Yao tribes (who are 
predominant in the area). Lomwes are the second largest ethnic group 
constituting 18 percent of the total population in Malawi. The Yao are the 
third largest group, making up 14 percent of the total population.  
In the Central Region, two sites were studied. The initial choice was the 
Ngoni tribe of Senior Chief Kwataine of Ntcheu district. This tribe has a 
confluence of both matrilineal and patrilineal traits. The Ngonis constitute 12 
percent of the total population of Malawi. I later added the matrilineal Chewa 
tribe of Senior Chief Lukwa‘s area in Kasungu district,1119 after realising that 
the study could not have a nationally inclusive spread without the 
representation of this largest ethnic group in Malawi, which accounts for 36 
percent of the total population. In the Northern Region, the research was in 
the patrilineal Tumbuka area of Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe in Karonga. The 
Tumbukas form 9 percent of the total population in Malawi.1120  
6.4.2 Interviews 
There were seven subsets of interviewees at national, district and community 
levels (see interview Protocols in the Annexure). 1121 A total of 51 interviews, 
covering 183 respondents, were conducted between January and April 2018 
(see Table 1 for sex disaggregated data and Table 2 for interviewee 
categories). For the interviews in my four study sites, the Programme Officer 
                                               
1118 The area practices a matrilineal system called chikamwini, where a man resides in his 
wife‘s village. 
1119 The area practices a matrilineal system called chitengwa, where a woman resides in her 
husband‘s village. 
1120 WorldAtlas, ‗Ethnic Groups of Malawi.‘ Available at 
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/ethnic-groups-of-malawi.html, accessed on 18 
January 2019. 
1121 I had initially targeted eight groups, including committees that formulated the respective 
community bylaws. This plan was based on my prior knowledge that a ‗Community 
Parliament‘ had formulated bylaws in one area in Malawi.‘ Therefore, I had expected to find 
and interview particular groups/committees that had formulated bylaws in the research 
sites. However, I discovered that in all sites, ‗committees‘ comprising mostly of Chiefs had 
formulated the community bylaws. Therefore the ‗committees‘ group became redundant as 




at the Ministry of Gender helpfully suggested that I should use Social Welfare 
Offices in the respective research districts to organise my proposed interview 
groups before my arrival.1122 The involvement of Social Welfare Offices made 
the research orderly, and helped me to be taken seriously by all 
district/community interviewees.  
Table 1: Sex disaggregated data of research participants 
Category Men Women Total 
Senior Chiefs 3 1 4 
Group Village Heads 23 6 29 
Village Heads  33 14 47 
GENET Committee 0 13 13 
Ordinary Women - 51 51 
Government & law-making institutions 21 7 28 
NGOs 7 2 9 
Donors 0 2 2 
Total 87 96 183 
 
All interviews were audio recorded with the consent of the interviewees. For 
individual/key informant interviews, the participant was given time to read 
the consent form prior to the interview, and sign the form if they agreed. For 
focus group discussions at community level, I read out the consent form in 
Chichewa translation, and asked for the participants‘ 
agreement/disagreement. 
In each site, the study concentrated on the three tiers of chieftaincy in Malawi: 
Traditional Authorities, Group Village Heads and Village Heads. Further 
interviews were held with groups that were monitoring the bylaws (the 
GENET Committee in Chiradzulu 1123  and Mother Groups 1124 ) and with 
                                               
1122  He gave me required contact details, and the district Social Welfare Offices gladly 
supported me since I was 'sent' by their parent Ministry.  
1123 This is a structure comprising local women that has been integrated into the primary 
education system in Malawi in order to support girls and encourage them to stay in school. 
1124 The committee was selected at village level and comprises six women and four men to 
monitor the efforts of promoting girls education on the ground, including directly engaging 
girls. The committee members were selected at a community meeting, whereby each village 




ordinary women. These were women resident around the central place where 
I was conducting my interviews in each study site.  
6.4.2.1   Interviews with Traditional Authorities/Senior Chiefs 
First was an individual interview with the high tier, the Traditional Authority 
(TA) (in the study areas all TAs have been elevated to Senior Chiefs). These 
were of interest because TAs are the ones mostly championing community 
bylaws in Malawi. Therefore, their views were critical in understanding the 
politics surrounding the emergence and conceptualisation of the community 
bylaws.  
Particularly, the interviews explored: the Chiefs‘ understanding of 
community bylaws as a model for addressing various community challenges; 
approaches that their communities pursued to address harmful practices 
affecting women and girls under customary law before the advent of the 
community bylaws; the Chiefs‘ knowledge about community bylaws as a 
means to address harmful practices in their area (how the bylaws have 
emerged, how they are formulated, and who participates in the formulation 
process); the Chiefs‘ perspectives about how the community bylaws are 
sitting with customary law and state law respectively; and the Chiefs‘ general 
opinion about the practicality of the community bylaws as a measure for 
addressing harmful practices affecting women and girls in Malawi. 
6.3.4.2   Interviews with Group Village Heads and Village Heads 
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) of between three to ten participants in each 
site were also conducted with the two tiers below the TA – Group Village 
Heads and Village Heads. The two groups were met separately, but were 
asked similar questions. In total, 29 Group Village Heads and 47 Village 
                                                                                                                                      
enforce the implementation of the bylaws) at the time of this study although the GENET 




Heads were interviewed.1125 
The interviews sought to capture how the Group Village Heads and Village 
Heads understood: community bylaws in general, and issues that community 
bylaws in their area cover; harmful practices against women and girls in their 
area; how such practices were in the past; community bylaws to eliminate 
harmful practices in their area and how/why they have emerged; the goal of 
the community bylaws; how the bylaws are sitting with customary law; how 
communities perceive the bylaws; whether they saw the bylaws as real law, 
and who owned the bylaws.  
Thus Group Village Heads and Village Heads were important in making 
sense of what/who is really influencing the emergence of these community 
bylaws, as well as the implications. These interviews helped to build a 
narrative of how Chiefs are facilitating the community bylaws, as well as an 
understanding of Chiefs‘ actual roles and perspectives on the whole 
phenomenon. Furthermore, their data was significant in unpacking the 
relationship between how community bylaws are being broadly 
conceptualised and African customary law.  
6.4.2.3   Interviews with women  
Since women are central to the community bylaws being studied, it was 
important to capture their perspectives regarding the ‗legitimacy‘1126 of the 
bylaws. Therefore, one FGD of ten women was conducted in each site. These 
women were randomly selected and drawn from houses around the central 
place where I was conducting my interviews in each study site. The Social 
Welfare officials who helped with convening all interviewed community 
                                               
1125 See Table 2. 
1126 Here legitimacy means whether the women recognise these as their laws, whether they 
participated in their formulation, and whether the women think the conceptualisation of the 




participants by collaborating with Chiefs also organised the participation of 
the women.  
Furthermore, I discovered that some sites were depending on Mother 
Groups 1127  (and in Chiradzulu there was the ‗GENET Committee‘ 1128 ) to 
monitor the community bylaws, and interviewed these too. These groups 
provided insight into the role they played in formulating the bylaws, as well 
how the bylaws are given community meaning through monitoring.  
The women were asked about: their knowledge of harmful practices in the 
area and best ways of dealing with them; whether they knew about the 
community bylaws for addressing harmful practices affecting women and 
children that exist in their area (and how they participated in the process); 
whether the community bylaws represent women‘s concerns and values as 
women regarding harmful practices; whether women accept the community 
bylaws as real law; and whether the women are bothered by the risk that 
community bylaws may replace tougher state law seeking to protect women 
from harmful practices. 
The women‘s voices also helped in building a comprehensive picture of the 
community bylaws on the ground, and in triangulating data from Chiefs, 
NGOs and other district level interviewees. A total of 51 women were 
interviewed as ordinary community members and Mother Group members. 
6.4.2.4   Interviews with government sector and law-making institutions  
These interviews were conducted at national and district levels. At national 
level, attention was on government sectors that are directly involved with 
community bylaws; and state ‗law making‘ institutions. In total, 28 people 
were interviewed. My main interest in these interviews was to understand the 
work that has been going on at national level to promote community bylaws 
                                               
1127 See note 1123. 




as a means of addressing harmful practices affecting women and girls, and 
the official‘s opinion about these efforts; reasons that have triggered national 
interest in the community bylaws at this point in time; the role of the 
respective sectors/institutions in the community bylaws phenomenon; the 
official‘s perspectives regarding whether government could be seen as 
imposing/driving foreign solutions and norms that are remote to the rural 
people; the official‘s perceptions on how the community bylaws relate to the 
constitution and statutory law.  
Therefore, for government sectors, the research targeted the Ministries 
responsible for gender and local government, who are working with 
Traditional Authorities to adopt the community bylaws. In the Ministry 
responsible for gender, three interviews were conducted with the Director of 
Gender Affairs, the Director of Social Welfare, and a Gender Programme 
Officer. Within Local Government, the Chief Local Government Services 
Officer was interviewed.  
In law-making institutions, interviews were held with the Law 
Commissioner; the Chief State Advocate from the Ministry of Justice; the 
Clerk of Parliament; and Parliamentary Chairpersons for the Women‘s 
Caucus, Legal Affairs Committee and Social and Community Affairs 
Committee). These interviews provided an in-depth understanding of 
whether and/or how the community bylaws fit into domestic and 
international human rights norms, and the implications on norm 
internalisation theory. 
Then in each district, interviews were held with district officials that are 
relevant to the community bylaws initiatives, namely Police Officers from 
Victim Support Units (VSUs); Magistrates; Social Welfare officials; District 
Commissioners; and NGO personnel. VSUs were relevant on two fronts. First, 




legislative provisions that criminalise harmful practices, including child 
marriage. Second, I wanted to establish the level of involvement of VSU 
officers in formulating or supporting the enforcement of community bylaws.  
This information was important in order to understand whether, perhaps, 
community bylaws are emerging to fill law enforcement or legislative gaps; 
and, indeed whether the bylaws are given any legal weight on the ground. A 
total of eight VSU officers were interviewed. Similarly, Magistrates, four in 
total, 1129  were interviewed in order to appreciate their involvement in 
community bylaw formulation processes, as well as their views on the legal 
character of these bylaws.  
District Commissioners (DCs), 1130  were pertinent to the study because, 
depending on one‘s viewpoint, community bylaws either clash with or 
support on-going decentralisation efforts in Malawi. Therefore, the study was 
interested in appreciating how the DCs regard the community bylaws 
phenomenon in general, and whether the bylaws are within or outside the 
respective districts‘ decentralisation agendas. The DC for Karonga was absent 
when I visited the district, so the study only covered three DCs Social Welfare 
offices because they have been the face of government in community bylaws 
efforts, especially through their Child Protection Officers, who work at TA 
level. The Social Welfare office is also responsible for facilitating the 
submission of community bylaws to the District Council, if the community so 
wishes. Five Social Welfare officials1131 were interviewed.  
6.4.2.5   Interviews with NGOs 
In respect of NGOs, the study involved both district and national NGOs. The 
NGOs were key to understanding the work that has been going on at national 
level to promote community bylaws as a means of addressing harmful 
                                               
1129 One in each research site. 
1130 Being the administrative heads of each district in Malawi. 




practices affecting women and girls. I was interested in their opinion about 
these efforts; how harmful practices have been regulated in the past in the 
NGOs‘ project areas; the type of projects in which the NGOs have been using 
community bylaws as a means of addressing harmful practices; the project 
strategies that the NGOs implement when working on community bylaws in 
an area; the role that NGOs play in the selection of content and/or language 
for the community bylaws; their perception about how the bylaws are sitting 
with gender equality laws and the Constitution; and their opinion on whether 
the bylaws are taken seriously as ‗law‘ on the ground. 
For district NGOs, I initially assumed that the development of community 
bylaws in all the study sites had been supported by NGOs domiciled in the 
districts. The plan was therefore to interview these NGOs. However, it turned 
out that bylaws in the areas of Senior Chiefs Kwataine, Ntcheu, and Lukwa, 
Kasungu, were neither grown nor trellised by NGO projects. Only Senior 
Chiefs Chitera, Chiradzulu, and Mwirang‘ombe, Karonga, had the 
involvement of NGOs such as Girls Empowerment Network (GENET) and 
Foundation for Community Support Services (FOCUS) respectively. 
Therefore, in Ntcheu and Kasungu, I interviewed NGOs who had community 
bylaws projects in other areas within the district (Youth Net Counselling – 
YONECO and World Vision respectively) because their perspectives were still 
important in constructing a picture of how and why NGOs are involved in 
bylaw initiatives on the ground.  
In Chiradzulu, GENET had left Senior Chief Chitera‘s area by the time of the 
study. However, the Executive Director of the NGO still promised to grant 
me an interview at another venue. This never materialised, despite several 
attempts to schedule the interview. This means that the study only covered 




identified from various written sources.1132   
Five NGOs were interviewed at national level, namely: Creative Centre for 
Community Mobilisation (CRECCOM), Malawi Interfaith AIDS Association 
(MIAA), Plan Malawi, Women‘s Legal Resource Centre (WOLREC) and 
Youth Net and Counselling (YONECO). Coupled with the community-level 
data, these interviews helped to reveal other conceptual questions that are 
emerging from the community bylaws phenomenon beyond norm 
internalisation. In total, eight people were interviewed. 
6.4.2.6   Interviews with UN agencies 
These were relevant in order to understand the involvement of transnational 
actors in the community bylaws phenomenon. I focused on UN Women and 
UNFPA because they have played a prominent role in the community bylaws 
phenomenon. 1133  I interviewed the UN Women Programme Specialist for 
Ending Violence Against Women and Girls (EVAWG); and the UNFPA 
Gender Programme Officer.  
I sought to understand, through these interviews, how donors have been 
involved in national-level efforts to promote community bylaws as a means of 
addressing harmful practices; the type of community bylaws projects that 
they have funded over the years and the objectives, including how they have 
worked with different stakeholders/structures); whether they perceived the 
bylaw as a community-driven effort to address harmful practices affecting 
women and girls; their opinion regarding the relationship between the 
bylaws, the Constitution and gender equality laws; and their perception 
about whether the bylaws are taken seriously as ‗law‘ on the ground.  
 
                                               
1132  One of them being a community bylaws mapping study that I authored in 2016 – 
Government of Malawi, UNFPA, and EU, 'Mapping of Community Bylaws under the Gender 
Equality and Women Empowerment (GEWE) Programme,' (2016). 




Table 2: Interviewees at a glance 
Category  Interviewees Interviews 
Government 
sectors  
Central level:  
 Department of Gender Affairs 
 Social Welfare Department 





 District Commissioner 
 District Social Welfare Officer 





 Solicitor General 
 Law Commissioner 
 Clerk of Parliament 
 Chairperson, Women‘s Parliamentary Caucus 
 Chairperson, Parliamentary Committee on Social and 
Community Affairs. 
 Chairperson, Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs. 
6 
Donors  UNFPA 
 UN Women 
2 
a) NGOs  
 
National level: 







 World Vision, Kasungu 
 YONECO, Ntcheu 
 FOCUS, Karonga 
3 
Senior Chiefs  Chief Chitera (female), Chiradzulu  
 Senior Chief Kwataine (male), Ntcheu  
 Senior Chief Lukwa (male), Kasungu  





 Senior Chief Chitera area, 1 FGD of 8 GVHs 
 Senior Chief Kwataine area, 1 FGD of 11 GVHs 
 Senior Chief Lukwa area, 1 FGD of 9 GVHs 
 Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe area, 1 FGD of 3 GVHs 






 Senior Chief Chitera area, 1 FGD of 12 VHs 
 Senior Chief Kwataine area, 1 FGD of 12 VHs 
 Senior Chief Lukwa area, 1 FGD of 13 VHs 
 Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe area, 1 FGD of 10 VHs 







 Senior Chief Chitera area, 1 FGD of 13 people 
 Senior Chief Kwataine area, 1 FGD of 8 people 
 Senior Chief Lukwa area, 1 FGD of 6 people 





 Senior Chief Chitera area, 1 FGD of 10 people 
 Senior Chief Kwataine area, 1 FGD of 10 people 
 Senior Chief Lukwa area, 1 FGD of 10 people 




                                               





Category  Interviewees Interviews 
Number of interview sessions: 51 
Total number of participants: 183  
6.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
After transcribing the audio files, I translated most Chichewa transcripts1135 
into English before analysing all the data. Data analysis was done by first 
coding broad themes from the research questions using Nvivo.1136 The coded 
data was used to synthesise responses that were most relevant to the research 
question. This process produced two data sets: one relevant to the emergence 
of community bylaws (processes); and the other relevant to the 
conceptualisation of the bylaws. The thesis question was later refined to 
resonate with the data.1137  
In summary, my data analysis sought to identify the actors that are prominent 
in the community bylaws phenomenon, and to capture their views about the 
emergence and conceptualisation of the bylaws. I was cautious to note 
opinions that should be quoted verbatim, or paraphrased. My goal was that 
the voices of people would not be lost in my description and analysis of the 
community bylaws story. Therefore, my empirical chapters regularly use 
participants‘ voices (translated into English) as evidence to support my 
arguments about how community bylaws work in the context of norm 
internalisation. Where translation cannot do justice to terms or phrases, these 
are quoted verbatim, and their best English approximation provided as 
footnotes.  
                                               
1135 'Most' because in the end, I decided to code some Chichewa transcripts directly and 
translate as needed during the writing process. This seemed sensible to me because I was 
translating the transcripts for my own needs anyway. 
1136 A data analysis software package. 
1137 I decided that I would not present it district-by-district, or actor-by-actor since this was 
not a comparative study. The narrative would flow better and build a coherent picture by 
using overarching themes that would reflect perceptions of different research participants 




6.5 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The main limitation of this research is that there was no control group. One 
might therefore argue that the thesis focuses only on areas where community 
bylaws have worked, without comparing them with areas where they have 
not worked. The fact that the four study sites were chosen based on the 
prominence of their community bylaws and the activism of certain chiefs 
certainly introduces a strong bias towards those areas where bylaws have 
worked, ignoring the possibility that initiatives in other parts of Malawi may 
have been weak or have failed. Nonetheless, this was a conscious choice 
because the thesis is not about the effectiveness of community bylaws. Rather, 
the choice reflects the thesis‘ interest to study the community bylaws from a 
(human rights) norm internalisation/vernacularisation angle, and to use the 
community bylaws to test current theories of norm internalisation. Executing 
such a thesis depended on the presence of some, if not strong, semblance of 





CHAPTER 7  
EMERGENCE OF COMMUNITY BYLAWS: ORIGIN AND NATURE 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
As illustrated by Chapter 2, scholarship on harmful practices in Africa has not 
engaged the phenomenon of community bylaws for addressing harmful 
practices, including child marriage. Furthermore, scholarship on 
vernacularisation (a model of local level norm internalisation) has largely 
focused on human rights interventions that are neatly introduced to 
communities from ‗outside,‘ expecting local settings to appropriate and 
translate international human rights norms. Chapter 4 has demonstrated that 
this unicameral approach is reflected in international law and jurisprudence, 
which emphasises the universalism of human rights, and predominantly 
expects rural citizenry to be mere recipients of programmes promoting 
international human rights standards.  
As a result, vernacularisation that manifests horizontally when grassroots 
actors are actively engaged in norm appropriation and translation (at times 
haphazardly, consciously or unconsciously), as is the case with community 
bylaws in rural Malawi, remains to be understood. As seen in Chapter 5, these 
community bylaws are alien even to Malawi‘s constitutional legislative 
framework. While Malawi‘s formal legal framework largely mirrors the 
prescriptions of international law on harmful practices,1138 rural areas seem to 
prefer the community bylaws instead.  
This chapter traces the history of the emergence of community bylaws, before 
                                               
1138 And where there are gaps, frameworks such as CEDAW and CRC can directly apply to 




examining the nuances of a ‗community bylaw‘. This will entail defining the 
level at which the community bylaws are made, and characteristics of these 
bylaws (including the range of issues that are addressed the bylaws). The 
chapter also highlights processes followed in developing the bylaws. This 
discussion lays the foundation for explaining the factors influencing the 
emergence and use of community bylaws aimed at protecting women from 
harmful practices and for understanding how facets of horizontal 
vernacularisation are manifesting as the bylaws emerge.  
7.2 COMMUNITY BYLAWS IN A HISTORICAL TIMELINE 
Community bylaws in Malawi cannot be easily located in a neat historical 
timeline. Community bylaws of sorts have existed since the mid-1990s. 
According to the Executive Director of CRECCOM,1139 community bylaws 
addressing harmful practices became topical from 1994 under the ‗Girls 
Attainment in Basic Literacy and Education (GABLE) programme‘: 1140 
‗GABLE involved social mobilisation campaigns that raised communities‘ 
consciousness about problematic cultural practices. Some Chiefs started to 
invent oral ‗bylaws‘ or ‗village based initiatives‘ [to counter long-standing 
practices]‘.1141 Senior Chief Kwataine, Ntcheu, recounts that he initially heard 
about community bylaws in 1995: ‗when I was a teacher,1142 the TA came to 
hear a case concerning people who had plucked mangoes from school trees 
                                               
1139 An organisation founded in 1999 to take over the social mobilisation work of the GABLE 
Programme. 
1140  Implemented between 1991 and 2003, GABLE was a USAID funded sector reform 
programme aimed at promoting system wide changes in the education sector while at the 
same time addressing gender disparities in education by introducing interventions 
specifically aimed at promoting girls education. 
1141  The CRECCOM Executive Director further explained that 'for example in some 
communities girls were rarely monitored at night because they slept in separate huts 
(Gowelo). This resulted in teenage pregnancies. With GABLE interventions, we saw different 
communities led by Chiefs on different levels abandoning bad practices and encouraging 
girls go to school through oral bylaws'. 





without permission. The culprits were fined chicken as chindapusa. 1143  I 
gathered then that the area had ‗malamulo ena apadera‘.1144 
The emergence of oral community bylaws in Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s 
area, Karonga, can be traced to between 2002 and 2004, and written ones in 
2014. Group Village Heads in the area recalled: ‗around 2002, we formulated 
bylaws on many topics.1145  So bylaws existed in the past, but they were 
unwritten and only used by chiefs and not the whole community‘. The Senior 
Chief said he initially introduced community bylaws around 2003/04 to 
protect girls following his pain after his school-going daughter was 
impregnated by a teacher: ‗we had a team which would visit schools, advising 
that any girl who gets pregnant should return to school after delivery. 
Communities were told that punishment awaited the concerned man and 
girl‘. The community adopted written bylaws to protect girls from early 
marriages in April 2014 with support from FOCUS.1146  
Senior Chief Kachindamoto of Dedza, 1147  who has received international 
attention for her stiff stance against child marriage in her Mtakataka area, 
started bylaw initiatives around 2005/6. As she was passing by a village 
                                               
1143 While ‗fine‘ is generally seen as the best English approximation of this term, ‗fine‘ may not 
capture that in literal translation, the word connotes someone who is being humbled to make 
the payment as an acceptance that he/she acted ‗stupidly‘. 
1144 Best English approximation would be ‗other extra laws'. 
1145 'Amongst the many issues, the bylaws prevented people from letting their livestock eat on 
free-range. We were taken to court by an owner of livestock that had been killed after 
destroying crops as prescribed by our bylaws. The Magistrate said such bylaws were bad.' 
1146 The bylaws were adopted as a joint initiative with TA Wansambo. FOCUS said that they 
have worked in Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area for over a decade on two projects that 
culminated into developing the community bylaws—a HIVOs funded project to deal with 
HIV and AIDS amongst the youth and community sex workers; and a project funded by the 
Scottish Government, which engaged Chiefs on safe motherhood and other harmful practices. 
1147 Chief Kachindamoto‘s area was not part of the research sites, but her public zero tolerance 
of pioneering child marriage would help to understand the history of community bylaws 
better. Previously, Chief Kachindamoto worked as an administrative assistant (Secretary) for 
27 years, before she took over as Senior Chief in 2003 after her father died—Norway Official 
Site in Malawi, ‗Chief Kachindamoto Has Stopped 850 Child Marriages and Sent the Girls 
Back to School.‘ Available at http://www.norway.mw/norway_malawi/News-from-
Malawi/News/Chief-Kachindamoto-has-stopped-850-child-marriages-and-sent-the-girls-
back-to-school/#.Vxj9OyN94t, accessed on 21 April 2016; Janet Karim, ‗Praise to Cultural 




football match, she observed a young girl (watching the match) with a baby 
who was crying uncontrollably. When she asked the girl to take the baby to 
its mother,1148 she was shaken when the girl responded that she was the 
mother and married. Asked about her husband, the girl pointed to a boy on 
the football pitch.1149  
Chief Kachindamoto resorted to ‗community bylaws‘ when she saw that 
many parents ignored her pleas to keep their girls in school.1150 Through her 
Area Development Committee (ADC), she got her 50 sub-Chiefs to sign an 
agreement in 2006 not to permit marriages of children. However, seeing that 
clerics continued officiating child marriages, in 2009 she decided to engage all 
faith leaders in her area, an effort that resulted in the conclusion of an 
agreement in terms of which all clerics committed to stop officiating child 
marriages under the pain of being chased away from the area.1151 Between 
2012 and 2016, WOLREC1152 developed a project1153 that helped to strengthen 
and organise the agreements into community bylaws.1154  
In Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area, community bylaws were also visible from 
2005/6. Group Village Heads approximated that safe motherhood bylaws 
have existed ‗since early 2000‘. Village Heads said estimated that 10 years had 
elapsed since these bylaws were introduced. However, Senior Chief Kwataine 
explained that when his area was implementing a Women, Girls, HIV and 
AIDS Project around 2005/6,1155 his ADC decided to fix the age of marriage at 
                                               
1148 For breastfeeding.  
1149 Chief Kachindamoto explained this background to her areas‘ bylaws to the author in 
another interview in 2016 when the author was commissioned by UNFPA to map community 
bylaws. 
1150 The common response was that she had no right to overturn tradition, nor, as the mother 
of five boys, to lecture others on the upbringing of girls. 
1151 Information based on interview with author and also see The African Child Information 
Hub, ‗Malawi‘s Fearsome Chief, Terminator of Child Marriages,‘ 31 March 2016. 
1152 Local NGO. 
1153 Under the Gender Equality and Women Empowerment Programme, see note 21. 
1154 Government of Malawi, UNFPA, and EU, 'Mapping of Community Bylaws under the 
Gender Equality and Women Empowerment (GEWE) Programme,' (2016), 16. 




21 years in order to guarantee girls‘ education, at least up to secondary 
school.1156 Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area is celebrated for safe motherhood 
bylaws, of which he said: ‗in 2006, all TAs in Ntcheu visited TA Mkanda‘s 
area, Mchinji to learn how to reduce maternal deaths. I was inspired and 
upon return, my area started formulating safe motherhood bylaws between 
2007 and 2009‘. 
Indeed in 2008, the health sector generally noted that safe motherhood bylaws 
were gaining traction following government‘s ban of traditional birth 
attendants.1157  Having been appointed the Chairperson of the Presidential 
initiative on Maternal and Safe Motherhood since April 2012, Senior Chief 
Kwataine1158 began rallying Chiefs across Malawi to formulate bylaws to force 
pregnant women to deliver in health facilities to prevent maternal and 
neonatal deaths. 1159 In respect of his areas‘ bylaws, Senior Chief Kwataine 
added: ‗because of the strong enforcement of our safe motherhood bylaws,1160 
around 2009, we linked these bylaws to girl education since many pregnant 
girls were dying early or developing fistula during delivery. In 2012, we 
formulated stronger bylaws on girls‘ protection‘. 1161  While women 
interviewees in Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area doubted whether a long time 
had passed since the bylaws emerged, they were referring to 2012 written 
                                               
1156 Government of Malawi, UNFPA, and EU, 'Mapping of Community Bylaws under the 
Gender Equality and Women Empowerment (GEWE) Programme,' (2016), 18. 
1157 'Ever since the government banned traditional birth attendants in 2007, women who do 
not deliver at health facilities can be fined through bylaws set by some traditional leaders'— 
The Health Foundation, ‗Improving Maternal and Newborn Health in Malawi: Lessons from 
a Landmark Programme Addressing Maternal and Newborn Health in Malawi,‘ (2013). 
Available at 
http://www.health.org.uk/sites/default/files/ImprovingMaternalNewbornHealthMalawi.
pdf, accessed on 18 June 2016. 
1158 He was appointed by the then State President Dr Joyce Banda. 
1159 Martin Chiwanda, ‗Malawi: Senior Chief Kwataine Blames Local Leaders on Maternal 
Deaths,‘ AllAfrica, 27 February 2014. Available at 
 http://allafrica.com/stories/201402271315.html, accessed on 18 June 2016. 
1160 Such that Chief Kwataine said he received a Women Deliver Safemotherhood Award in 
2009. 
1161 Best English approximation for the Chichewa title of the bylaws document would be—
'bylaws protecting girls from different forms of violence'. Their objective is to 'support the 
protection of girls from forms of violence emanating from unacceptable marriages in the area 




community bylaws on girls‘ protection in the area as their first encounter with 
these bylaws. 
In Senior Chief Chitera‘s area, Chiradzulu, oral community bylaws emerged 
before 2011 and written ones in 2012. While Senior Chief Chitera could not 
remember the exact year, she could remember that oral initiatives to curb 
child marriage before GENET1162 appeared in 2011 to help them ‗formalise‘ 
their efforts:1163 ‗before GENET came, we had a committee led by Group 
Village Heads, bent ensuring that girls below 21 years should not get married. 
People went door to door to meet and plead with parents of a child about to 
get married that the child should continue schooling‘.1164  
The rest of the respondents in Senior Chief Chitera‘s area only made reference 
to the current written community bylaws, adopted with GENET‘s support in 
August 2012. Group Village Heads and Village Heads said, ‗the bylaws came 
five to six years ago‘. A women‘s FGD said, ‗we started hearing of bylaws 
here in 2015 – Chiefs brought these laws because with democracy, ‘anthu 
atailira kwambiri’1165’. In Senior Chief Lukwa‘s area, Kasungu, oral bylaws 
were placed between 2004 and 2007, and written ones in 2014/15. Village 
Heads stated, ‘we started having bylaws between 2004 and 2007. We Chiefs 
met and noted that ‘chibwana chachuluka ndipo ndikofunika kuchitapo kanthu’.1166 
However, these bylaws were loosely applied, not well known and 
undocumented.‘  
Referring to their current written community bylaws, the Senior Chief and 
Group Village Heads said the bylaws were launched in April 2015. Senior 
                                               
1162 A local NGO. 
1163 According to Chief Chitera, GENET came after they heard of the community‘s oral bylaws 
initiatives. 
1164 At times as young as 13 years. 
1165 Best English approximation would be—'people are misbehaving recklessly a lot'. 
1166 Best English approximation could be 'there was a lot of childishness/carelessness [in the 




Chief Lukwa shared the background: ‗we 1167  went TA Mwanza‘s area in 
Salima in 2014. We were impressed with what they have achieved through 
community bylaws. We decided that we could do the same. So some of the 
punishments in our bylaws, such as the payment of goats as fines, are 
modelled after those bylaws‘. Senior Chief Lukwa‘s act symbolises 
socialisation – a strategy of translation in horizontal vernacularisation 
discussed in Chapter 9.  
Whereas Chapter 5 has shown that legal and extra-legal strategies to address 
child marriage and some harmful practices date back to colonial and pre-
democracy eons, the use of community bylaws for this agenda appears to be a 
post-democracy development. These community bylaws are broadly traceable 
to 1994, though in the study communities they have materialised between 
2002 and 2015. Notably, pre-2010 community bylaws were typically oral.  
Post-2010, written community bylaws to address practices that enflame 
gender inequalities are prominent. For example, the Gender Equality and 
Women Empowerment (GEWE) Programme (2012-2016) robustly 
documented the use of community bylaws for eliminating harmful practices 
driving gender-based violence and HIV in Malawi.1168 Some of the ‗GEWE‘ 
bylaws are used illustratively in this chapter.  
Establishing that written community bylaws have become conspicuous post-
2010 is noteworthy because this phase is associated with the growth of a 
‗human rights culture‘ and advocacy for the enactment of gender equality 
statutes. 1169  However, the empirical data discussed up to Chapter 9 
demonstrates that one cannot just superficially conclude that the community 
bylaws are budding as a mode of diffusing legislation and related human 
                                               
1167 The Senior Chief as part of a national delegation. 
1168 Government of Malawi, UNFPA, and EU, 'Mapping of Community Bylaws under the 
Gender Equality and Women Empowerment (GEWE) Programme,' (2016). 




rights norms to rural communities since horizontal vernacularisation usually 
happens in unpredictable patterns.  
7.3 DEFINING A ‘COMMUNITY BYLAW’  
This part presents data that defines a community bylaw by examining three 
issues: for something to be called a community bylaw, at what level is it 
made? Under what processes are community bylaws formed? What are the 
characteristics of community bylaws?  
7.3.1 Level at which Community Bylaws are Made 
Chapter 4 has established that CEDAW, CRC and AU jurisprudence 
presumes that norm internalisation is mostly credible within state or formal 
institutions and systems. Yet, the findings show that the community bylaws 
that are internalising the norm protecting women from harmful practices are 
emerging at the level of Chiefs and their subjects/territories. As the VSU 
Police Officer at Karonga Police Station remarked, ‗community bylaws are 
laws that Chiefs have – to be followed by their villages/communities‘.  
But at which level of Chiefs, amongst the three tiers of chieftaincy in Malawi, 
do the community bylaws rest? The bylaws are popularly being adopted at 
TA level; indeed, this is where the bylaws for all the study sites, and those 
cited expositively, are located. Sometimes, such bylaws are made under the 
auspices of the Area Development Committee (of which the TA or Senior 
Chief is head), or directly under the TA.1170  
                                               
1170 Some areas (for example Dedza and Mangochi) have developed bylaws for addressing 
gender inequalities at District Council level, so that these can apply to each TA in the district. 
I am wary to call these ‗community‘ bylaws because generalising that the district is a 
‗community‘ could be stretching matters. In Dedza, the bylaws were developed as ‗district 
education bylaws‘. They evolved from community bylaws to address child marriage in Chief 
Kachindamoto‘s area, resulting in consensus by all TAs (who are part of the District Council) 




There is particular rationale for resting community bylaws at TA level. 
According to the Social Welfare Assistant in Chiradzulu, ‗community bylaws 
are TA specific since they address contextual problems affecting an area. For 
example, a problem in Senior Chief Chitera may not be the same as in TA 
Nkalo, though both are in Chiradzulu district‘. Furthermore, where the TA is 
zealous about the community bylaws (as were the Senior Chiefs in the study 
sites), TA level bylaws are tidier because they make both Village Heads and 
Group Village Heads accountable to the TA for the implementation of the 
bylaws. Also, it is more realistic for the TA to administer the implementation 
of one overarching bylaw than manifold bylaws of lower Chiefs.  
This is not to say the community bylaws cannot exist at the level of lower 
Chiefs, but this has proven problematic. For example, Senior Chief Kwataine, 
Ntcheu, illustrated difficulties posed by community bylaws that used to sit at 
Group Village Head level in his area: 
Before 2012, our bylaws gave Group Village Heads wide discretion 
to address obstacles to girl education in their villages. However, we 
were not cohesively arresting the problem. My Chiefs would 
respond to cases differently – some would impose ‗chindapusa‘1171 of 
goats, some chickens, and some would forgive perpetrators. To bring 
sanity and unity, in 2012 we developed TA-wide community bylaws 
protecting girls from violence. 
Senior Chief Kwataine also recalled a similar challenge in the maiden years of 
promoting safe motherhood in his area: ‘some Chiefs would set good ‗laws‘ in 
their village, but other Chiefs would not. If a compliant village would try to 
counsel subjects in a neighbouring village on good maternal health practices, 
they would be rebuffed: those are your laws not ours‘. These findings 
contradict intimations made by the Child Protection Manager for Plan Malawi 
                                                                                                                                      
the development of TA specific bylaws first in TAs Ngokwe and Nyambi, and also supported 
the process of generating gender related District Council Bylaws. 
 




that ‗bylaws at Group Village Head level work the best because the 
constituency is smaller unlike bylaws at TA level which may not apply well in 
certain villages‘. Section 7.3.3 shows that the TA bylaws in the study areas 
were formulated consultatively, thus making it unlikely that they would not 
suit some villages. 
Chapter 4 has demonstrated that international human rights jurisprudence 
expects states to harmonise mechanisms of plural systems with international 
human rights frameworks that promote the rights of women and girls.1172 
Though the presence of community bylaws at TA level may appear like the 
state is achieving this task, the process of developing community bylaws 
articulated below shows that what the TAs are doing in their communities is 
primarily their own initiative that may somehow (or indeed may not) involve 
the state along the way – thus departing from the usual way of 
vernacularising human rights.  
7.3.2  Characteristics of a Community Bylaw  
There are four main characteristics of a community bylaw: leadership of local 
Chiefs, including the signature of (or verbal proclamation by) the TA; focus 
on resolving specific community problems; and the use of local fines for their 
violation. 
7.3.2.1   Community bylaws are anchored in Chiefs’ leadership  
As Section 7.3.1 shows, the leadership of Chiefs, particularly the TAs or 
Senior Chiefs, is requisite to the establishment of community bylaws. Chiefs 
also play a crucial role in the implementation of bylaws. NGOs have reported 
that a key factor that hinders the functionality of some bylaws adopted 
without a TA‘s involvement or commitment to make the bylaws work.1173 As 
                                               
1172 See section 4.4.4 of the thesis. 
1173 Government of Malawi, UNFPA, and EU, 'Mapping of Community Bylaws under the 




discussed more under Chapter 9, by championing community bylaws, Chiefs 
are establishing themselves as important vernacularisers, a role that has not 
been recognised in vernacularisation discourse. This role of Chiefs has been 
obscured by the skewed attention paid to ‗elite‘ driven vernacularisation at 
the expense of vernacularisation that horizontally occurs amongst local actors. 
7.3.2.2   Community bylaws are problem driven 
Communities introspectively identify their problem, and direct community 
bylaws at such a problem. The titles of the community bylaws in the four 
study sites actually point to the overall interests of the bylaws. 1174 Group 
Village Heads in Senior Chief Chitera‘s area, Chiradzulu, remarked, ‗because 
we have particular problems affecting us, we are developing our own laws so 
that our community can move smoothly‘. A women‘s FGD in Senior Chief 
Kwataine‘s area, Ntcheu, said, ‗the bylaws are addressing the problems that 
we used to face‘. A police officer at Ntcheu Police Station VSU, said, ‗bylaws 
help to regulate internal problems in a community‘. A police officer at 
Chiradzulu Police Station VSU, noted, ‗bylaws are formulated to reduce 
harmful practices that communities are recognising as problematic‘.  
                                               
1174  The first set of bylaws originally developed in Senior Chief Lukwa‘s area is titled 
‗HeforShe: Lukwa Girl Child Abuse Back to School Campaign Bylaws.‘ Thus the provisions 
mostly focus on promoting the education of children, particularly the girl child. The 
complementary set of bylaws in the area has a Chichewa title: 'Malamulo A M'dera pa Nkhani 
Yolimbikitsa Umoyo Wabwino Polimbikitsa Maphunziro, Uchembere Wabwino ndi Pothetsa Nkhanza 
za M’banja, Miyambo ndi Zikhulupiliro Zina Zimene Zimathandizira Kufala kwa Ka Chilombo ka 
HIV' (best English approximation would be 'Bylaws on the Topic of Strengthening Healthy 
Living Through Strengthening Education, Safe Motherhood, and Eliminating Domestic 
Violence, Cultural Practices and Beliefs that Promote the Spread of HIV').  These bylaws focus 
on education, safe motherhood, domestic violence and other harmful practices that 
predispose community members to HIV infection. The community bylaws in Senior Chief 
Mwirang‘ombe‘s area are titled ‗Bylaws for Prevention of Maternal, Neonatal and Child 
Mortality and Morbidity in TA Mwirang‘ombe.‘ Child marriage is covered in this context. 
The community bylaws in Chief Kwataine‘s area are titled 'Malamulo Oteteza Atsikana ku 
Nkhanza Zosiyanasiyana' (best English approximation would be—'Bylaws protecting girls 
from different forms of violence'). Their objective is to support the protection of girls from 
forms of violence emanating from unacceptable marriages in the area of Senior Chief 




Table 3 displays examples of internal problems that the community bylaws 
are seeking to address. While the emphasis is on the bylaws in the four study 
areas, further examples are tapped from other bylaws developed across 
Malawi.  
  Table 3: Summary of issues covered by community bylaws  
Bylaw field Summary of bylaw prescriptions 
Child marriage  
 
Some bylaws prohibit children to marry before 18 years,1175 forced 
marriage,1176 child betrothal,1177 solemnisation of child marriages by 
clergy and Sheikhs,1178 approval of child marriage by Chiefs;1179 and 





Some bylaws fine the man responsible,1182 pregnant girl,1183 and duty 
bearers protecting the man responsible;1184  require the return any 
educational support received by the girl,1185 and perpetrator to be 
taken to court; 1186  task grandparents to care for grandchild after 
mother returns to school;1187  forbid abortion of the pregnancy;1188 
allow adolescents to access sexual and reproductive health services 
to prevent pregnancies.1189 
Child support  Some bylaws task the child‘s father,1190 or parents of the father if he is 
a schoolboy1191 to pay maintenance. 
School gender-
based violence 
Some bylaws prohibit schoolteacher/schoolboy to sexually touch, 
insult, and demean a schoolgirl;1192 a teacher to be with a schoolgirl 
at an inappropriate place or1193 to propose love to a schoolgirl.1194 
                                               
1175 All reviewed community bylaws. 
1176 Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa (Kasungu) and Mwirang‘ombe (Karonga); TA Ngokwe 
(Machinga); TAs Nthalire and Kameme (Chitipa). 
1177 Areas of Senior Chief Kwataine (Ntcheu) and Mwirang‘ombe; TA Ngokwe. 
1178 Bylaws in the areas of Senior Chiefs Lukwa and Chitera (Chiradzulu); TAs Mwanza and 
Makanjila (Salima), Ngokwe.  
1179Areas Senior Chiefs Chitera, Kwataine, Lukwa, and Kachindamoto (Dedza), TA Ngokwe. 
1180 Area of Senior Mwirang‘ombe.  
1181 The bylaws in Chief Mwirang'ombe area say that a person who marries a child below 16 
years should be reported to the police. 
1182 Areas of Senior Chiefs Lukwa and Kwataine.  
1183 Areas of Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe; TA Mankhambira (Nkhata Bay). 
1184 Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa; TAs Mwanza and Makanjila.  
1185 Areas of Senior Chiefs Lukwa and Senior Chief Chitera‘s area (Chiradzulu). Such support 
can include school fees, uniform and bicycles given as education incentives to girls under 
some projects.  The man responsible or the girl should return such support. 
1186 Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa; TAs Mwanza and Makanjila.  
1187 Area of Senior Chief Kwataine.  
1188 Area TA Mwansambo (Nkhotakota). 
1189 Area of Senior Chief Kwataine. 
1190 Area of Senior Chief Lukwa (Kasungu). 
1191 Areas of TA Kapondo and Dambe (Mchinji). 
1192 Area of TA Chimombo (Nsanje). 




Bylaw field Summary of bylaw prescriptions 
Education: girl 
sanitation  





Some bylaws cover teachers who either marry, or impregnate or have 
an affair with a schoolgirl;1196 lazy and drunken teachers;1197 teachers 
who administer corporal1198 or extreme1199punishment, teachers who 
send students to buy beer or cigarettes,1200 or to work at their homes 
during class time.1201 
Education:  
learners‘ conduct 
Some bylaws cover children who refuse to attend school, 1202 
rebellious girls,1203 those absconding classes;1204  learners who have 
affairs with each other,1205 and learners wearing tight and/or short or 
sagging1206 clothes.1207 
Education: 
conduct of other 
third parties  
Some bylaws punish men who have sex/affairs with schoolgirls, 1208 
anybody who encourages children to drop out of school,1209 parents 
who consent to 1210 or initiation counsellors who perform 1211 or 
traditional leaders who permit 1212  initiation during schooldays; 
prohibit performance of initiation ceremonies during education 
calendar, and harassment of learners as they go to school 1213 
(including banning Gule Wamkulu 1214  performance during school 
time).1215 
Sexual violence Some bylaws cover rape;1216 rape of a schoolgirl;1217 kusasa fumbi;1218 
‗ritual sex‘ during initiation;1219 child marriage;1220 and defilement of 
young girls by fathers or stepfathers.1221 
                                                                                                                                      
1194 Area of TA Chimombo.  
1195 Areas of Senior Chiefs Lukwa and Kwataine; and TAs Mwanza and Makanjila—such 
bylaws hold accountable School Management Committees, Parent Teacher Associations, and 
Mother Groups. 
1196 Area of Senior Chiefs Lukwa and Kwataine and TAs Chimombo, Nyambi (Machinga), 
Mwanza and Makanjila, Ntchema and Kadewere (Chiradzulu). 
1197 Area of TA Mankhambira. 
1198 Area of TAs Mwansambo; Kabunduli (Nkhata Bay). 
1199 Area of TAs Nthalire and Kameme.  
1200 Area of TA Kabunduli.  
1201 Area of TAs Kabunduli; Mwanza and Makanjila.  
1202 Areas of TAs Mwanza and Makanjila and Ngokwe; Senior Chief Lukwa. 
1203 Area of Senior Chief Lukwa.  
1204 Area of Senior Chief Chitera.  
1205 Area of Senior Chief Chitera TA Mwansambo.  
1206 Locally termed 'kukhwefula'. 
1207 Area of TA Mwansambo. 
1208 Area of Senior Chief Kwataine; TAs Nyambi, Mwansambo. 
1209 Area of TA Nyambi. 
1210 Areas of Senior Chiefs Kachindamoto and Chitera; TAs Makhuwira and Ngabu.  
1211 Areas of Senior Chief Chitera; TAs Mwansambo; Makhuwira and Ngabu. 
1212 Areas of Bylaws in the area of Senior Chiefs Kachindamoto and Lukwa; TAs Makhuwira 
and Ngabu; and Bwananyambi and Chowe (Mangochi). 
1213 Area of TA Mankhambira.  
1214 See Glossary of Chichewa terms. 
1215 Area of Senior Chief Lukwa.  








Some bylaws prohibit spousal battery,1222 wife battery, neglecting to 
dress and feed a wife and children, economic abuse, divorce without 
justifiable cause,1223 beating a pregnant wife, marital rape,1224 verbal 
abuse, extramarital affairs,1225 preventing a wife to do business or 
participate in social groups; and failure of polygamous man to 
financially/emotionally take care of wife and children or failure by a 
migrant husband to support his family for more than five years.1226  
Inheritance 
 
Some bylaws encourage community members to write a Will;1227 
prohibit grabbing of property from orphans and/or widows; 1228 
entitle the surviving wife and children to household property;1229 
recognise the DC‘s mandate to determine the distribution of non-
household property;1230 impose a formula for distributing property 
where there is no Will;1231  some consider property grabbing as a 





Some bylaws ban chokolo,1234 require the disbandment of the chokolo 
family,1235  prescribe HIV testing as a precondition for chokolo,1236 




Some bylaws disallow the use of profane language against other 
community members, women and Chiefs; 1239  and playing music 
loudly in one‘s home at night.1240 
                                                                                                                                      
1217 Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa; TAs Mwanza and Makanjila.  
1218  Initiation sexual cleansing—Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa‘s area; TAs Mwanza and 
Makanjila. 
1219  Areas of TAs Mwanza and Makanjila (Salima) have banned Gule Wamkulu namely 
Kankwanya and Kamano, which used to beat and have sex with newly initiated girls. 
1220 Area of Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe—16 years and below. 
1221 Area of TAs Kadewere and Mwansambo— including concealment of the act by a mother. 
1222 Bylaws in the area of TA Mwansambo.  
1223 Bylaws in the area of Senior Chief Lukwa (Kasungu); TAs Mwanza and Makanjila.  
1224 Bylaws in the areas of TA Kabunduli and Mkumbila.  
1225 Bylaws in the area of TA Mwansambo.  
1226 Bylaws in the areas of TA Kabunduli and Mkumbila. 
1227 Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa; TAs Mwanza, Makanjila and Ntchema.  
1228 Areas of TAs Mwanza, Makanjila and Ntchema. 
1229 Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa; TAs Mwanza and Makanjila.  
1230 Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa; TAs Mwanza and Makanjila. 
1231 Area of TA Mwansambo. 
1232 Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa; TAs Mwanza and Makanjila.  
1233 Areas of TA Mwansambo.  
1234 Wife inheritance—Areas of TAs Kapondo, Dambe, Kabunduli, Mkumbila, Nthalire and 
Kameme.  
1235 Areas of TAs Kapondo and Dambe. 
1236 Area of TA Mwansambo.  
1237 Area of TA Chimombo.  
1238 Area of TA Kabunduli—e.g. requiring her to cover her face or to wear rags. 
1239 i.e. when one is drunk—Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa; TAs Kabunduli and Mkumbila. 








Other bylaws require proprietors of video showrooms not to admit 
children during school time; 1241  prohibit the screening of 
pornographic films1242 or admission of children into such shows;1243 
selling of beer to children;1244 admitting children to beer joints;1245 
playing loud music at beer joints, 1246 especially during school time1247 
and running a beer joint near a school or health facility; 1248  and 




Some bylaws prohibit overnight community celebrations1251; impose 
curfews for such celebrations – usually up to 7 pm1252 or 10 pm; 1253 
and forbid young people from attending overnight choir events 




Some bylaws address issues of: late attendance at antenatal clinics; 
not giving birth at hospital; practicing as traditional birth 
attendant;1256 giving pregnant women traditional herbs to assist with 
labour;1257 being pregnant at 35 years and above, inadequate child 
spacing; 1258  having more than six children; husband‘s failure to 
provide nutritious food to pregnant wife; overworking a pregnant 
wife;1259 not allowing a pregnant woman to eat eggs and drink milk, 
sending a pregnant wife to her parents‘ home till she gives birth;1260 
husband‘s neglect to buy necessary supplies for birth;1261 husband‘s 
neglect to escort expectant wife to the hospital.1262 
                                               
1241 Area of Senior Chief Lukwa‘s area; TAs Mwanza and Makanjila.  
1242 Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa‘s area; TAs Mwanza and Makanjila, Kapondo and Dambe. 
1243 Area of TAs Nthalire and Kameme.  
1244 Area of TAs Kabunduli and Mkumbila.  
1245 Area of TAs Nthalire and Kameme; Makhuwira and Ngabu.  
1246 Area of TAs Makhuwira and Ngabu. 
1247 Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa; TAs Mwanza and Makanjila. 
1248Area of TAs Kapondo and Dambe. 
1249 Area of TAs Kapondo and Dambe say all beer halls should close at 10:00 pm. 
1250 Area of Senior Chief Lukwa say video shows should run up to 9 pm. 
1251 Commonly known as zisangala or michezo in order to control the spread of HIV. These 
celebrations occur during coronation of Chiefs, weddings, initiation graduation, traditional 
dance events and religious festivals. 
1252 Areas of Senior Chiefs Kwataine and Chitera.  
1253 Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa; TAs Mwansambo, Mwanza and Makanjila. 
1254 Areas of Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe; TAs Mwanza and Makanjila. 
1255 The safe motherhood topic cuts across most bylaws. 
1256  Areas of Senior Chiefs Mwirang‘ombe, Lukwa and Kwataine; TAs Mwansambo, 
Kabunduli, Mkumbila, Kapondo, Dambe, Mwanza, Makanjila, Mponela, Chakhaza, 
Chimombo, Nthalire and Kameme. 
1257 Areas of Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe ; TAs Kabunduli and Mkumbila. 
1258 Area of Senior Chiefs Mwirang‘ombe and Kwataine Ntcheu. 
1259 Area of Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe. 
1260 Areas of TAs Kabunduli and Mkumbila.  
1261 Areas of Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe; TAs Kabunduli, Mkumbila and Mwansambo. 





Bylaw field Summary of bylaw prescriptions 
Child labour and 
trafficking  
 
Some bylaws prohibit sending children to herd cattle during 
education calendar, including as employees, 1263  allowing school-
going children to be employed as domestic or other workers;1264 
employing children in hazardous work1265 including bars;1266 sending 
children to trade during school time.1267 
Other cultural 
practices 
Other bylaws prohibit: bulangete la mfumu, 1268  fisi, 1269 
chimwanamaye,1270 mbiligha (bonus wife),1271 and locking a girl indoors 




Other bylaws cover: community security, funeral ceremonies, 
agriculture and businesses, water management and environmental 
and natural resource management, 1273  hospital-based male 
circumcision. 1274  Others ban njuga. 1275  To encourage education 
amongst boys, some communities that commonly export unskilled 
labour to South Africa have imposed travel restrictions.1276 
Source: Government of Malawi, UNFPA, EU (2016) 
Thus notwithstanding the involvement of external actors in the development 
of some community bylaws as shown in this chapter, the communities are 
first and foremost persuaded that they have a problem before them. In all the 
four study sites, respondents primarily mentioned that they were moved to 
                                               
1263 Area of TAs Kabunduli, Mkumbila and Ngokwe.  
1264 Area of Senior Chief Kwataine.  
1265 Areas of TAs Kapondo and Dambe.  
1266 Areas of TAs Kabunduli, Mkumbila, Bwananyambi and Chowe. 
1267 Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa; TAs Kapondo and Dambe. 
1268 A way of making a male visiting Chief feel welcome and respected by giving him a young 
woman to sleep while away from home.—Area of TA Mwansambo. 
1269 Apart from the other two types of fisi explained in the Glossary of Chichewa terms,  by 
bylaws in TA Mwansambo prohibit parents from arranging for the fisi  to have sex with the 
widow (who wants to remarry) to cleanse her womb, since it is assumed that she may not 
have had sex for a long time. 
1270  Also known as ‗swinging,‘ two couples that are very good family friends, find it 
acceptable that the men can have sex with each other‘s wife whenever they agree—Area of 
TA Mwansambo. 
1271 Areas of Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe; TAs Kabunduli and Mkumbila. 
1272 In some areas known as ‘kuchidzika ana atsikana’—Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa; TAs 
Kabunduli, Mkumbila, Mwanza and Makanjila.  
1273 Area of TA Mwansambo.  
1274 Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa TAs Mwanza and Makanjila—in order to combat HIV 
transmission. Also, circumcision should be conducted during school holidays. 
1275 A local form of gambling—Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa; TAs Mwanza and Makanjila.  
1276 Areas of Senior Chief Lukwa and TA Nyambi—the latter bylaws prohibit Chiefs from 
giving boys clearance letters to apply for passports. The former says such clearance letters 
should only be issued to holders of at least a Junior Certificate of Education, and/or those 





act by the problem of child marriage, amongst others. Senior Chief Lukwa 
plainly illustrated problem consciousness by explaining that ‗we had to 
accept that we have a problem when many schoolgirls were dropping out of 
secondary school to get married though they were on bursaries‘.1277 Senior 
Chief Lukwa responded with a hint of frustration to further probing about 
whether his (lower) Chiefs could be promoting the bylaws just because they 
fear him: ‗I would like to believe that rural people are aware and tired of their 
problems and they would like to find solutions that can work for them 
somehow‘.  
The element of ‗taking charge of internal problems‘ was picked by the Clerk 
of Parliament (CoP), who, while acknowledging her deficient familiarity with 
community bylaws, reckoned that ‗bylaws are programmes or initiatives that 
are providing opportunities for traditional leaders to take charge of social 
challenges within their communities‘. This is an important observation since 
indeed, traditional leaders are key to bylaws. Notably, the CoP identified the 
problems bylaws are trying to solve as social challenges. Responses of the 
Child Protection Manager, Plan Malawi, had the same tone: ‗different 
communities have had social norms that encourage certain practices. To 
change these norms, one would want to apply a social, not a legal perspective. 
Communities have to realise for themselves that their existing norms are 
problematic, and introduce new ones‘. 
From a legal perspective, the tag of ‗social problem‘ above could be troubling 
because the fact that legislation already outlaws many of the challenges that 
the bylaws are addressing means that these are legal challenges and not just 
social challenges. However, the findings suggest that as far as the community 
bylaws are concerned, legislation could be playing ‗catch up‘ with addressing 
social norms that communities are already questioning. Therefore, legislation 
cannot erase the ‗social problem‘ label because as communities formulate the 
                                               




bylaws, their initial concern may not be what legislation says (though section 
7.3.3.5 shows that this issue eventually comes in), but their concern is how 
their way of life is problematic in the contemporary age.  
Therefore, the ‗problem‘ basis of the community bylaws calls for 
acknowledgement that the horizontal appropriation and translation of human 
rights could occur deliberately or intuitively at different stages of a local 
community‘s project to fix its internal problems. Chapter 8 further examines 
how this horizontal vernacularisation reflects resonance between 
international human rights or state law norms and community bylaws.  
7.3.2.3   Community bylaws are grassroots owned 
This section uses the concept of ‗grassroots ownership‘ of the bylaws to 
describe respondents‘ perceptions about whether or not the bylaws ‗belong‘ 
to their communities, and not to mean a unanimous acceptance of or zeal 
towards the bylaws by community members. This distinction is important 
because section 7.3.4 illustrates that at times, the adoption of bylaws in the 
study sites has not been without contestations. 
In all study sites, respondents were asked ‗who is really pushing for these 
bylaws and why? Do you really believe in these bylaws?‘ These questions 
were posed to establish whether the communities own the bylaws or whether 
communities see them as foreign driven (being imposed on them by 
government or NGOs). This question was essential because community 
ownership (or lack thereof) of the bylaws would say a lot about the nature of 
norm internalisation that is taking place. 
Ordinary women, whose opinion could be regarded more credibly than that 
of their Chiefs, fully claimed the community bylaws as their own, and their 
law. In Senior Chief Chitera‘s area, the women asserted, ‗these are our own 
laws because we made them right here with the involvement of the Senior 




are like a child whom everyone in the village has seen growing up‘. Women 
in Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area, Karonga, said, ‗we made these laws 
ourselves. All in all, as women we accept these laws as our laws‘. Women in 
Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area remarked, ‗we see these bylaws as our own laws 
because we want them to address our problems through them‘. In Senior 
Chief Lukwa‘s area, the women stated, ‗we see the bylaws as our law because 
now you cannot find a girl who is pregnant or in a marriage here‘. 
Chiefs said that because the bylaws are directly linked to their communities‘ 
problems, they could not be said to be externally driven. Group Village Heads 
in Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area indicated, ‗we decided on our own to 
come up with bylaws and no one influenced us‘. Recalling his experience 
when a teacher impregnated his primary school daughter, Senior Chief 
Mwirang‘ombe said: ‗from this painful event, we decided to protect girls from 
harmful and predatory behaviour, including that a girl who gets pregnant 
should return to school after delivery‘. Section 7.3.3 discusses how Senior 
Chief Mwirang‘ombe later worked with FOCUS to formally adopt written by 
laws.  
Group Village Heads in Senior Chief Lukwa‘s area in Kasungu also explained 
that they came up with bylaws following their own acknowledgement that 
the community had power to reverse some cultural problems. Senior Chief 
Chitera, Chiradzulu, opined: 
 It is us who are saying through these rules that our children should 
get educated so that this community can develop and change. 
Previously, our community was not prioritising education and was 
ignorant of the aim of education. People thought education is not 
for villagers – now they know better.  
Her Group Village Heads added that they own the bylaws because they are 
the ones that were investigating/consulting in their communities, ‗resulting 




Kwataine in Ntcheu responded that his community owned the bylaws 
because ‗they were developed based on a consensus. Ngati anthu ambiri 
agwirizana nacho chinthucho timachitenga chimenecho. 1278  Therefore people 
accept the bylaws because they represent majority opinion.‘ Senior Chief 
Kwataine added that the downside of this approach is that the majority has 
ended up shooting down some grave issues (e.g. polygamy, popular among 
the Ngonis). The Chief said he could not do much about the rejection because 
‗it is people who make their own bylaws‘.   
Among all interviewed Chiefs, it is only Senior Chief Lukwa who made a 
direct connection between the community owned bylaws in his area and 
cosmopolitan discourse. He described his area‘s community bylaws as an 
expression of the community‘s desire to localise the HeforShe Campaign,1279 
by promoting girl education:  
We made our community bylaws ourselves with the purpose of 
sending girls back to school. We sat down as community leaders, 
keen to translate ‗HeforShe‘ at local level after the Head of State 
committed himself to the campaign. We decided that we would 
make our own commitments and punishments to ensure that girls 
return to school. 
For Senior Chief Lukwa, the essence of ownership of the bylaws by his 
community lies in the extra mile (transcending the HeforShe obligations) 
taken by Chiefs in setting fines for the obstruction of girl education. Indeed, 
this was not the only instance Senior Chief Lukwa spiced our conversation 
with international parlance. Despite drawing from international discourse to 
                                               
1278 The best English approximation would be—'if the majority agrees with the thing (idea) we 
take it'.  
1279  Himself a UN Women Malawi 'HeforShe' model, Chief Lukwa was referring to the 
HeforShe Campaign created by UN Women in 2014, the United Nations entity for gender 
equality and the empowerment of women, the HeforShe solidarity movement for gender 
equality provides a systematic approach and targeted platform on which men and boys can 
engage and become change agents towards the achievement of gender equality –UN Women 
HeforShe IMPACT 10x10x10. Available at http://www.heforshe.org/en/impact, accessed on 




internalise norms protecting women from harmful practices in his community 
Senior Chief Lukwa‘s sentiments suggest that community bylaws in his area 
have not emerged because of the ‗international.‘ Rather, the Chief‘s 
international outlook is only flavouring prevailing interests of his community 
to self-regulate. Senior Chief Lukwa has high national visibility, 1280  and 
therefore has the advantage of being frequently invited to forums discussing 
trending women‘s issues.1281  
It would not have been a surprise if all NGOs and government officials 
working at local level had claimed that the grassroots communities own the 
bylaws. After all, these are the national level players whom scholars call 
‗human rights intermediaries‘1282 or ‗intermediaries‘1283 that visibly advance 
the adoption of the bylaws at local levels. Thus they could eagerly paint the 
picture that norm internalisation (through the bylaws) is happening because 
‗the norms have become locally accepted‘1284 and ‗absorbed in the life of the 
people‘.1285  
What came as a surprise (because in a way I expected communities to 
primarily point at outside influences1286) was the almost adamant insistence 
by community respondents that the bylaws are their very initiative, and 
therefore they own them. It quickly became clear that a distinction should be 
made between two types of inventions – ‗the paperwork‘ or ‗packaging‘ 
(bylaws reduced to writing, which has indeed mostly been engineered by ‗the 
outsider‘) and the substantive spirit of the bylaws (seen as a community‘s 
                                               
1280 Compared to most of the interviewed Chiefs. 
1281 Supposedly due to his interest in promoting women‘s human rights. 
1282 See note 322. 
1283 See note 323. 
1284 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‗International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change,‘ (1998), 895. Also broadly see section 3.3 of the thesis. 
1285 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, (1979), 50. Also broadly see 
section 3.4.1 of the thesis. 
1286 Mostly NGOs and government (Departments of Social Welfare/Gender) because until the 





brainchild). For example, Senior Chief Chitera explained how an NGO called 
Girls Empowerment Network (GENET) got involved, which was a curious 
point for me since literature celebrates GENET for the successful bylaw 
initiatives in Senior Chief Chitera‘s area:1287 
In 2011, GENET heard about what we were doing and started 
helping us to have an organised way of preventing child marriage. In 
fact, it is GENET who made us aware that what we were already 
doing was ‗bylaws.‘ I first heard about the term ‗bylaws‘ when 
GENET came with its project because being educated and conversant 
with legal issues, they were repeatedly using the term ‗bylaws.‘1288  
Senior Chief Chitera stated that she happily welcomed GENET‘s intervention 
since ‗iwowo anapita ku sukulu ndiye anabwera kuno kuti atithandize kuti 
tisamangopanga zinthu mu chimbulimbuli poti ndife anthu osaphunzira.‘1289 To her, 
GENET came in as the ‗processing plant‘ to enhance existing ‗raw materials,‘ 
and not to originate new ideas:  
GENET advised us to formulate our ‗laws‘ properly so that we 
should be in line with what the government is doing/promoting. 
They made us aware that the legal minimum age of marriage should 
18 years so that we should conform to the country‘s laws – though 
we would have loved it to stay at 21 years for the girls to get well 
educated first. 
                                               
1287 For instance, the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner has 
published a GENET brief on its website saying 'GENET‘s Stop Child Marriage project in the 
area of Traditional Authority Chitera targeted traditional leaders at three levels—village 
heads, group village heads and the traditional authority, together with parents in the 
community to come up with viable strategies to fighting the crisis of child marriage. All 
agreed to mobilise themselves and establish local laws that would stop child marriages by 
imposing penalties such as chickens and goats to offenders'—GENET Information on GENET 
Malawi‘s Work in the Fight Against Child Marriage. Available at 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/ForcedMarriage/NGO/GENE
TMalawi, accessed on 15 January 2019. 
1288 Also see section 1.3  of the thesis, suggesting that in some communities NGOs have 
influenced the common usage of the term 'community bylaws'. 
1289 The best English approximate would be—'they [GENET officers] went to school, and they 
came to help us so that we [through our original ‗bylaw‘ initiative] should not do things 




This part shows that the community bylaws are embracing horizontal 
vernacularisation and departing from the perception that vernacularisation is 
exclusively introduced by external actors in several ways. The cycle of vested 
interests between Chiefs/communities and external players such as NGOs 
does not dilute the community ownership of the community bylaws. In fact, 
Chapter 9 shows that these vested interests introduce new versions of 
translation (augmentation, customarisation) and adapt others (simplification, 
hybridisation). Furthermore, they shape the roles that Chiefs are playing as 
vernacularisers (e.g. crusaders, adaptors) and those that NGOs are playing 
(e.g. converters, adaptors). The approach taken by Senior Chief Lukwa in 
translating ‗HeforShe‘ also reveals that in horizontal vernacularisation, the 
local may flirt with international human rights discourse as is convenient – so 
long as this reinforces the local‘s vision to improve its status quo.  
Additionally, in Senior Chief Kwataine‘s areas, we see a ‗give and take‘ 
approach that excludes polygamy from the community bylaws. This is a mark 
of grassroots ownership of the bylaws, and exhibits contestations that also 
exist in state law.1290 Chapter 8 takes this discussion further in the context of 
how the community bylaws reflect international standards. 
7.3.2.4   Community bylaws mostly prescribe village-based penalties 
Restoring or encouraging good behaviour through village fines and penalties 
is an essential feature of the community bylaws. According to Senior Chief 
Lukwa: ‗we decided that if there would be challenges towards achieving our 
commitment to have girls in school, we would impose village-based penalties 
against guilty teachers, parents, children and Chiefs‘. 
The penalties mainly take the form of chindapusa – a fine involving payment 
of money or goats and chickens. The beneficiary of the chindapusa varies from 
area to area.  In Senior Chief Chitera‘s area in Chiradzulu, Chiefs receive the 
                                               




chindapusa for their own use.1291 In the other study areas, the fine goes to 
either to the health centre or to be utilised for meeting the school needs of 
destitute girls.  The bylaws in TA Mwasambo‘s area in Nkhotakota say 
chindapusa should go into a special ADC fund and be transparently used for 
development activities. 1292  Victims do not personally benefit from the 
chindapusa.  
The payment of chindapusa in the village usually settles the matter. However, 
there are some instances when the penalty involves both chindapusa, and 
prosecution by the police. For example, bylaws in the areas of Senior Chief 
Lukwa, Kasungu, and TA Mwanza, Salima, respectively require that a 
perpetrator of property grabbing should first pay chindapusa of three goats to 
the TA before being taken to the police.  
In some instances, the community bylaws require that a matter be out rightly 
reported to the state machinery. For instance, in Senior Chief 
Mwirang‘ombe‘s area, anyone who marries a girl of 16 years and below 
should immediately be taken to the police. Most bylaws treat rape as a 
criminal offence outside their scope. However, what is culturally considered 
rape varies. For instance, the bylaws in areas of Senior Chief Lukwa and TA 
Mwanza consider kusasa fumbi (initiation sexual cleansing) as rape, while 
others do not. And unlike in Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area, the marriage 
of someone aged 16 years and below is also not typically seen as defilement.  
Chapter 8, which examines the community bylaws sanctions in detail, 
illustrates how chindapusa and other penalties in the community bylaws relate 
                                               
1291 One could argue that the fact that Chiefs personally benefit from the chindapusa defeats 
the claim that the community bylaws are 'community owned and driven.' However, the 
Chiefs in Chitera's area explained that the main purpose of the community bylaws is the 
prevention of mischief, and not the payment/collection of fines.Therefore, Chiefs stand to 
hardly ‗benefit‘ financially if there is full compliance of the bylaws. In this case, the major 
benefit the Chiefs would gain is the development of their communities, which is also a 
communal benefit. 
1292  Mwansambo Area Development Committee, ‗Malamulo Oyendetsera Ntchito 




to the internalisation of human rights norms. Furthermore, Later, it will be 
argued that harmful practices (which is a major human rights challenge) 
through chindapusa amounts to ‘deflective translation‘, a key and unique form 
of translation in horizontal vernacularisation.  
7.3.3  The Process of Developing Community Bylaws  
While there is no standard script for developing community bylaws, the way 
communities are developing their bylaws exposes six main steps: problem 
identification; training of community stakeholders; consultation; processing 
and consolidating ideas; drafting the bylaws; and adoption.  
7.3.3.1   Step 1: Problem identification 
The first step in developing community bylaws involves a TA‘s own 
conviction about a problem demanding a response through the community 
bylaws, followed by a TA-led ‗community leaders‘ dialogue that results in a 
shared understanding of the problem and a decision to adopt the community 
bylaws. Although TAs can delegate the facilitation of the dialogue to others, 
they remain the agenda setter. This stage usually culminates in a decision to 
adopt bylaws and the general vision, and not necessarily what should form 
the exact content of the bylaws.  
The TA can become convinced of a problem by existing evidence. Thus, 
sometimes NGOs, lower Chiefs and subjects, who may have concerns about a 
local situation, can approach a TA with evidence of a problem. For example, 
Senior Chief Lukwa in Kasungu said, ‗when Plan Malawi gave me data on the 
high number of girls that were dropping out from our Lunyangwa Secondary 
School to get married despite that they were receiving bursaries, 1293  I 
understood the depth of our problem, and that we needed to deal with it 
ourselves.‘ Outside the study sites, TA Mwanza in Salima admitted that: 
                                               





‗when MIAA came with their project and helped us to vividly see how gender 
inequalities were negatively impacting development in my area, as TA, I 
decided that we should create bylaws to ban practices that prevent women 
and girls from achieving their highest potential‘.1294 Apart from confronting a 
problem through NGO efforts, the TAs also said lower Chiefs and subjects 
that have concerns about a local situation could approach them to act. 
Personal experiences can also convince the TA that there is a problem 
necessitating community bylaws. After suffering the impregnation of his 
daughter by her teacher, Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe in Karonga said he 
decided to do something to protect girls in his area. Senior Chief Chitera in 
Chiradzulu confessed that she had been haunted by the fact that as a young 
girl, her father denied her to go to school and study for her dream career, 
medicine:1295 ‗thus as a Chief, I have a fiery desire to have educated subjects, 
and I was concerned that girls were getting married too early and leaving 
school‘. 
Furthermore, a TA learns from others or exposure. Senior Chief 
Mwirang‘ombe said he got the ‗bylaws idea‘ from TA Chikulamayembe‘s 
area, Rumphi. Section 7.2 has shown that Senior Chief Lukwa borrowed the 
idea from TA Mwanza‘s area in Salima; and that Senior Chief Kwataine was 
inspired to develop bylaws on maternal health after visiting TA Mkanda‘s 
area in Mchinji. Referring to his attendance at an international meeting, Senior 
Chief Kwataine also admitted, ‗we discussed at length how cultural practices 
were fuelling HIV and AIDS, and the meeting agreed on the idea of 
developing bylaws. When I returned, I brought that suggestion to my 
community by engaging my Group Village Heads‘.  
                                               
1294 Government of Malawi, UNFPA, and EU, 'Mapping of Community Bylaws under the 
Gender Equality and Women Empowerment (GEWE) Programme,' (2016), 14. 




If a TA is persuaded that there is a problem that needs resolution, the next 
step is to officially initiate ‗high-level‘ community dialogue. Thus, the 
formulation of community bylaws is at times political because the Senior 
Chief or TA needs to convince his lower Chiefs1296 (to appreciate that there is 
a problem) and galvanise support for the idea to develop community bylaws. 
Senior Chief Lukwa in Kasungu said he initially invited his sub-TAs, Senior 
Group Village Heads and the District Commissioner to discuss the issue of 
abnormal school dropout rates amongst girls. This meeting endorsed 
adopting bylaws as a solution. In the other three study sites, the Senior Chiefs 
first engaged Group Village Heads, also culminating in decisions to develop 
community bylaws to promote girl education and arrest specific harmful 
practices.1297  
Senior Chiefs/TAs that have some exposure can personally handle the 
community leaders‘ dialogue, while some rely on NGOs. Senior Chiefs 
Lukwa and Kwataine facilitated the problem identification themselves. For 
example, Senior Chief Lukwa said, ‗I had to make my Chiefs understand how 
‗HeforShe‘1298 is about us‘. Senior Chief Kwataine explained, ‗I had to break 
down issues such as death audits, maternal mortality through language 
familiar to my Chiefs‘.  
With regard to NGOs as dialogue facilitators, these are NGOs that have come 
into a community either to strengthen existing bylaws efforts or to support 
the community to address social challenges. Executive Directors for 
WOLREC, MIAA and FOCUS stated that after engaging the TA, they held 
                                               
1296 And other decision makers if necessary. 
1297 Senior Chief Mwilang‘ombe, Karonga, said he first sat down with Group Village Heads, 
and they agreed to develop community bylaws to curb child marriage and encourage girl 
education. Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area, Ntcheu, explained that he first agreed with his 
Group Village Heads that local regulation could strengthen girls‘ education and protect them 
from child marriage and all forms of violence; and that the ADC should develop the bylaws. 
Chief Chitera, Chiradzulu, stated that she engaged Group Village Heads even before the 
arrival of GENET who formed a committee to block child marriages. 




initial dialogue meetings with community leaders 1299  to help them 
problematise their way of life. MIAA‘s Executive Director explained, ‗by 
interrogating what could be done to resolve identified challenges, community 
leaders proposed that girls should access education, and that community 
‗laws‘ should be formulated to enforce compliance‘.1300 FOCUS‘s Executive 
Director said, ‗we first met the TA and all area stakeholders to brainstorm 
challenges related to child marriages and safe motherhood‘. 1301  GENET 
worked with the TA, Group Village Heads, and Village Heads in arriving at 
the initial consensus to establish local laws on child marriage and other 
harmful cultural practices.1302  
As Chapter 9 argues, this phase of problem identification demonstrates that 
human rights vernacularisation via community bylaws is treading new 
grounds. First, Chapter 3 has discussed the vernacularisation concept of 
‗vernaculariser‘1303 – an outsider with both international and local knowledge 
who comes into a community to frame human rights norms for local 
community members‘ consumption.1304 However, the Senior Chiefs Lukwa 
and Kwataine are ‗insiders,‘ and yet their facilitation role is synonymous to 
the vernaculariser. Chapter 9 uses these examples to reconceptualise 
‗vernacularisers,‘ and to further show that the role being played by TAs is 
that of intuitive converters and crusaders. Additionally, apart from fitting into 
the translation strategy of simplification,1305 the TAs‘ role in the bylaws is 
revealing two new translation strategies – socialisation and customarisation.  
                                               
1299 For example, traditional leaders, village Chiefs, religious leaders. 
1300 This was in reference to community bylaws efforts in the area of T.A. Mwanza, Salima. 
1301  This was in reference to community bylaws efforts in the area of Senior Chief 
Mwirang'ombe, Karonga. 
1302 This was in reference to community bylaws efforts in the area of Senior Chief Chitera, 
Chiradzulu—Government of Malawi, UNFPA, and EU, 'Mapping of Community Bylaws 
under the Gender Equality and Women Empowerment (GEWE) Programme,' (2016), 19. 
1303 Also known as ‗translator‘. 
1304 See section 3.4.2.3 of the thesis. 




Second, unlike the straightforward NGO-to-community interface in 
vernacularisation,1306 the community bylaws are showing that such interface 
is not as clear-cut. Some Chiefs seem to have become conscious about the 
developmental impacts of negative practices in their territories through NGO 
projects, and then decided to deal with such practices by producing 
community bylaws (the decision allegedly being made independent of the 
NGOs influence). In other instances, NGOs projects simply stepped in to 
facilitate the strengthening of on-going community efforts on community 
bylaws and not necessarily initiate them.  
The role of NGOs as facilitators is not surprising because they are seen as 
having double-consciousness, enabling them to sell human rights ideas at the 
grassroots. 1307  Indeed, CEDAW and CRC jurisprudence promotes the 
involvement of these ‗conventional‘ vernacularisers in designing and 
implementing interventions to address harmful practices.1308 Chapter 9 argues 
that the role being played by the NGOs symbolises a new version of 
translation, ‗augmentation‘, manifesting when NGOs are not master 
conceptualisers of the community bylaws, but still support the appropriation 
of human rights along the way. 
7.3.3.2   Step 2: Orientation or training of community stakeholders  
The training or awareness raising of communities that are formulating 
community bylaws only happens when opportune, and its absence may not 
affect the bylaws formulation process. The process involves the deliberate 
organisation of meetings by NGOs and other partners to orient/train people 
on human rights issues.   
The meetings target a particular category of people. MIAA‘s Executive 
Director said, ‗in TA Mwanza‘s area, Salima, we trained a ‗Community 
                                               
1306 Section 3.4.2.3 of the thesis. 
1307 See note 355. 




Parliament‘1309 for five days to build their legal and human rights knowledge‘. 
WOLREC‘s paralegal also confirmed, ‗we wanted human rights issues to be 
included in the bylaws, so we taught those involved in formulating the 
bylaws about human rights frameworks at the onset of the process. The 
Executive Director of YONECO explained that in Machinga1310  YONECO 
trained community educators1311 on legal and human rights frameworks. In 
turn, these educators were raising human rights awareness during the process 
of formulating bylaws.  
Women‘s FGD in Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area, Karonga, who had a 
Women‘s Forum seminar that educated them about many human rights 
issues commented: ‗at our first meeting in 2014, a team from Mzimba taught 
us how to lobby Chiefs. We used this skill to lobby for specific fines to be 
applied in the bylaws‘. Chiefs in Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area, Ntcheu, 
mentioned that UNFPA together with Ministry of Gender once educated 
Chiefs on diverse human rights issues. The Mother Group in the area said 
they were previously educated by YONECO on different human rights issues 
and gender – ‗especially that when we are at community meetings, we should 
boldly contribute our views and that men should accept women‘s views‘. 
Notably, this stage of human rights training/orientation shows that unlike in 
the vernacularisation model where human rights appropriation and 
translation is the foremost thing, 1312  in horizontal vernacularisation the 
training/orientation follows a community‘s commitment to adopt community 
bylaws in order to solve internal challenges. 1313  Thus communities may 
initially care little about the human rights connotations of such challenges 
until given human rights lenses by external actors. Still, the appropriation of 
                                               
1309 The group that developed the bylaws—comprising selected subjects, Chiefs, religious 
leaders, law enforcers, health workers, teachers and a Magistrate. 
1310 Where YONECO has facilitated the formulation of bylaws in TAs Nyambi and Ngokwe. 
1311 Groups of 8-10 people that operate at Group Village Head level. 
1312 See section 3.4.2 of the thesis. 




human rights ideas follows as the community is steered towards the ‗human 
rights way‘ as the community bylaws are formulated. Chapter 9 illustrates 
that as NGOs jump on the community bylaws bandwagon, they influence the 
horizontal vernacularisation of human rights norms through simplification, 
augmentation and hybridisation; and they wear the vernacularisers‘ hats of 
converters, grafters and connectors.  
Furthermore, this step of human rights training/orientation exposes that the 
community bylaws have gone ahead of the type of human awareness that is 
expected by both international human rights jurisprudence and statutory 
law.1314 The formal frameworks present training and awareness raising as 
measures for facilitating attitudinal change so that duty bearers can start 
upholding human rights. However, in the development of community 
bylaws, human rights are not always being applied as a lobbying mechanism 
to discard harmful practices, but usually to reinforce already changed 
community values prompted by local-local dialogue. 
7.3.3.3   Step 3: Consultation  
Occurring after the TA and his rather senior Chiefs (sub-TAs and Group 
Village Heads) have taken the decision to establish community bylaws, 
consultations are not a process whereby Chiefs‘ subjects are just asked to 
endorse bylaws. Rather, subjects are expected to buy into the idea of 
formulating the community bylaws, and propose and debate the substantive 
contents of the bylaws. This step involves two levels of dialogue: between 
Group Village Heads and Village Heads; and between these Chiefs and 
subjects.  
The dialogue between Group Village Heads and Village Heads is a first step 
of the consultations because the Village Heads do not form part of the TA‘s 
‗high-level‘ dialogue that takes the decision to formulate community bylaws. 
                                               




Therefore, it is necessary that the Group Village Heads should inform their 
Village Heads of the decision, explain the rationale, and task them to hold 
consultations. In Senior Chief Lukwa‘s area in Kasungu, the ‗high-level‘ 
dialogue was attended by Senior Group Village Heads, thus they had to meet 
both Group Village Heads and Village Heads ‗so that they should know what 
we have discussed and make contributions‘. Group Village Heads in Senior 
Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area in Karonga said, ‗we proceeded to disseminate 
the bylaws vision to Village Heads so that they could consult subjects‘. 
Similarly, Group Village Heads in Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area in Ntcheu 
asserted, ‗we sat down with Village Heads to discuss why we need the 
bylaws; the Village Heads went to inform and consult their subjects‘. 
In turn, Village Heads organise meetings with their subjects to advocate for 
the bylaws and mobilise ideas. Village Heads in Senior Chief 
Mwirang‘ombe‘s area explained their role, ‗we did the main job of 
consultations to solicit subjects‘ proposals for the bylaws. We had to mobilise 
people through village meetings. We even took advantage of funeral 
ceremonies to inform people that we needed their ideas. It was a tiresome 
job‘.  
Some Group Village Heads also attend the meetings being facilitated by 
Village Heads to provide guidance to Village Heads or to co-facilitate the 
consultations. For example, according to a women‘s FGD, Group Village 
Heads in Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area in Ntcheu, ‗the main issue in 
community discussions was: ‗if this act is committed, what should be the 
fine?‘ Group Village Heads would provide guidance to Village Heads on how 
to facilitate the production of good ideas. In Senior Chief Chitera‘s area in 
Chiradzulu, Group Village Heads were as involved as co-facilitators: ‗we 
were the ones consulting in our communities. We could go to a school and 




children. The result was bylaws that ensured that school dropouts would 
return to school‘. 
Beyond Village Heads, some communities involved ADC members and 
taskforces as facilitators of consultations. ADC members participated in 
Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area, Ntcheu. Senior Chief Chitera‘s area constituted 
‗the GENET Committee‘.1315  Interviewed committee members explained:  
Each one of us here went from village to village, spreading the 
message that bylaws are being formulated, and collecting ideas 
from people. Sometimes, the whole committee would visit one 
village in order to assure people that the exercise was credible, thus 
encouraging them to contribute ideas towards dismantling negative 
cultural practices. 
While the consultations do not generally involve a cost, it is also possible that 
they could be supported by external funding. For example, Senior Chief 
Lukwa, Kasungu, wrote UN Women asking for funding to hold detailed 
consultations. UN Women provided MK700,000.00,1316 which the Chief used 
for meetings in his four ADCs to generate ideas for the bylaws.1317 Since the 
bylaws centred on schoolgirls, the process also involved Village Heads, 
Mother Groups and School Management Committees.  
Chapter 9 demonstrates that the step of consultation has several conceptual 
implications. First, consultations involve framing, 1318  so that subjects can 
appreciate the conversation and contribute to it productively. For example, in 
Karonga, apart from using funerals, Wanangwa Youth Organisation 
(WAYO)1319 supported Village Heads in breaking down the issues through 
drama in order to creatively reach both literate and illiterate audiences. Thus 
framing should not merely be seen as an act performed by erudite outsiders 
                                               
1315 See note 1124 of the thesis. 
1316 Equivalent to USD 943. 
1317 ADCs in TA Kaphaizi, Sub TA Mangwazu, Sub TA Mawawa, and Sub TA Simdemba. 
1318 See section 3.4.2.2 of the thesis. 




with both global and local knowledge.1320 Second, consultations imply that 
community subjects are not merely appropriating already conceptualised 
(human rights) ideas, but are actually conceptualising what to them are 
harmful practices and negotiating new norms that have social transformation 
potential.  
Though not always (as seen in Chapter 8), mostly such conceptualisation is in 
line with human rights standards, whether the subjects are aware of it or not. 
This means the vernacularisation of human rights is not always deliberate 
and externally driven as is currently perceived by both vernacularisation 
scholarship and international jurisprudence.1321 Third, Chapter 9 shows that 
the consultation stage reveals more crusaders (a form of vernacularisers) who, 
though not explicitly talking human rights language, facilitate the 
establishment of cultural values that protect women from harmful practices. 
These crusaders and their subjects ‗customarise women‘s protection‘ as one 
strategy for translating women‘s rights norms in horizontal vernacularisation. 
7.3.3.4   Step 4: Processing and consolidating ideas 
Since community bylaws formulation process is a heavily negotiated site, this 
step requires Group Village Heads, ADCs (sometimes with the support of 
NGOs 1322 ) or some appointed committee to sit down and sieve the 
interchange of ideas from the community. In Senior Chief Chitera‘s area, 
Chiradzulu, a special group 1323  applied its diverse expertise to embrace, 
discard or refashion proposed ideas. 
Group Village Heads in Senior Chief Lukwa‘s area, Kasungu, reflected, ‘this 
process [of synthesising ideas] is where the work was – because people were 
                                               
1320 See section 3.4.2.2 of the thesis.  
1321 See sections 3.4.2 and 4.4.3 of the thesis respectively. 
1322 In community bylaw initiatives that are being facilitated by NGOs. 
1323  Comprising the Chiefs, GENET committee members, police, health, and social work 





contributing varied ideas. After receiving all ideas, we convened a Group 
Village Heads forum to deliberate them.‘ Group Village Heads in Senior Chief 
Kwataine‘s area, Ntcheu, explained that they had to bring the ideas from their 
Village Heads to an ADC forum.1324 Senior Chief Kwataine, who facilitated 
the ADC forum, expounded: ‗the ADC met on several occasions, pondering 
each proposed idea. During the discussions, ADC members would decide to 
adopt or discard an idea based on majority opinion. It was a process of 
intense discussion, whereby people would state reasons for supporting or 
rebuffing an idea‘. 
The processing of ideas means dropping arbitrary proposals. Group Village 
Heads in Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area, Karonga, explained, ‗from the 
villages‘ submissions, we rejected proposed bylaws that could potentially 
infringe peoples‘ rights – some villages proposed the unaffordable fine of 
K200,000.00 1325  for impregnating a schoolgirl; others proposed corporal 
punishment for wrongdoers‘. Group Village Heads in Senior Chief Lukwa‘s 
area added, ‗some villages said those who rape schoolgirls should be 
castrated. This could not go into the bylaws because it is an emotional and 
ferocious punishment; and rape is a police matter‘.  
At times, discarded ideas may be genuine gender concerns, but that do not 
resonate with local (decision makers‘) meanings of power and value. In 
response to my question whether the bylaws are satisfying women‘s needs, 
women in Senior Chief Chitera‘s area felt the bylaws are falling short on 
initiation: ‗initiations give children bad advice and are the major cause for 
school dropouts and adolescent pregnancies. We wanted initiations to stop 
altogether so that we should just counsel children at home‘. However, Senior 
Chief Chitera argued that initiation (minus bad teachings) form the cultural 
fabric of the community. Women in Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area confided, 
                                               
1324 Of which the Group Village Heads were part. 




‗the bylaws have not included our concerns about men‘s polygamy and 
adultery. This conduct is cruel and emotionally oppressive because even your 
own marriage counsellor dismissively tells you banja ndi kupilira’.1326 Group 
Village Chiefs rejected banning polygamy even before the community 
consultations because polygamy is ‗Ngoni culture‘.1327  
International jurisprudence expects all domestic laws, including in plural 
systems, to comprehensively adhere to human rights standards.1328 Opting-
out of some international human rights norms have some implications on 
norm internalisation/vernacularisation that are analysed in Chapter 8.  
7.3.3.5    Step 5: Drafting the bylaws 
The process of drafting the community bylaws usually co-opts ‗outsiders‘1329 
who have ‗expert knowledge.‘ Some communities involve these experts 
directly during the drafting of the bylaws, while some only require the 
experts to vet what the community has produced. Senior Chief Lukwa, 
Kasungu, who explained that the process of developing the bylaws in his area 
happened over six meetings,1330 said: 
At our final meeting, we saw it wise to involve the police, 
Magistrate, and other experts who are conversant with state law to 
help us to develop the bylaws. We invited the police and Magistrate 
because we were afraid that the bylaws could oppose or interfere 
with state law – timaopa kuti nafenso ngati tasokoneza titha 
kuzayimbidwa mlandu.1331  
Group Village Heads in Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area, Karonga, said: 
                                               
1326 Best English approximate would be 'marriage is perserverance, so just persevere'.  
1327 Section 7.3.2.3 of the thesis has reported that Chief Kwataine also wanted polygamy to be 
banned, but the majority of Chiefs rejected the proposal during the internal Chiefs‘ 
discussions that made the decision to have the bylaws. 
1328 Section 4.4.4 of the thesis. 
1329 Usually district level officials. 
1330 Five at sub TA level and the sixth one to finalise the bylaws at his headquarters. 
1331 Best English approximation would be 'we were afraid that if we mess up we would find 




With technical advice from FOCUS, who hired external facilitators, 
we developed draft bylaws in close consultations with the Chiefs‘ 
Council1332 advisers, and education, health and police personnel. 
Then we sent the draft bylaws to the Chiefs Council for their 
scrutiny, who then sent the draft bylaws to the Magistrate. After the 
Magistrate‘s input, the bylaws returned to the Chiefs Council, 
which gave us the final version for community announcement. 
In Senior Chief Chitera‘s area, Chiradzulu, it is at this stage when GENET 
facilitated meetings with a group comprising the Senior Chief, Group Village 
Heads, selected Village Heads, representatives from the police and health 
centre and members of the GENET Committee to formulate the bylaws.1333 
Through Chiefs, draft bylaws were first shared with the community for 
review and approval. Then the final draft was sent to the DC for vetting. 
Senior Chief Kwataine, Ntcheu, narrated: ‗the ADC developed draft bylaws 
from the ideas that the majority of their members found acceptable. They sent 
the draft copy to the DC and Magistrate for comments – who made changes, 
especially reducing punishments perceived as hefty‘. 
Beyond the study sites, TA Mwanza, Salima, mobilised selected subjects, 
religious leaders, law enforcers, health workers, teachers and a Magistrate to 
conduct a ‗Community Parliament‘ to make her area‘s bylaws. She 
expounded: 
I delegated my Group Village Head Mwanza to be ‗Speaker‘ of the 
Community Parliament. I knew the bylaws would eventually come 
to me for adoption, so I did not join but left the group to discuss 
freely. The Magistrate guided the group so that the bylaws would 
not conflict with state laws. When the Community Parliament was 
satisfied, it brought its draft bylaws to me. I convened a 
stakeholder‘s meeting to fine-tune the bylaws. I sent the final 
bylaws to the DC for him to know what we had done. Myself, the 
                                               
1332 Comprising the Senior Chief, advisors and Senior Group Village Heads. 
1333 Government of Malawi, UNFPA, and EU, 'Mapping of Community Bylaws under the 




DC and Magistrate signed the bylaws.1334 
This stage of engaging outside ‗experts‘ seals some level of appropriation of 
human rights and state law ideas into community bylaws for communities 
where stage two 1335  did not occur. Furthermore, in translation terms, it 
facilitates augmentation (whereby the community drafts the bylaws first and 
then ‗experts‘ come in to test the bylaws for congruence with state 
law/human rights). It also enables the emergence of ‗grafters‘ as a group of 
vernacularisers – further discussed in Chapter 9.  
7.3.3.6    Step 6: Adopting the bylaws 
For written community bylaws, it is usually the TA/Senior Chief‘s signature 
that operationalises the community bylaws.1336 However, having a written 
community bylaw is not a precondition for the bylaw to be accepted as law 
within a community. A Chief‘s announcement is authority enough.1337 A good 
example of such oral pronouncements are the prohibitions of child marriage, 
initiation sexual cleansing and other negative cultural practices among the 
Chewas made by Kalonga Gawa Undi 1338  at several events in 2018. 1339  
                                               
1334  Ibid., 14.  For MIAA, the Executive Director's perception was that the DC‘s and 
Magistrate‘s signatures give the bylaws legal authority. 
1335 Stakeholder training or orientation. 
1336 However, with variations from area to area, the TA usually signs the bylaws along with 
other officials such as the Group Village Heads (or their representative), representative of 
Village Heads, DC, Magistrate, Area Development Committee (ADC) Chairperson, ADC 
Secretary, Police Officer-In-Charge, District Health Officer or Health Facility In-Charge. 
1337 Therefore, the TA would first reaffirm the bylaw with his Chiefs, and they would in turn 
trickle down the message through various avenues such as community meetings and funeral 
gatherings. 
1338 King of the Chewa people of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. Of these, 138 Chiefs are 
in Malawi, 40 are in Mozambique while 36 Chiefs are in Zambia. Senior Chief Lukwa of 
Kasungu is one of the King‘s advisors. 
1339 At the annual Chewa Kulamba ceremony, and during his tour of duty to Malawi, 'the King 
outlawed the fisi Concept (employing a mystery man to test the skills of a young girl who has 
just come of age) or sexual cleansing in Chewa culture with immediate effect. Girls attending 
those initiations must be supervised by cultured elders who should be monitored in their 
deeds and content administered to the initiates. He also outlawed spouse inheritance and 
early marriages. Furthermore, only willing boys above 16 years should be initiated into Gule 
Wamkulu with their consent. Initiates who are attending school should only be taken in 
during school holidays and allowed to attend school programmes when asked to by school 




Furthermore, the bylaws may be publicly launched, though this is not 
essential for the operationalisation of the bylaws. NGOs such as MIAA, 
FOCUS and GENET have sponsored public launches of the bylaws in their 
impact areas. Community bylaws in Senior Chief Lukwa‘s area were 
launched with the support from UN Women, and the UN Women Country 
Representative even attended the event. 
The adoption of bylaws is further symbolised by the application of 
community bylaws in their ordinary life. This may involve framing messages 
in the vernacular, as seen in Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area where people have 
embellished the outer walls of their houses with different bylaws. Moreover, 
it may see the rise of ‗troopers‘ (a category of vernacularisers) who ensure that 
the bylaws are not rhetorical but are actually lived. Chapter 9 examines these 
issues more.   
7.3.4 Implementing the Community Bylaws 
Although a detailed discussion of the implementation of community bylaws 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth briefly recognising it as an 
important part of the bylaws formulation. Group Village Heads and Village 
Heads play a pivotal role in this stage.  
                                                                                                                                      
punished. Early marriages, where no girl below 16 years should be married off, are also 
prohibites. He also banned chokolo (forcing wife or husband to marry a family member after 
losing their legal spouses often for selfish motives), chidyerano (a practice where men forcibly 
exchange their wives for sexual variety against the women‘s will)'—Steve Pembamoyo, 
‗Chewa King against Early Marriages,‘ Nation Online, 27 August 2018. Available at 
https://mwnation.com/chewa-king-against-early-marriages, accessed on 15 January 2019; 
Christopher Miti, ‗Gawa Undi Outlaws Spouse Inheritance,‘ Themast Online, 7 November 
2018. Available at https://www.themastonline.com/2018/11/07/gawa-undi-outlaws-
spouse-inheritance/, accessed on 15 January 2019; ‗Gawa Undi Bans Chidyerano (Wife 
Swapping) among the Chewa,‘ Zambia Observer, 8 November 2018. Available at 
https://www.zambianobserver.com/gawa-undi-bans-chidyerano-wife-swapping-among-




7.3.4.1   Role of Group Village Heads  
Group Village Heads play the role of enforcer on three altitudes – first by 
penalising slack and/or dissident Village Heads; second by reacting to bylaw 
noncompliance by subjects; and third by dealing with community resistance.  
With regards to punishing Village Heads, Group Village Heads in Senior 
Chief Kwataine‘s area, Ntcheu, explained, ‗a violation of bylaws starts in the 
village, which is under the Village Head. Violations may happen because the 
Village Head was either passive towards the bylaw or has clandestinely 
approved child marriage. So we have to punish such Chief too‘. In Senior 
Chief Lukwa‘s zone, Kasungu, a Village Head will first pay a fine to the 
Group Village Head and another to the TA. However, when child marriage 
occurs, the bylaws punish Group Village Heads and Village Heads uniformly 
by fining both a goat.1340 The logic is that the Village Head‘s carelessness to let 
child marriage happen under his/her watch suggests lack of vigilance by the 
Group Village Head to monitor his Chiefs.  
In respect to violations by subjects, Group Village Heads in Senior Chief 
Kwataine‘s area shared the view that if parents defy a Village Head‘s refusal 
to endorse a child marriage, the latter can refer the matter to the Group 
Village Head. This move serves as a deterrent because the fine increases at 
each tier of chieftaincy. As Group Village Heads in Senior Chief 
Mwirang‘ombe‘s area, Karonga, observed, ‗an insolent subject may find 
himself/herself concurrently paying two chickens to the Village Head, five 
chickens to the Group Village Head, and a goat to the TA for affronting a 
bylaw‘.  
Group Village Heads also enforce community bylaws by vetoing and 
dissolving child marriages. A Group Village Head in Senior Chief Chitera‘s 
area, Chiradzulu, claimed that, ‘I always refuse to allow marriages of those 
                                               




who are below the age of 18 years‘. Group Village Heads in Senior Chief 
Kwataine‘s area reported, ‗of late we withdrew some children from marriages 
because the bylaws give us the authority to dissolve child marriages‘. 
Parents/guardians of the child(ren) involved simultaneously pay chindapusa 
for violating bylaws. 
A third role of Group Village Heads as enforcers is to deal with community 
resistance. It became apparent during community interviews that the bylaws 
are not a unanimously accepted ideology by community subjects. Group 
Village Heads in Senior Chief Chitera‘s area confided, ‗it was a battle to arrive 
at and institute these bylaws. People [who have a wedding or initiation 
events] would still come and demand, amfumu ife tikufuna tichezere pano’.1341 In 
Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area, Group Village Heads shared, ‗we really 
struggled with parents who felt that the bylaws would make them lose bride 
price‘. In all study sites Chiefs generally lamented that they would get 
insulted by parents who argued that they had every right to do anything with 
their children because they, not the Chiefs, gave birth to the children. 
The responsibility of countering resistance mainly rests with the Group 
Village Heads, who have to ensure compliance with bylaws. Section 9.5.4 
demonstrates that such strategies mostly rely on organised groups of women 
within the community. In Senior Chief Chitera‘s area, the Group Village 
Heads explained how they have coped with resistance after banning 
overnight celebrations that were fuelling HIV transmission:  
We would defeat them1342 by telling them that you can go ahead so 
long as you have five goats as your combined fines to the Village 
Head, the Group Village Head, and the Senior Chief. Hearing this, 
they would just say ‗we will come back to you after we conduct clan 
discussions (about the goats),‘ and they would not return.  
                                               
1341 Best English approximation would be 'Chief, we want to have an overnight celebration for 
this event'. 





This is a good example of how even those who feel inconvenienced may still 
respect the bylaws as living law, discussed further in Chapter 8.  
7.3.4.2   Role of Village Heads 
The role of Village Heads in implementing bylaws includes imposing fines; 
refusing permission for child marriages; ensuring that mechanisms for each 
child to be in school are being enforced; ensuring that pregnant mothers go to 
hospital on time; and confronting facilitators of harmful rituals.  
Village Heads dispelled doubts as to whether they have the power to 
implement and enforce the bylaws. Village Heads in Senior Chief Kwataine‘s 
area said, ‗we are each other‘s eyes‘. If ‗it seems that a child has gotten 
married in X village‘ we ask ourselves: ‗what happened? We ask in a way that 
the concerned Chief should know that we know. Next, we hear that the Chief 
has gone to end the marriage‘. Village Heads are compelled to take bylaws 
seriously because the Village Heads are policed by special groups who sniff 
what is happening in their community: Back to School Committee (Senior 
Chief Lukwa‘s area); GENET Committee (Senior Chief Chitera‘s area); Mother 
Groups (Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe area) and Amai Achinsisi 1343  (Senior 
Chief Kwataine area).1344  
Generally, the evidence above suggests that interviewed Chiefs implement 
the community bylaws because their Senior Chiefs take the bylaws seriously, 
and also because the Group Village Heads and Village Heads themselves 
believe in the potential of the bylaws to address cultural challenges, which 
further attests to the Chief/community driven nature of horizontal 
vernacularisation.  
                                               
1343 Secret Mothers. 




7.4 CONCLUSION  
This Chapter has presented empirical evidence data on the emergence and 
character of community bylaws addressing harmful practices affecting 
women and girls in rural Malawi. Oral bylaws to address harmful practices 
seem to have emerged from around 1994 under the GABLE project, although 
some communities said that they started making oral bylaws from the early 
2000s. Written bylaws have been mainly prominent after 2010. What is clear 
though is that the bylaws cannot be divorced from when government begun 
to strengthen safe motherhood and girl education initiatives, as well as 
gender equality laws. This is not to say that the community bylaws are 
government initiatives either, because the evidence shows that by their very 
nature, they are Chiefs‘ initiatives.  
In terms of their characteristics, community bylaws are Chief-led, 
(community) problem driven, grassroots owned and mostly prescribe village-
based punishment. In fact, community bylaws cannot exist without 
punishments, known as chindapusa. The issues generally addressed in various 
bylaws have been highlighted, and Chapter 8 further analyses the gender 
specific prohibitions to examine how international human rights norms are 
influencing the bylaws.  
Community bylaws are mainly formulated at TA level, and indeed all the 
community bylaws studied have been spearheaded by TAs (all of whom are 
promoted to Senior Chiefs). While the process of making community bylaws 
is peculiar to different areas, the process typically involves six main steps: 
problem identification, mainly involving Group Village Heads; orientation or 
training of community stakeholders by Chiefs, mainly the TA and Group 
Village Heads, at times with support from NGO partners; consultations by 
Chiefs, mainly Village Heads and Group Village Heads; processing and 




from NGO partners/government district stakeholders; drafting the bylaws (at 
times facilitated by TAs, at times by NGO partners); and adoption of the 
bylaws (particularly marked by the TAs signature).  
The chapter has shown that the emergence of community bylaws constitutes a 
process of horizontal vernacularisation. As the bylaws emerge, the 
appropriation and translation of human rights is not always purposeful and 
unicamerally driven by external programmes. Additionally, human rights 
norms are not being conventionally used to challenge communities to 
abandon harmful practices, but are only reinforcing decisions of communities 
to pursue positive cultural values. 
As will be shown further in Chapter 9, the different stages of community 
bylaw making demonstrate the emergence of both new forms of 
vernacularisers (crusaders, grafters, troopers) and already recognised 
vernacularisers (converters, adapters), except that the community bylaws are 
adding other actors that play these conventional roles. Also visible are new 
strategies of translating human rights, such as deflective translation, 
socialising, customarising women‘s protection and augmentation. 
Furthermore, the emergence of community bylaws is illuminating new 
perspectives to existing translation strategies such as simplification and 
hybridisation (including the overall strategy of framing).  
The next chapter discusses in greater detail the legal character of the 
community bylaws. How do bylaws reflect international human rights? What 







LEGAL CHARACTER OF COMMUNITY BYLAWS 
 
8.1  INTRODUCTION 
Having seen, in Chapter 7, how community bylaws have emerged to date and 
what they say, this chapter discusses the legal character of the bylaws in order 
to achieve two of the study‘s objectives: to establish whether there is a 
relationship between the community bylaws and African customary law; and 
to assess the extent to which the community bylaws address international and 
domestically recognised human rights standards, including how they reflect 
key principles of leading women‘s rights protocols such as CEDAW and the 
Maputo Protocol. 
The chapter commences with a discussion of people‘s general perceptions of 
the legal character of community bylaws, the legal status of the bylaws within 
Malawi‘s constitutional framework, and the status of the bylaws as African 
customary law. By establishing that the community bylaws are a rupture of 
both customary and formal law, this discussion helps to properly characterise 
and contexualise these laws within the discourse of horizontal 
vernacularisation.  
The discussion then proceeds to consider the question of how, if at all, the 
emerging practice of community bylaws resonates with human rights 
standards. This will involve interrogating the similarities and contrasts 
between gender-specific harmful practices that are articulated in the 
community bylaws and those pronounced in international/legislative norms 




The chapter demonstrates that while community bylaws have questionable 
status as formal law, they represent a form of horizontal vernacularisation, 
and a means of brigading the gap between the international and national and 
the local.  
8.2 PERCEPTIONS ON COMMUNITY BYLAWS AS LOCALISED LAW 
Discussing communities‘ perception of the legal character of the community 
bylaws is important because it reveals how people see themselves in relation 
to their bylaws. Respondents were asked the question: ‗do you see these 
community bylaws as real laws?‘  
At community level, one perception portrayed the bylaws as ‗context-specific 
law‘ or laws of localised, instead of general, application. Common sentiments 
were ‘awa ndi malamulo kwathu kuno’1345 or ‗ndi malamulo, koma akudera.‘1346  
Several reasons were given for this perspective: the bylaws are routinely 
applied when any case happens;1347 the bylaws govern every primary school 
in the area; 1348  the bylaws are taken seriously and people are afraid to 
contravene them (e.g. clerics rejecting to solemnise child marriages; 1349 
women obliging to pay chindapusa when they give birth at home;1350 child 
marriages being annulled; 1351  people refraining from violence and other 
harmful practices;1352 girls returning to school after giving birth instead of 
staying home, waiting for marriage1353). 
                                               
1345 Best English approximation could be 'here in our area, these [bylaws] are laws'. 
1346 'They are law, but only for the community'. 
1347 Senior Chief Lukwa and Village Heads in his area, Kasungu; Group Village Heads, Senior 
Chief Chitera's area, Chiradzulu. 
1348 Senior Chief Lukwa, Kasungu. 
1349 Group Village Heads, Senior Chief Kwataine's area, Ntcheu. 
1350 Group Village Heads, Senior Chief Chitera's area, Chiradzulu. 
1351 Senior Chief Chitera, Chiradzulu. 
1352 Women's FGD, Senior Chief Kwataine's area, Ntcheu. 




Two Chiefs shied away from calling the community bylaws ‗laws,‘ on 
technical reasons. Senior Chief Chitera‘s perspective was: ‗we know state law 
is the law. Our bylaws are not – they are simply a mechanism we have 
identified to protect our children‘. Senior Chief Kwataine remarked: ‗No, 
these bylaws are not law. However, they are helping us to respond to socio-
cultural issues that were unproblematic before either because their 
consequences were not felt as harshly as now, or people lacked knowledge‘. 
Notably, despite their restraint to name them ‗law,‘ the two Chiefs were 
devoted to the application of the bylaws ‗because of their positive results‘. In 
fact, Senior Chief Kwataine divulged that when an incident arises in his 
community, the bylaws are the first recourse.  
Interviewed parliamentarians and local government officials also perceived 
the bylaws as locality-based law. The Chairperson, Parliamentary Legal 
Affairs Committee said: ‗when offenders pay the imposed punishment, it is in 
obedience to their law.‘ Similarly, the Chairperson, Social and Community 
Affairs Committee rationalised: ‗in their culture these are laws because if 
someone is told pay three goats, and they bring three goats, it means the 
offender is accepting the bylaws‘ authority.‘ The Chairperson, Women‘s 
Caucus termed the bylaws ‗laws of the people, expressed in vernacular.‘ The 
DCs in Ntcheu and Kasungu also accepted that at the level they are, the 
bylaws are considered law.  
There were different opinions from police and court respondents regarding 
whether the community bylaws are valid law. The VSU Coordinator at 
Malawi Police Headquarters, who mistakenly thought Chiefs are empowered 
by legislation to make community bylaws said, ‗the bylaws are law because 
both the Chiefs Act and the Local Government Act give power to Chiefs to 
make laws. The bylaws should even be enforceable in court‘.1354 However, 
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police officers at district levels had contrary views. A VSU Officer at 
Chiradzulu Police Station, said:  
These are malamulo akumudzi1355 made to reduce problems being 
faced in the village. They are meant to dissuade villagers from 
conduct that has been declared bad because it can harm others. In 
short these are village ‗do‘ or ‗don‘ts‘ – they are unstable and easily 
changeable since their relevance depends on the prevailing 
conditions. But as police, we follow state law.  
Interviewed VSU officers at Karonga Police Station also referred to the 
temporal nature of the bylaws, ‗bylaws are not law because some of them are 
meant to address a particular problem and they change after the problem 
vanishes‘. VSU police officers at Ntcheu Police Station called the bylaws ‗part 
of efforts to end VAW and other harmful practices as grassroots levels‘. They 
explained that because these are strictly laws for a given area, you would see 
that bylaws vary from area to area depending on their challenges. 
However, most of the interviewed Magistrates saw the community bylaws as 
being valid law both in the community and the courtroom. The 3rd Grade 
Magistrate at Nyungwe Court, Karonga, asserted that the bylaws are valid 
because people there obey them, and they are binding because the Magistrate 
signed them. Magistrates in Ntcheu and Kasungu were all about preserving 
the dignity and authority of the community bylaws: ‗unless excessive, courts 
should enforce punishments in the bylaws if they receive complaints of 
community bylaw non-compliance – otherwise if the court dismisses them, 
then the community bylaws would be rendered impotent in their very 
communities‘. It was only the Magistrate in Chiradzulu who said the bylaws 
have limited validity: ‗the bylaws are law so long as they are within a 
                                                                                                                                      
community bylaws are not following. The Chiefs Act (Chapter 22:03) simply says one of the 
functions of a Chief is ‗to carry out the traditional functions of his office under customary law 
so long as the discharge of such functions is not contrary to the Constitution or any written 
law and is not repugnant to natural justice and morality'(Section 7(b)). 




community. Once we exit that community, bylaws cannot stand as law since 
courts have to apply state law instead‘. 
The above findings are intriguing because apart from the opinion of some 
Magistrates, the state of ‗community bylaws as law‘ is seen as incapable of 
enduring beyond community boundaries, because ‗higher‘ law usurps the 
bylaws – and yet such law is distant from the communities. Nevertheless, 
communities have confidence in this insecure law because they relate to its 
‗customarised‘ way of protecting various groups, and they see its tangible 
normative effects. This gives the bylaws inner force. As a Programme Officer 
at World Vision‘s Kasungu office observed, ‗communities understand that 
these bylaws are only for their area, but they fear them more than state law 
because the bylaws and the punishments they prescribe are closer to them‘. 
However, the question remains, what is the legal validity of the bylaws, 
according to the existing body of Malawian law? 
8.3 LEGAL VALIDITY OF COMMUNITY BYLAWS IN MALAWI’S CONSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Chapter 1 has mentioned that one conundrum created by community bylaws 
is their legal validity and authority. There are two main questions: how the 
community bylaws sit with the formal law on the one hand; and how they sit 
with African (living) customary law on the other hand. 
8.3.1 Community Bylaws and the Statutory Framework 
Chapter 5 has shown that although the Constitution recognises Chiefs as part 
of local government authorities, Chiefs do not have independent powers to 




District Council, and Town or City Assembly have non-delegatable powers to 
make bylaws for governing a local government area.1356  
Indeed, several local government respondents that are conversant with the 
making of legal bylaws stressed that the community bylaws are not formal 
law. Kasungu‘s District Commissioner enlightened, ‗notwithstanding a 
Magistrate‘s signature, what should happen for community bylaws to gain 
legal validity is that after completing its bylaws, a community should send 
them to the Ministry of Local Government.‘ The Chief Local Government 
Services Officer in the Ministry of Local Government expressed concern that 
‗the community bylaws have no legal basis because they do not follow the 
procedure for promulgating bylaws under the Local Government Act 
whereby the District Council is supposed to send us its bylaws for vetting 
before we can approve them as subsidiary legislation‘. As seen in section 1.3, 
District Council bylaws can even be made at Traditional Authority level.1357  
Therefore, because community bylaws are not constitutionally recognised as a 
source of law in Malawi, the label ‗bylaws‘ weakens the legal force of the 
community bylaws, as legal positivists or centralists would contend that they 
are detached from formal systems of law and are therefore legally invalid. It 
has been argued elsewhere that ‗[case] law that lacks any grounding in 
constitutional text or tradition represents a judicial usurpation of law-making 
power incompatible with the rule of law‘. 1358 By analogy, this sentiment could 
apply to the community bylaws.  
                                               
1356 See section 5.3.1.3 of the thesis. 
1357 Particularly referencing to Section 102 of the Local Government Act No. 42 of 1998, as 
amended by Local Government (Amendment) Act No. 10 of 2017.  
1358  Jr. Richard H. Fallon, ‗The Rule of Law as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,‘ 
Columbia Law Review (97)1 (1997), 1-56 25. Fallon explains that in the United States case of 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey (505 U.S. 833 (1992) at 874-76), a mere five-to- four Supreme Court 
purported to uphold the central abortion right, first recognised in Roe v. Wade 2. (410 U.S. 113 
(1973), even though they were reducing the scope of that right by permitting ‗incidental‘ 
restrictions on abortions that do not amount to ‗undue burdens‘. The dissenting opinion of 




Chapter 5 has shown that no gender-related law in Malawi marks community 
bylaws as subsidiary legislation – meaning that as far as formal law is 
concerned, the community bylaws are legally invalid. The fact that national 
frameworks such as the National Strategy on Ending Child Marriage (2018-
2023) have planned for the formulation of community bylaws to address child 
marriage across Malawi1359 does not cure the situation, since Parliament has 
exclusive legislative powers in Malawi.1360 In fact, the validity of efforts by the 
Ministry of Gender to harmonise the community bylaws by producing a ‗one 
bylaw framework‘, as will be outlined in Chapter 9, would depend on action 
by District Councils to appropriate and apply the framework as required by 
law, and not on Chiefs‘ usage of the framework (to produce their community 
bylaws) alone.  
The fact that the community bylaws cannot be used as formal law in 
courtrooms is both unproblematic and problematic. On the one hand, it 
should be immaterial that the community bylaws are not enforceable as 
formal law because that is not their aim anyway. On the other hand, the lack 
of judicial force should be cause of concern because a community bylaw that 
is judicially quashed would suddenly lose its power to enforce anticipated 
protection for women and girls (unless the community returns to the drawing 
board to produce ‗legal‘ bylaws). 
Using the broader term community ‗laws‘ would have been less contentious 
than community ‗bylaws,‘ since the Constitution accepts ‗any law,‘ (including 
customary law,)1361 so long as it is consistent with constitutional principles. 
And as seen in Chapter 4, CEDAW jurisprudence now recognises community 
law as legal pluralist law.1362 Nevertheless, the next part argues that there is 
                                                                                                                                      
text or tradition, and therefore represented a judicial usurption of lawmaking power 
incompatible with the rule of law. 
1359 See note 993 of the thesis. 
1360 See note 941 of the thesis. 
1361 See section 5.3.1.2 of the thesis. 




scope to argue that community bylaws can be recognised as valid law in a 
pluralistic legal system such as that of Malawi. This begs an understanding of 
how the community bylaws are perceived within the context of culture and 
(living) customary law particularly.  
8.3.2 Community Bylaws, Culture and Living Customary Law  
Since ‗custom‘ and ‗law‘ form part of cultural systems,1363 interrogating the 
legal status of community bylaws as living customary law has to start with 
appreciating whether the bylaws are positively impacting on communities‘ 
cultural beliefs and value systems (which systems are embedded in 
customary law) before delving into the living customary law dimension.  
8.3.2.1   Community bylaws and cultural beliefs and value systems 
The findings below are presented with the recognition that it has long been 
established that ‗not all cultural practices are indigenous law and vice 
versa‘.1364 Changing beliefs and values regarding education and health in the 
study communities are used as two examples to demonstrate how the 
community bylaws are positively impacting on cultural belief systems and 
values.  
                                               
1363 Clifford Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York Basic Books, Inc, 1973) 
cited in Ebenezer Durojaye, Bridget Okoye, and Adetoun Adebanjo, ‗Harmful Cultural 
Practices and Gender Equality in Nigeria,‘ (2014), 6170; Isabel Apawo Phiri, Women, 
Presbyterianism and Patriarchy: Religious Experience of Chewa Women in Central Malawi, (2001), 
13; Bronwyyn Winter, Denise Thompson, and Sheila Jeffreys, ‗The UN Approach to Harmful 
Practices: Some Conceptual Problems,‘ (2002), 77; Sally Engle Merry, ‗Changing Rights, 
Changing Culture,‘ (2001),‘ 39. 
1364 Hlope v Mahlalela 1998 (1) SA 449 (T) at 457 H – I, cited in Chuma Himonga and Craig 
Bosch, ‗The Application of African Customary Law Under the Constitution of South Africa: 
Problems Solved or Just Beginning,‘ (2000), 321. To be (living) customary law, a social rule 
should not only involve conduct or behaviour that recurs within a social group, but should 
create a sense of obligation to conform—John Hund, ‗―Customary Law is What the People 
Say it is"—HLA Hart's Contribution to Legal Anthropology,‘ (1998), 420; Ian Hamnett, 
Chieftainship and Legitimacy: An Anthropological Study of Executive Law in Lesotho (1975), 10. 
Both cited in Chuma Himonga and Craig Bosch, ‗The Application of African Customary Law 




The first example demonstrates that values attached to (girl) education have 
shifted, resulting in discarding prior beliefs and practices. Senior Chief 
Mwirang‘ombe, Karonga, explained, ‗some customary values were bad and 
allowed parents to exploit children through marriage. They regarded the 
education of a boy as more important than a girl‘s. The bylaws are 
disconnecting us from these bad beliefs’. Indeed, it is undeniable from the 
empirical data in Chapter 7 that child marriage bylaws are signaling 
attitudinal transformation towards girl education – thus swapping the beliefs 
and values that viewed girls as (potential) dependent wives and carers, with 
the value of educating both the girl and the boy child.1365  
The second example illustrates that changing values attached to health (from 
HIV and safe motherhood perspectives) have resulted in banning practices 
that were ordinarily condoned at customary law. Group Village Heads in 
Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area, Ntcheu, noted: ‘chokolo1366 was valued in the 
past because it secured a reliable provider for the widow and her children. 
However, chokolo is problematic now due to AIDS, so we have banned it‘. 
Village Heads in Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area disclosed that ‗we used 
to believe in the practice of kuchotsa mzimu,1367 which the widow would go 
through while a dead body was still in the house‘. Though this belief was also 
meant to protect clan health, HIV has compelled the community to re-
evaluate its values.  
As shown in Table 3, some of the community bylaws address safe 
motherhood, and the value of maternal health has replaced old beliefs in 
traditional births. In Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area, the increased respect for 
                                               
1365 Indeed, communities seem to be attaching greater value towards education generally— 
for example by banning Gule Wamkulu inductions for boys (Lukwa area) and initiation 
ceremonies (Chitera area) from being conducted during the school calendar as shown in 
Chapter 7. 
1366 Wife inheritance. 
1367 Best English approximation could be 'removing dead spirits'—for fear that the dead man‘s 
spirit would linger around and cause some calamities. Therefore, if a man has died, a male 




maternal health has been accompanied by a growing interest to reduce fistula 
cases.1368 The seriousness attached to the value of maternal health in Senior 
Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area was displayed when women said they do not 
find it problematic that as a way of enforcing the area‘s community bylaws, a 
mother and a new born baby can be detained at a health facility if the mother 
fails to pay chindapusa after violating bylaws that prohibit women from giving 
birth at home or on the way to the hospital.1369 The women did not see this as 
a violation of human rights, but as a measure for protecting women‘s health 
so that they do not die due to avoidable birth delivery complications.  
A combination of the increased value attached to health and general 
(economic) wellbeing was visible in community bylaws that prohibit property 
grabbing. Village Heads in Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area explained that 
in the past they would grab property whenever a father died, but the bylaws 
have banned the practice in order to safeguard children‘s future. Village 
Heads in Senior Chief Chitera‘s area, Chiradzulu, added: 
We practiced property grabbing because under our inheritance 
customs and beliefs, the ones who ‗owned‘ the deceased man were 
his natal family, and they deserved to inherit his property. Currently, 
the bylaws have completely eradicated the practice after we realised 
that due to the many HIV deaths, the practice was only promoting 
poverty as well as HIV itself.1370 
Therefore, the community bylaws are ‗shaking‘ customary beliefs and values, 
with communities abandoning long-standing beliefs and values that inflicted 
harm and installing renewed protective values to cure such harms. The 
                                               
1368 The community came to appreciate that if girls stay longer in school, they would be 
protected from fistula as they would get married at a mature age. 
1369 Discussed further under Chapter 9. 
1370 For example, the widow would be desperate to have a husband again, or would be having 
multiple transactional sexual relationships. Impoverished female orphans would also quickly 





reference to ‗government‘ in the above quote is what Phiri 1371  has been 
described as ‗interaction with other cultures‘.1372 Thus, formal legal culture 
and the influence of changing socio-economic conditions may interact with 
people‘s lived realities to generate living law.1373 
Customary values like those examined above are considered important to 
living law discourse. It has been argued that in determining what is truly 
living law, one may have to the focus on the values (of a customary law) than 
being fixated with the rules – because the rules that seek to translate and 
implement such values may change, whereas values are more durable.1374 
Even without the inference that the community bylaws are living law, one can 
appreciate that the bylaws are a manifestation of the argument that although 
values can be resilient, they can also be the very subject of, if not cause, for 
change – or both.  
In this context, a values-oriented approach helps one to tread carefully with 
postulations that the community bylaws could be all about vernacularising 
human rights or legislation. Rather, horizontal vernacularisation assists to 
grasp that the rural communities that are formulating community bylaws 
have suffered unpleasant backlashes from their very cultures, leading them to 
voluntarily transform their ‗interior‘ by questioning their values, while 
inevitably interacting with complementary modern (human rights) agendas. 
8.3.2.2   Community bylaws within the context of living customary law 
Chapter 3 has illustrated that commentators have differentiated customary 
                                               
1371 Isabel Apawo Phiri, Women, Presbyterianism and Patriarchy: Religious Experience of Chewa 
Women in Central Malawi, (2001). 
1372 Ibid., 13. 
1373 Anthony C. Diala, ‗The Concept of Living Customary Law: A Critique ‘ (2017), 151; 
Chuma Himonga and Craig Bosch, ‗The Application of African Customary Law Under the 
Constitution of South Africa: Problems Solved or Just Beginning,‘ (2000), 318.  
1374See section 3.5.3 of the thesis, and particularly Chuma Himonga and Craig Bosch, ‗The 
Application of African Customary Law Under the Constitution of South Africa: Problems 




law from living customary law, with the validity of the former being 
mistrusted due to rigidity and distortions. 1375  On the other hand, ‗living 
customary law‘ is more accepted, since it flows with societal socio-economic 
changes, circumstances and patterns affecting those practicing it.1376   
It has been argued that attaching the term ‗customary‘ in descriptions of 
living law is an oxymoron (because ‗customary‘ means digging up the past 
and therefore contradicts the living nature of living law).1377  However, this 
thesis maintains the term living customary law because the reality is that 
living law does not work from nothing. In the case of the community bylaws, 
returning to the past (customary) is necessary in order to sift practices that 
should respond to modern socio-economic realities.  
Do Chiefs understand community bylaws as living customary law?1378 Chiefs 
commonly felt that the community bylaws on child marriage and harmful 
practices are reconstructing customary law, and therefore cannot be separated 
from it. Senior Chief Lukwa, Kasungu, argued that community bylaws are 
just an improved form of customary law because in the past punishments 
were orally prescribed, but were still the same as in the bylaws (goats, 
chickens). Senior Chief Kwataine, Ntcheu, had a similar opinion, which was 
generally echoed by other Chiefs1379: 
                                               
1375 See sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 of the thesis respectively. 
1376 See section 3.5.3 of the thesis. 
1377  See note 475. 
1378 The focus is on perspectives of Chiefs given that they would best know what is or is not 
customary, and therefore place the bylaws in appropriate context.  
1379 In Kasungu, Group Village Heads in Chief Lukwa‘s area said, ‗we are only pruning 
disturbing elements of customary law so that we only enforce good customary law‘. Village 
Heads in Chief Chitera‘s area, Chiradzulu explained, ‗the establishment of bylaws means 
people are abandoning old bad practices for new useful ones. The bad laws of the past may 
have pleased our ancestors, but our generation has to replace them because they are 
dangerous today.‘ Group Village Heads too in the area conceded: ‗bylaws are sieving 
unpalatable parts of customary law. So the new lifestyle we are adopting through the bylaws 
will gradually replace whatever is bad under customary law‘. Village Heads in Chief 
Mwirang‘ombe‘s area asserted, ‗the community bylaws will continue working, replacing bad 
customary laws that lowered people‘s living standards—for instance laws that permitted 




Community bylaws and customary law move together because the 
bylaws are ending some aspects of customary law that were 
damaging to girls and boys. Thus bylaws are slowly changing or 
abolishing customary laws that were violating human rights, and in 
the process adapting customary law to modern life. 
The fact that the Chiefs were not shielding ‗bad customary law‘ and had no 
reservations about its substitution raised the question of whether, by backing 
community bylaws,1380  the Chiefs are not contradicting their own role as 
custodians of culture. The Chiefs were unapologetic about transforming 
culture and customary law. Senior Chief Kwataine summed up their attitude 
by remarking, ‗we cannot deodorise bad customs‘. The reasons that were 
provided demonstrate the pursuit of intertwined agendas (local/traditional 
and state), whose success hinges on deconstructing customs and customary 
law. Group Village Heads in Senior Chief Chitera‘s area, Chiradzulu, 
clarified: ‗our role to safeguard culture remains, but we are focused on good 
culture. Chiefs now know that some customs have simply been destructive. 
Having witnessed deaths of our subjects daily due to AIDS, our perspectives 
have changed too‘. Senior Chief Chitera also underlined Chiefs‘ cooperation 
with government: 
We are supposed to change so that our local customs and laws 
should support government‘s interests.1381 Every day, the world is 
changing and we should use all tools necessary – whether state law 
or our own bylaws– to protect people. This is not the time to 
defend/protect harmful practices, but to drop them. 
According to Chiefs, outdated values and beliefs cannot be sustained when 
Chiefs now know better, including that they have to cooperate with 
government to promote development. 1382  Group Village Heads in Senior 
                                               
1380 Which are challenging culture. 
1381 For example, promoting child education. 
1382 For example, Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe noted, ‗you just cannot insist on bad things 
because you are a Chief. Even Chiefs have to learn and work with government to promote 




Chief Lukwa‘s area observed that some customs are being uprooted because 
they had troubling ideals, when compared to the modern world and its 
changes. Senior Chief Lukwa, who remarked that Chiefs have been accused of 
violating women‘s rights by approving child marriage so that they can ‗eat‘ 
cows, goats and chickens, declared passionately:  
Some traditional practices just have to change. What our ancestors 
used to do cannot be instinctively preserved 100 percent today 
because they were perpetuating some practices mu nthawi 
yakusadziwa’.1383 Now zinthu zapenya1384 and we cannot accept a 12- 
year old to leave school to get married or continue promoting 
fisi,1385 bulangete la mfumu,1386 polygamy . . . Today many Chiefs are 
educated or have been exposed to issues and are not blind 
anymore. Practices of our ancestors are unbeneficial to people and 
should change for our country to develop.   
Thus, a three-fold perspective on why Chiefs should change customs and 
customary law was advanced, regardless of whether Chiefs personally benefit 
from the harmful practices: 1387  a) the need to respond to contemporary 
problems;1388 b) the demand that customs have to change to conform to the 
state‘s development goals means that bad customary laws1389  have to be 
replaced with laws that promote everyone‘s development; and c) the reality 
that negative aspects of culture that contravene state law have to change to 
correspond with legislation.  
                                               
1383 Best English approximation would be 'during an era of ignorance'. 
1384 Best English approximation would be 'we know better; we can see with our own eyes'. 
1385 See Glossary of Chichewa terms. 
1386 'Chief‘s blanket'—see Glossary of Chichewa terms. 
1387  While the three perspectives summarise what other Chiefs were articulating, these 
perspectives were particularly shared by Chiefs in Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area. In 
respect of practices that benefit Chiefs, they cited the practice of bulangete la mfumu (Chief's 
blanket, see Glossary of Chichewa terms) which they felt was very bad and had to be banned 
because Chiefs would infect their wives and create problems for their families. 
1388 'We have experienced and witnessed high population growth not only in this area but the 
entire Malawi'. 




While communities are self-motivated to eradicate harmful practices for the 
sake of their own development, the relevance of ‗state benchmarks‘ to 
redefining customary law and practices through the community bylaws is 
also unmistakable in the above findings. This reveals the iterative nature of 
horizontal vernacularisation – whereby one cannot pin down human rights 
influences as being fully external, although one also cannot reject the 
relevance of such influences as local communities reconstruct their beliefs and 
values. No wonder the scholarship on living customary law discussed in 
Chapter 3 has noted that the powerful influences of state and international 
law (and their human rights groundings) unite with other socio-economic 
changes and compel people to change negative customary laws and practices 
by embracing new norms.1390 However, instead of expecting customary law to 
totally submit to state law ideals, horizontal vernacularisation in the context 
of community bylaws exposes that the relationship between customary law 
on the one hand, and state law on the other is one of mutual submission.   
Although the above findings would tempt one to conclude that the 
community bylaws are a form of living customary law (as their tenor certainly 
imposes rights and obligations in the vernacular, with ‗people adapting their 
customs to socio-economic changes‘1391), scholarship notes one main feature 
of living customary law that poses a challenge to such a conclusion. It is taken 
for granted that unlike customary law, which is written down (has been 
codified) in countries such as South Africa,1392 living customary law has to be 
oral. 1393 On the other hand, the community bylaws studied are all written, 
although it has been shown that the initial bylaws were oral in nature. Before 
hastily disqualifying them from customary living law, several findings 
                                               
1390  See section 3.5.3. Particularly also see  Anthony C. Diala, ‗The Concept of Living 
Customary Law: A Critique ‘ (2017), 155 & 159. 
1391 Ibid., 155. 
1392 For example, the Natal Code of Zulu Law; the Kwazulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law 
Chuma Himonga and Craig Bosch, ‗The Application of African Customary Law Under the 
Constitution of South Africa: Problems Solved or Just Beginning,‘ (2000), 328-329. 




illuminate the value that the communities attach to these bylaw documents. 
Chiefs were asked: where are these bylaws – in your heads or you have 
written documents that you make reference to cases arise? In all study sites, 
Group Village Heads and Village Heads said they know the bylaws orally – 
the TA has a copy, but they do not have copies of the bylaws.1394  This 
prompted a follow up question: ‗how can you ever hope that your successors 
will know these bylaws and act as you do if they cannot inherit a document?‘ 
Most Chiefs explained that while human nature is unpredictable, it was 
unlikely that future Chiefs could reverse the new values that communities 
had collectively agreed upon.  
What looked like a gap later started to make sense from the perspective that 
Chiefs may not be troubled by not having reference documents (bylaws) 
because that is the way their law has always existed – in their heads. Indeed, 
during the interviews none of the Chiefs was reciting from any bylaw 
document.1395 In fact, Chapter 7 has shown that the idea of reducing bylaws to 
writing (and indeed the very term bylaws as seen in Senior Chief Chitera‘s 
area) came from NGOs. It really seems the communities would not stop 
rejecting child marriage and other harmful practices even if their bylaws were 
unwritten.  
Indeed, section 7.3.3.6 has shown that writing the bylaws down is not a 
crucial step, and that consensus is reached first before reducing the rules into 
writing; and that in 2018, the Chewa King, Gawa Undi, made serious oral 
decrees against harmful practices. Practically, communities are not operating 
based on written documents, but based on a conviction for the need to change 
their cultural values. As seen above, a focus on values brings sustainable 
                                               
1394 They explained that they do not have resources to print the community bylaws for every 
Chief, but that the bylaws are known by Chiefs anyway. 
1395 Getting the typed bylaws was a feat, even for me, and some Senior Chiefs did not have 
them at hand. Chief Chitera referred me to the NGO, GENET; I later sourced bylaws for Chief 
Mwirang'ombe's area from the Social Welfare Office; and Chief Kwataine had to search for 
area's bylaws as an email attachment (after hotspotting my phone to get internet access) in 




change than just rules. 1396 Indeed, one wonders whether the insistence of 
NGOs/projects for a written community bylaws document to be produced is 
for the good of the community, or it is just something to wave about as 
evidence of project success.1397  
There are good grounds, therefore, for arguing that community bylaws still 
fall under the broader concept of living law – viewed by Claassens1398  as 
blended law and experiences (i.e. from vernacular, constitutional or statutory 
sources); 1399  and what Hellum 1400  labels as ‗the outcome of the interplay 
between international law, state law, and local norms that takes place through 
human interaction in different historical, social and legal contexts‘.1401 This 
means that even if they may not have the status of formal law or customary 
law, the community bylaws have legal status as living law in the context 
pluralistic legal system.  
In other words, the community bylaws are neither formal law, nor do they sit 
easily with customary law. By simply tagging them as ‗living law‘, the 
community bylaws can be seen as a rupture of both formal and customary 
law to address current pressing problems in Malawian society, especially 
harmful practices. The vertical approach of international jurisprudence that 
mostly expects states to take legal and other formal measures seems to not 
have achieved much by way of curbing harmful practices. Customary law is 
itself too patriarchal and stale to resolve this problem. Therefore, the bylaws 
represent a disruption of both an entirely new innovation from the bottom up, 
involving multiple players both local and non-local. 
                                               
1396 See section 8.3.2.2 of the thesis. 
1397 Of course one would also argue that if it was the former, the same projects ensure that 
they print enough bylaws for every existing Chief in the jurisdiction. 
1398  Aninka Claassens, ‗Entrenching Distortion and Closing Down Spaces for Change: 
Contestations Over Land and Custom in South Africa,‘ (2012), 1-62.  
1399 Ibid., 31-32. 
1400  Anne Hellum, Women’s Human Rights and Legal Pluralism in Africa: Mixed Norms and 
Identities in Infertility Management in Zimbabwe, North-South Legal Perspectives, (1999). 
1401 Ibid., cited in Aninka Claassens, ‗Entrenching Distortion and Closing Down Spaces for 




The next section considers the question of the congruence of these community 
bylaws with international human rights standards. This question is relevant 
to the discussion of the nature of vernacularisation at play in the context of 
the bylaws vis-a-vis international human rights law. 
8.4 CONCEPTUALISATION OF COMMUNITY BYLAWS AND HARMFUL PRACTICES 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW  
Three issues are of interest: a) comparing the conceptualisation of harmful 
practices under community bylaws with that in international human rights 
law and jurisprudence (and state law); b) ‗sizing‘ the community bylaws 
against key principles underpinning women‘s and children‘s rights 
conventions; and c) contrasting how community bylaws are conceptualising 
punishments (chindapusa) with international human rights and state law 
approaches. First, the key conceptual issues guiding the analysis are 
presented. 
8.4.1 Overview of Key Conceptual Issues 
Chapter 4 1402  necessitates an examination of how community bylaws for 
addressing harmful practices affecting women and girls are internalising 
international human rights norms in five areas:  
 how the type of harmful practices under the community bylaws 
compare with examples of harmful practices in the jurisprudence, 
particularly those that are specifically developed by international 
jurisprudence1403 (and that apply to Malawi‘s context);  
                                               
1402 Analysing  international human rights law and jurisprudence on harmful practices. 
1403 Child marriage is also particularly elaborated by the joint ACHPR/ACERWC General 




 how the bylaws are reflecting key principles of CEDAW and the 
Maputo Protocol,1404 as well as core principles of the CRC and the 
African Children‘s Charter;  
 the extent to which community bylaws satisfy the ‗harmful test‘ criteria 
proposed by CEDAW and CRC jurisprudence, 1405  and challenges 
regarding the criteria;  
 whether the recommended services for victims of child marriages and 
under international jurisprudence are embraced in community bylaws, 
and the approaches that the bylaws pursue in reinforcing access to the 
services; and  
 how the punishment schemes of the community bylaws are designed 
given that international jurisprudence is concerned about negative 
impacts of some sanctions on victims of harmful practices. This also 
exposes how communities in rural Malawi are conceptualising ‗victim,‘ 
and how this challenges perspectives of international human rights 
jurisprudence. 
8.4.2 Harmful Practices under Community Bylaws and in International 
Jurisprudence  
Table 4 analyses how gender-specific harmful practices covered in 
community bylaws1406 are reflecting harmful practices that are recognised in 
international jurisprudence (and state law). However, internationally 
recognised harmful practices that are invisible in Malawian communities are 
omitted. 1407  Table 4 is simply illustrative of the range of internationally 
                                               
1404  Which also underpin provisions promoting women's rights under the Republican 
Constitution. 
1405 See section 4.3.1.2 of the thesis. 
1406 These are drawn from Table 1, which captures all the harmful prcatices covered in the 
studied community bylaws. 
1407 FGM, forced-feeding of girls; fattening; virginity testing; 'honour' crimes dowry-related 
death and violence, breast ironing—CRC/C/GC/13; CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18; 




recognised harms covered/not covered by the bylaws, and areas marked ‗yes‘ 
should not be read as representing the common position of all community 
bylaws reviewed for this thesis. For issues that are specifically covered by 
certain bylaws, reference should be made to Table 3.1408    















CEDAW; CRC; African 
Children‘s Charter; CRC 
General Comment No. 
13; joint CEDAW 
General 
Recommendation/ 
CRC General Comment; 
CESCR General 





Divorce and Family 
Relations Act; Child 
Care, Justice and 
Protection Act.  
  Girls and boys should not enter 
marriage before 18 years; forced 
marriage and child betrothal 
prohibited; Clergy and Sheikhs 
should not solemnise a child 
marriage; Chiefs should not 
approve a child marriage; those 
undertaking cultural 
negotiations relating to child 
marriage should be punished; 
child marriage should be 




Joint CEDAW General 
Recommendation/ 
CRC General Comment. 
   Issue is not addressed in lobola 
paying areas.  
Polygamy Joint CEDAW General 
Recommendation/ 
CRC General Comment; 
Maputo Protocol. 
Marriage, Divorce and 
Family Relations Act.  
   Though sometimes debated, 






CRC General Comment 
No. 13; joint CEDAW 
General 
Recommendation/ 
CRC General Comment. 
HIV and AIDS 
(Prevention and 
Management) Act; 
Gender Equality Act. 
  A girl should not be: locked 
indoors upon reaching puberty; 
subjected to initiation sexual 
cleansing; given sex instructions 
during initiation. 
Initiation ceremonies should not 
be conducted during 
schooldays. 
                                               















Joint CEDAW General 
Recommendation/ 
CRC General Comment; 
CESCR General 
Comment No 14. 
Gender Equality Act.  
  Girls should be given equal 
opportunities with boys 
regarding education, 





Joint CEDAW General 
Recommendation/ 
CRC General Comment. 
HIV and AIDS 
(Prevention and 
Management) Act; 
Gender Equality Act. 
  Widows should not be subjected 
to chokolo (wife inheritance), 
sexual cleansing, and any 
inhumane practices; property 
should not be grabbed from 
orphans and/or widows; 
surviving wife and children 
should have all household 
property; property grabbing is a 
criminal offence.   
   Chokolo ‗candidates‘ should 
undergo HIV testing. 
Incest Joint CEDAW General 
Recommendation/ 
CRC General Comment. 
  Defilement of girls by fathers or 
stepfathers will be sanctioned, 












Gender Equality Act. 
  Pregnant women should: 
timeously attend antenatal 
clinics; deliver at hospital; be 
escorted by husbands to 
hospital; not take traditional 
herbs to assist with labour; not 
be overworked by husband; be 
provided nutritious food by 
husband; not be denied eggs 
and milk; not be sent to wait for 
delivery at their parents‘ home. 
Adolescent girls should access 
contraceptives and anyone 
restricting them will be fined. 
   A girl who has fallen pregnant 






CEDAW; CRC; joint 
CEDAW General 
Recommendation/ 
CRC General Comment; 
Maputo Protocol; 
African Children‘s 
  Other prohibited practices are: 
bulangete la mfumu (Chief‘s 
blanket), fisi, chimwanamaye 
(wife swapping), mbiligha 
(bonus wife); chiramu (sleeping 













Equality Act; Child 
Care, Justice and 
Protection Act; HIV and 
AIDS (Prevention and 
Management) Act; 
Prevention of Domestic 
Violence Act1409. 
  
Prohibited domestic violence 
acts include: spousal/wife 
battery; neglecting to clothe and 
feed a wife and children; 
economic abuse, including by 
migrant husband; divorce 
without justifiable cause, 
beating a pregnant wife, marital 
rape, verbal abuse, extramarital 
affairs, preventing a wife to do 
business or participate in social 
groups; financial/emotional 




Joint CEDAW General 
Recommendation/ 
CRC General Comment; 
CRC General Comment 
No 13; African 
Children‘s Charter 
Constitution; Child 
Care, Justice and 
Protection Act.  
  Violence against girls of 
following nature is prohibited: a 
schoolteacher/schoolboy to 
sexually touch, insult, and 
demean a schoolgirl; a teacher to 
be with a schoolgirl at an 
inappropriate place or to 
propose love to a schoolgirl; 
other men having sex/affairs 
with schoolgirls. 
 
The following discussion draws from Table 4 to interpret the findings from 
the context of whether the conceptualisation of harmful practices in the 
community bylaws: is reinforcing patriarchy; complying with international 
human rights standards; and displaying different understandings of harm by 
rural people in Malawi. 
8.4.3 Patriarchal Conceptualisation of Harmful Practices 
According to Table 4, the patriarchy argument arises in respect of lobola/bride 
price, polygamy and some approaches to levirate marriages since these are 
inconsistent with practices regarded as harmful under international human 
rights jurisprudence. Section 5.3.3.1 has shown that issues of lobola/bride 
                                               
1409 However, note 1003 has mentioned that the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act has not 





price, polygamy are equally evaded in legislation.1410 Therefore, their absence 
in the community bylaws (particularly for polygamy) may not signal 
widespread acceptance,1411 but rather that they are unresolved controversies. 
Though one could contend that community bylaws are taking a cue from 
legislation, the fact that some bylaws banned child marriage ahead of 
legislative bans would rebut such an argument.  
From a patriarchy perspective, the CEDAW and CRC jurisprudence argues 
that bride price payments predispose women and girls to violence and other 
harmful practices.1412 As shown in section 5.3.1.1, the dilemna is that lobola is 
the bedrock of a valid marriage in Malawian patrilineal societies.1413 In so far 
as violence against girls is concerned, this risk is arguably dissolved by the 
unqualified child marriage prohibitions in the reviewed bylaws. Nonetheless, 
this does not resolve the risk of VAW. As for polygamy, CEDAW and CRC 
jurisprudence regards the practice as a human rights violation that affects 
women‘s and girls‘ dignity, and that has negative physical, mental, economic 
and social implications. 1414  Therefore, merely cushioning the impacts of 
polygamy by punishing a polygamous man who neglects his wife and 
children, as one bylaw stipulates, is insufficient. 
As regards levirate marriages/chokolo,1415 patriarchy is reinforced where the 
practice is conditionally upheld, and where it is outlawed on health and not 
on gender grounds. While most bylaws completely ban the practice, one 
community bylaw makes HIV testing a precondition of chokolo, thus still 
                                               
1410 Section 5.3.3.1 of the thesis has noted that the new marriage law only proscribes polygamy 
in civil marriages. Furthermore, it is noted that the two issues have been excluded in 
legislation despite debates by special Law Commission affirming the need to legislate 
regarding them. 
1411 Indeed section 7.3.2.3 of the thesis shows that Chief Kwataine and women proposed that 
community bylaws in their area should ban polygamy but the community failed to reach a 
consensus. 
1412 E.g. see Paragraph 24, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18/. 
1413 See note 1007. 
1414 E.g. see Paragraph 25, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 




sustaining chokolo. For the community in question, the bylaw‘s objective is to 
prevent HIV transmission (therefore, so long as the practice is ‗modified‘ to 
ensure that concerned parties are certified HIV free, the hazard vanishes). 
Even bylaws that completely ban chokolo are motivated by the HIV epidemic, 
and not gender concerns.1416 Arguably, such communities could reinstate the 
practice in the absence of existing HIV risks. This reveals limitations of a one-
dimensional approach to modifying traditional practices because, from the 
gender equality lens of CEDAW and CRC jurisprudence, levirate marriages 
should be entirely prohibited since they are a form of forced marriage.1417 Any 
law that falls short of this standard, flouts international human rights 
standards.  
However, the subsequent section shows that the three gaps are not a 
catastrophic failure, as the bylaws still substantively protect women.  
8.4.4 Compliant Conceptualisation of Harmful Practices 
Table 4 reveals high consistency between harmful practices in the community 
bylaws and most of the harmful practices under international human rights 
jurisprudence and state law discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. Read 
together, the bylaws cover issues of forced marriage, child betrothal and child 
marriage; violent and degrading initiation rites; preferential care and 
treatment of boys; widowhood practices; GBV norms violating sexual and 
reproductive health; and other harmful practices, including various forms of 
VAW and VAC. 
In respect of child marriage, although the respective bylaws were formulated 
before the new marriage law was enacted in Malawi (2015),1418 they all set 18 
years as the minimum marriage age at customary law for both girls and boys. 
                                               
1416 See illustrative explanations by Chiefs in section 8.3.2.1 of the thesis. 
1417 E.g. see Paragraph 23, CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18. 





The bylaws did this when child marriage, including at custom, was 
constitutionally permitted.1419 The Chiefs‘ stance to reject marriages of those 
below 18 years even contrasts with the acceptance by CEDAW and CRC 
jurisprudence that persons under 16 years can get married in exceptional 
circumstances.1420 In some bylaws, serious intent to eliminate child marriages 
and other harmful practices is expressed by banning specific duty bearers 
from performing roles that would facilitate child marriages;1421 as well as 
practices that ‗benefit‘ Chiefs.1422 This aligns with calls for comprehensive 
approaches to address harmful practices/child marriage under jurisprudence 
generated by the CEDAW and CRC committees, as well as by 
ACHPR/ACERWC. 1423  But the broader question is: how are community 
bylaws conceptualising harmful practices? 
8.4.5 Conceptualisation of Harms  
The community bylaws do not typically carry definitions of harmful practices, 
but their list of proscribed practices suggests that their interests are not too 
remote from those of legislation and international jurisprudence. 1424 
According to Table 4, the community bylaws reviewed mostly ban cultural 
and social practices, which is not surprising since communities want to deal 
with their internal socio-cultural harms that hinder the development of girls 
and women. Indeed, in line with legislation, the harmful practices specified in 
both Tables 3 and 4 can potentially have physical, sexual, emotional or 
psychological [and even economic and social] impacts.1425 
                                               
1419 See section 5.3.1.2 of the thesis. 
1420 See section 4.3.1.2 of the thesis. 
1421 For example Clergy, Sheikhs and Chiefs. 
1422 Bulangete la mfumu/Chief's blanket—see Glossary of Chichewa terms. 
1423 See sections 4.3.1.2 and 4.3.2 of the thesis respectively. 
1424 See sections 4.3 and 5.3.3.1 of the thesis respectively. 
1425Chapter 5 has shown that the Gender Equality Act defines a harmful practice as ‗a social, 
cultural or religious practice, which, on account of sex, gender or marital status, does or is 
likely to undermine the dignity, health or liberty of any person; or result in physical, sexual, 




Malawian statutes do not comprehensively conceptualise harmful 
practices,1426 and thus the conceptualisation of harmful practices under the 
community bylaws can be most meaningfully tested against the ‗harmful 
practices‘ criteria under CEDAW and CRC jurisprudence. Moreover, the 
conceptualisation of child marriage under ACHPR/ACERWC jurisprudence 
provides a comparative basis with how the community bylaws conceptualise 
‗victimhood‘ in the context of child marriage.  
First, the ‗harmful practices‘ criteria under CEDAW and CRC jurisprudence 
expose conceptual gaps when certain harmful practices banned by the 
community bylaws are applied. For example, respondents commonly stated 
that their safe motherhood bylaws are addressing harmful practices. Upon 
seeking explanation about why unsafe ‗motherhood‘ practices are being 
linked with common harmful practices, women gave several examples that 
make certain, traditionally anchored, maternal practices harmful: Traditional 
Birth Attendants using traditional maize grinding mortars to press a pregnant 
woman‘s stomach so that she can deliver quickly during labour;1427 denying a 
pregnant woman nutritious food and/or medical care during the pregnancy 
and delivery;1428 insisting on traditional births even during obstructed labour 
and pumping the pregnant woman with herbal medicine ‗to release 
witchcraft spells‘ (instead of rushing her to hospital).1429  
This conceptualisation of harmful practices challenges the emphasis of 
CEDAW and CRC jurisprudence on ‗practices and behaviour grounded in 
discrimination on the basis of sex, gender, age and other intersecting forms 
of discrimination that often involve violence and cause physical and/or 
                                                                                                                                      
(Prevention and Management) Act defines harmful practices as ‗any social, religious or 
cultural practice that puts a person at risk of HIV infection and reinfection; or may catalyse 
progression of HIV to AIDS‘—See section 5.3.3.1 of the thesis. 
1426 See section 5.3.3.1 of the thesis. 
1427 Women‘s FGD, Chief Lukwa‘s area, Kasungu. 
1428 Women‘s FGD, Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area, Karonga. 




psychological harm or suffering . . . ‘1430  (emphasis added). Arguably, the 
above maternal health harmful practices do not neatly meet the 
discrimination and violence components of this definition.1431  
The findings show that one should not be limited to defining harmful 
practices against women from the lens of overt discrimination or violence, but 
should be more alert to concealed forms of the same. Therefore, for the safe 
motherhood bylaws, one would contend that since only women can be 
pregnant, the lack of measures to avert harmful effects of some traditional 
practices on pregnant women (their dignity, health, right to life) is 
discriminatory.  
In this regard, the safe motherhood bylaws are directly addressing three of 
the four criteria of determining a harmful practice under CEDAW and CRC 
jurisprudence.1432  First, they are averting the indignity and human rights 
abuses that occur when the health and life of a woman is risked by traditional 
maternal health practices. Second, they are addressing the adverse impacts 
suffered by pregnant women physically (resultant maternal mortality or 
morbidity), psychologically (birth/delivery trauma), economically (financial 
losses incurred by a family due to death or morbidity of a woman), and 
socially (due to prolonged recovery and morbidity, e.g. fistula). Third, the 
bylaws are removing the element of imposition, whereby a pregnant woman 
may be expected to comply with harmful traditional birth delivery methods. 
Conversely, it is difficult for the harmful ‗motherhood‘ practices to satisfy the 
third criteria, which stresses that the practice should be ‗traditional, set 
                                               
1430 See note 624.  
1431 One could argue that the conceptualisation of harms related to maternal health is best 
suited for CESCR jurisprudence. However, in the absence of detailed conceptual elaboration 
of harmful practices by the CESCR, and to the extent that women were clearly linking 
maternal issues to how we should understand harmful practices against women, the issue 
deserves an analysis under the harmful practices criteria provided by the joint CEDAW 
General Recommendation/CRC General Comment (CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18), at 
least in the context of this thesis. 




and/or nurtured by social norms that perpetuate male dominance and the 
inequality of women and children on the bases of sex, gender, age and other 
intersecting factors‘.1433 While the mischief the community bylaws seek to 
address are certainly traditional, the bylaws may not be inspired by ‗social 
norms aimed perpetuating male dominance and the inequality of women‘. In 
fact, in ages when health facilities were severely limited, the practices were 
more responsive to pregnant women, who were seen as ‗having one foot in 
the grave.‘1434 Therefore, the harmful ‗motherhood‘ practices are challenging 
the conceptualisation of the ‗traditional root criteria‘, which would apply 
more elastically by not only focusing inward (on the patriarchal causes of 
traditional practices), but also outward (on discriminatory/violence-related 
results of traditional practices, albeit unintended).  
On another note, while totally embracing child marriage as a harmful 
practice, the community bylaws project a different understanding of child 
marriage victim, thus questioning the common stance in international 
jurisprudence that child marriages automatically equate with forced 
marriages.1435 Section 8.4.7, which discusses the human rights implications of 
chindapusa in detail, shows that some bylaws give the Chief discretion to fine 
a girl child who rushes into marriage. 1436  This bylaw responds to a 
resounding concern expressed across the study sites, ‗today‘s children are so 
undisciplined and they have a fast life. Some girls are rebellious, will reject all 
counsel, and run away to cohabit with a man and get married‘.1437 Also, 
communities are reconceptualising the ‗victim‘ of child marriage, saying that, 
on some occasions, a girl is not really a victim, but is actually insubordinate to 
                                               
1433 See note 627. 
1434 This is a long held belief/saying in many Malawian (and African) communities. For 
example, see Women in the World Media LLC, ‗A Solvable Problem: Pregnant Women Have 
―One Foot in the Grave‖: Four Women Reducing Maternal Mortality.‘ Available at 
https://womenintheworld.com/2016/04/08/pregnant-women-have-one-foot-in-the-grave-
four-women-reducing-maternal-mortality/, accessed on 23 July 2019. 
1435 See sections 4.3.1.2 and 4.3.2 of the thesis particularly. 
1436 In addition to ordering the disbandment of the marriage. 
1437 One would ask why the sanctions concentrate on the girl. Table 5 also displays sanctions 




new cultural norms against child marriage and deserves being sanctioned as 
any other violator. These issues draw attention to how the community bylaws 
are projecting key principles of women‘s and child rights treaties. 
8.4.6 Community Bylaws and Key Principles of Women’s and Children’s 
Rights  
First, this part assesses how the bylaws are mirroring cardinal principles of 
CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol: gender equality and non-discrimination; 
and three of the core principles of the CRC and the African Children‘s 
Charter: best interests of the child; non-discrimination; children‘s right to 
survival, development and protection/life; and children‘s right to 
participation. 
8.4.6.1   Gender equality and non-discrimination 
Gender equality and non-discrimination as key principles of the CEDAW and 
Maputo Protocol1438 also underlie the protections of women‘s rights under the 
Republican Constitution.1439 Also, non-discrimination is a core principle of the 
CRC and African Children‘s Charter. 1440  Community bylaws exhibiting 
principles of gender equality and non-discrimination would challenge 
patriarchy by, among others, pursuing substantive equality between women 
and men. This means addressing ‗social and economic inequalities that fuel 
VAW, including access to opportunities and resources‘.1441  
Some community bylaws could move communities closer to social and 
economic equality if implemented faithfully. For example, community bylaws 
                                               
1438 See sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 of the thesis respectively. 
1439 See section 5.3.1.1 of the thesis. 
1440 See sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 of the thesis respectively. Apart from providing that every 
child should enjoy the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter without discrimination, 
the grounds of discrimination that are prohibited by the African Children‘s Charter include 
discriminating the child in his/her own right, but also by virtue of the situation of his/her 
parents or legal guardians—Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, ‗The Merits and Demerits of the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,‘ (2002), 158-159. 




in Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area, Ntcheu, have a specific ‗gender equality 
clause‘: ‗girls should be given equal opportunities with boys regarding 
education, employment, businesses, household responsibilities/chores‘. 
Additionally, Chiefs‘ responses to the question ‗what do you want to achieve 
through your bylaws‘ revealed transformative desires: that both boys and 
girls should finish education up to college level, pregnant women should 
deliver safely, and practices that mainly oppress girls/women should stop;1442 
that the community should safeguard girl education and be steered towards 
development;1443 that cultural issues that were handled wrongly, resulting in 
poverty and poor health be reversed;1444 and that the new generation of boys 
and girls should be given a good foundation for them to develop their 
community/country in future.1445  
As seen in Chapter 4,1446 apparent in the respective Chiefs‘ motivations is the 
notion of transformative substantive equality. The fact that eliminating child 
marriage is the main objective of the respective community bylaws suggests 
that the bylaws are addressing a form of sex and gender-based 
discrimination, which, according to ACHPR/ACERWC jurisprudence, 
‗reinforces harmful social constructions of gender, supports systems of 
patriarchy, and entrenches patterns of discrimination‘.1447  
Table 4 provides examples of community bylaws that can potentially achieve 
gender transformation. One bylaw boldly proscribes marital rape in 
accordance with CEDAW jurisprudence. 1448  The Marriage, Divorce and 
                                               
1442 Senior Chief Chitera, Chiradzulu. 
1443 Senior Chief Lukwa, Kasungu. 
1444 Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe, Karonga. 
1445 Senior Chief Kwataine, Ntcheu. 
1446 See section 4.2.1 of the thesis, especially note 523. 
1447 Paragraph 11, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. The joint general comment 
interprets the right to freedom from non discrimination based on sex and gender in the light 
of Article 2 the Maputo Protocol (CAB/LEG/66.6 (Sept. 13, 2000)) and Article 3 of the African 
Children's Charter (CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990)). 
1448 For example, while this is an issue that the CEDAW General Recommendation/CRC 




Family Relations Act acknowledges rape during judicial separation of 
spouses. 1449  Other bylaws have overturned the practice of dispossessing 
widows and children of inheritance property; most bylaws on safe 
motherhood are transforming gender roles by demanding that husbands 
escort their wives to ante-natal clinics and to deliver there; some bylaws 
require maintenance for a child born out of wedlock, a responsibility which 
Malawian men are traditionally not held accountable for routinely. The 
remaining principles of the CRC/African Children‘s Charter are discussed 
next. 
8.4.6.2   The best interests of the child 
In Malawi, ‗the best interests of the child‘ is domesticated as a constitutional 
principle.1450 A majority of community bylaws promote the bests interests of 
the child by banning destructive initiation practices;1451 protecting children 
from financial and emotional neglect and abuse; protecting girls from sexual 
abuses by school boys, teachers and other men; requiring young mothers to 
return to school; and requiring the payment of child maintenance.  
8.4.6.3   Children’s right to survival, development and protection/life 
Community bylaws protect children‘s right to survival, development and 
protection or life in several aspects. The concern by international 
jurisprudence that child marriage hinders children‘s economic, political, 
social growth 1452  is similarly visible in Chiefs‘ passion to eliminate child 
marriages, because uneducated girls in turn contribute to the retrogression of 
communities‘ development. However, the studied bylaws do not specifically 
                                                                                                                                      
General Recommendation No. 35 recognises marital rape as a sexual crime (Paragraph 33, 
CEDAW/C/GC/35 (advance unedited version)). 
1449 Section 62. 
1450 Section 23 (1) provides that 'all children, regardless of the circumstances of their birth, are 
entitled to equal treatment before the law, and the best interests and welfare of children shall 
be a primary consideration in all decisions affecting them'. 
1451 And generally banning the performance of initiation during school calendar. 




protect the other vulnerable groups listed in the ACHPR/ACERWC 
jurisprudence1453 from child marriage. 
While scholars that have argued that children‘s right to survival and 
development is promoted through upholding the rights to education and 
health,1454 community bylaws safeguard the right to education more strongly 
than the right to health. All reviewed community bylaws promote 
compulsory primary education and keeping girls in school.1455 Though not 
(expressly) striving for technical and vocational education as provided by the 
CRC, 1456  community bylaws apply to community-based primary and 
secondary schools operating in the territory of the interviewed Chiefs.1457  
With regard to the gender aspects of children‘s right to health, most of the 
community bylaws do not expressly promote the right of children (girls) to 
enjoy the best attainable state of physical, mental or spiritual health as 
espoused under the African Children‘s Charter.1458 As seen in Table 3,1459 only 
the bylaws in Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area directly protect girls‘ sexual and 
reproductive health rights. However, most bylaws expressly prohibit girls 
from aborting a pregnancy. The bylaws call for the elimination of customs 
and practices that are prejudicial to the health and life of a child in accordance 
                                               
1453  Paragraph 12, joint ACHPR/ACERWC General Comment. From this list, categories 
applicable to Malawi would be children with disabilities and children in child-headed 
households. 
1454  See note 653. 
1455 E.g. through prohibitions of child marriage and school GBV and ensuring the return to 
school of girls who dropped out on pregnancy grounds. Thus the bylaws are informally 
enforcing the compulsory primary education provision under Section 13 of the Education 
Act. 
1456 Article 28(1)(d)—UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 
1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3. Of course section 8.4.6.1 of the thesis has 
captured the desire of some Chiefs that the bylaws should result in the education of girls and 
boys up to college level. 
1457 Chiefs Lukwa, Ntcheu and Chitera, Chiradzulu mentioned the involvement of Mother 
Groups and school committees in the development of their areas‘ bylaws. Chief Lukwa 
added, ‗if you go to the District Education Manager, you will find a copy of our bylaws so 
that the office should cooperate with us when it comes to sanctioning teachers'. 
1458 Article 14(1), CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). 




with the African Children‘s Charter.1460  These include prohibited harmful 
practices that pose a risk to HIV transmission, such as initiation sexual 
cleansing, child marriage, defilement of girls by stepfathers and other forms 
of sexual violence, as set out in Table 4.  
Community bylaws also promote children‘s right to be protected from 
economic exploitation and hazardous work.1461  They mainly protect girls in 
patrilineal areas from economic exploitation by shielding them from being 
commodified through marriage so that parents can get lobola. Community 
bylaws in Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area, for example, prohibit parents from 
sending girls to sell merchandise after 7 pm; and punish a Chief who allows a 
girl child to migrate as a domestic worker.  
With regard to sexual exploitation, bylaws ban initiation cleansing or the 
coercion of initiated girls to have experimental sex (kusasa fumbi). These 
provisions mirror the African Children‘s Charter call for children not to be 
induced, coerced or encouraged to engage in any sexual activity. 1462 
Prohibitions of practices such as bulangete la mfumu1463 protect children from 
being used in ‗other sexual practices‘, as articulated by the Charter.1464 
8.4.7 Chindapusa: Community Bylaws and Conceptualisation of 
Sanctions 
Chindapusa, which should be understood as a civil form of traditional 
‗punishment‘, is the main sanction and enforcement mechanism for the 
community bylaws. However, through chindapusa community bylaws do not 
mean to undercut formal mechanisms of addressing harmful cultural 
                                               
1460 Article 21(1)(a), CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). 
1461  For example, through prohibiting child labour, exposing children to alcohol selling 
premises and sending children to sell merchandise at night or during school time—see Table 
3 for general examples. 
1462 Article 27(1)(a), CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). 
1463 'Chief's blanket,' see Glossary of Chichewa terms. 




practices, but to complement them. Apart from the term chindapusa, this thesis 
uses the terms ‗sanctions‘ and ‗penalties‘ interchangeably in reference to the 
contents of the bylaws. 
The main enforcers of community bylaws are Chiefs, and they do this task at 
several levels. As seen in section 7.3.4, Group Village Heads and Village 
Heads shoulder the responsibility to ensure that their subjects respect the 
bylaws; and Group Village Heads also hold Village Heads accountable for the 
implementation of the bylaws in villages under the responsibility of the 
Village Heads.  The TA is the final enforcer, and has the power to sanction 
Group Village Heads, Village Heads and rebellious/stubborn subjects where 
matters have not been resolved at Village Head and Group Village Head 
levels. At times, police may also be approached to enforce community bylaws 
when the wrong under the bylaws constitutes a crime under formal law or 
when the bylaws ‗criminalise‘ a wrong that is not necessarily a criminal act 
under statutory law. The latter has legal implications that higher courts are 
yet to resolve. 
The issue of sanctions for particular gender-specific harmful practices is 
analysed from two angles: what type of sanctions are available under the 
bylaws, and how do they meet or interrupt the vision of punishments for 
harmful practices under international human rights jurisprudence and state 
law? How are the remedies under community bylaws connecting victims to 
services?   
8.4.7.1   Overview of sanctions 
Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the diversity of sanctions in community bylaws, and 




reviewed bylaws.1465  Remedies for child marriage (Table 5) are separated 
from those for other harmful practices (Table 6) since child marriage has 
layers of penalties across the reviewed bylaws.  
a) Sanctions for child marriage 
Table 5 elucidates that sanctions related to child marriage generally target the 
following culprits: Chiefs; religious leaders; parents/guardians/clan leaders; 
teachers; ‗husband‘ of a girl child; and stubborn children.1466 
Table 5: Diversity of sanctions for child marriage  
Penalties against for Chiefs and religious leaders1467 
 Any Chief who allows marriage of child of school-going age will be fined one to two 
goats. 
 A Village Head has to report to police if he is aware of any child marriage in his 
village. Failure to report will be punished by K100,000.001468 and imprisonment for 24 
months. 
 A Chief who is involved in a child marriage will be fined a goat or be dethroned. 
 Chiefs should protect children from early marriages by refusing to register them in 
village registers. The penalty for non-adherence is three goats and demotion. 
Penalties against religious leaders1469 
 Religious leaders have the obligation to protect children from early marriages by 
refusing to bless such marriages. The penalty for non-adherence is three goats. In 
addition, the religious leader will be banished from the community. 
 All Sheikh, Pastors should not solemnise marriages of children below 18 years. 
Anyone not following this will be arrested and prosecuted. 
Penalties against parents/guardians1470 
 Parents and clan leaders who decide/agree that a girl should drop out of school and 
get married or be betrothed before the age of 18 years will be fined a goat. 
                                               
1465  For example, the fine of a goat for child marriage is simply an example in one bylaw to 
show that goats are part of the fines. Different bylaws may specify different quantities of 
goats as punishment for child marriage—some may say two, three etc. 
1466 Those adamant about getting married. 
1467 These penalties are usually enforced by the TA since 'Chief' in this instance means Group 
Village Heads and Village Heads. Where 'prosecution' is involved, the TA is expected to 
collaborate with the Police. 
1468 Equivalent to USD 135. 
1469 These penalties are usually enforced by the TA. Where 'prosecution' is involved, the TA is 
expected to collaborate with the police. 
1470 These will initially be enforced by the Village Head. The Group Village Head and TA 
become involved where the Village Head is complicit in the violation, or where the subject 




 Regardless of a child‘s consent, parents who allow school-going children to marry or 
be married will pay a fine of five goats (or the market value). 
 If a girl marries before 18 years parents of both the girl and man shall be fined 
K25,000.001471  each, and there shall be no marriage. And anyone who facilitates 
cultural arrangements relating to such marriage will be fined K50,000.00.1472 
 Arranging early marriage or forcing a girl (under 18 years or while the girl is still at 
school) into marriage attracts a fine of two goats or K40, 000.00.1473 
 A parent who secretly marries off their school-going daughter will be locked in a 
police cell until the girl is back at school. 
 Any parent who forces a child into marriage will be punished by moulding 2,500 
bricks or more, or through a fine of five chickens or one goat. 
 Parents who allow child marriage may also be penalised with community service 
such as three months of janitorial work in the local community health centre or 
school. 
Penalties against teachers1474 
 A teacher who marries a schoolgirl will be reported to the Chief, school committee, 
Mother Groups, ADC, VDC, child protection worker, District Education Manager 
(DEM), police. 
 A teacher who impregnates or marries a girl aged below 18 years old will be fined 
two goats, and be chased from the village through the DEM.  
Penalties against a man marrying a girl child1475 
 Any man who marries a young girl will be denied land and be chased out of the 
village. 
 If the ‗married‘ girl is below 16 years old, the ‗husband‘ should be reported to the 
police. 
 Any man who marries a girl aged below 18 years will be fined between one and three 
goats, and the marriage will be disbanded. 
Penalties when children enter ‘marriage’ ‘voluntarily’1476 
 A girl child who rushes into marriage will be forced out of the marriage and 
punished. 
 If two children (stubbornly) elope, their parents will be fined K25,000.00.1477 
Sources: Government of Malawi, UNFPA, EU (2016); Thesis data 
                                               
1471 Equivalent to USD 34. 
1472 Equivalent to USD 68. 
1473 Equivalent to USD 54. 
1474 While the Village Head and Group Village Head are first line points of contact when such 
violation happens, these sanctions are enforced by the TA. 
1475 These sanctions will initially be enforced by the Village Head. The Group Village Head 
and TA will get involved where the Village Head is complicit in the violation, or where the 
subject does not respect the penalty prescribed by the Village Head. 
1476 These sanctions will initially be enforced by the Village Head. The Group Village Head 
and TA will get involved where the subject does not respect the penalty prescribed by the 
Village Head. 




To note from Table 5 is the fact that beyond fines, some penalties include 
temporary ‗detention‘ in police custody; 1478  or community service. 1479  
Furthermore, sanctions for child marriage are accompanied by the automatic 
dissolution of the ‗marriage‘. Before examining the implications of these 
sanctions, it is also necessary to appreciate examples of remedies for the other 
harmful practices presented in Table 6 as there are similarities and contrasts.  
b)    Sanctions for other gender-specific harmful practices 
Penalties for the other harmful practices, set out in Table 6 target Chiefs, 
teachers, schoolboys or their parents, pregnant girls and their lovers, rapists 
(including perpetrators of kusasa fumbi 1480 ), procreation fisi 1481  initiation 
counsellors, Traditional Birth Attendants, clan leaders and relatives and men 
who marry young girls. Again, all the tiers of Chiefs1482  are involved in 
enforcing these penalties depending on the gravity of the incident. Village 
Heads and Group Village Heads remain the primary enforcers.  
Table 6: Examples of sanctions for other harmful practices  
Bylaw field Penalty 
Child 
support  
The man responsible, or parents of the responsible schoolboy will have to 
pay maintenance for the pregnancy, delivery and the child. 
School GBV  A teacher who mocks a learner who has returned to school after giving 
birth will be fined a minimum of a goat and a maximum of two goats.  
 A teacher or schoolboy who touches any private part of a schoolgirl 
will be reported to be police.  
 A teacher or schoolboy who verbally abuses a schoolgirl will be fined 
two chickens by the Village Head; three chickens by the Group Village 
Head if he persists; and a goat by the TA if he still persists. If he 
continues, he should be reported to police. 
                                               
1478 Until the girl leaves the marriage and returns to school. 
1479 E.g. moulding bricks and janitor/development work. 
1480 See Glossary of Chichewa terms. 
1481 See Glossary of Chichewa terms. 









 The pregnant girl and the man responsible will be fined K25,000.001483 
each.  
 The pregnant girl will be asked to pay back any materials that she 
received from projects promoting girl education. (Some bylaws say the 
man responsible should pay back.)  




 An initiation counsellor who encourages a girl to have experimental 
sex (kusasa fumbi) will be fined three goats; will no longer be allowed 
to practice as counsellor; and will be banished from the village.  
 The practice of kusasa fumbi is similar to rape and any man practicing it 
must be arrested by Inkhata [local vigilante group] and taken to police. 
 Parents/guardians and initiation organisers who facilitate initiation 
ceremonies during school time will be fined four goats each. 
 A female initiation counsellor who gives sex instructions to any girl 
under 18 years will be fined either five chickens or a goat. 
 If a child who has reached puberty is given harmful instructions, the 
Village Head will answer to the Group Village Head. If the Group 
Village Head has allowed this practice, he/will shall be summoned to 
the TA.  
 Parents who lock up a girl who has reached puberty will be fined four 
chickens. 
Rape  Parents/anyone found stopping a girl from reporting a rape case to 
the police will be fined two goats. 
 Parents whose child has been raped/defiled must immediately report 
at the One Stop Centre, police VSU and community policing. 
 Any person who rapes another will be fined three chickens or one goat 
before being taken to the police. 
 If a schoolgirl is raped, the issue should not be concealed but should 
be taken to the police.  
Domestic 
violence  
 A man who abandons his family without reasonable excuse should be 
reported to the court. 
 Anyone found committing prohibited acts of domestic violence will be 
fined three chickens by the Village Head; and four chickens by the 
Group Village Head if the violence continues; and a goat by the TA if 
there is no change (in addition to reporting him/her to the police 
VSU). 
Inheritance  A victim of property grabbing should report it to the police and court.  
 A Chief or anyone facilitating property grabbing will be fined three 
goats by the TA and then be reported to the police. 
                                               




Bylaw field Penalty 
Widowhood 
rites 
 A widow must not be forced to be sexually cleansed. If her in-laws 
insist on this practice, they must find or pay a married couple to do it 
instead. A violation will attract a fine five goats or MK50,000.00.1484  
 Subjecting a widow to inhumane practices attracts a fine of a chicken. 
 A new marriage by chokolo will be disbanded.   
Safe 
motherhood 
 A woman who delivers on the way to hospital or at home will pay five 
chickens to the Village Head, ten chickens to the Group Village Head, 
and two goats to the TA. (Some bylaws impose a monetary fine e.g. 
K10,000.00.1485) 
 Any Traditional Birth Attendant who is found practising will pay 
three chickens to the Village Head and five chickens to the Group 
Village Head. If she still continues, she will be fined one goat by the 
TA. (Some bylaws impose a monetary fine e.g. K10,000.00.1486) 
 A man who does not escort his wife to antenatal clinic will be fined 
five chickens by the Village Head. If he is uncooperative, he will be 
fined 10 chickens by the Group Village Head.  If he remains 
uncooperative, he will be fined a goat by the TA. (Some bylaws 
impose a monetary fine e.g. K6,000.00.1487) 
 A man who fails to provide basic necessities for child delivery will be 
fined K10,000.00.1488 
 A man who overburdens his pregnant with chores will be fined 
K5,000.00.1489 
 Anyone who prevents an adolescent girl from accessing contraceptives 





 Any community members who participate in wife selling, wife 
hijacking, chiramu1490 will be fined four goats. 
 A man who practices mbiligha, as well as the girl‘s father should pay 
K20,000.001491  each. (Some bylaws prescribe a fine of K40,000.001492). 
 Hiring fisi1493 to impregnate a wife will attract a fine of three chickens 
or K9,000.001494. 
Sources: Government of Malawi, UNFPA, EU (2016); Thesis data 
                                               
1484 Equivalent to USD 68. 
1485 Equivalent to USD 13.50. 
1486 Equivalent to USD 13.50. 
1487 Equivalent to USD 8. 
1488 Equivalent to USD 13.50. 
1489 Equivalent to USD 6.75. 
1490 See Glossary of Chichewa terms. 
1491 Equivalent to USD 27. 
1492 Equivalent to USD 54. 
1493 See Glossary of Chichewa terms. 




Just as in Table 5, the sanctions in Table 6 demonstrate that in some cases, 
chindapusa is solely livestock or money. Some community bylaws make 
livestock or money optional. The few cases where some community bylaws 
suggest arrests/reporting to the police include touching a girl‘s private 
parts;1495 habitual verbal abuse of schoolgirl;1496 performing kusasa fumbi,1497 
rape; habitual domestic violence; property grabbing. The following examines 
the sanctions under Tables 5 and 6 from a human rights perspective.  
 
8.4.7.2    ‘Chindapusa’ and international human rights norms 
The provisions of community bylaws and their enforcement mechanisms are 
assessed on how they adhere to international human rights standards. While 
this section presents chindapusa as the central inforcement tool, one should be 
mindful that communities are also deploying other broad implementation 
strategies, including services, monitoring, self-help, counselling and 
investigations.1498 
      a)    Community bylaw provisions on remedies 
There are two issues that raise human rights questions: the targets of the 
prescribed penalties; and the nature of some of the penalties. Chapter 4 
demonstrates that with regards targets of punishments, ACHPR/ACERWC 
jurisprudence supports the sanctioning of ‗marriage officers‘.1499 Statutory law 
has achieved this,1500 and most community bylaws have also not spared those 
that have authority over marriage approval/celebration – Chiefs and 
religious leaders. Chiefs 1501  may even be demoted or dethroned as 
                                               
1495 By a teacher or schoolboy. 
1496   By a teacher or schoolboy 
1497 See Glossary of Chichewa terms. The person who is penalised is the man who offers these 
services. 
1498 Discussed under sections 8.4.8 and 9.5.4 of the thesis respectively. 
1499 See section 4.3.2 of the thesis. 
1500 Sections 54-56, Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act. 
1501 Group Village Heads in the case of demotion and dethronement; and Village Heads in the 




punishment, while some clerics are threatened with banishment or arrests 
(Table 5).  
It has been noted that international jurisprudence cautions against penalising 
and sanctioning children involved in a child marriage.1502 To the extent that 
adolescent pregnancies fuel child marriages, Table 5 demonstrates that some 
community bylaws impose a fine on both a pregnant girl and her lover. Some 
require either the pregnant girl or her lover to repay any project donated 
resources that the girl received at school to support her education. Where an 
underage schoolgirl and boy elope, some bylaws impose chindapusa on their 
parents. The rationale of these bylaws is deterrence, as well as disciplining 
disobedient school-going children, though in reality the burden of paying 
chindapusa falls on their parents/clans. This is where the risk of retaliation 
feared by international jurisprudence could materialise1503 (except that in the 
bylaws context, the offending children are not considered as ‗victims.‘) 
Section 8.4.5 has also noted that the community bylaws diverge from the 
principle that a child involved in child marriage should not be sanctioned 
since some bylaws give the Chief discretion to fine a girl child who rushes 
into marriage and withdraws her or him from such marriage. In the spirit of 
deterrence, these bylaws target disobedient children who have eloped to 
marry. Thus, it is naïve for jurisprudence to ignore the realities and blindly 
exempt all children involved in a child marriage from penalties and sanctions. 
Of course, the nature of sanctions and penalties would have to be human 
rights sensitive. These bylaws align with the position of international 
jurisprudence that the right to participation does not bestow on children the 
right to make decisions to get married.1504  
                                               
1502 See sections 4.3.1.2 and 4.3.2 of the thesis. 
1503 See ibid. 




Although the ACHPR/ACERWC jurisprudence does not recommend the 
sanctioning/penalising of parents, fearing that this could fuel clandestine 
marriages, 1505  parents are consistently sanctioned under community 
bylaws.1506 Section 7.3.4.1 has uncovered that some parents resisted Chiefs 
who were advocating against child marriage.1507 Therefore, the preventative 
effect of child marriage bylaws would best materialise if such parents fear 
punishment, and not when they are protected from punishment. Getting 
away with clandestine child marriages, in the study communities, would be 
difficult, because villages in Malawi are closely knit and Chiefs are feared. 
Furthermore, section 7.3.4.2 has indicated that the communities are 
implementing their bylaws through internal watchdogs that monitor actions 
of both Chiefs and subjects. 1508  Understandably, the jurisprudence was 
considering the risks of legislatively penalising parents, while child marriages 
‗secretly‘ flourish in remote villages. This position reveals jurisprudential 
gaps arising from the ignored role of functional grassroots mechanisms for 
addressing child marriage, such as the community bylaws.  
The legality of punishments that some community bylaws stipulate, as noted 
in Table 5, is another concern. For example, imprisonment and/or ‗pressure‘ 
arrests are prescribed for actions where detention is not a statutory 
punishment (e.g. ‗a Village Head who fails to report a known child marriage 
to the police will be imprisoned for 24 months‘; ‗a parent who secretly marries 
off their school- going daughter will be locked in a police cell until the girl is 
back at school‘) 1509. Such bylaws are clearly ultra vires. 
                                               
1505 See note 698. 
1506 E.g. for child marriage, initiating a child during school time, locking up a girl who has 
reached puberty; and obstructing the reporting of the rape of a child. 
1507 Also discussed further in Chapter 9. 
1508 Others have noted that 'community bylaws promote a sense of ownership and ensure 
easy monitoring by the community itself as a means of ensuring compliance'—Malawi 
Human Rights Commission and Southern Africa Litigation Centre, Towards a Human Rights-
Based Approach to Learner Pregnancy Management in Malawi, (2017), 53. 
1509  As Table 5 notes, these punishments were sourced from various community bylaws 




On the other hand, the commission of some harmful practices that have 
criminal connotations is handled informally. For example, while few bylaws 
under Table 5 progressively specify that kusasa fumbi1510 is rape deserving 
police response, most bylaws punish the practice with chindapusa, payable to 
the Chief. 1511 The same applies to practices such as mbiligha1512 and kulowa 
kufa.1513 Even teachers who impregnate schoolgirls escape criminal liability in 
many bylaws.1514 Therefore, while most of the bylaws keenly regard ordinary 
rape as a serious crime beyond a Chief‘s jurisdiction, their conceptualisation 
of culturally entrenched human rights violations of a sexual nature remains 
soft.   
Arguably, some community bylaws are also oblivious to the double jeopardy 
principle,1515 as they punish some violations locally before taking a person to 
the police. 1516  Explaining why this is so, Senior Chief Lukwa said, 
‗considering that any matter that happens in the village is first brought to the 
Chief‘s attention, we punish the perpetrator first for violating the bylaws that 
the community agreed on, and then let the state do its part‘. Community 
respondents lamented how hard it is for a common villager to find chickens, 
let alone goats, to pay as chindapusa. Adding this punishment to prosecution 
(and possible imprisonment) therefore seems excessive. 
                                                                                                                                      
three themes: a) the type of issues they address (Table 3); their contents on sanctions for child 
marriage (Table 4); and their contents regarding sanctions for other harmful practices (Table 
5). 
1510 Coerced experimental sex for initiated girls. 
1511 In most cases, the man practicing the kusasa fumbi is not even sanctioned along with the 
initiation counsellors that facilitated the practice. 
1512 Bonus wife. 
1513 Widow sexual cleansing. 
1514 If the girl is 16 years and below, since that is defilement. 
1515 The subjecting of a person to a second trial or punishment for the same offense for which 
the person has already been tried or punished (Thesaurus.com). 
1516 For example some bylaws say: ‗a Chief or anyone facilitating property grabbing will be 
fined three goats by the TA and then reported to the police‘; ‗anyone who continues to 
perpetrate domestic violence will be fined a goat by the TA in addition to reporting him/her 




Other community bylaws violate human rights. These include those 
demanding the eviction of a native subject, as well as denying him/her land 
for farming. 1517  Though made in good faith, these punishments can 
potentially render perpetrators (and by association their families) homeless, 
as well as jeopardising their means of livelihood, as in the case of land 
deprivation. Comprehensively addressing harmful practices without 
violating human rights could be realised through the triangular state-NGOs-
Chiefs collaboration (in implementing education and awareness raising and 
design of interventions) that international human rights jurisprudence 
promotes.1518 Not only should community bylaw provisions on punishments 
adhere to international human rights standards, but so should enforcement 
strategies for such punishments.1519 
        b)    Strategies for realising ‘chindapusa’ 
For the community bylaws to work, people have to actually pay the 
chindapusa (fine) charged by Chiefs. So, what strategies do 
Chiefs/communities deploy to ensure that the fines are paid, and how do 
these strategies align with international human rights standards? To a large 
extent, people pay the fines without ‗complications.‘  
However, the findings reveal three problematic mechanisms that are 
sometimes used to compel the payment of fines. First, enforcement may be 
done by the ‗offender‗s‘ imprisonment, until he/she pays the fine. In 2017, it 
was reported that 14 teenagers were imprisoned by a lay Magistrate for 
                                               
1517 For example, some bylaws provide that ‗a religious leader who solemnises child marriage 
will be banished from the community‘; 'any man who marries a young girl will be denied 
land and be chased out of the village‘; ‗an initiation counsellor who instructs a girl to 
experiment with sex (kusasa fumbi) will be evicted from the village'. 
1518 See section 4.4.3 of the thesis. 
1519 It is acknowledged that some may find the notion of violation of human rights that the 
thesis has just presented as odd. For example, they could argue that human rights are not 
absolute, and are often in tension with each other; and that any sanction at all would violate 




failing to pay a community bylaw penalty of K10,000.001520 each for becoming 
pregnant while in school.1521 Section 8.2 has exposed that some Magistrates 
feel duty bound to enforce community bylaws, lest the bylaws lose their bite. 
However, the imprisonment of the pregnant teenagers shows that enthusiasm 
to implement bylaws can also lead to violations of fundamental human rights 
for social omissions that are otherwise non-arrestable.1522  
Second, enforcement may be achieved by curtailing rights of a woman and 
her baby. A woman who has given birth en route to hospital can be detained 
at a health facility together with her newborn baby until she/her family pays 
the prescribed chindapusa.1523 A radio news bulletin in 2016 also reported that 
in a community in Machinga, babies of women that had not paid chindapusa 
were being denied vaccines until the chindapusa was paid. While women have 
no problems with the detention of a new mother,1524 from a human rights 
perspective, these measures harshly intrude on basic human rights and 
victimise women who may themselves be victims of circumstances. 1525 
However, community respondents rejected this view of human rights, 
arguing, 'since the detention is meant to be a deterrent against home births so 
that a pregnant woman and child do not die, it is in fact helping to protect 
their human rights and not infringe them‘. 
Lastly, some possible enforcement measures reflect retaliation, although of a 
different type from the retaliation against victims of harmful practices that is 
                                               
1520 Equivalent to USD 13.50. 
1521 Malawi Human Rights Commission and Southern Africa Litigation Centre, Towards a 
Human Rights-Based Approach to Learner Pregnancy Management in Malawi, (2017), 53. At the 
time of publishing the report, the case was under review at the Mzuzu High Court (but the 
report does not provide particulars of the case). 
1522 Ibid. 
1523 Such mother and baby would have been taken to the health facility for a medical check- 
up/help and may not be discharged unless they have paid the fine prescribed in the bylaws. 
The bylaws states that an expectant mother should wait at the hospital two to three months 
before expected delivery day. 
1524 See section 8.3.2.1 of the thesis. 
1525 For example, the woman may have delayed going to hospital or to pay the fine because 




envisaged in international human rights jurisprudence. For example, asked 
what a Chief would do if a perpetrator overturns a bylaw verdict in court, or 
just refuses to pay by asserting his/her rights, one Chief‘s response was, 
‗every subject needs the Chief. For example, no one can bury the dead until a 
Chief opens the graveyard. So if a person thinks he can do without Chiefs‘ 
bylaws, the Chief can simply sit back when such person has a funeral in 
his/her own home‘. Therefore, people may coercively abide by community 
bylaws penalties just because respecting the Chief is social currency. Indeed, 
the interviewed Programme Officer in the Ministry of Gender admitted that 
anxiety over ‗run-away‘ penalties and enforcement mechanisms is behind the 
Ministry‘s push for the ‗one bylaws framework‘, so that no community 
penalty or its enforcement should undermine human rights.  
The subsequent section examines how community bylaws are doing in the 
area of service provision for victims, an issue that international human rights 
jurisprudence values.  
8.4.8 Community Bylaws and Services for Victims 
Although the chindapusa that is payable in respect of the violation of 
community bylaws is not paid as compensation to particular victims of 
harmful practices, some community bylaws integrate a component of 
‗services‘ for communal benefit. Such services are part of the implementation 
scheme of community bylaws. 
International human rights jurisprudence calls for the provision of 
prevention, protection, recovery, reintegration and redress measures for 
victims of harmful practices. While most of the measures specified by 
jurisprudence are located in formal machineries, some community bylaws 
are, albeit feebly, providing informal service-related measures (especially 




ACHPR/ACERWC jurisprudence. 1526  Notably, these measures are not 
recommended in legislation. Overall, the reviewed community bylaws do not 
cover girls and boys who are already in marriage as urged by the 
jurisprudence 1527  but this is understandably beyond their focus since the 
bylaws‘ main aim is prevention. 
In terms of education, community-based education-related services are 
offered through Mother Groups, who mostly offer psychological/advisory 
support to keep girls in school and prevent child marriages/pregnancies. To 
communicate the seriousness of this service, community bylaws in Senior 
Chief Kwataine‘s area, Ntcheu, sanction ‗slack‘ Mother Group members: ‗if 
more than two girls fall pregnant and drop out of school within the tenure of 
a Mother Group committee, each committee member will be fined three 
chickens‘. Otherwise, the common redress for a child who was forced into 
marriage is to withdraw her from the marriage and return her to school.  
Chindapusa1528 also helps significantly in relation to supporting educational 
requirements of needy girls who are withdrawn from child marriages and 
those who dropped out of school because of pregnancies in order to 
reintegrate them into the education system. Senior Chief Lukwa, Kasungu, 
explained that where chindapusa proceeds are insufficient to cover demand, he 
personally approaches Social Welfare Offices to seek bursaries for such girls. 
Senior Chief Kwataine said he mobilises ‗well wishers‘1529 to help. Beyond the 
study sites, Chief Kachindamoto1530 said she uses her money to pay school 
fees for girls that have returned to school. 1531  These efforts attempt to 
minimise the hardship when parents/guardians of girls withdrawn from 
                                               
1526 See section 4.4.2.2 of the thesis. 
1527 As urged by ACHPR/ACERWC jurisprudence, see section 4.3.2 of the thesis. 
1528 This means that if a person has been fined a chicken or goat, this is sold, and the money 
handed over to a dedicated committee. 
1529 Usually educated people in town who come from Ntcheu district. 
1530 Of Dedza. 
1531  She explained that when she goes to any workshop/sponsored trip, she keeps the 




marriage or being compelled to leave babies at home and return to school are 
themselves poor. It appears that the bylaws do not just rely on Chiefs for 
enforcement, which makes them quite unique.  
In respect of health, several preventative and protection measures for 
potential victims of harmful practices are pursued. Table 3 has noted that 
bylaws of Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area specify that adolescent girls should 
have access to contraceptives. Senior Chief Kwataine‘s safe motherhood 
work 1532  influenced this stance in a country where publicly ‗condoning‘ 
adolescent sex is culturally taboo. Senior Chief Kwataine also depends on 
Amai achinsisi1533 to counsel girls and women (particularly those pregnant) on 
health issues. In Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area, Karonga, the chindapusa 
proceeds are given to the local health centre to pay for a guard at the 
maternity wing to guarantee pregnant women and new mothers‘ security. In 
respect of other harmful practices, redress in some community bylaws is 
provided for property grabbing victims by directing them to the police.  
How chindapusa is used does not only have a bearing on issues of education 
and health, but also on the transparency, accountability and credibility of 
Chiefs with regards to why they are introducing bylaws in the first place – 
since community bylaws have the potential to be abused as a means of wealth 
creation if Chiefs are personally gaining from chindapusa.1534 The next chapter 
demonstrates that the chindapusa model creates a unique strategy  of 
translation that is used in horizontal vernacularisation.  
                                               
1532 See section 7.2 of the thesis. 
1533 Secret mothers. 
1534 See section 7.3.2.4 of the thesis to note how the fines are used in different communities. 






While community bylaws are a relatively new and a fluid locally-grown 
phenomenon, they have clear human rights footprints. Yet, while close, the 
relationship between community bylaws and international norms on child 
marriage and other harmful cultural practices is not scripted by the 
expectation of human rights jurisprudence and vernacularisation theory, that 
epistemic outsiders should lead interventions.   
With local vernacularising horizontally, the community bylaws are taken 
seriously as valid localised law by the communities that adopt them, even 
though they have questionable status under state law. There is tangible 
evidence that the community bylaws are positively changing cultural beliefs 
and value systems, resulting in transformation of generations-old cultural 
beliefs that affect women. By changing their values to suit modern socio-
economic realities, communities are seen as gradually constructing new 
customary law in so far as harmful practices are concerned.  While grey areas 
remain to unequivocally call the bylaws living customary law, given their 
written nature, one could argue that they constitute valid law from the broad 
context of living law. In fact, by horizontally negotiating positive cultural 
norms and values, the local is creating living law that mitigates the inability 
of both formal law and customary law to practically deal with harmful 
practices.  
The chapter has demonstrated that to a small extent, the reviewed community 
bylaws are yet to comply with some human rights standards. For example, 
when it comes to challenging patriarchy, the bylaws have not confronted 
issues of polygamy and lobola, which are frowned upon by international 
jurisprudence. The chapter has argued that this gap, coupled with how 
levirate marriages are usually banned on HIV and not gender grounds, in a 




short of human rights and legislative standards are: their soft stance towards 
some cultural practices that are potentially rape and thus criminal in nature 
(i.e. kusasa fumbi, kulowa kufa), and enforcement measures that violate human 
rights (i.e. the arrest of people for non-arrestable offences, banishment from a 
community, denial of land). Indeed, these are the teething challenges of 
community bylaws and their horizontally engineered nature that may take 
time to resolve.  
Nevertheless, to a large extent, the reviewed community bylaws address the 
substance of the international human rights law protecting women from 
harmful practices, though they are also reinterpreting, expanding, adapting, 
and innovating. The community bylaws are reinforcing key principles 
underlying protections of women‘s rights under international law and the 
Constitution (gender equality and non-discrimination), and the rights of the 
child. Yet, the community bylaws are not merely copying what human rights 
jurisprudence or legislation set out. Apart from pursuing the chindapusa 
model,1535 there is also no doubt that the community bylaws have broken new 
conceptual paths in human rights discourse. They have re-conceptualised 
‗harmful practices‘ when it comes to harmful ‗motherhood‘ practices, as well 
as victims of child marriages. Additionally, they do not exempt some groups 
from their application as international jurisprudence recommends. This 
approach has exposed some gaps in the ‗harmful practices‘ criteria under 
CEDAW and CRC jurisprudence, as well as how international jurisprudence 
views the issue (and targets) of punishment when grounded phenomenon 
such as community bylaws are applied.   
While the use of criminal punishment is a questionable aspect of community 
bylaws, some of their localised enforcement or implementation mechanisms 
are innovative and commendable, and underscore the need to develop 
                                               
1535 Which, this chapter has shown, is complementary to formal mechanisms of addressing 




multiple complementary mechanisms of protecting women and children from 
harmful cultural practices. For example, community bylaws make provision 
for counseling and education as well as for support for victims of harmful 
practices. With Chiefs taking the lead, they draw upon traditional 
mechanisms of dispute resolution, NGOs and other agencies, formal courts 
such magistrates‘ courts, the police and other actors. The convergence of these 
players in implementing and enforcing the community bylaws adds to the 
twisted and unique character of horizontal vernacularisation. Chapter 9 
provides a conceptual understanding of the exact facets of horizontal 





 COMMUNITY BYLAWS, HORIZONTAL VERNACULARISATION AND 
NEW SHADES OF TRANSLATION 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 7 has argued that the factors influencing the emergence and use of 
the community bylaws on child marriage and other harmful practices 
affecting women in rural Malawi reflect a process of ‗horizontal 
vernacularisation‘ rather than conventional ‗vernacularisation‘. This view has 
been buttressed by Chapter 8, which has shown that community bylaws do 
not form part of formal state law by which international human rights norms 
are internalised, but have instead gained the character of living law that 
draws on and disrupts the existing customary laws and traditions and its 
institutions, formal institutions, such as policy, and a variety of social forces, 
including development agencies and NGOs.  
This chapter consolidates the thesis by substantively conceptualising 
‗horizontal vernacularisation‘ and its features. It commences with discussing 
the concept of ‗horizontal vernacularisation‘ itself, and then exposes how 
community bylaws are manifesting horizontal vernacularisation through 
different strategies of translating human rights/statutory norms to local 
settings. Thereafter, the chapter demonstrates how horizontal 
vernacularisation has reconceptualised the notion of the ‗vernaculariser‘. This 
is done by analysing the various actors involved this process. 
9.2 SUMMARY OF ACTORS OF COMMUNITY BYLAWS 
Each category of actors in Table 7 helps to shape the theory of norm 




explains how the actors play several roles in the formulation and 
conceptualisation of community bylaws: mobilisation, facilitation, actual 
drafting of the bylaws, coordination with other actors, implementation and 
enforcement, and women‘s participation. These roles are further discussed in 
the rest of the chapter. 
Twelve actors are highlighted: Senior Chiefs, Group Village Heads/ADCs, 
Village Heads, Women (groups), Department of Gender Affairs, Department 
of Social Welfare, Local Government, Magistrates, Police VSUs, NGOs, UN 
Women and UNFPA. Table 7 combines the roles of actors that have been used 
to explain processes of formulating community bylaws, set out in Chapter 7, 
as well as other roles that may or may not be the mainstream part of 
formulating bylaws, but are crucial to the existence of the bylaws. 
  Table 7: Actors and their roles 
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9.3 CONCEPTUALISING HORIZONTAL VERNACULARISATION  
The conceptualisation of community bylaws on addressing child marriage 
and other harmful practices in Malawi does not neatly fit into how 
vernacularisation is currently understood, because vernacularisation is a 
unicameral concept that is linked to externally-driven efforts aimed at 
localising, in a small community, human rights ideas developed from 
elsewhere. Rather, the phenomenon of community bylaws awakens us to 
bicameral manifestations of vernacularisation, whereby the local is also a 
source of vernacularisation. In this context, vernacularisation heavily unfolds 
horizontally, thus the use of the term ‗horizontal vernacularisation‘.  
Horizontal vernacularisation should not be misunderstood as arguing that a 
local community is not engaged in norm contestation, because Chapter 8 
shows that it is. Rather, the focus of horizontal vernacularisation is: how does 
the ‗local‘ too (whether independently or in convoluted relationships with 
epistemic outsiders) activate the vernacularisation process? 










‗interventions have to be initially organised for purposes of vernacularisation 
in order for them to amount to vernacularisation‘.1536 Indeed, section 7.3.2 has 
shown that the communities developing the community bylaws are not often 
moved by the primary need to appropriate and translate human rights 
ideas/programmes brought from elsewhere by an epistemic community.  
Yet, one cannot ignore that vernacularisation can happen indirectly through 
appropriation, such as the instance of a chief that is inspired by ‗educated‘ 
women she has met and her desire that girls from her community achieve 
such success.1537 Indeed, it has been shown that chiefs are motivated to initiate 
the adoption of bylaws by a wide range of factors, including a growing 
consciousness about the value and benefits of educating girls, the need to 
protect girls from sexual abuse, and peer influence. However, chiefs hear 
different human rights messages through the media, attend different 
meetings, and interact with other chiefs, NGOs and state players and in the 
process gain human rights perspectives that they later apply to solve 
challenges in their own communities. As ‗increasingly knowledgeable‘ 
community members engage with each other (and at times with NGOs and 
state officials) to question their own development and cultural practices from 
the viewpoint of ‗modern (development) realities‘; and as government and 
NGOs (with the support of donors), they are motivated to develop 
interventions to use community bylaws as a channel for addressing harmful 
practices affecting women and girls. 
Horizontal vernacularisation acknowledges that human rights appropriation 
                                               
1536 See note 361. 
1537 For example, Chief Chitera talked a lot about how she is inspired when educated women 
make presentations. Chief Kwataine shared his experience that his first experience of 
boarding a plane was when he was part of a presidential delegation. He was so impressed to 
see Malawian young ladies confidently speaking English and serving as air hostesses on Air 
Malawi. His interest led him enter into conversations with the air hostesses, and none of them 
came from Ntcheu. When they returned from the trip, he was lodged at a guest house in 
town so that he could proceed to his village the next day. The female guard at the guest house 
saluted him as her Chief and said she originated from his area. Chief Kwataine says it greatly 




and translation in community bylaws is blurry and unconventional. This is 
true of the bylaws, which sprout in a continuum of intuitive, interlocking, 
convoluted, iterative processes within a predominantly local-local dialogue. 
The fact that other human rights programmes are jumping on board to 
‗perfect‘ or ‗strengthen‘ or opportunistically ride on what the local is doing 
does not reduce the local anchorage of this form of vernacularisation.  
The evidence discussed in this thesis shows that community bylaws do not 
emanate exclusively from elite vernacularisers or communities‘ captivation 
with diffusing international human rights and legislative norms on harmful 
practices. Because the formulation of community bylaws is fraught with 
overlapping layers, the appropriation and translation of women‘s rights ideas 
at local levels is not neatly patterned. At the initial stages, there is sometimes 
‗implied appropriation‘ whereby human rights norms and values are 
unconsciously integrated as communities discuss and conceptualise the 
contents of the bylaws. Such appropriation can become ‗explicit‘ as the 
process of making the community bylaws ripens.  
However, the totality of the process manifests a process of horizontal 
vernacularisation. The local is heavily invested in translating women‘s rights 
ideas in its setting, notwithstanding that other external actors are involved 
along the way. The local continues to make meaning of the new gender justice 
norms and values being introduced by the community bylaws beyond the 
conceptual stages of bylaw making as it strives to make the bylaws local 
practice. Thus, horizontal vernacularisation is both about the process of 
appropriating and translating human rights ideas, and about the 
communities‘ efforts to ensure that the human rights values enshrined in the 
community bylaws actually start to govern local people‘s daily lives. 
Admittedly, horizontal vernacularisation has pros and cons from a human 




the direct or indirect internalisation of human rights norms protecting women 
from harmful practices at grassroots levels – in the process, the community 
takes ownership of the bylaws, which presents a better chance of 
implementation. On the other hand, it can be perceived as an obstacle to the 
full internalisation of human rights norms if community bylaws 
overzealously (but nevertheless well-meaningly) leap too far from the 
prescriptions of international human rights and gender equality legislation. 
As the previous chapter has shown, these dual roles of horizontal 
vernacularisation are at play with the community bylaws studied in this 
thesis. 
9.4 TRANSLATION STRATEGIES IN HORIZONTAL VERNACULARISATION  
The translation process involves meaning making of imported ideas.1538 This 
part examines seven types of translation that are evident in horizontal 
translation: deflective translation/deflection, customarisation, simplification, 
socialisation, augmentation, reverse augmentation and hybrisation.  




                                               
1538 See section 3.4.2.1 of this thesis. 
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Figure 1 illustrates that deflective translation/deflection is the cross-cutting 
piece of horizontal vernacularisation that influences how five1539 of the other 
translation strategies play out. 
The fact that out of the seven translation strategies, existing vernacularisation 
theory only accommodates hybridisation and simplification demonstrates 
that horizontal vernacularisation has its own unique features of translation.  
9.4.1 Chindapusa: Protecting Women’s Rights Through ‘Deflective 
Translation’  
Chapter 5 discussed Malawian legislation that criminalises harmful 
practices.1540 The fact that community bylaws are introducing parallel village-
based sanctions for most of the same harmful practices would spark 
presumptions that the bylaws are diluting the legislative gains. The findings 
portray the sanctions in the bylaws as ‗deflective translation/deflection‘ – 
meaning that communities are consciously or unconsciously using legislative 
human rights ideologies to create positive meanings of their cultural practices 
through ‗rules,‘ and yet deflecting the punishments imposed in such 
legislation by drawing on culturally resonant penalties. For most respondents, 
this is not a digression from or a watering down of the legislative or human 
rights intents, but it is an acceptable, practical, and locality-based model of 
complementing the women‘s rights agenda.  
Thus, deflective translation is based on the following justifications that 
chindapusa is the preferred option to legislative penalties and sanctions:  
9.4.1.1   ‘Chindapusa’ is a primary solution 
It is common belief across the study communities that rights of women and 
girls will be firmly protected with home-grown penalties first, before rushing 
to state measures. Respondents expressed this using different local analogy: 
                                               
1539 Customarisation, simplification, socialisation, augmentation and hybrisation. 




‗when you build a house, you put msanamira 1541  to prevent cracks and 
strengthen it. These bylaws are our msanamira – warning people not to engage 
in certain harmful practices banned by state law‘.1542 Some said ‗the bylaws 
are our primary justice – culturally, each rural community has primary justice 
at village level that warns the community to refrain from wrong conduct‘1543. 
Others explained that, ‗the bylaws are poyambira,1544 like primary health care. 
If a patient does not recover, we send him to chipatala china chachikulu1545 for 
advanced assistance‘.1546 Some women said, ‗bylaws are like first aid. If it does 
not work, you go for state help‘.1547 One Magistrate‘s description was that, 
‗bylaws are similar to community policing – those involved are not police 
officers yet they play a big role in curbing crime‘.1548 
The above views give room for the application of legislation, but not before 
attempting to deflect state punishment1549 through cultural solutions. This 
way, deflective translation (presumably) quickly corrects mischief and 
encourages good practices, and is seen as preventive.  In any event, the 
proceedings for imposing chindapusa are swifter compared to criminal trials, 
and they are more accessible than formal dispute resolution mechanisms. 
                                               
1541 Best English approximation would be 'pillar'. 
1542 Group Village Heads, Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area, Karonga. 
1543 Chief Lukwa, Kasungu. 
1544 In this context the respondents were saying the bylaws are like 'primary health care'. 
1545 The best English approximation would be 'secondary/tertiary hospital'. 
1546 Village Heads, Chief Lukwa‘s area, Kasungu. 
1547 Mother Group, Chief Kwataine‘s area, Ntcheu. 
1548 Third Grade Magistrate Nyungwe Court, Karonga. 
1549 As seen in section 5.3.3.1of the thesis, the Gender Equality Act defines a harmful practice 
as ‗a social, cultural or religious practice, which, on account of sex, gender or marital status, 
does or is likely to undermine the dignity, health or liberty of any person; or result in 
physical, sexual, emotional or psychological harm to any person‘. The punishment for 
committing a harmful practice is a fine of one million kwacha and imprisonment for five 
years. The HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Management) Act defines harmful practices as 
‗any social, religious or cultural practice that puts a person at risk of HIV infection and 
reinfection; or may catalyse progression of HIV to AIDS‘.  The punishment for committing a 
harmful practice is a fine of five million kwacha and imprisonment for five years. The Child 
Care, Justice and Protection Act does not define harmful practices, but criminalises and 
except for the offence of child trafficking, which is punishable by life imprisonment,  
prohibits any person from subjecting a child to a social or customary practice that is harmful 
to the health or general development of the child. It also particularly proscribes forced 




9.4.1.2   ‘Chindapusa’ is inherently deterrent  
Deflective translation is justified because, while both state sanctions and 
chindapusa have deterrent effects, legislation is relatively unknown.1550 Thus 
chindapusa triggers palpable fear, which is seen as a more efficient way to 
deter women‘s rights abuses. This element was expressed as follows: ‗the 
essence of imposing chindapusa is to inculcate fear so that child marriages 
should not occur‘;1551 ‗people obey the bylaws for fear of paying a goat, which 
to us is unaffordable‘;1552  ‗the bylaws for reducing school drop-outs and 
marriages amongst girls because people fear chindapusa‘.1553  
Even state officials agreed that since legislation is weakly implemented on the 
ground, chindapusa is a more efficient and tangible way of deterring the 
commission of culture-specific harmful practices, and thus cannot be indicted 
of contradicting legislation.1554 This is analogous to acknowledgements made 
by early feminists in the context of rape – that if a severe penalty would mean 
fewer convictions (and therefore less deterrence), it is better to have a light 
punishment that would result in many convictions and be deterrent.1555  
9.4.1.3   ‘Chindapusa’ allows a second chance and transformation 
Deflective translation through chindapusa is preferred because it deliberately 
gives chance for character reform. Thus it was argued that: ‗because 
legislation is inflexible, chindapusa helps people to discontinue harmful 
practices that would otherwise get them imprisoned, suffer in our bad 
                                               
1550 For example, in our interview, the Law Commissioner commented that during the Malawi 
Law Commission's consultations on the review of the Prison's Act, commissioners found 
several young men who were imprisoned on child marriage charges in Nkhata Bay prison 
who claimed not to have known that child marriage is a criminal offence (let alone the 
meaning of child marriage itself). 
1551 Group Village Heads in Chief Chitera‘s area. 
1552 Women‘s FGD in Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area. 
1553 Women‘s FGD in Chief Lukwa‘s area. 
1554 E.g. interviews with the Director of Gender, Clerk of Parliament, Law Commissioner, 3rd 
Grade Magistrate, Nyungwe Court (Karonga) and VSU Officer, Kasungu Police. 





prisons‘.1556 Thus community bylaws are perceived as having higher impact 
on behavioural change than legislation: ‗though chindapusa is seen as 
lenient,1557 the perpetrator becomes the talk of the village and gets highly 
humiliated and this forces him/her to change behaviour‘.1558 Therefore, it was 
argued, ‗chindapusa cannot be adulterating legislation, but, to the contrary, it 
is fixing societal menaces, making people transform from old beliefs and 
practices.1559 
The ‗second chance‘ aspect of deflection was also justified from a social 
relations perspective, thus further demonstrating that the fines that are 
payable as chindapusa are not criminal in nature, but have a restorative justice 
foundation. For example, it was contended that the community bylaws are 
the first resort because the state gives stiff penalties. However, the bylaws 
strike a balance, and both parties (mostly ‘anthu odziwana’ 1560) are satisfied 
that they have been helped. Only when a person is defiant is he/she reported 
to the state. 1561  This is why, even from a criminal justice context, the 
chindapusa model was appreciated by some interviewed police officers, except 
for rape cases.1562  
                                               
1556 For example, Village Heads in Chief Lukwa‘s area. 
1557 Compared to statutory punishment. 
1558 Senior Chief Kwataine. 
1559 Village Heads, Senior Chief Kwataine's area. 
1560 Best English approximation would be 'people who know each other'.  This attitude also 
contributes to people‘s mistrust of state criminal sanctions, as pointed out in Chapter 5. 
1561 These views were shared by Senior Chief Kwataine. He was speaking in the context of 
cases of property grabbing and child marriage, and not sexual offences (rape), which are 
treated as criminal matters. 
1562 For example, agreeing that state channels should be a last resort, VSU Police Officers at 
Karonga Police Station said, 'if a person is declining to pay chindapusa in accordance with 
bylaws, he/she has to be brought to the police station, and be warned about how the state 
would otherwise deal with the case.' VSU Police Officers at Ntcheu Police Station asserted, 'if 
we hear that bylaws were bypassed, we send the people back to apply their bylaws. We only 




The fact that both communities and police have confidence in community 
bylaws also validates the challenges regarding the enforcement of legislation 
articulated in Chapter 5.1563 
9.4.1.4   ‘Chindapusa’ is filling legal gaps 
Chapter 5 has alluded to the fact that legislation on harmful practices fails to 
connect with rural communities. Thus, deflective translation was justified on 
the ground that chindapusa is filling legal gaps. For example, it was contended 
that ‗if legislation has not defined a punishment for child marriage, non-
school attendance, or harmful initiation rites, it is acceptable for the 
community to determine its own punishments‘. 1564  Section 9.4.1.2 has 
highlighted examples of sanctions that the state offers to curb harmful 
practices.1565  The previous chapters have indeed shown that for most of the 
acts that constitute harmful practices, there is no sanction of the kind the 
community bylaws have. Community bylaws also promote certain things for 
which formal law does not really prescribe sanctions. For example, apart from 
well-known harmful practices and acts of violence, Table 31566 has a catalogue 
of practices that communities deem to be harmful,1567 most of which, one 
could argue, cannot be reasonably policed by the state.  
However, it can also be contended that the scope of harmful practices being 
targeted by legislation (particularly the Gender Equality Act) is broad enough 
and that it is difficult to comprehend how community bylaws, say to address 
child marriage, could work together with legislation – unless it is to prevent 
the mischief in the first place. If the starting point is to acknowledge that child 
marriage is a statutory offence, then it means the court should be left to apply 
                                               
1563 See section 5.3.3.1. 
1564 According to the Assistant District Social Welfare Officer in Chiradzulu. 
1565 See note 1549. 
1566 Section 7.3.2.2 of the thesis. 
1567 For example, these practices relate to issues of: pregnancy of schoolgirls; girl sanitation; 
teachers‘ conduct; learners‘ conduct; third parties conduct towards school-going children; 





a suitable statutory punishment, and not for a community‘s bylaw to take 
over. Though the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act does not 
penalise child marriage, this omission is not calamitous since the general 
penalty for harmful practices would apply to child marriage as well.1568 The 
same goes for the 18 harmful practices that are specifically prohibited under 
the HIV and AIDS (Prevention and Management) Act,1569 meaning that any 
harmful practice falling outside the scope of the Act could as well be covered 
by the Gender Equality Act so long as the element of harm is proven.  
Communities‘ inclination to nevertheless regulate these harms their way 
betrays that deflective translation is also purposefully selective. The 
commission of (recently criminalised) entrenched harmful practices is 
regarded more sympathetically compared to harms that have routinely been 
abhorred by generations, such as rape. Thus, vernacularisation scholarship 
rightly argues that ‗selective exposure and selective appropriation‘ are marks 
of translation.1570 Despite being selective, deflective translation is seen as not 
injurious to the principle behind legislation of harmful practices (the 
modification and elimination such practices), and as a relatively acceptable 
‗middle-ground‘ of appropriating human rights in cultural settings. In fact, 
deflective translation is a vivid example of how the universal measures that 
are promoted by human rights jurisprudence may be blind to more practical 
cultural solutions in legal plural systems.1571  
Deflection permeates the other strategies of translating human rights ideas in 
horizontal vernacularisation discussed below.  
                                               
1568 For example, the five years imprisonment and one million Kwacha [equivalent to USD 
1,347] fine for all harmful practices under the Gender Equality Act. 
1569 See note 1061. 
1570 See section 3.4.2.1 of the thesis in reference to  Rajam and Zararia‘s translation concept of 
compartmentalisation. 




9.4.2 Other Translation Strategies  
9.4.2.1   Customarisation   
The community bylaws have a strong chief-centred and protectionist flair 
since they are a story about rural chiefs and their communities rising up to 
protect women and girls through customary treatment (whether or not such 
protection is directly influenced by human rights and formal legal norms or 
not). The fact that ‗law-like‘ actions of ‗protection‘ (which incidentally is also 
human rights language) are manifesting at customary base under the 
captaincy of chiefs (who are custodians of customs and customary law) 
symbolises that different communities are ‗customarising‘ women‘s 
protection as their settings, experiences and ideals of modern society demand.  
Therefore, this thesis uses the concept of customarisation of women‘s 
protection to denote chief-led rural community‘s introspective and negotiated 
retracing and filtering of its customary norms, beliefs and values in order to 
strengthen the protection of women and girls in cultural spaces. Thus, when it 
comes to women‘s protection in grassroots circles, the ‗customary‘ is engaged 
in activism on its terms. Instead of being recipients of ‗handed down‘ 
traditions, chiefs and rural communities in the study areas are no longer 
‗innocently‘ protecting harmful practices and are troubleshooting their own 
culture by infusing it with values that resonate with human rights and 
legislative standards.  
Through their unique customary characteristics, community bylaws are 
customarising women‘s protection by reconceptualising statutory 
punishments through deflective translation. 1572  This is authentically 
empowering communities to protect those vulnerable to harmful practices 
(including the community itself, from a development perspective) when 
legislation is remote to the people. Thus, community bylaws have even 
                                               




customarised the way of dealing with defiant perpetrators. For example, if a 
perpetrator is defying a Village Head‘s refusal to endorse a child marriage, 
the latter refers the matter to the Group Village Head. If the perpetrator still 
resists, the matter goes to the TA. This approach is also deterrent because the 
fine increases at each tier of chieftaincy.1573  
As seen in section 7.3.4, chiefs may use the threat of fines to address resistance 
to the community bylaws since the bylaws may not be a unanimously 
accepted ideology among subjects. 1574  In Senior Chief Chitera‘s area, 
Chiradzulu, Group Village Heads said ‗we coped with resistance by granting 
conditional permissions (i.e. to hold overnight celebrations) so long as the 
subjects had five goats1575 to pay as a fine, which they would not have‘.  
The community bylaws are further customarising women‘s protection by 
looking internally to unlock customary bottlenecks to the protection of 
women, particularly Chiefs themselves. As Group Village Heads in Chief 
Kwataine‘s area (Ntcheu) explained, ‗a violation of bylaws starts in the 
village, which is under the Village Head. So if a Village Head is passive or 
non-commital and a harmful practice happens, we sanction such Chief too‘. In 
many areas, both the Village Head and Group Village Head are sanctioned by 
the Senior Chief/TA.1576  
Customarisation of women‘s protection is also apparent in the way women‘s 
protection has been institutionalised within the chieftaincy. Some Senior 
Chiefs have established groups of women as a specific arm of the chieftaincy 
for purposes of monitoring adherence to community bylaws. Some of these 
                                               
1573 As Group Village Heads in Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area, Karonga, observed: ‗an insolent 
subject may find himself/herself concurrently paying two chickens to the Village Head, five 
chickens to the Group Village Head, and a goat to the TA for affronting a bylaw‘. 
1574 Generally see section 7.3.4.1 of the thesis regarding the types of resistance some Chiefs 
encountered. 
1575 Being combined fines to the Village Head, the Group Village Head, and the Senior Chief. 
1576 As seen in section 7.3.4.1 of the thesis, the logic is that the Village Head‘s carelessness to 
allow child marriage to happen under his/her watch, suggests lack of vigilance by the Group 




women have been exposed to information so that they can support the 
implementation of community bylaws successfully, and they have been 
organised to be the Chiefs ‗ears and eyes‘ on the ground regarding the 
monitoring of the bylaws. With a self-teasing but proud demeanour, Senior 
Chief Kwataine explained that poti nkhani ya uchembele wabwino anaimvera pa 
mgong’o,1577 in 2007 he took twelve women from his community (known as 
‗amai a chinsinsi’1578) to a safe motherhood meeting in South Africa. When they 
returned, the women were so motivated and proud of their role of monitoring 
the bylaws because they were officially ‗chiwalo chimodzi cha a mfumu’.1579 
Senior Chief Lukwa has also created a structure headed by his wife. He 
narrated that he is counting on a ‗Back to School Committee,‘ established in 
2016, to be his ‗ears and eyes‘. He said he advised his wife to form and head a 
‗Back to School Committee‘ for wives of Chiefs. His wife facilitated the 
mobilisation of wives of Group Village Heads so that they could set-up 
committees for Chiefs‘ wives at ADC and VDC levels.1580 The Chiefs‘ wives 
meet to discuss and they also investigate why certain girls are not in 
school. 1581  They are expected to provide counselling to such girls in 
collaboration with Mother Groups. They compile a report, which Senior Chief 
Lukwa‘s wife submits at a Chiefs‘ meeting. In turn, she reports the Chiefs‘ 
feedback to her committee members.  
Thus, customarisation is not just a matter of the software (bylaws), but also 
the chieftaincy as an engine of the customary justice machinery. This way, the 
chieftaincy structure has the potential to facilitate transformative substantive 
                                               
1577 Best English approximation would be—'since they have received the safe motherhood 
message over-enthusiastically‘. 
1578 Secret Mothers. 
1579 Best English approximation would be—as ‗one limb of the Senior Chief‘. 
1580 The ADC committee is the higher committee led by Chief Lukwa's wife; and wives of 
Group Village Heads head VDC level committees. 
1581 When the Committee sees that a child needs school fees, the goats that people paid as 
fines are sold to obtain the required amount. If there is no goat to sell, Chief Lukwa said ‗we 




equality, which, as observed in Chapter 4, is achieved when women‘s rights 
are internalised in the very centres of patriarchy.1582 
9.4.2.2   Simplification  
Communication strategies, particularly the use of ‗Gule Wamkulu’(masked 
dancers )1583 drama, subjects‘ real stories and ‗house bill boards‘) used in the 
community bylaws reflect elements of Rajam and Zararia‘s1584 ‗simplification‘, 
which is achieved through communicating a development/human rights idea 
in ways that both literate and illiterate audiences can understand.1585 
Gule Wamkulu is a respected yet scary Chewa cult, and is accountable to 
Chiefs. Whereas in the past Gule Wamkulu would limit children‘s right to 
education by randomly ambushing and beating up children on their way to 
and from school (with girls being more vulnerable because they are not cult 
members), community bylaws are using the scariness of Gule Wamkulu 
positively. For example, in some areas, Gule Wamkulu is deployed every 
morning to mobilise children out of their homes to attend school. Others are 
using Gule Wamkulu dances as a medium of communicating messages 
promoting children‘s access to education, including for girls. Thus, though 
not headlined ‗human rights,‘ the transformed spoken and non-spoken 
language of Gule Wamkulu is practically reflecting and influencing the 
diffusion of a human rights culture. 
Some communities have used drama groups to simplify messages. In 
Karonga, Wanabgwa Youth Organisation (WAYO) has tactically used a 
popular drama group, Tiyanjane 1586  Drama Group, which uses male and 
female characters to appeal to people‘s conscious by portraying hidden 
                                               
1582 See note 523. 
1583 See Glossary of Chichewa terms. 
1584 N. Rajaram and Vaishali Zararia, ‗Translating Women's Human Rights in a Globalising 
World: The Spiral Process in Reducing Gender Injustice in Baroda, India,‘ (2009)—See section 
3.4.2.1 of the thesis. 
1585 Ibid., 476-477. 




injustices and impacts of common harmful practices in their plays. Because 
the group is a crowd puller, a lot of people have turned up to listen to its 
messages, giving a platform for WAYO to facilitate public discussions and 
awareness about harmful practices that should be addressed. WAYO has 
used this model both in supporting Chiefs to conduct consultations about 
impeding community bylaws, and to disseminate the bylaws.  
Simplification is also evident in the ways Chiefs have used actual tragic 
stories/case studies to make connections between human rights and local 
realities. Section 7.3.3.1 has stated that in his area, Senior Chief Kwataine was 
the one facilitating the community bylaws formulation process. He said he 
gave different vivid stories of what led to deaths of specific women that 
Chiefs/the community knew had died from child birth or had ended up with 
fistula. In this process, without using human rights language, people‘s mind-
sets changed from seeing the tragedies as ‗witchcraft at work,‘ to recognising 
that the community could avoid such deaths by changing their practices The 
simplification of human rights issues by appealing to practical local examples 
is also seen in Senior Chief Lukwa‘s use of community research data to 
highlight worrying rates of school dropouts amongst girls despite a girls‘ 
bursary project in the area.1587  
Simplification has further happened through ‗house bill boarding‘. This was 
peculiar to Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area, who explained that he has 
encouraged his subjects to write, in their own words, messages regarding 
how they have understood the area‘s community bylaws on the outer walls of 
their houses or pit latrines.1588 In this community, many houses/pit latrines 
have bylaws captured in short sentences such as: ‗mwana wa mkazi asakwatiwe’; 
‘mwana aliyense asajombe ku sukulu’; mzimayi wapakati ayambe sikelo pokwana 
                                               
1587 See section 7.3.3.1 of the thesis. 
1588 Chief Kwataine explained that this idea originated from him when he was the National 
Chairman on Safe Motherhood. Some subjects would tell him that they may forget his 
message, so he proposed that they could try writing outside the walls of their houses or pit 




mwezi wachitatu; mzimayi wapakati aliyense akachilire ku chipatala’. 1589  Senior  
Chief Kwataine clarified that ‗no person was forced, but in the past three to 
four years, almost every house here carries a message about our bylaws‘. He 
equated this style of framing bylaws messages with ‗the way others use 
billboards to disseminate information‘. 
The simplification transactions that are unfolding in the community bylaws 
phenomenon above provide further evidence of the use made of both 
tradition (Gule wamkulu, which is very traditional among Chewa speaking 
communities) and received cultures (drama and ‗bill boarding‘). Furthermore, 
they reveal that horizontal vernacularisation has similarities with and 
differences from how vernacularisation scholarship perceives framing (a 
package used to interpret human rights ideas to make them understandable 
in new settings and connect the ideas with local audiences, e.g. by using 
locally decipherable images, symbols and stories 1590 ). In horizontal 
vernacularisation, framing is ‗done by locals for locals‘ 1591  – thus 
strengthening the ownership of local problems and solutions. This trait is 
similar to what has been noted in vernacularisation: that framing affects how 
women‘s problems are defined and understood; how causes of women‘s 
problems and their solutions are conceptualised and locally embraced; and 
how human rights are owned as addressing local problems.1592  
However, the internal character of simplification in horizontal 
vernacularisation means that framing is not a mere conceptual need. As some 
scholars have argued, vernacularisation is not simply about the process, but 
also the outcome (‗the so-what‘).1593  Thus, in horizontal vernacularisation, 
framing establishes human rights (whether consciously or unconsciously) as 
                                               
1589 Best English approximations could be 'a girl child should not get married'; 'every child 
should be in school'; 'a pregnant woman should start antenatal clinics by the 3rd month'; 
'every pregnant woman should give birth at the hospital'. 
1590 See section 3.4.2.2 of the thesis.  
1591 Unlike in vernacularisation, where framing is an 'outside' act—see ibid.  
1592 See section 3.4.2.2 of the thesis. 




local practice as communities strive to practically deal with their challenges. 
This happens when new ideals are simplified and communicated 
continuously by strategic framing insiders and fixed frames (e.g. Gule 
Wamkulu and individual households). Such locally bred simplification/framing 
approaches ensure that genuine appropriation of human rights ideas should 
occur, since ‗vernacularisation only results if ideas are well framed‘. 1594 
Notably, most vernacularisers, 1595  whom vernacularisation scholarship 
expects to be responsible for framing, are not the framers at this stage.  
9.4.2.3   Socialising 
Derived from the ‗socialisation process‘ in norm internalisation (an induction 
of new members into ways of behaviour that are preferred in society),1596 
translation of human rights norms to grassroots settings through ‗socialising‗ 
is occurring in the community bylaws context through Chief-to-Chief 
interaction. Chiefs interact with other Chiefs from other areas, thereby 
borrowing ideas about community bylaws as a tool for addressing child 
marriage and other harms. For example, section 7.2 shows that Senior Chief 
Lukwa, Kasungu, borrowed the idea of developing community bylaws after 
visiting TA Mwanza‘s area in Salima, and witnessing community bylaws in 
action. Senior Chief Kwataine, Ntcheu, was inspired to develop safe 
motherhood bylaws after visiting TA Nkanda‘s area, Mchinji. Senior Chief 
Mwirang‘ombe, Karonga, initially got the idea from Chief Chikulamayembe‘s 
area, Rumphi.  
Sometimes, external players that have a specific women‘s rights interest 
facilitate socialising. For example, external actors arranged the visits of Senior 
Chiefs Lukwa and Kwataine respectively. Socialising happens even outside 
                                               
1594 See note 309 and section 3.4.2.2 of the thesis generally. 
1595 See section 9.5 for the vernacularisers that are involved in horizontal vernacularisation. 




the study areas. For example, FOCUS1597 arranged for a group of Chiefs from 
Karonga to learn from community bylaws in the areas of Senior Chief 
Kachindamoto, Dedza, Senior Chief Kwataine, Ntcheu, and TA Sawale, 
Balaka. Being highly impressed by Kachindamoto, the Karonga Chiefs ended 
up adopting ‗contracts‘ that would guide the fight against harmful practices 
that result in child marriage and pregnancies in their areas.1598 These findings 
show that the ‗socialiser‘ and ‗socialisee‘ can both be local/grassroots players, 
and that the ‗socialiser‘ does not have to be sophisticated or transnational.1599  
The uniqueness of how socialising plays out in the community bylaws lies in 
the fact that it is experiential, whereby the socialising Chiefs are not merely 
sharing rhetoric, but their communities‘ real lives. Consequently, the 
socialised Chiefs are confronted with their own communities‘ reality, and 
they return with conviction to usher their own change, as opposed to merely 
adopting bylaws instrumentally.  
Socialisation also happens at sectoral level. The Ministry of Gender roped in 
the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) after the 
work of developing the ‗one bylaw framework‘ had begun. The Programme 
Officer in the Ministry of Gender said: ‗we realised that we had left out an 
important player who needed to understand the significance of the bylaws, 
the District Commissioners. Therefore, we had to co-opt the Ministry of Local 
Government in this work.‘ The Ministry of Gender appreciates that until they 
have buy-in from MLGRD, they are unlikely to succeed in ensuring that 
District Councils facilitate the formulation of gender-related bylaws in their 
respective districts.  
The Ministry of Gender was socialising MLGRD by involving it in important 
forums that were discussing harmful practices, including community bylaws. 
                                               
1597 As part of their maternal health/safe motherhood project. 
1598 James Chavula, ‗Kachindamoto Inspires Karonga Chief ‘ (2016). Also see some remarks 
from Chief Kilipula, leader of delegation, in note 27. 




For example, in July 2017, MLGRD was invited to give opening remarks at a 
consultative meeting on strategies for abolishing harmful practices. The 
meeting targeted female TAs, wives of all Paramount Chiefs and 
representatives of mother groups.1600 In October 2018, the Minister of LGRD 
shared the podium with the Minister of Gender to open a conference on child 
marriage, FGM1601 and other harmful practices for traditional and cultural 
leaders and institutions from the East and Southern Africa.1602 The conference, 
which was sponsored by UN Women culminated in ‗The Blantyre 
Commitment to Action‘, which, among other things, called on the participants 
to ‗scale up or establish necessary gender sensitive and community bylaws 
regulations and sanctions as an enforcement measure of national legislation 
or policies prohibiting child marriage, FGM and other harmful practices‘.1603  
However, socialisation is not a smooth path because the ‗socialiser‘ and the 
‗socialisee‘ can have different priorities. In the case of Ministry of Gender and 
MLGRD, the Social Welfare Director expressed the concern that ‗because 
community bylaws [do] not generate revenue for councils, our colleagues in 
local government are dragging their feet to ensure that one bylaws framework 
is finalised and applied‘.  MLGRD‘s behaviour resembles ‗tactical concession‘, 
discussed in Chapter 3,1604 whereby MLGRD was seemingly supportive of the 
one bylaws framework initiative, and yet not taking decisive policy action. 
This dilemma is deepened by the fact that neither the community bylaws nor 
the local government linkage is mandated by legislation.  
                                               
1600 Remarks by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development at a consultative 
meeting on strategies for abolishing harmful practices, made by Darwin Pangani, 27 July 
2017. On file with author. 
1601 Though this is not a Malawian challenge, the scope of the conference covered issues 
affecting Eastern and Southern African cultures. 
1602 Speech by the Minister of Local Government and Rural Development, Mr Kondwani 
Nankhumwa, MP. On file with author. 
1603 East and Southern Africa Commitment of Traditional Leaders, Cultural Authorities and 
Religious, Leaders. Adopted at Blantyre, Malawi on November 2, 2018. On file with author. 
1604 Whereby escalating a norm violating state makes appeasement cosmetic changes due to 




9.4.2.4   Augmentation 
Augmentation provides evidence that community bylaws facilitate the 
appropriation and translation of human rights. Translation was happening 
through augmentation especially where NGOs and other ‗experts‘ become 
involved in the process of formulating community bylaws. These players can 
become involved at any stage of the bylaws formulation process. 
Augmentation influences the language of the community bylaws by making 
the people who draft community bylaws appreciate how the problems the 
bylaws are seeking to solve amount to human rights violations. NGOs and 
other experts have augmented the bylaws through technical support. While 
several NGOs denied directly proposing language for the community 
bylaws,1605 WOLREC‘s paralegal admitted that during the development of the 
bylaws, WORLEC facilitators helped to make the bylaws consistent with 
statutory and human rights frameworks: ‗we also repeatedly emphasised … 
[the] child‘s right to education in order to maintain people‘s focus on the 
motive of the discussions – child protection‘. He added that WOLREC even 
educated drafters of the bylaws about human rights frameworks at the onset 
of the process so that human rights should influence the spirit of the bylaws.  
Some of the NGOs that claimed to have had nothing to do with the language 
ended up disclosing a similar role to that described by WOLREC. For 
instance, MIAA‘s Executive Director said, ‗certainly, legally correct or human 
rights language was important to the whole process. This is why we needed 
people from Ministry of Gender and ourselves, who are conversant in human 
rights programming, to be there so that human rights are protected in the 
bylaws‘. Even before starting to develop the bylaws, MIAA said they 
                                               
1605 'We never prescribed the type of bylaws or penalties to be adopted. We only facilitated a 
consensus' (MIAA); 'They decided on their own to include whatever language that could 
make sense to them' (FOCUS); 'No, we cannot guide them on what they should include as 




conducted five days of training of the ‗Community Parliament‘1606 to equip 
them with legal and human rights knowledge: ‗throughout the engagement of 
developing the bylaws, we made sure that we were the facilitators‘. FOCUS 
said a Magistrate was one of the facilitator‘s so that the Chiefs would be well 
guided. YONECO also made sure that the people were trained in human 
rights and legal issues as part of the drafting process.  
There is therefore a basis for saying that NGOs and other experts augment 
community bylaws by expressly examining them through human 
rights/legislation lenses, though the language of the bylaws is not couched in 
human rights terms. In Senior Chief Lukwa‘s area, the process of drafting the 
bylaws was internally facilitated, but when it reached advanced stages, 
‗experts‘ from the police, court and social welfare were invited to help them 
fine-tune the bylaws. Social Welfare officials also acknowledged that they 
offer technical support during the formulation of community bylaws when 
invited and resources permit.  
Augmentation influences the language of the community bylaws. This 
happens when ‗experts‘ from outside the community are asked to comment 
on the legal soundness of the bylaws and recommend changes. Indeed, taking 
draft community bylaws to ‗experts‘ who can examine the bylaws critically 
before they are adopted is common practice. YONECO‘s Executive Director 
asserted, ‗our role was to ensure that the bylaws did not conflict with national 
laws. So we engaged a lawyer to advise us‘.  
Usually, Magistrates are regarded as the legal experts who advise on the 
scope of the bylaws. FOCUS said: ‗a Magistrate helped us in drafting and 
scrutinising the bylaws in Mwirangombe‘s area‘. MIAA, WOLREC and 
GENET also involved Magistrates to vet the bylaws in their impact areas. 
Furthermore, though the bylaws in Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area were 
                                               




exclusively drafted by the community, a Magistrate vetted the bylaws and 
advised them to reduce some of the fines.  
Thus the vetting of bylaws by Magistrates is meant to ensure that they are fair 
and consistent with statutory law. The First Grade Magistrate at Kasungu 
district expounded, ‗when vetting bylaws, I look at their fairness because 
every law should be fair to people of different economic backgrounds. For 
instance, bylaws imposing a fine of ten goats would disadvantage someone 
who has nothing. Two goats would be more lenient‘. Referring to his prior 
experience of adopting bylaws in Chief Kachindamoto‘s area as Dedza 
District Council Bylaws,1607 Kasungu‘s DC also shared, ‗the draft bylaws said 
a Group Village Head who violates the bylaws should be fined a cow. 
However, the Magistrate advised us that even his court would not charge a 
cow for the offense, and we had to adjust the fine to a goat‘.   
By suggesting amendments, the ‗experts‘ influence how community-bred 
ideas are (re)packaged in order to resonate with legislative and human rights 
norms. However, the so-called ‗resonance‘ is partial, as Magistrates still defer 
to the traditional conceptions of justice within which bylaws are rooted. The 
advice they give is not binding. In any case, this advisory function performed 
by Magistrates does not form part of their official duties. Magistrates are 
apparently still grappling with what formal status they should give to the 
community bylaws. At the date of writing, the Chief Justice was yet to give 
directions on this question.  
Augmentation has some opportunistic elements. The Director of Social 
Welfare admitted that his Department is riding on the initiatives by Chiefs to 
make human rights gains.1608 He stated that community bylaws have been 
                                               
1607 See note 1170. 
1608 For example, he said that the Department of Social Welfare therefore took advantage of 
the GEWE Programme (2012–2016) to ensure that in the districts where the programme was 
being implemented, Social Welfare Officers were working with project communities to 




included in State Party reports to the CRC as well as to the Universal Periodic 
Review mechanism, and that ‗there has been recognition from international 
bodies that here in Malawi we now use bylaws for child protection.‘ 
On the one hand, Chiefs have appreciated the strengthening of their bylaws 
by NGOs, magistrates and other external actors, viewing this as a safeguard 
against bylaws violating state norms because ‗experts and the educated know 
better.‘ On the other hand, section 7.3.2.3 illustrates that Chiefs and their 
communities are quick to claim exclusive ownership of the community 
bylaws despite that other agents are involved in the process of drafting the 
bylaws. For their part, NGOs and the state 1609  have used augmentation 
opportunistically to meet their own human rights agendas by riding on 
communities‘ commitments ‗to do better‘. Section 7.3.2.3 has shown that 
GENET has claimed that it brought the community bylaws to Senior Chief 
Chitera‘s area,1610 while the Chief illustrated how oral bylaws existed before 
GENET‘s arrival. 
The fact that communities and NGOs may have different agendas in 
implementing the same initiative has long been noted in social 
movements.1611 In the community bylaws‘ context, several Chiefs clarified 
that while the intent behind the community bylaws is not different from the 
human rights agenda1612 they are not primarily motivated to act by the simple 
desire to implement human rights laws. The Chiefs claimed that the principle 
of kuteteza (protection) underlies the bylaws. According to the Chiefs, rural 
communities are wounded and weary of their culturally induced problems; 
                                                                                                                                      
Welfare Officer across Malawi has an official mandate to ensure that each TA should have 
community bylaws to protect children. 
1609 For example, section 9.4.2.5 of the thesis below reports an admission by the Director of 
Social Welfare that they took advantage of some Chiefs' disclosure that they were using 
community bylaws and started implementing the government's child protection agenda 
through the bylaws. 
1610 See note 1287. 
1611 See section 3.4.2.4 of the thesis. 
1612 Which is about protection, empowerment of girls and enhancement of human capabilities 




all they want is for women and girls to have a chance too, be protected, and 
for their villages to improve socio-economically.  
9.4.2.5   Reverse augmentation 
Reverse augmentation is occurring as Chiefs and their community bylaw 
initiatives ended up influencing and strengthening national level human 
rights programming. An example is the Ministry of Gender‘s recognition of 
the need to adopt the community bylaw model as a strategy for addressing 
harmful practices after interacting with chiefs. The Director of Social Welfare 
disclosed that they initially were unaware that bylaws were being used as a 
tool for addressing child marriage until they heard of it from chiefs at the 
initial child marriages symposium in 2013: 
Some chiefs who attended the symposium divulged that they are 
contributing to ending child marriage and other harmful practices by 
developing bylaws. We later followed up with Chiefs such as TA  
Dzoole in Dowa to get the bylaws they were talking about. We took 
this information as an opportunity, and started promoting the 
bylaws as part of our child protection strategy because our chiefs are 
custodian of culture, and have a greater say on all harmful practices.  
Given that Malawi has not managed to eliminate child marriage with formal 
strategies, the government is refining its strategies and practices, learning 
from the local/Chiefs. The Director of Social Welfare said that their aspiration 
is that all District Councils will eventually adopt child protection bylaws. 
Chapter 5 made clear that the new National Strategy on Ending Child 
Marriage has formally earmarked the formulation of community bylaws in 
300 TA areas,1613 implying that the reverse augmentation may even impact on 
strengthening the Ministry of Gender‘s budget. NGOs also suggested that 
they were borrowing a lot from community bylaws in one area, and pursuing 
similar projects in other sites. 
                                               




9.4.2.6   Hybridisation 
Rajam and Zararia1614 have also proposed that translation happens through 
hybridisation, which connotes mixing the ‗local‘ and the ‗exotic‘ in a 
vernacularisation project.1615  Community bylaws mainly display traces of 
hybridisation through their written texts (just as legislation is on paper). 
Section 7.2 has shown that this was not always so, and that early community 
bylaws (pre 2010) were mostly oral. The documentation culture is happening 
despite chiefs‘ claims that they store the bylaws in their heads. The urge to 
write seems to emerge from interests by others (e.g. donors, NGOs, 
government) to see the text as evidence that bylaws have been formulated.  
Other communities are also hinging the ‗legal validity‘ of their bylaws on 
Magistrates‘ signatures – thus mimicking affidavits that are signed under a 
Magistrate‘s oath. The fact that some chiefs make the effort to distribute 
community bylaws to key institutions1616 further imitates the style of formal 
laws, whose copies are physically available in different venues.  
Some locally-used concepts are also consonant with ‗borrowed‘ 
terminologies. Section 7.3.3.6 demonstrated that, beyond the study 
communities, TA Mwanza‘s area in Salima borrowed a state term by using 
the concept of ‗Community Parliament‘ in reference to the team that 
developed draft community bylaws. TA Mwanza also designated Group 
Village Head Mwanza as ‗Speaker‘ for this Community Parliament. The use 
                                               
1614 N. Rajaram and Vaishali Zararia, ‗Translating Women's Human Rights in a Globalising 
World: The Spiral Process in Reducing Gender Injustice in Baroda, India,‘ (2009). 
1615 See section 3.4.2.1 of the thesis, especially note 275. For example, the authors show how a 
local women's court was modelling the formal legal process through the use of legal papers, 
stamps and other symbols of law. 
1616  For example, in Senior Chief Mwirang‘ombe‘s area, Karonga, FOCUS facilitated the 
printing of the community bylaws, which have been distributed to relevant government 




of ‗household billboards‘ in Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area is a further 
example.1617 Even the term ‗bylaw‘ itself is borrowed from formal law.  
9.5  RECONCEPTUALISING THE VERNACULARISER 
Chapter 3 uses the term vernaculariser to also mean ‗translator‘. The different 
actors engaged in processes of formulating community bylaws in Table 7 
reveal that horizontal vernacularisation demands the broadening of the 
current conceptualisation of vernacularisers.1618 Section 3.4.2.3 sets out several 
types of vernacularisers, one of which (converters) is visible in the community 
bylaws context (converters). However, unique types of vernacularisers that 
have a heavy local/community façade have arisen from the community 
bylaws phenomenon (crusaders, grafters, troopers and connectors). The 
connection between the roles of these vernacularisers and the translation 
strategies discussed above is illustrated in Figure 2.  
9.5.1 Converters 
With reference to NGOs, Rajam and Zararia,1619 argue that ‗converters‘ use 
human rights discourse so that their clients can start appreciating their 
challenges from a human rights context. 1620  They use various frames 
(speeches, plays, campaigns etc.) to achieve their goal.  
In the community bylaws context, converters are mainly NGOs and state 
officials. To the extent that UN Women and UNFPA are working with 
selected chiefs, they are also playing a role of converter though not robustly 
on the ground. Some NGOs that have facilitated community problem 
identification exercises (and also the development of the community bylaws) 
                                               
1617 See section 9.4.2.2 of the thesis. 
1618  See section 3.4.2.3 of the thesis for different types of vernacularisers recognised in 
vernacularisation scholarship. 
1619 N. Rajaram and Vaishali Zararia, ‗Translating Women's Human Rights in a Globalising 
World: The Spiral Process in Reducing Gender Injustice in Baroda, India,‘ (2009). 




have leaned on human rights and state law frameworks to demonstrate the 
impact of harmful practices and wider state/global human rights and 
development objectives.1621  Section 9.4.2.2 also illustrates that WAYO has 
utilised drama to convey human rights implications of harmful practices.  
Other Chiefs have, in the course of developing community bylaws, invited 
state officials (such as police VSU personnel, Magistrates and Social Welfare 
officials) to make presentations on gender-related frameworks and human 
rights norms that have assisted community members to understand their 
internal challenges as legal and human rights violations.1622  
UN Women‘s Programme Specialist for the elimination of violence against 
women and girls (EVAW) stated that UN Women is directly implementing 
some projects involving chiefs. For instance, it has particularly utilised its 
HeforShe campaign to work with male chiefs as HeforShe role models. 
Furthermore, UN Women has mobilised selected TAs and Paramount Chiefs 
in the fight against child marriage and other harmful practices with the 
specific agenda of ensuring that chieftaincy mechanisms are protecting 
human rights, including promoting the use of community bylaws. 
                                               
1621 See section 7.3.3.1. 







UNFPA‘s Gender Programme Officer also shared that UNFPA has been 
promoting community bylaws since 2014, and this started under a safe 
motherhood programme whereby the organisation engaged Chiefs to 
champion the establishment of community rules to ensure that expectant 
women were delivering at hospital.  
The role of converters is certainly important, but as this chapter has shown, is 
not decisive to the formulation of community bylaws. Rather, converters are 
mostly relevant in augmenting the community bylaws so that they should 
have a human rights handle, though unseen in the actual text. 
9.5.2 Crusaders 
Crusaders initiate and lead efforts that persuade others about the viability of 
paradigm shifts in local culture through community bylaws. There are two 
tiers of crusaders: those at community and national levels respectively. At 
community level, Senior Chiefs/TAs are the main crusaders who are working 
at different levels to translate the protections they are seeking for women and 
girls into community bylaws. Thus, it is befitting that international 
jurisprudence is starting to recognise traditional leaders as vernacularisers.1623 
After they themselves are challenged through different experiences (including 
attending meetings and socialising with other Chiefs), Senior Chiefs/TAs 
persuade other chiefs and the community at large to problematise their 
culture and find solutions that resonate with human rights ideals.  
Section 7.3.3.1 has shown how TAs/Senior Chiefs are crucial to mobilising 
other ‗local decision makers‘ (lower cadres of chiefs and the ADC) behind the 
crusade to address cultural problems through community bylaws. For 
example, Senior Chief Lukwa, Ntcheu, said, ‘I personally went from one sub-
                                               




TA area to the other, mobilising all the chiefs, and facilitating discussions‘. 
Senior Chief Chitera, Chiradzulu, explained how, before GENET‘s arrival, she 
ensured that through her Group Village Heads, various villages should 
appoint ‗ma komiti oteteza ana’.1624 In Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area (Ntcheu), 
the TA mobilised Group Village Heads as part of the ADC. About his role, he 
said: ‗we met as ADC to discuss for several days and I was facilitating the 
discussions as the TA. We did not collaborate with any NGO; we were just 
doing it ourselves‘.  
As crusaders, the TAs/Senior Chiefs are sometimes vendors of international 
ideas, convincing fellow Chiefs and their communities to adopt 
(international) ideas/perspectives to which they themselves have been 
persuaded. This role was peculiar to Senior Chiefs Kwataine, Ntcheu, and 
Lukwa, Kasungu. Senior Chief Kwataine recounted that when his area was 
implementing the Women, Girls, HIV and AIDS Project between 2005 and 
2006,1625 he attended four meetings in Namibia:1626  
At one meeting, I was asked to speak about how I can advise 
community members to prevent HIV transmission through cultural 
practices. This awakened me to challenges such as polygamy, 
commonly practiced by Ngonis. So I asked at the meeting, ‗if we 
continue to sustain this practice, will we indeed conquer HIV?‘ This 
is when the meeting agreed on the idea of developing community 
rules against polygamy. When I returned, I engaged my Chiefs, and 
we conceded that ‘mitala ndi dyera chabe ndipo akazi amazuzika’.1627 
Unfortunately community members disputed banning polygamy. 
Still, we developed bylaws to promote girl education.  
                                               
1624 Best English approximation would be ‗child protection committees‘. These committees 
conducted door-to-door advocacy, and reported incidents of child marriage to Chief Chitera 
for termination. However, Chief Chitera‘s role of actively mobilising Chiefs ended when 
GENET took over the process of formulating written community bylaws. 
1625 See note 1155. 
1626 Sponsored by the Ministry of Gender. The meetings were hosted in Namibia because the 
wife of Namibian President Pohamba was leading a Women and Girls HIV Taskforce in 
Southern Africa. 
1627  Best English approximation would be—'polygamy is just greed on the part of men; 




Senior Chief Kwataine epitomises a Chief‘s interest to implement the 
recommendations of an international conference directly at grassroots, 
without relying on the NGO or government interlocutor. The fact that he won 
a Women Deliver award in 2009 intensified his resolve. He led the crusade for 
his community to ban marriages of those below the age of 21 years1628 under 
the area‘s safe motherhood bylaws in 2009, long before child marriage was 
legislatively proscribed in 2015. 
Senior Chief Lukwa‘s vending of international ideas is seen both in the 
adoption of ‗HeforShe Bylaws on Girl Child Abuse‘ in his area, and in his 
claim that one of the two sets of bylaws in his area 1629  domesticates 
commitments that Chiefs made at an international conference in Kigali, 
Rwanda:  
We sat down as community leaders, motivated to translate HeforShe at 
local level. 1630 So through our 2014 ‗HeforShe‘ bylaws, we decided to 
make our own commitments to ensure that girls return to school and 
we decided to impose village-based punishments against guilty 
teachers, parents, children and Chiefs. As for the 2015 bylaws, leaders 
who met in Kigali, Rwanda, 1631  committed each leader (political, 
religious or traditional) to ensure that girls are in school regardless of 
the reason for dropping out, and that cultural obstacles to girl 
education are eliminated. We have domesticated these Kigali 
commitments. 
While the ‗domesticated Kigali commitments‘ are a verbatim version of the 
community bylaws in TA Mwanza‘s area in Salima, the Chief‘s purported 
self-drive to ‗domesticate‘ and his impulsive use of the terms ‗international 
law‘ and ‗protocol‘ in our discussion reveals that his crusade for the bylaws to 
address cultural obstacles to the enjoyment of women‘s rights is also 
                                               
1628 This was later adjusted to 18 years in the community's 2012 bylaws to align with the 
internationally recommended age. 
1629 Dated 10 April 2015 and 15 June 2015 respectively. 
1630 'Since HeforShe does not have sanctions', he explained. 
1631 He quickly added that he did not attend the conference personally but that it was adopted 




internationally inspired. Thus, in the process of crusading, Senior Chiefs/TAs 
raise legal consciousness, and recruit other crusaders (junior Chiefs and 
community groups, e.g. the GENET Committee in Senior Chief Chitera‘s 
area), who conduct advocacy-based consultations at village levels so that 
subjects can support and contribute to the development of community 
bylaws.  
NGOs, the Ministry of Gender and donors are a national set of crusaders that 
have seized the opportunity provided by community bylaws to localise the 
implementation of gender equality statutes. As seen in this chapter, the 
Director, Ministry of Gender (with support from UN Agencies) convened 
national meetings targeting Chiefs and/or their spouses with the aim of 
lobbying for community bylaws to embrace human rights/legislative 
perspectives. They have also been urging the Ministry of Local Government 
to support the ‗one bylaw framework‘ and to be an ally in promoting Chiefs‘ 
adherence to gender equality norms through District Councils. UN Women is 
even working directly with selected Chiefs. Plan Malawi has supported the 
Ministry of Gender to develop the National Strategy on Ending Child 
Marriage (2018-2023), which aspires to see 300 TAs adopt community bylaws 
prohibiting child marriage. This national category of crusaders has what 
vernacularisation scholarships calls ‗double consciousness‘, 1632  navigating 
between local, national and international platforms with different hats.  
9.5.3 Grafters 
Grafters identify local perspectives that should be dropped so that another 
perspective can be grafted onto community bylaws in order to strengthen the 
protection of women‘s rights. The main grafters in the context of the bylaws 
are state officials – the Magistrates/‘experts‘ engaged by NGOs and the 
Ministry of Gender (as supported by donors). ‗Experts‘ that have been 
                                               




engaged by NGOs to facilitate the vetting of community bylaws have ended 
up dropping bylaw provisions and fines deemed inappropriate, and grafting 
on ones that ‗align‘ with legislation and human rights standards.  
The Ministry of Gender and donors are also potential grafters, as they are 
currently working towards the adoption of a ‗one bylaws framework,‘ which, 
if approved, would graft onto community bylaws the state‘s multi-layered 
gender agenda.1633  The Director of Social Welfare noted that through the 
framework, the Ministry intends to avoid conflicts that might arise between 
community bylaws and state law. The Programme Officer in the Department 
of Gender Affairs explained that, since 2016, the Ministry of Gender has been 
working with UN agencies (UN Women, UNFPA and UNAIDS) to develop 
the framework, trying to resolve weaknesses in community bylaws by 
proposing guidelines:  
This framework is meant to guide traditional leaders and their 
subjects on the content and minimum penalties of community 
bylaws. We are also trying to address some of the challenges that 
have been observed in the implementation of the bylaws because we 
are aware that some of the penalties in the bylaws were violating 
human rights. For example, some would prescribe imprisonment for 
failure to send a child to school. Furthermore, where some of the 
challenges being addressed by the bylaws are already addressed in 
legislation, we want to ensure that the penalties that the Chiefs give 
will be related to legislation. So we are working through a task 
force1634 to develop the framework. 
                                               
1633 The framework is addressing the following issues: early childhood development; primary 
and secondary school education; adult literacy; maternal, child and general health; child and 
forced marriages; GBV; harmful cultural practices; inheritance; land rights; child labour; 
human trafficking and humanitarian issues—'Framework for the District Council Bylaws' 
(Draft, 2017). On file with author. 
1634 Comprising key partners, namely: Ministry of Gender, Children Disability and Social 
Welfare, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Ministry of Civic Education and 
Community Development, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, 
representatives of both female and male traditional leaders, UN family (UNFPA, UN Women, 
UNAIDS), and representative of civil society. With time, some members representing the 




However, the development of the ‗one bylaw framework‘ exposes several 
risks associated with grafting. First, the grafters may lose sight of the fact that 
the respect, power and authority of community bylaws is derived from the 
fact that they originate from communities seeking to take control of their 
pressing socio-cultural struggles. Section 9.4.1 suggests that through 
deflective translation, the community bylaws are subtly sidestepping state 
law because it is not relatable to how they would want to earnestly, but 
informally, uproot socio-cultural harms. It is doubtful that the prescriptive 
‗one bylaw framework‘ would be viewed in the same light. It could even 
muzzle the current zeal of communities to face their problems head-on, their 
way.  
The second related risk is that the grafters may weaken legal pluralism, as 
they imbue the informal justice system with philosophies of the formal justice 
system. The consultant commissioned to finalise the framework validates 
these concerns, his opinion being that the effort ‗is not a good idea since it 
may result in formalising the informal justice system‘.1635 The interviewed 
Programme Officer in the Department of Gender Affairs acknowledged that 
some District Commissioners are also uncertain about the framework, and 
their argument is ‗that communities themselves should suggest principles 
that they would abide by. If the government imposes a framework on them, it 
would be difficult to enforce adherence‘.  
Thus, grafters could negatively impact on both norm internalisation and legal 
pluralism. For instance, grafters may bulldoze the style of norm 
                                               
1635 In his preliminary recommendations, he says ‗the development of community by-law 
framework may not be a good idea as it may result in formalising the informal justice system 
and also that most of the issues covered by the draft community bylaw framework are 
comprehensively and substantively covered by the relevant pieces of legislation. Instead, 
there is a need to develop a booklet on all pieces of legislation dealing with matters 
highlighted in the draft community by-law framework‘—William Yakuwawa Msiska, 
‗Preliminary Report on the Consultancy to Facilitate the Finalisation of the Community By-
Law Framework, Submitted to The Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability and Social 




internalisation that resembles the model of legal rationality, whereby there is 
an insistence that universal laws/models should apply to all cultures without 
minding cultural differences.1636 Furthermore, they may sabotage the ‗open-
endedness‘ of legal pluralism, which allows informal mechanisms that 
promote women‘s rights to work at a legal scale despite being outside the 
scope of formal law.1637 
9.5.4 Troopers 
Since message framing in horizontal vernacularisation is on-going, troopers 
are those who conduct continuous purposeful investigations and awareness-
raising, helping others to translate community bylaws into lived experience. 
Troopers in the study areas are special groups that support the ‗hands-on‘ 
implementation of the bylaws (e.g. lower cadres of Chiefs, Mother Groups,1638 
GENET Committee,1639 Amai a chinsinsi,1640 and Back to School Committee1641). 
Troopers take the message to different sites and visit the sites where harmful 
practices are likely to be committed in order to promote bylaws compliance.  
Regarding Chiefs as troopers, one of their roles is to sustain communication 
about the bylaws so that people do not slip up. They use various forums, 
particularly funerals:  
At every funeral, the Chief has a slot to speak, and mfumu 
imalakhula zonse zaku khosi kwake1642. Therefore, we announce that 
nowadays, the village has a law prohibiting a child below the age of 
18 years to get married and that anyone violating this law will 
answer at the Chief‘s court. We do this to publicly declare both the 
problem and the consequences of fostering it.  
                                               
1636 See note 535. 
1637 See section 1.5 of the thesis. 
1638 Available in all study areas. 
1639 Chief Chitera's area. 
1640 Chief Kwataine‘s area, Ntcheu. 
1641 Chief Lukwa‘s area, Kasungu. 
1642 Best English approximation would be 'the Chief speaks everything on his/her mind' 




Furthermore, Chiefs can visit the sites where harmful practices are typically 
committed to conduct dialogues. For instance, Chiefs have also been known 
to challenge clandestine practices at initiation camps. For example, Village 
Heads in Senior Chief Chitera‘s area said: ‘we go to the initiation camp to talk 
to anankungwi1643 to advise them of initiation instructions that are harmful to 
children and that should be changed. Sometimes anankungwi used to 
seriously beat up rude children – we have also stopped this‘. Apart from 
educating counsellors on new norms, the Chiefs also regularly monitor 
whether initiation practices are aligned with community bylaws. YONECO‘s 
Executive Director reported that Chiefs in Machinga once burnt initiation 
camps that were secretly running during school time.  
Troopers include women groups that help to enforce the community bylaws. 
For example, each study site had an organised group of women to ensure 
adherence to the bylaws. The women‘s ‗Back to School Committee‘ in Senior 
Chief Lukwa‘s area said their main role was ‗kusokola ana’.1644 they visit homes 
of girls who have dropped out of school.  If the child drops out because of 
lack of school fees, they refer the case to the Chief, who requests the DC to 
provide a bursary. But if a parent says the child should stay home because she 
is troublesome, the women visit the home to counsel the child. If the child still 
stays home, the Senior Chief punishes both the Village Head and the Group 
Village Head for failing to make their subjects adhere to bylaws‘. Amai a 
chinsinsi in Senior Chief Kwataine‘s area use one-on-one dialogues with girls 
and/or women to continue breaking down the community bylaws and 
supporting adherence. Mother Groups in all study areas also counsel and 
support girls in school environments. The Mother Group in Senior Chief 
Kwataine‘s area mentioned that they do undercover investigations and work 
with NGOs:  
                                               
1643 Best English approximation would be 'initiation counsellors'. 
1644 Best English approximation is 'hunting down children who dropped out of school and 




We found out that a Chief‘s daughter was getting married. Our 
investigations revealed that she was between 16 and 17 years and 
pregnant and we confronted the Chief. Consequently, the marriage 
didn't take place and the girl returned to school after delivery. In 
another case, there was a 13-year-old girl who eloped to Mulanje 
with her boyfriend. We did our investigations and reported the 
matter to YONECO, who brought her back and returned her to 
school.  
Troopers also physically withdraw children from marriages, stop the 
celebration of child marriages, and/or alert the Chiefs about impeding child 
marriages. The GENET Committee in Senior Chief Chitera‘s area reported, 
‗when a child who wants to get married is refusing our counsel, we take the 
case to the Village Head; if the parents/child are unbending, the case goes to 
the Group Village Head or even Senior Chief.‘ Though most troopers said 
they had not received structured human rights trainings, they draw from 
their appetite for change, the language of the community bylaws, and ad hoc 
human rights information obtained from community sensitisations conducted 
by NGOs or provided through various media sources.  
9.5.5 Connectors 
Connectors have strategic interests. They play the role of connecting different 
players that have sectoral or other expertise to the process of formulating 
community bylaws so that they can improve the quality of the bylaws from 
developmental, legal and human rights perspectives. The connector needs to 
be aware of community bylaws development processes in order to play 
his/her role. 
Social welfare officials at district level are the key connectors of the 
government sector. The District Social Welfare Office is well positioned to 
play this role since it has Child Protection Officers in most TA areas or at least 




efforts that are being taken in different communities to develop community 
bylaws. Social welfare officials mobilise other district-level sectors with 
relevant expertise to help communities meet the objectives of the bylaws they 
are formulating. For example, an Assistant Social Welfare Officer in 
Chiradzulu explained: ‗if people are making bylaws related to health/safe 
motherhood, we link them to a district health official to support them to make 
good bylaws‘.  
NGOs are also connectors since they bring external facilitators and other 
experts to the process. Section 9.4.2.4 has shown that NGOs can connect 
communities with lawyers, magistrates, and other relevant government 
officials at community and district levels.  
Connectors sometimes deliberately cast the net wide so that strategic players 
involved in the formulation of the bylaws continue to support the 
implementation of the community bylaws after they are formulated. For 
example, a Third Grade Magistrate at Nyungwe Court in Karonga said that a 
group of stakeholders from the court, police, health, social welfare, 
community development, and NGOs operating in Senior Chief 
Mwirang‘ombe‘s territory meet periodically with Chiefs to review the 
implementation of community bylaws because they were involved in their 
development. This not only ensures that the community bylaws have local 
authority and respect from community members and official stakeholders 
alike, but also that translation is on-going through collective reflections on 
how the bylaws are protecting human rights. 
9.6   CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that drivers of the community bylaws include Chiefs, 
government agencies, NGOs, donors and local women. It demonstrates the 




‗local‘ is driving its own efforts to deal with harmful practices. The 
community bylaws originate locally, with Chiefs playing the roles of: 
mobilising other local decision makers and facilitating dialogues, selling 
international ideas to their communities, facilitating the empowerment of 
women to monitor the implementation bylaws, propagating the established 
community bylaws, enforcing/implementing the community bylaws, and 
fundraising, at times. Chiefs are depending on women within their 
communities as a resource to contribute to the contents of the bylaws, as well 
as monitor their implementation. Meanwhile, some communities are also 
working with NGOs, who are mainly playing the roles of facilitating 
community dialogues (problem identification), providing technical support to 
those formulating bylaws, influencing the language of the bylaws, and 
printing/launching the community bylaws. All this is mostly happening 
intuitively, interlocking, convolutely, and iteratively – but still resulting in 
human rights appropriation and translation, whether consciously or 
unconsciously.  
The chapter further displays that in some ways, there is also interaction 
between local and external players in the formulation (and at times the 
implementation) of the community bylaws. This is influencing and/or 
strengthening the appropriation and translation of human rights norms 
protecting women and girls from harmful practices. Five government 
agencies are involved in community bylaws. The Ministry of Gender 
(MoGCDSW), though its Departments of Gender Affairs and Social Welfare 
are the main players that have mobilised the Local Government to take the 
community bylaws agenda seriously since Chiefs fall under its mandate. 
MoGCDSW is particularly pushing for the ‗one bylaw framework‘ to be 
implemented by District Councils (Local Government). For their part, 
Magistrates have found themselves as the legal experts in the communities 
where the community bylaws are being made, being relied upon to vet draft 




 Police VSUs‘ main roles have been to make presentations of state law/human 
rights at meetings and attending community bylaw launches. Unless it is a 
rape or defilement case, police generally give precedence to community 
bylaws over applying state law. Donors such as UN Women and UNFPA are 
also supporting community bylaws to complement government efforts to 
address harmful practices. UN Women has particularly been directly 
involved through its HeforShe campaign and its project involving selected 
TAs and Paramount Chiefs. Furthermore, together with UNFPA and 
UNAIDS, UN Women is technically supporting the development of the ‗one 
bylaws framework‘.   
The nature of the respective roles being played by various drivers is 
introducing new understandings, translation patterns, as well as the type of 
vernacularisers that are involved in horizontal vernacularisation. In this 
regard the chapter makes several theoretical contributions to the thesis: 1) 
conceptualising horizontal vernacularisation, 2) illustrating that the concept 
recognises the local as another form of vernacularisation, and 3) illustrating 
that the concept departs from vernacularisation as a structured and 
unicameral concept, where there is a clear ‗outside‘ programme to 
vernacularise human rights in a local community, with the locals being mere 
recipients.  
The chapter further introduces five strategies for translating human rights 
and statutory norms that are being exhibited by the community bylaws. Out 
of these, deflective translation/deflection, socialisation,1645  customarisation, 
augmentation and reverse augmentation are unique to the bylaws 
phenomenon, while simplification, and hybridisation are adapted from 
vernacularisation. Through deflection (which cuts across the other strategies), 
community bylaws are deliberately, or at times not, borrowing from human 
                                               
1645 Although the concept itself is used in a different context in norm diffusion scholarship. 




rights and legislative norms, while deflecting statutory punishments and 
opting for locally familiar punishments (chindapusa). Customarisation is 
sparked by the Chief-led and protection basis of the community bylaws. This 
has seen legislation and the notion of ‗women‘s protection‘ being 
customarised so that cultural sites can be safe for women and girls, and truly 
facilitate their development.  
During simplification, communities are innovatively using local images and 
symbols through the use of Gule Wamkulu, drama, actual stories, and ‗house 
billboards‘. Thus, simplification is transcending community bylaw making, 
and moulding local practice. Socialisation is happening experientially, 
through ‗Chief to Chief‘, and ‗Chief to Government‘ interactions. Thus, 
socialisation can unfold locally beyond the ‗state-to-state‘ engagement 
described in norm diffusion scholarship. Augmentation is providing a direct 
entry point for human rights appropriation and translation, and being 
facilitated by outside ‗experts‘ with the intention of strengthening bylaws 
from statutory and human rights perspectives. Lastly, hybridisation is 
exposed when the community bylaws embrace features that are present in 
formal state mechanisms. 
The chapter ends with an exposition of conceptualising who vernacularisers 
are in the context of the community bylaws and horizontal vernacularisation. 
There are five types of vernacularisers: converters (NGOs and Government 
Officials); crusaders (the main ones of which are Senior Chiefs/TAs, followed 
by national level crusaders (Ministry of Gender and NGOs); grafters (the 
‗experts‘ that amplify community bylaws, but also the Ministry of Gender and 
who are formulating the ‗one bylaw framework‘ and UN agencies supporting 
the work); troopers (lower cadres of Chiefs and special community/women‘s 
groups that physically move across cultural sites to ensure compliance); and 
connectors (District Social Welfare officials who connect different government 




process other players as facilitators and experts). 
These (re)conceptualisations, as summarised in Figure 2 above, attest to the 
fact that horizontal vernacularisation is not as structured as other 
vernacularisation programmes and is multidimensional. The local is very 
involved along with external actors in horizontal vernacularisation, with 
Senior Chiefs/TAs, being particularly engaged at several translation points 






CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
10.1 THESIS QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES 
This thesis set out to examine how international human rights norms for 
protecting women and girls from harmful practices have influenced and 
shaped the emergence and conceptualisation of community bylaws on child 
marriage and other harmful practices in rural Malawi. There is a dearth of 
scholarship on the topic of community bylaws on harmful practices. This 
thesis fills this gap by providing an understanding of the role that these 
bylaws play in internalising international human rights norms for protecting 
women and girls from harmful practices and how they relate to the existing 
theories of norm diffusion of international human rights. The thesis has 
drawn on empirical data from four study sites: the areas of Senior Chiefs 
Chitera in Chiradzulu, Kwataine in Ntcheu, Lukwa in Kasungu and 
Mwirang’ombe in Karonga, where community bylaws have been adopted 
and implemented for some time.  
The thesis had four objectives:  
a) to explain the factors influencing the emergence and use of community 
bylaws to ensure the protection of the right of women to be free from 
harmful practices;  
b) to examine the relationship between the community bylaws and 
African customary law within the broader context of legal pluralism;  
c) to understand how the community bylaws and harmful practices 




such conceptualisation is consistent with and/or influenced by 
domestic and international human rights law; and  
d) to contribute to the theoretical discourse on norm internalisation by 
assessing and testing if the phenomenon of community bylaws is 
revealing other vernacularisation concepts that are at play when 
culture/custom is the action ground. 
10.2 KEY FINDINGS 
10.2.1  Factors Influencing the Emergence and Use of Community Bylaws  
      a)  Community bylaws have existed orally in the past 
The thesis has established that community bylaws on harmful practices in 
Malawi have existed in oral form from around 1994, while written 
community bylaws have gained traction since around 2010, coinciding with 
the period when government enacted several gender statutes.  
b) The community is the main source and author of community bylaws 
One of the essential features of community bylaws is that they are developed 
under the leadership of Senior Chiefs or TAs in collaboration with lower tiers 
of Chiefs (Group Village Heads and Village Heads) in order to address 
harmful practices that a community has itself found to be problematic. Thus, 
despite the involvement of external actors in later stages of their adoption, 
community bylaws are owned, used and primarily enforced by rural 
communities: the communities adopt them out of their own conviction that 
there are internal cultural problems worth solving through their own 
initiative. 
The community bylaws rely on a wide range of enforcement mechanisms 
including social pressure, community investigations and self-help, traditional 




such as the police and magistrates courts, all of which renders them more 
relatable and accessible and therefore more enforceable than formal laws. 
Through these bylaws, Chiefs and community members are engaging in the 
reconstruction of their cultures in a fashion strongly resembling human rights 
appropriation, though they may initially do this unconsciously (implied 
appropriation), but in more innovative and engaged ways than is assumed by 
proponents of norm diffusion of international law.  
c) The processes of formulating community bylaws are laden with layers 
of horizontal vernacularisation 
The thesis has shown that processes for formulating community bylaws have 
heavy community footprints, although some collaboration between Chiefs, 
their subjects and external (human rights) actors also occurs. Thus, horizontal 
vernacularisation is manifested in the fact that the decision to formulate 
community bylaws is not primarily moved by the desire to implement 
externally developed/funded projects, or to promote state and human rights 
norms regarding harmful practices/gender equality, though the latter 
becomes a significant secondary consideration eventually. Furthermore, as 
noted below, the various stages of formulating community bylaws reveal that 
horizontal vernacularisation deploys unique strategies of translating human 
rights ideas and vernacularisers.  
10.2.2 Relationship Between the Community Bylaws and African 
Customary Law  
 The community bylaws are living law 
The thesis has interrogated the legal character of the community bylaws in 
order to appreciate the relationship between the community bylaws and 
African (living) customary law and other laws. It has established that 
although respondents generally consider community bylaws to be valid law, 




at least at the constitutional level. However, the community bylaws can 
become formal law if they are formulated under the auspices of District 
Councils in accordance with the Local Government Act. Without this process, 
in their current state, the term community ‘bylaws ’itself is unstable.  
Nevertheless, in the context of legal pluralism, the community bylaws can be 
said to have some legal effect. The findings demonstrate that the community 
bylaws are uprooting harmful customary laws and practices and establishing 
cultural values that protect women and girls, as communities intuitively 
respond to socio-economic and legal changes. They are a rupture of 
patriarchal customary law, and ‗remote‘ formal law. The communities accept 
them as legally binding laws and enforce them as such. Oral community 
bylaws, which are mostly known by Chiefs and their subjects, bear the 
hallmarks of living customary law. It could be argued that written 
community bylaws do not form part of ‘living customary law’, but the form 
they take makes little difference in practice. The communities make no 
distinction between oral and written bylaws and the practice of reducing 
these laws to writing is more recent and externally driven than it is a 
requirement for valid community bylaws. The unwritten and written forms of 
community bylaws operate side by side and interrelate in ways that do not 
permit easy separation.  
10.2.3  Conformity Between the Conceptualisation of Community Bylaws 
and Domestic/International Human Rights Law  
As part of understanding the legal character of the community bylaws, the 
thesis has examined international human rights law and jurisprudence, as 
well as domestic policies and laws on harmful practices and applied these to 
how community bylaws generally, and harmful practices particularly, are 




a)  International law and jurisprudence show preference for formal 
interventions to informal mechanisms 
Despite that community bylaws are being relied upon to eliminate child 
marriage and other harmful practices in rural Malawi, informal measures are 
at the margins of the strategies that international and domestic frameworks 
recommend for states to take in order to internalise human rights norms. As a 
result, the recommended measures are mostly legislative and administrative, 
and do not easily facilitate the localisation of human rights norms to 
grassroots settings. Notably, international jurisprudence has generally been 
mistrustful of informal and customary justice systems. Although some recent 
jurisprudence now recognises that plural and informal mechanisms 
(including customary law) have a role to play in promoting women‘s rights, 
this recognition is still guarded, and the expectation is that plural systems 
should merely codify CEDAW standards. 
The jurisprudence also promotes the impression that vernacularisation only 
proceeds from without, and that ‗the local‘ is only a mere recipient of human 
rights interventions that are conceptualised elsewhere by ‗elite‘ outsiders. The 
bulk of the jurisprudence positions traditional leaders as targets of human 
rights awareness and education. In turn, traditional leaders are expected to 
adapt traditional norms to fully comply with international norms. This 
conventional approach to norm diffusion of international human rights 
reflects the notion of vertical vernacularisation, which denies rural 
communities‘ agency to think for themselves and take part in the construction 
and implementation of human rights. This thesis has shown that ‗the local‘ is 
also engaged in the reinterpretation of human rights norms in ways that 
enriches the discourse and expands the possibilities for the implementation 
and enforcement of human rights.  
Even though some jurisprudence is starting to recognise the role of traditional 




remains to be acknowledged that traditional leaders and ‗the local‘ are in 
themselves a cradle of horizontal vernacularisation as seen in the community 
bylaws phenomenon. 
b)  There is gulf between legislation and rural people 
The 1994 Constitution, through its Bill of Rights, has specifically internalised 
the norms protecting women women‘s rights and from harmful practices, 
culminating in the enactment of legislation on child protection, domestic 
violence, inheritance, gender equality, marriage, human trafficking, and HIV, 
between 2006 and 2017. These statutes have, to a large extent, appropriated 
international human rights standards, although they have at times also re-
interpreted some of them.  
However, the thesis has observed that the internalisation of human rights 
norms through legislation has been inadequate, since legislation has not had 
any impact on rural areas. To a large extent, domestic policy and legislation 
mirrors the unicameral view that vernacularisation is facilitated by epistemic 
outsiders who have human rights programmes that target the ‗local‘. This 
approach does not position ‘the local‘’as a source of its own interventions to 
address harmful practices. Through community bylaws, rural people spark 
second-level norm internalisation, thus launching the concept of ‘horizontal 
vernacularisation’. This pursuit is coinciding with government’s priorities to 
promote girls ’education (including by eliminating child marriage), safe 
motherhood, and to address various drivers of gender inequalities. 
c)  The community bylaws display the appropriation of and division 
from human rights norms  
 Conceptualisation of harmful practices 
Most of the harmful practices identified by international jurisprudence are 




Marriage before the age of 18 years is outlawed without the exception 
allowed by CEDAW and CRC jurisprudence. Some community bylaws also 
impose sanctions on those who traditionally approve or officiate child 
marriages in accordance with requirements of international jurisprudence.  
However, in some respects, the community bylaws fail to shake off the yoke 
of patriarchy and thus fail to prohibit some internationally recognised 
harmful practices. As with state law, they fail to recognise lobola/bride price 
and polygamy as harmful practices, contrary to what international 
jurisprudence expects. Community bylaws accept levirate marriages/chokolo 
on condition that the parties involved should undergo HIV testing, despite 
international jurisprudence calling for the complete elimination of levirate 
marriages. The conditional acceptance of chokolo (and even the general ban of 
chokolo in some bylaws) purely on HIV grounds remains an affront to gender 
equality. It could also be argued that some of the enforcement mechanisms 
and remedies compromise human rights standards. In addition, some forms 
of rape/defilement (e.g. kusasa fumbi, kulowa kufa, mbiligha, kupimbira) are still 
permitted by some bylaws. 
Some sanctions such as chindapusa, forcing a married child to return home by 
detaining parents, banishing a perpetrator from the community, denying a 
perpetrator farming land, and submitting violators of bylaws to community 
sanctions and criminal prosecution, can be harsh, disproportionate and 
inconsistent with some key rights. 
Despite these shortcomings, as dynamic and living laws, community bylaws 
reflect a mix of the old and new, a revaluation of traditional practices and 
values as communities interact with other communities, cultures and received 
norms. In some respect, the thesis has shown, the community bylaws have 
been quite radical and more ambitious than formal law. 




There is no doubt that community bylaws generally incorporate international 
human rights norms. First, the community bylaws are transforming 
entrenched cultural beliefs and values that have had negative impacts on 
community development, and replacing them with values that express 
greater respect for girls‘ education, community health and safe motherhood, 
and for women‘s/girls‘ dignity and equality with men in general. Thus, the 
community bylaws being adopted are meant to address obstacles to these 
human rights inclined new values.  
Second, to a large extent, most community bylaws are advancing key 
principles of women‘s and children‘s rights under both the Republican 
Constitution and international law, namely gender equality and non-
discrimination (women‘s rights); and non-discrimination, the best interests of 
the child, children’s right to survival, development and protection/life 
(children’s rights). Upholding principles of gender equality and non-
discrimination is evident since some of the community bylaws are gender 
transformative, and have high potential to substantively address social 
inequalities by: specifically promoting equality between girls and boys (in 
education, employment, businesses, household chores); utterly uprooting 
child marriages; ensuring that both girl and boys, including those that 
dropped out, are in school; prohibiting marital rape and property 
dispossession of widows and children; and promoting male involvement in 
safe motherhood efforts.  
In upholding the cardinal principles of children’s rights, all reviewed 
community bylaws are promoting ‘the best interests of the child ’by not 
allowing child marriage in any circumstance (and requiring young mothers to 
return to school); treating rape/defilement as criminal matters; and banning 
harmful initiation practices (few bylaws even treat entrenched harmful 




GBV in schools, as well as fathers who financially and emotionally neglect 
their children.  
The principle of children’s right to survival, development and protection/life 
is being promoted by the emphasis that the community bylaws are placing on 
eliminating harmful practices broadly (most of which are detrimental to 
children’s health); as well as promoting children’s education in general, and 
girls‘ education in particular. Additionally, the bylaws barring cultural 
practices such as kupimbira and child marriage in lobola paying areas are 
protecting girls from economic exploitation. Girls are further protected from 
sexual exploitation by community bylaws proscribing entrenched practices 
such as kusasa fumbi and bulangete la mfumu. However, most bylaws do not 
promote sexual and reproductive health rights of girls. 
d)  The community bylaws are critiquing some international approaches  
When measured against the criteria for ‗harmful practices‘ under CEDAW 
and CRC jurisprudence, maternal health practices that are regarded harmful 
practices in the study communities do not meet those stringent criteria. The 
community bylaws are challenging the way that the jurisprudence narrowly 
conceptualises the ‘traditional root criteria‘ in establishing harmful practices, 
and calling for a broader perspective that does not only focus on the 
patriarchal causes of traditional practices but also focus on unintended 
discriminatory or violence-related consequences of some seemingly ‗innocent‘ 
traditional practices. 
Second, the thesis has established that the community bylaws are 
reconceptualising ‗child marriage victim‘ and challenging the position of 
international jurisprudence that ‗child marriages are automatically forced 
marriages‘. By punishing 'girls who rush into marriage‘ (beyond punishing 
the man involved) some study communities recognise the reality of the 




does not deserve the victim label. These communities insist that, depending 
on her age, such a girl not only has to be withdrawn from such marriage but 
also deserves to be sanctioned as a deterrent.  
10.2.4  Theoretical Contributions to Norm Internalisation Theory 
Additional to what has been noted under section 10.2.2, the thesis has shown 
that a valid claim cannot be made that the practice of community bylaws 
merely reflects the traditional understanding of vernacularisation, whereby 
the process of transmitting norms to local destinations is triggered by 
epistemic outsiders. Horizontal vernacularisation does not mean that a local 
community is not engaged in norm contestation. Rather, it is process-focused, 
and demonstrates that local communities and their chiefs too (whether alone 
or in intricate relationships with epistemic outsiders) can also actively initiate 
vernacularisation. This is because in the process of appropriating (and even 
re-negotiating) international and statutory norms, there is significant locally 
initiated horizontal engagement among local peers and across peer 
communities; as well as vertical engagement with outsiders. It is therefore 
more accurate to speak of both vertical and horizontal vernacularisation in 
describing the relationship between international human rights norms on 
harmful practices and community bylaws. This bicameral understanding of 
vernacularisation recognises that the catalyst for appropriation and 
translation of human rights norms can arise from both outside and within a 
local community. This bicameral process of vernacularisation makes use of 
multiple translation strategies and vernacularisers. 
a)   Translation strategies 
While the thesis has demonstrated that the strategies of simplification and 
hybridisation have been utilised in vernacularisation, it has also 





 Deflective translation/deflection  
Through deflection, communities are consciously or unconsciously applying 
legislative human rights ideologies to create positive meanings of their 
cultural practices through ‘rules ’that promote women’s rights, and yet 
deflecting legislative punishments by opting for culturally resonant penalties. 
Deflective sanctions in rural areas such as chindapusa are valued as being: 'a 
primary solution‘ that nips socio-cultural practices in the bud, which the state 
is finding problematic; ‗inherently deterrent‘ because subjects hardly oppose 
Chiefs and poor people would rather comply with bylaws than face local 
sanctions; ‗transformative‘ because perpetrators would rather take a second 
chance and reform locally than eventually face harsh legislative penalties; and 
‗filling legal gaps‘ where some harmful practices are not clearly penalised by 
legislation. 
 Customarisation (of women’s protection) 
Through ‗customarisation‘, Chiefs lead their rural communities in a process of 
introspective and negotiated retracing and filtering of their customary norms, 
beliefs and values in order to strengthen the protection of women and girls in 
cultural spaces. Thus, by rejecting ‗handed down‘ traditions, the ‗customary‘ 
is troubleshooting its own culture by customising tradition and adopting 
values that reflect human rights and legislative norms. This is being done 
through village-based sanctions; establishing mechanisms of dealing with 
defiant perpetrators or potential resistance to the bylaws; and 
institutionalising women’s protection mechanisms within the structure of 
Senior Chief/TA.  
 Simplification  
In horizontal vernacularisation, simplification as a strategy of framing human 
rights ideas is 'done by locals for locals‘. The community bylaws use local 




boards‘ to simplify and communicate human rights and development ideas in 
ways that are persuasive to both literate and illiterate subjects without 
necessarily using human rights language. The study communities have not 
only used simplification to conceptualise their bylaws, they have also 
knowingly or reflexively established human rights as local practice.  
 Socialising 
There is a dual occurrence of translation of human rights norms in the 
practice of community bylaws: through Chief-to-Chief interaction, and at 
sectoral level (e.g. between Ministries of Gender and Local Government). 
Thus, in horizontal vernacularisation, the ‗socialiser‘ and ‗socialisee‘ are 
local/grassroots players, and the ‗socialiser‘ seod not have to be 
transnationally savvy. Chief-to-Chief socialisation is experiential, whereby the 
socialisers (Chiefs) showcase vivid changes that community bylaws have 
triggered in their areas, in turn inspiring socialised Chiefs to lead cultural 
changes in their own communities. However, at sectoral level, the thesis has 
shown that the ‗socialiser‘ and the ‗socialisee‘ may have different priorities 
and this could delay the pace of appropriation of human rights interventions 
by the ‗socialisee‘.  
 Augmentation 
Augmentation concretises the appropriation and translation of human rights 
in community bylaws. This is seen when NGOs and other ‗experts‘ (from the 
police, court and social welfare) visibly participate in the process of 
formulating community bylaws, and influence legislative/human rights 
considerations in the bylaws, e.g. by providing human rights training to those 
who are involved in formulating the community bylaws; and/or by making 
human rights presentations that help to fine-tune bylaws.  
Augmentation also influences the language of the community bylaws when 




legal soundness‘ of draft bylaws, and suggest changes. One challenge with 
augmentation is that NGOs may claim credit for the formulation of bylaws in 
an area, say for funding purposes. 
 Reverse augmentation 
Reverse augmentation has occurred when Chiefs and their community 
bylaws have influenced/strengthened national level human rights 
programming within the Ministry of Gender. For example, the Ministry has 
officially adopted the community bylaw model as a strategy for addressing 
harmful practices. This is most evident in the National Strategy on Ending 
Child Marriage (2018-2023). Some NGOs have promoted the community 
bylaws concept in their project areas.  
 Hybridisation 
Hybridisation (mixing the ‗local‘ and the  ‗exotic‘) is visible through the 
written texts of the community bylaws; adding signatures of Magistrates to 
bylaws (to symbolise ‗legal validity‘); distributing copies of bylaws to various 
formal institutions; and using concepts that are found in formal law such as 
‗Community Parliament', 'Community Speaker‘, and ‗bylaws‘.  
b)  The vernacularisers 
Unlike in conventional vernacularisation discourse, whereby first-level 
vernacularisers are epistemic outsiders, and second-level vernacularisers are 
sometimes locals who have been trained by first-level vernacularisers (to 
fulfill a vernacularisation agenda in a local community), horizontal 
vernacularisation exhibits a strong presence of ‗inside‘/community first-level 
vernacularisers. These may act alone or interact with other human rights 
players/platforms. Thus, in horizontal vernacularisation, vernacularisers are 
both native insiders and epistemic outsiders. Second, the thesis has 




discussed below, are also identifiable in ‗vernacularisation‘ discourse, while 
the rest are unique to ‗horizontal vernacularisation‘. 
 Converters 
The thesis has shown that vernacularisation scholarship describes ‗converters‘ 
as those who persuade their clients to start appreciating their challenges from 
a human rights context. NGOs and state officials play this role in the 
community bylaws phenomenon when they are involved in some stages of 
formulating community bylaws. Agencies such as UN Women are softly 
playing the role of converter by working with selected Chiefs. Though 
important, converters do not determine whether or not community bylaws 
should be adopted, but they mostly help to spice the community bylaws with 
human rights flavor (augmentation). 
 Crusaders 
Senior Chiefs are the first set and primary crusaders that imagine, initiate and 
lead efforts that convince other local decision makers about the need for 
paradigm shifts in local culture. They rope in lower cadres of Chiefs/ADCs as 
secondary crusaders in the crusade to address harmful cultural practices 
through community bylaws. As crusaders, the Senior Chiefs can also be 
vendors of international ideas, taking good ideas they have encountered from 
human rights platforms to their communities.  
The second set of crusaders is NGOs, the Ministry of Gender and donors who, 
operating at national level, have seen the community bylaws momentum as 
an opportunity for localising the implementation of gender-related statutes. 
These actors convene high-level meetings for Chiefs; agitate for the adoption 
of a ‗one bylaw framework‘ to be used by Chiefs and District Councils in 
formulating bylaws that promote specific gender equality standards; and 





Magistrates and sometimes lawyers (as ‘experts‘ engaged by NGOs) and the 
Ministry of Gender (supported by donors) serve as grafters who identify local 
perspectives that should be dropped in order for other perspectives to be 
grafted onto community bylaws in order to ‗align‘ the bylaws with legislation 
and human rights standards. At community level, ‗experts‘ vet draft versions 
of community bylaws and make changes as appropriate. As noted above, the 
Ministry of Gender and donors are (controversially) promoting a ‗one bylaws 
framework‘, which, if approved, would graft onto community bylaws various 
pieces of legislation aimed at promoting women‘s and children‘s rights. The 
thesis has noted that national grafters can negatively affect norm 
internalisation and legal pluralism by imposing universal provisions, thereby 
diluting the contextual and problem-driven character of community bylaws.  
 Troopers 
The thesis has argued that troopers conduct continuous purposeful 
investigations and awareness-raising and quicken others, particularly in sites 
where harmful practices are likely to be committed, to follow the community 
bylaws. Troopers are lower cadres of Chiefs who take information to 
initiation camps and community gatherings, such as funerals. Troopers are 
also special women/community groups who are designated to physically 
withdraw children from marriages, stop the celebration of child marriages, 
alert the Chiefs about impeding child marriages, and conduct one-on-one 
sensitisations with perpetrators/potential perpetrators.  
 Connectors 
The thesis has shown that connectors strategically play the role of connecting 
communities that are formulating bylaws to different players that have 
sectoral or other expertise in order to improve the quality of the community 




bring in government officials from other sectors that are relevant to the 
objectives of the bylaws. NGOs also connect lawyers, Magistrates, and other 
relevant government officials to the process. Some of these players, 
particularly those at area level, may continue to support the implementation 
of the community bylaws after adoption. This makes translation continuous, 
as there is regular reflection about how the bylaws are promoting human 
rights. 
       c)   From vertical to horizontal vernacularisation 
Therefore, applying the model of vernacularisation as the analytical 
framework, the thesis has demonstrated that the appropriation and 
translation of international human rights norms in the community bylaws 
phenomenon is not simply occurring as ‗vernacularisation‘, but as ‗horizontal 
vernacularisation‘. This is because human rights appropriation and 
translation in the community bylaws phenomenon is blurry and 
unconventional as the bylaws sprout in a continuum of interlocking, 
convoluted, iterative, and intuitive processes within a predominantly local-
local dialogue (although other human rights programmes or actors may get 
involved at some point). Thus, horizontal vernacularisation acknowledges 
that vernacularisation happens bicamerally, whereby ‗the local‘ can be one 
source of vernacularisation in addition to the other typically known source 
whereby vernacularisation is driven by external programmes and actors.   
10.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
10.3.1 Policy Recommendations 
The thesis has demonstrated that the first thing that needs to be clarified is 
whether these community rules should be called ‗bylaws.‘ The use of this 
legal term of art poses technical challenges for efforts to address child 




‗community laws‘ is less controversial and could better describe the status of 
these laws in the context of a plural legal system. The Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development could promote the use of this less 
controversial legal term through its work with Chiefs. Alternatively, since the 
community bylaws could easily translate into valid formal law by processing 
them under the Local Government Act, NGOs should support Chiefs that are 
keen to take this route in order to protect their bylaws from potential legal 
challenges. 
Malawi has no clear policy on the use of community bylaws in rural 
communities. Instead of loosely welcoming the use of these bylaws, 
government officials and lawmakers need to engage in a discussion regarding 
how they should utilise the community bylaws to measure national gender 
equality indicators, especially through decentralisation structures. This would 
make the bylaws relevant not only as a cultural mechanism, but also as a 
device for achieving overarching policies such as the MGDS III and its 
successors. By the same token, since the thesis has exposed the power that 
Senior Chiefs hold in concretely supporting the government’s socio-economic 
objectives, government could capitalise on this local asset by supporting 
Chiefs with information and problem identification skills, and letting them 
drive community laws even in other sectors (e.g. issues of population control, 
and environment).  
While some oversight of the bylaws is necessary to reinforce transparency 
and human rights compliance, the state’s oversight strategies should not stifle 
the autonomy and agency of the communities in responding to their most 
pressing cultural challenges. This means that universal frameworks such as 
the ‘one bylaw framework ’should not be imposed on communities since the 
community bylaws derive their usefulness from having grassroots legitimacy. 
Government should be mindful that a District Council book of bylaws that 




rationale behind, and the usability of community bylaws, and should tread 
strategically if it is adamant to introduce the framework.  
The thesis accepts that within the discourse of horizontal vernacularisation, 
some Chiefs have been persuaded to adopt community bylaws after being 
exposed to various human rights platforms and learning visits where they 
have socialised with other Chiefs who are advanced in implementing 
community bylaws. National strategies that are seeking to utilise community 
bylaws as a mechanism for addressing child marriage and other gender 
inequalities should capitalise on these strategies, particularly ensuring that 
Chiefs who are illiterate or have basic literacy are not left behind.  
10.3.2  Recommendations for Future Research   
      a)   Research on community bylaws 
The thesis has contributed to academic scholarship by: empirically 
positioning community bylaws and highlighting the activist role of Chiefs in 
harmful practices; applying norm internalisation/vernacularisation theories 
to grassroots and Chief-led community bylaws; and proposing ‗horizontal 
vernacularisation‘ as a new concept that explains events in community 
bylaws that cannot be clarified by existing understandings of 
‗vernacularisation‘. However, since community bylaws for promoting 
women‘s rights are an acutely understudied area, the findings of the thesis 
call for further studies to strengthen scholarship. 
The thesis has only accounted for the ‗emergence and conceptualisation‘ of 
community bylaws on child marriage and harmful practices. There is need for 
further interrogation of the effectiveness of these bylaws in order to have 
tangible evidence of the potential that the community bylaws have in 
eliminating child marriage and other harmful practices. Second, beyond the 




many other issues (such as transport, education, health, sanitation, disability, 
and environment). The way these other bylaws are emerging and being 
conceptualised need to be understood too, particularly from a gender 
perspective.  
While the thesis has argued that horizontal vernacularisation is at play in the 
practice of community bylaws, there is the need for another study to test if the 
same conclusion would apply to communities where their bylaws are not 
working well. These could be areas where they have bylaws that were 
adopted due to NGO projects and initiatives, and yet TAs or Senior Chiefs are 
not seriously championing the implementation of such bylaws. 
Districts such as Mangochi and Dedza have adopted District Council bylaws 
related to gender equality that apply universally to the whole district. A study 
could be conducted to understand how these community bylaws are working 
in different TA areas. The implementation of these District Council bylaws 
could also be compared to community bylaws that are purely driven by 
Senior Chiefs/TAs outside District Council mechanisms.  
Recognising that community bylaws on child marriage and other harmful 
practices are not only mushrooming in rural Malawi, there is a need to 
understand how similar community laws work in other countries in the 
SADC region. Lastly, further studies could apply other analytical frameworks 
in order to better understand the phenomenon of community bylaws. Such 
other models include legal pluralism, modernity, restorative justice, 
governance, dispute resolution, cultural movement and gender theories. 
       b)   Other research 
The thesis provokes the question: if communities are relying on their own 
bylaws to address child marriage and other harmful practices despite the 




practice? Therefore, there is need for more research to understand how the 
measures prescribed by each piece of gender-related legislation in Malawi has 
worked in practice, and use the findings to shape policy and legislation. 
For those interested in studying the agency of chiefs in greater detail, they 
could explore questions such as: what happens to chiefs if they do not 
sanction violence against women? Does the chiefdom suffer? What about 
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Annexure 1: Interview Protocol: Traditional Authorities 
 [To be administered in Chichewa] 
1. Explain to me about community bylaws in general in this area: what issues do 
community bylaws cover?  What form are they in? How are they negotiated, how 
are they adopted? 
2. I am interested in harmful practices: 
 Are you aware of any harmful practices? 
 What kind of practices may be harmful here?   
 What is the best way to deal with harmful practices? 
 Why is it necessary to deal with harmful practices anyway, if at all? 
3. How have you regulated harmful practices before? 
Probe: Considering how you and your Chiefs have ordinarily used customary laws to 
resolve problems, where would you say the community bylaws fit? If they are not 
embedded in any ‘legal’ ordering, can they have impact? 
4. Tell me about the first time you ever heard about the phenomenon of the 
community bylaws to address harmful practices, and what has been your 
approach for your TA area to have these community bylaws?  
Probe: What necessitated the introduction of the community bylaws despite the 
existing practices? Who is really pushing for these community bylaws and why? Did the 
enactment of national legislation have anything to do with your community bylaws? 
What about human rights consciousness? Does each Group Village Head (GVH) have 
community bylaws – are they uniform across GVHs or not? 
5. Reflecting on your earlier account of how the community makes its community 
bylaws in general, how are you personally involved? Who has been involved? At 
what stage? And why?  
Probe: How have women been involved? How are women’s voices given serious 
consideration? How are the community bylaws adopted? How are they communicated 
to the community? 
6. What are your expectations regarding what goes into the community bylaws?  
Probe: Do you have any expectations about the type of language that should be used and 
the issues that should be included in the community bylaws? How do you ensure that 
your expectations are met? Who has a final say about the content and language in the 
community bylaws? Is adherence to human rights language or legally correct language 




7. What is the goal of the community bylaws – is it (a) to simply modify some 
practices (which ones and why?) or to (b) completely eliminated practices (which 
ones and why?). Why is the community taking these different approaches? 
Probe: Are there any other practices that are harmful but have not gone into the 
community bylaws? Why? How should such practices be addressed? 
8. Tell me how the bylaws are sitting with gender equality laws and the 
Constitution. For example, the Gender Equality Act (GEA) says ‗outlaw all 
harmful practices and fine/arrest perpetrators.‘ The inheritance law says the 
same about property dispossession. With the community bylaws, how will the 
GEA, for example, have teeth in practice? (or aren‘t the community bylaws 
sabotaging the intents of state laws in practice?). 
Probe: What are the risks that community bylaws will grow apart from the gender 
equality laws and the Constitution? Can a victim obtain a remedy? What takes 
precedence between state law and the community bylaws (for example in the community, 
are the community bylaws regarded as laws of first instance before a victim has recourse 
to state law)? 
9. What do you think the communities feel about these community bylaws? Do 
they obey/support them? 
10.  Some people may say: ‗projects/government are just pushing TAs to adopt these 
community bylaws but it is doubtful if the TAs really believe in these community 
bylaws, and whether the community bylaws will endure beyond projects; most Chiefs, 
especially Group Village Heads and Group Village Heads are just being compelled to go 
along with the community bylaws; and the community bylaws are not even being taken 
seriously as law on the ground…’ Where are such sentiments wrong or right?   
Annexure 2: Interview Protocol: Group Village Headpersons and Village 
Headpersons 
[To be administered in Chichewa] 
1. Explain to me about community bylaws in general in this area: what issues do 
community bylaws cover?  What form are they in? How are they negotiated, how 
are they adopted? 
2. I am interested in harmful practices against women and girls: 
 Are you aware of any harmful practices? 
 What kind of practices may be harmful here?  
 What is the best way to deal with harmful practices?  
 Why is it necessary to deal with harmful practices anyway, if at all? 




Probe: What are these community bylaws superseding? If you had rules in place why 
didn't you develop them further instead of introducing the community bylaws?  
4. What do you know/understand about the community bylaws to eliminate 
harmful practices in this area and how/why they have emerged?  
Probe: When did they emerge? Are these Group Village Head specific community bylaws 
or for the whole TA? Did the enactment of national legislation have anything to do with 
the community bylaws? What about human rights consciousness? What role have you 
played/do you have relating to these community bylaws? Who else has been involved at 
what stage and why? How have women been involved? How are women’s voices given 
serious consideration? How are the community bylaws adopted? How are they 
communicated to the community? 
5. What are your expectations regarding what goes into the community bylaws?  
Probe: Do you have any expectations about the type of language that should be used and 
the issues that should be included in the community bylaws? How do you ensure that 
your expectations are met? Who has a final say about the content and language in the 
community bylaws? Is adherence to human rights language or legally correct language 
important in this process? Why? 
6. What is the goal of the community bylaws – is it (a) to simply modify some 
practices (which ones and why?) or (b) to completely eliminate practices (which 
ones and why?). Why is the community taking these different approaches? 
Probe: Are there any other practices that are harmful but have not gone into the 
community bylaws? Why? How should such practices be addressed? 
7. Tell me how the bylaws are sitting with gender equality laws and the 
Constitution. For example, the Gender Equality Act (GEA) says ‗outlaw all 
harmful practices and fine/arrest perpetrators.‘ The inheritance law says the 
same about property dispossession. With the community bylaws, how will the 
GEA, for example, have teeth in practice? (or aren‘t the community bylaws 
sabotaging the intents of state laws in practice?) 
Probe: What are the risks that community bylaws will grow apart from the gender 
equality laws and the Constitution? Can a victim obtain a remedy? What takes 
precedence between state law and the Community bylaws (for example in the community, 
are the community bylaws regarded as laws of first instance before a victim has recourse 
to state law)? 
8. What do you think the communities feel about these community bylaws? Do 
they obey/support them? 
9. Considering how you have ordinarily used customary laws to resolve problems, 
what is your opinion on how the community bylaws sit with customary law? 
Probe: have the community bylaws made things easy or difficult? 
10. Some people may be sceptical about whether this is real law, or about the whole 




Probe: do you really believe in these community bylaws? Are they even seen as real law 
here? Do you think there is shared enthusiasm towards the community bylaws amongst 
Chiefs in the area (or community members)? What do you think about what the TA is 
doing? Who is really pushing for these community bylaws – insiders or outsiders? 
Annexure 3: Interview Protocol: Local Women 
[To be administered in Chichewa] 
1. I am interested in harmful practices: 
 Are you aware of any harmful practices? 
 What kind of practices may be harmful here?  
 What is the best way to deal with harmful practices? 
 Why is it necessary to deal with harmful practices anyway, if at all? 
2. Do you know about the community bylaws for addressing harmful practices 
affecting women and children that exist in your area?   
     Probe: How did you know about the community bylaws? How are women involved in the 
formulation processes? Are women involved in commenting on any drafts? Are they 
involved in the implementation process? Which groups of women?  
3. Do the community bylaws represent women‘s concerns about harmful practices? 
      Probe: Are there any other practices that are harmful but have not gone into the 
community bylaws? Why? How should such practices be addressed? Did you/women 
have any expectations about language and issues that should go into the community 
bylaws when they were being formulated? How did you/women identify this language or 
the issues? Were you/women exposed to the Constitution, gender equality laws or 
human rights laws in order to inform your ideas – if yes, how did this process unfold and 
at what stage? 
4. Do the community bylaws represent your values regarding how harmful 
practices should be addressed? 
     Probe: How do the community bylaws sit with customary law in general, and your 
opinion of how customary issues should be handled in particular?  
5. Do women accept the community bylaws as real law?  
    Probe: Are women keen to use the community bylaws? Do you have examples of women 
that have used the community bylaws? Do you really believe in these community bylaws? 
Are they generally seen as real law here? Do you think there is shared enthusiasm towards 
the community bylaws amongst Chiefs in the area (or community members)? What do you 
think about what the TA is doing? Who is really pushing for these community bylaws? 
6. Does it bother you that there is a risk that the community bylaws, may replace 
state law seeking to protect women from harmful practices (when the intention of 




7. In practice, do you think the community bylaws protecting women? What are the 
opportunities and obstacles of the community bylaws? 
 
 
Annexure 4: Interview Protocol: Government Sectors & District Level 
Officials 
1. Tell me about work that has been going on at national level to promote 
community bylaws as a means of addressing harmful practices affecting women 
and girls, and your opinion about these efforts. 
2. Why do you think there is national interest in the community bylaws at this point 
in time? Who is leading this work at national level? What is your sector‘s role? 
3. Since when has your sector been involved in pushing for the community bylaws? 
What you are trying to achieve? 
Probe: What exact role are you playing; who are your main allies? What kind of harmful 
practices have you been particularly interested in? Why these practices and not others? 
What has motivated you to support community bylaws initiatives – e.g. have any 
legislative/human rights developments got anything to do with your interest?  
4. Is there a chance that through these community bylaws, the government is/may 
be seen as imposing/driving foreign solutions/norms that are remote to the rural 
people?  
Probe: How are the community bylaws expected to work/working in these rural 
communities considering that the communities already have their own customary laws? 
How is the government pitching human rights and gender equality issues in these 
community bylaws? How are the human rights issues that the sector is interested in 
being unpacked so as to make sense to the people as ‘community problem?’ 
5. What types of efforts have you taken to facilitate stakeholder ‗buy-in‘ whether at 
district or national levels? 
Probe: Which structures have you worked with? What methods have you used to engage 
them? How do you facilitate/get involved in the process?  
6. As government, you are supposed to be enforcing state law. Tell me how these 
community bylaws relate to state law (the Constitution and gender statutes), if at 
all, especially considering that state law has more stringent measures than most 
of the community bylaws? 
Probe: Are the community bylaws valid law? Are they enforceable in a court of law – if 
yes under what frameworks (state vs customary law)? What are the chances that the 
community bylaws are promoting principles/ideas that are inconsistent with state law 




7. Tell me your opinion about these community bylaws: One would look at these 
community bylaws projects and think: ‗community bylaws have just become a 
rhetorical buzz word for many donor projects and there’s a slim chance that community 
bylaws will endure beyond projects; communities are just adopting community bylaws 
because they are being told/lobbied to do so by outsiders; most Chiefs, especially Group 
Village Heads and Village Heads are just being compelled to go along with the 
community bylaws but have little interest to implement them; the community bylaws 
may not even being taken seriously as ‘law’ on the ground; …’ Where are these 
sentiments wrong or right? 
8. Is government considering introducing (a) enabling legal measures for the 
community bylaws or (b) legal controls for the community bylaws? 
Annexure 5:  Interview Protocol: Law Making Institutions 
1. I am interested in harmful practices: 
 Are you aware of any harmful practices? 
 What is the best way to deal with harmful practices? 
2. Tell me what you know about what is going on to promote community bylaws as 
a means of addressing harmful practices affecting women and girls.1646 
Probe: why do you think there’s national interest in the community bylaws at this point 
in time? Have the community bylaws (as a potential legal solutions) ever come up in any 
discussions/context during your law-making functions? 
3. With the existence of statutory law to address harmful practices, why do you 
think some actors/communities are resorting to the community bylaws instead? 
Probe: Is this an indicator that statutory law is working well/not working well or 
something else? Do you think the community bylaws have higher potential to address 
harmful practices compared to state law? 
4. What do you think is the impact of the community bylaws on the aspirations of 
the state to promote human rights and gender equality norms according to 
international human rights standards?  
Probe: Do you think the community bylaws are upholding or lowering these standards? 
5. What is your opinion about how the community bylaws fit into the rule of law 
scheme in Malawi?  
Probe: How do you think that the community bylaws are interacting with customary 
law? Do you think the community bylaws are law – if not in the context of state law, then 
                                               
1646 Or if the interviewee has no knowledge, I may have to introduce the community bylaws 
by saying that ‗several communities in rural Malawi are formulating the so called 
‗community bylaws‘ as a means of eliminating harmful practices. In these community 
bylaws, the communities generate a list of prohibited harmful practices and sanctions for 
perpetrators. Chiefs have the mandate to enforce these ‗laws.‘ Mostly, the community bylaws 




in the context of legal pluralism? What are the challenges and opportunities that the 
community bylaws have for the rule of law? Is there room for community bylaws to 
neatly fit into the rule of law? 
For Parliament only: 
6. How does Parliament view these community bylaws? Probe: Is Parliament 
considering introducing legal controls? Or is it considering introducing enabling legal 
measures for the community bylaws? 
Annexure 6: Interview Protocol: NGOs 
1. Tell me about work that has been going on at national level to promote 
community bylaws as a means of addressing harmful practices affecting women 
and girls, and your opinion about these efforts. 
Probe: why do you think there’s national interest in the community bylaws at this point 
in time? Who is leading this work at national level? What is your organisation’s role? 
2. In the areas where you work, what existing practices were there to 
regulate/address harmful practices before the community bylaws came in? 
Probe: If something existed already, why is it that you couldn't just work with it or build 
on it instead of introducing the community bylaws? 
3. Please explain the projects in which your organisation has been using community 
bylaws as a means of addressing harmful practices.  
Probe: What kind of harmful practices have you been addressing in your project areas and 
why? What has influenced your attention on some harmful practices and not others? 
What is the main objective of the community bylaws in your project area, i.e. is it to (a) 
modify, (b) completely eliminate harmful practices? What determines the approach that 
you take? What has influenced the choice of community bylaws as an intervention 
compared to other interventions you may have tried? i.e. have any legislative/human 
rights development got anything to do with your interest?  
4. When you work in an area that is adopting community bylaws, what is your 
project strategy/the process of adopting the community bylaws like from the 
start to finish? 
Probe: which structures do you use as the entry point? how do you engage them? how do 
you facilitate/get involved in the formulation process? How do women participate? Have 
you encountered stakeholders or community members who have expressed reservations to 
the community bylaws? How exactly are the three tiers of Chiefs (TA, Group Village 
Head and Village Head) involved, and at what stages? During and after formulation, 
what ways are used to communicate the community bylaws ideas to the community? 
How are the community bylaws implemented? How are women involved in the 
implementation? 
5. What role do you play in the selection of content and/or language for the 




Probe: Do you have any expectations about language issues and how the community 
bylaws should be generally framed? How do you ensure that your expectations are met? 
Is human rights/legal knowledge imparted to the framers (and how)? Is adherence to 
human rights language or legally correct language important in this process (why)?  
6. Tell me how the bylaws are sitting with gender equality laws and the 
Constitution. For example, the Gender Equality Act (GEA) says ‗outlaw all 
harmful practices and fine/arrest perpetrators.‘ The inheritance law says the 
same about property dispossession. With the community bylaws, how will the 
GEA, for example, have teeth in practice? (Or aren‘t the community bylaws 
sabotaging the intents of state laws in practice?) 
Probe: What are the risks that community bylaws will grow apart from the gender 
equality laws and the Constitution? Can a victim obtain a remedy? What takes 
precedence between state law and the community bylaws (for example in the community, 
are the community bylaws regarded as laws of first instance before a victim has recourse 
to state law)? 
7. What is your opinion on how the community bylaws sit with customary law?  
8. Tell me your opinion about these community bylaws: One would look at these 
community bylaws projects and think: ‗community bylaws have just become a 
rhetorical buzz word for many donor projects and there is a slim chance that community 
bylaws will endure beyond projects; communities are just adopting community bylaws 
because they are being told/lobbied to do so by outsiders; most Chiefs, especially Group 
Village Heads and Village Heads are just being compelled to go along with the 
community bylaws but have little interest to implement them; the community bylaws 
may not even being taken seriously as ‘law’ on the ground…‘ Where are these 
sentiments wrong or right? 
Annexure 7: Interview Protocol: Donors 
1. Tell me about work that has been going on at national level to promote 
community bylaws as a means of addressing harmful practices and your opinion 
about these efforts. 
Probe: why do you think there’s national interest in the community bylaws at this point 
in time? Who is leading this work at national level? What is your organisation’s role? 
2. Tell me about the community bylaws projects that you have funded over the 
years and what you are trying to achieve.  
Probe: What kind of harmful practices have the projects been addressing? Why these 
practices and not others? What has motivated you to support community bylaws 
initiatives – e.g. have any legislative/human rights developments got anything to do with 
your interest?  
3. Do you see the community bylaws as a community driven effort to address 




Probe: Is there a chance that through these community bylaws, the donors are/may be 
seen as imposing/driving foreign solutions/norms that are remote to the rural people? 
How are the community bylaws expected to work/ or are working in these rural 
communities considering that the communities already have their own customary laws? 
How are human rights and gender equality issues being promoted as ‘community 
problems’ in ways that make sense to the people? 
4. Give me examples of community bylaws projects that you have funded that have 
(a) successfully and (b) unsuccessfully implemented community bylaws? Why 
have these different results come about?  
Probe: how do you measure the success of your community bylaws projects? How have 
various actors played a role in the success/lack of success? 
5. What types of efforts have you taken to facilitate stakeholder ‗buy-in‘ into your 
community bylaws projects whether at district or national levels? 
Probe: which structures have you worked with? What methods have you used to engage 
them? How do you facilitate/get involved in the process?  
6. Tell me how the bylaws are sitting with gender equality laws and the 
Constitution. For example, the Gender Equality Act (GEA) says ‗outlaw all 
harmful practices and fine/arrest perpetrators.‘ The inheritance law says the 
same about property dispossession. With the community bylaws, how will the 
GEA, for example, have teeth in practice? (Or aren‘t the community bylaws 
sabotaging the intents of state laws in practice?) 
Probe: What are the risks that community bylaws will grow apart from the gender 
equality laws and the Constitution? Can a victim obtain a remedy? What takes 
precedence between state law and the community bylaws (for example in the community, 
are the community bylaws regarded as laws of first instance before a victim has recourse 
to state law)? 
7. What is your opinion on how the community bylaws sit with customary law?  
8. Tell me your opinion about these community bylaws: One would look at these 
community bylaws projects and think: ‗community bylaws have just become a 
rhetorical buzz word for many donor projects and there is a slim chance that community 
bylaws will endure beyond projects; communities are just adopting community bylaws 
because they are being told/lobbied to do so by outsiders; most Chiefs, especially Group 
Village Heads and Village Heads are just being compelled to go along with the 
community bylaws but have little interest to implement them; the community bylaws 
have a weak legal basis and I’m not sure they are even being taken seriously as law on the 
ground; …’ Where are such sentiments wrong or right?
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